(a)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection, whenever any person, having no record of prior criminal conviction, whose fingerprints, photograph and physical description are filed with the State Police Bureau of Identification in accordance with section
29-12 has been found not guilty of the offense charged, or has had such charge dismissed or nolled, such person's fingerprints, photograph and physical description and other identification data, and all copies and duplicates thereof, shall be returned to such person not later than sixty days after the finding of not guilty or after such dismissal or in the case of a nolle within sixty days after thirteen months of such nolle.
(2) Whenever any person, having no record of prior criminal conviction, whose fingerprints, photograph and physical description and other identification data have been filed and stored in an electronic format, has been found not guilty of the offense charged, or has had such charge dismissed or nolled, such electronically stored images and data shall be permanently deleted and any paper copy of such fingerprints, photograph and physical description and other identification data, and all copies and duplicates thereof, shall be destroyed not later than sixty days after the finding of not guilty or after such dismissal or in the case of a nolle within sixty days after thirteen months of such nolle.
(b) Any person having no record of prior criminal conviction whose fingerprints and pictures are so filed, who has been found not guilty of the offense charged or has had such charge dismissed or nolled prior to October 1, 1974, may, upon application to the person charged with the retention and control of such identification data at the State Police Bureau of Identification, have his fingerprints, pictures and description and other identification data and all copies and duplicates thereof, returned to him not later than sixty days after the filing of such application provided in the case of a nolle, such nolle shall have occurred thirteen months prior to filing of such application.
(1949 Rev., S. 3657; 1949, S. 1988d; P.A. 74-163, S. 4; P.A. 75-567, S. 72, 80; P.A. 78-200, S. 5; P.A. 06-111, S. 3; P.A. 07-6, S. 2; P.A. 08-9, S. 3.)
History: P.A. 74-163 rephrased previous provisions for clarity, adding reference to dismissed charges and added Subsec. (b); P.A. 75-567 made technical change, adding “when” after date in Subsec. (a); P.A. 78-200 substituted persons “charged with retention and control of such identification data” at bureau of identification for clerk of the court; P.A. 06-111 amended Subsec. (a) to designate existing provisions as Subdiv. (1) and replace “pictures” with “photograph”, add references to “physical description” and make technical changes therein, and to add new provision re electronic storage as Subdiv. (2), effective July 1, 2006; P.A. 07-6 made technical changes in Subsec. (a); P.A. 08-9 made a technical change in Subsec. (a)(1), effective April 29, 2008.
Fingerprints, pictures and descriptions and other identification data regulated by statute are not among records whose disclosure is governed by Sec. 54-142a. 192 C. 488. Cited. 237 C. 501.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
12
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1984–2025 · leading case:
State v. West, 472 A.2d 775 (Conn. 1984).
State v. West, 472 A.2d 775 (Conn. 1984).
· cites it 12× “Under General Statutes § 29-15, 5 a person whose arrest has not led to a conviction has the right to have returned to him identifying data such as fingerprints and pictures, if he had no prior criminal record.”
DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987).
· cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 29-15(3) (1984). The facts in this case require us to determine whether the word "person" in the Wrongful Death Act includes a viable fetus.”
State v. Anonymous, 680 A.2d 956 (Conn. 1996).
· cites it 3× “2d 775 (1984); and the return of identifying data, such as fingerprints, pictures, and descriptions, which is governed by General Statutes § 29-15. That statute provides for the return of such items to the defendant in a dismissed criminal action provided that the defendant has…”
In Re the Est. of Lunsford, 610 S.E.2d 366 (N.C. 2005).
“C.G.S. § 29-15(3) (2003). If both parents survive the child under such circumstances, the child’s estate is divided equally between them.”
Evans v. Diaz, 430 S.E.2d 244 (N.C. 1993).
“C.G.S. § 29-15(3) (1984), and solely entitled to *776 any recovery which would be realized in a wrongful death action brought on account of her son’s death, N.”
Locust v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 571 S.E.2d 668 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 29-15 (2001). As all of the wrongful death benefits would have been distributable to Brenda Tyson had she not abandoned Lester Tyson, there is no percentage share Lester Tyson's siblings could claim as remaining beneficiaries to keep the wrongful death action alive.”
Hales v. Thompson, 432 S.E.2d 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
“The testimony of Donald’s mother during plaintiff’s offer of proof as to the evidence concerning Donald’s leukemia tends to establish that Donald’s battle with leukemia drew Donald and his parents closer together, caused them to spend more time together, and increased their…”
State v. Gilmore, 409 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 1991).
“C.G.S. § 29-15(3) (1984). The defendant argues that because of the weakness of the evidence against him, this testimony by the members of the victim’s family was crucial and it was prejudicial error not to give the requested instruction.”
State v. Weber, 896 A.2d 153 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004).
· cites it 2× “” In West , the court held that identification data regulated by General Statutes § 29-15 are not among records *534 whose disclosure is governed by § 54-142a.”
State v. Sharpe (Concurrence & Dissent) (Conn. 2025).
· cites it 5× “’’ General Statutes § 29-15 (a) (1). That same stat- ute requires that any fingerprints or other identifying information in digital form shall be ‘‘permanently deleted’’ and, in physical form, ‘‘destroyed .”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-15(3) — 5 cases
DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987).
“C.G.S. § 29-15(3) (1984). The facts in this case require us to determine whether the word "person" in the Wrongful Death Act includes a viable fetus.”
In Re the Est. of Lunsford, 610 S.E.2d 366 (N.C. 2005).
“C.G.S. § 29-15(3) (2003). If both parents survive the child under such circumstances, the child’s estate is divided equally between them.”
Evans v. Diaz, 430 S.E.2d 244 (N.C. 1993).
“C.G.S. § 29-15(3) (1984), and solely entitled to *776 any recovery which would be realized in a wrongful death action brought on account of her son’s death, N.”
Hales v. Thompson, 432 S.E.2d 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
“The testimony of Donald’s mother during plaintiff’s offer of proof as to the evidence concerning Donald’s leukemia tends to establish that Donald’s battle with leukemia drew Donald and his parents closer together, caused them to spend more time together, and increased their…”
State v. Gilmore, 409 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 1991).
“C.G.S. § 29-15(3) (1984). The defendant argues that because of the weakness of the evidence against him, this testimony by the members of the victim’s family was crucial and it was prejudicial error not to give the requested instruction.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-15(4) — 1 case
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