Connecticut General Statutes
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-722 (2026)
Demand
✓ current as of May 2026
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No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) A written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and (2) ninety days have expired from the date delivery of the demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the ninety-day period.
(P.A. 94-186, S. 77, 215; P.A. 11-147, S. 16.)
History: P.A. 94-186 effective January 1, 1997; P.A. 11-147 amended Subdiv. (2) to replace “the date the demand was made” with “the date delivery of the demand was made”.
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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5
cases, 1997–2015 · leading case: Stutz v. Shepard, 901 A.2d 33 (Conn. 2006).
Stutz v. Shepard, 901 A.2d 33 (Conn. 2006). “l court, the court improperly denied his application to vacate because the arbitrator committed clear error by: (1) *118 reducing the plaintiffs attorney’s fees by 60 percent due to the lack of novelty and complexity of the shareholder derivative suit brought by the plaintiff;…”
Beckworth ex rel. Disc. Trophy & Co. v. Bizier, 138 F. Supp. 3d 144 (D. Conn. 2015). “Conn. Gen. Stat. § 33-722 . Section 33-722 is part of the Connecticut Business Corporation Act ( Conn.”
MBIA Inc. v. Fed. Ins., 652 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2011). “Then, after one of three events, the shareholder may commence a derivative suit: (1) the passing of ninety days without any action by the corporation, (2) notification that the shareholder’s demand is rejected, or (3) a showing that irreparable injury would follow if the court…”
Frank v. LoVetere, 363 F. Supp. 2d 327 (D. Conn. 2005). “On February 10, 2003, plaintiffs sent Reflexite a formal demand letter pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 33-722 requesting that the Board investigate and remedy the failure to provide the requested information; the letter also demanded an investigation into allegations…”
Boland v. Engle, 113 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1997). “See Conn.Gen.Stat. § 33-722; Fla.Stat. ch. 607.”
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