Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-44b (2026)

Judicial construction of Connecticut Antitrust Act

✓ current as of May 2026

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It is the intent of the General Assembly that in construing sections 35-24 to 35-46, inclusive, the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the federal courts to federal antitrust statutes.

(P.A. 92-248, S. 2.)

Cited. 235 C. 1. Sec. 35-35 must be interpreted consistently with relevant provisions of federal case law. 260 C. 59. This section does not deprive the state of standing to pursue a parens patriae action for antitrust damages to its general economy pursuant to Sec. 35-32(c)(2) because this section does not incorporate the federal preclusion of general economy damages into the state antitrust scheme. 286 C. 454. To have standing to bring a claim under the antitrust act, a plaintiff must adequately plead both that it has suffered an antitrust injury and that it is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust act, thus a claim that a plaintiff has failed to allege an antitrust injury or that it has failed to allege that it is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws implicates the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction and should be raised by way of a motion to dismiss. 333 C. 672.

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Notes of Decisions

Cited in 20 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1995–2024 · leading case: Miller's Pond Co., LLC v. City of New London, 873 A.2d 965 (Conn. 2005).

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Miller's Pond Co., LLC v. City of New London, 873 A.2d 965 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 87× “, when those activities are "specifically directed or required by a statute of this state, or of the United States," to the facts of the present case; and (2) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because there are unresolved factual issues about the definition of…”

Vacco v. Microsoft Corp., 793 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 2002). · cites it 14× “Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 , as amended, the statute on which § 35-35 is modeled, provides in relevant part that “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district…”

State v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, Inc., 944 A.2d 315 (Conn. 2008). · cites it 20× “The trial court, sua sponte, raised the issue of its subject matter jurisdiction, namely, whether the state had standing to seek damages to its general economy under § 35-32 (c) (2). Specifically, the trial court noted that the state’s authority to pursue general economic…”

Reserve Realty, LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC, 165 A.3d 162 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). · cites it 6× “17 Furthermore, the plaintiffs contend that General Statutes § 35-44b 18 grants this court the authority to analyze the validity of Hossan-Maxwell, Inc.”

Tremont Pub. Advisors, LLC v. Connecticut Resources Recovery Auth., 333 Conn. 672 (Conn. 2019). · cites it 4× “t injury, but, because the failure to allege an antitrust injury implicates the plaintiff’s standing and, thus, a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss rather than its motion to strike: this court relied on…”

Cheryl Terry Enter., Ltd. v. City of Hartford, 854 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 4× “are operated for the mutual benefit of the members thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or both of the following requirements: (i) That no member of the association is allowed more than one vote because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein,…”

Housatonic R.R. v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 21 A.3d 759 (Conn. 2011). · cites it 3× “Accordingly, and as confirmed by this legislative intent, because the plaintiff is not included in the term "taxpayer," it is not governed by the appeal provision set forth in § 12-597, and its claim is beyond the contemplation of the petroleum tax chapter.”

Westport Taxi Serv., Inc. v. Westport Transit Dist., 664 A.2d 719 (Conn. 1995). · cites it 2× “We note that in 1992, the legislature explicitly incorporated into law its intent that the judiciary be guided by interpretations of federal antitrust statutes when it enacted No.”

Journal Publ'g Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1097 (Conn. 2002). · cites it 2× “General Statutes § 35-44b provides: “It is the intent of the General Assembly that in construing sections 35-24 to 35-46, inclusive, the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the federal courts to federal antitrust statutes.”

Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 1 A.3d 21 (Conn. 2010). · cites it 3× “17 ; see also General Statutes § 35-44b. Nevertheless, we may disregard federal precedent when the statutes at issue differ materially in their terms.”

Roncari Dev. Co. v. GMG Enter., Inc., 718 A.2d 1025 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). · cites it 3× “92-248, which is now codified at General Statutes § 35-44b. Section 35-44b provides as follows: “It is the intent of the General Assembly that in construing *421 sections 35-24 to 35-46, inclusive, the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the federal…”

Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 32 A.3d 296 (Conn. 2011). · cites it 2× “Furthermore, General Statutes § 35-44b provides that, in construing the antitrust act, “the courts of this state shall be guided by interpretations given by the federal courts to federal antitrust statutes.”

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