(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section
4-165b, no claim shall be presented under this chapter but within one year after it accrues. Claims for injury to person or damage to property shall be deemed to accrue on the date when the damage or injury is sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, provided no claim shall be presented more than three years from the date of the act or event complained of.
(b) The General Assembly may, by special act, authorize a person to present a claim to the Office of the Claims Commissioner after the time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this section have expired if it deems such authorization to be just and equitable and makes an express finding that such authorization is supported by compelling equitable circumstances and would serve a public purpose. Such finding shall not be subject to review by the Superior Court.
(c) No claim cognizable by the Office of the Claims Commissioner shall be presented against the state except under the provisions of this chapter. Except as provided in section 4-156, no claim once considered by the Office of the Claims Commissioner, by the General Assembly or in a judicial proceeding shall again be presented against the state in any manner.
(1959, P.A. 685, S. 23; P.A. 75-605, S. 5, 27; P.A. 90-284, S. 3; P.A. 16-127, S. 7.)
History: P.A. 75-605 replaced commission on claims with claims commissioner; P.A. 90-284 inserted new Subsec. (b) re the authority of the general assembly to permit a person to present a claim after the expiration of the time limitations of Subsec. (a), and relettered former Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c); P.A. 16-127 amended Subsec. (a) by adding reference to Sec. 4-165b and amended Subsecs. (b) and (c) by substituting “Office of the Claims Commissioner” for “Claims Commissioner”, effective June 9, 2016.
Cited. 186 C. 300; 211 C. 199; 216 C. 85; 240 C. 246.
Cited. 36 CS 271; 45 CS 136.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 189 C. 550; 213 C. 13. Correct legal standard by which to evaluate timeliness of causes of action in negligence restated; limitation period for actions in negligence begins to run on date when injury is first discovered or in exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered. 268 C. 723.
Cited. 28 CA 175.
Cited. 36 CS 273.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 204 C. 17; 212 C. 415, 421.
Although a special act passed by General Assembly under Subsec. will undoubtedly confer a direct benefit on a particular claimant, court has found a public purpose if act remedies an injustice done to that individual for which the state itself bears responsibility. 150 CA 237.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
35
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1965–2024 · leading case:
Chotkowski v. State, 690 A.2d 368 (Conn. 1997).
Chotkowski v. State, 690 A.2d 368 (Conn. 1997).
· cites it 74× “91-8 is constitutional, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs action because the claim that he filed with the claims commissioner was barred by both General Statutes § 4-142 [15] and General Statutes § 4-148 (c). [16] Finally, the state maintains that even if…”
Lagassey v. State, 846 A.2d 831 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 40× “The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that her claim against the state, alleging medical malpractice in connection with her husband’s death, had been untimely presented under General Statutes § 4-148. 2 We agree and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment…”
Merly v. State, 558 A.2d 977 (Conn. 1989).
· cites it 18× “21, § 1, 1 which excused the failure of the estate to present its claim to the claims commissioner within one year *201 after it had accrued, as required by General Statutes § 4-148 (a), 2 violates the prohibition in article first, § l 3 of our state constitution against any…”
Kelly v. Univ. of Connecticut Health Ctr., 963 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 22× “The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) his claim against the state, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent in connection with his surgery for kidney stones and chronic kidney dys *248 function, had been presented untimely…”
Kinney v. State, 941 A.2d 907 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 18× “The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the special act under which the legislature had extended the time limitation under General Statutes § 4-148 2 to bring her claim against the state; Special Acts 1994, No.”
184 Windsor Avenue, LLC. v. State, 875 A.2d 498 (Conn. 2005).
· cites it 8× “In response, the state claims that the trial court properly granted its motion to dismiss because: (1) there was no legislative intent impliedly to waive the state’s sovereign immunity; (2) the facts pleaded do not support a claim of taking, but merely breach of contract; (3)…”
State v. Avoletta, 212 Conn. App. 309 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022).
· cites it 38× “Because the defendants’ claim was not timely filed within the one year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 4-148 (a),3 the commissioner dis- missed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Doe v. State, 579 A.2d 37 (Conn. 1990).
· cites it 7× “8 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the plaintiffs had not timely filed their claim in accordance with General Statutes § 4-148. On December 21,1987, the claims commissioner rejected the defendants’ argument, and granted the plaintiffs permission to sue…”
Duprey v. Connecticut Dep't of Motor Vehs., 191 F.R.D. 329 (D. Conn. 2000).
· cites it 8× “Additionally, defendant asserts that, to the extent that this Court certifies a class, the class should be limited to individuals who purchased parking placards within one year of the filing of this action, because all other claims are time-barred by Connecticut’s one-year…”
Doe v. Heintz, 526 A.2d 1318 (Conn. 1987).
· cites it 4× “General Statutes §§ 4-148 (b), 4-160. The claim of the plaintiffs for attorneys’ fees incurred in obtaining necessary health related benefits erroneously denied to them by state officials falls within the jurisdiction of the claims commissioner, as set forth in § 4-142, to “hear…”
Chotkowski v. State, 566 A.2d 419 (Conn. 1989).
· cites it 8× “” It is undisputed that, when the plaintiff first presented his notice of claim to the commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 4-147, 4 no award was made because the claim was barred by the one year limitation for present *16 ing claims against the state prescribed by…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-148(a) — 3 cases
Duprey v. Connecticut Dep't of Motor Vehs., 191 F.R.D. 329 (D. Conn. 2000).
“Additionally, defendant asserts that, to the extent that this Court certifies a class, the class should be limited to individuals who purchased parking placards within one year of the filing of this action, because all other claims are time-barred by Connecticut’s one-year…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.