Conn. Gen. Stat. » Title 47 — LAND AND LAND TITLES · Chapter 822 — Easements and Restrictions
Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47-38 (2026)

Mode of preventing acquisition

✓ current as of May 2026
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The owner of land over which a right-of-way or other easement is claimed or used may give notice in writing, to the person claiming or using the privilege, of his intention to dispute the right-of-way or other easement and to prevent the other party from acquiring the right; and the notice, being served and recorded as provided in sections 47-39 and 47-40, shall be deemed an interruption of the use and shall prevent the acquiring of a right thereto by the continuance of the use for any length of time thereafter.

(1949 Rev., S. 7131; P.A. 79-602, S. 57.)

History: P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording but made no substantive changes.

Cited. 140 C. 370; 142 C. 296; 143 C. 40. Trial court properly determined that boundary line agreement did not constitute notice of intent to prevent airport defendant from acquiring an easement and, therefore, did not prevent airport defendants from acquiring a prescriptive easement in the land trust properties. 275 C. 105. None of defendant's actions, including the posting of “no trespassing” signs, was sufficient to interrupt plaintiff's continuous use of property. 296 C. 43.

Cited. 40 CS 272.

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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1959–2024 · leading case: Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 881 A.2d 937 (Conn. 2005).
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Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 881 A.2d 937 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 10× “urt improperly determined that the airport defendants had a prescriptive easement because: (1) the airport defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing the scope of the easement; and (2) the existence of a boundary line agreement between the predecessors in title to…”
Crandall v. Gould, 711 A.2d 682 (Conn. 1998). · cites it 12× “General Statutes § 47-38 provides in relevant part that “[t]he owner of land over which a right-of-way or other easement is claimed or used may give notice in writing, to the person claiming or using the privilege, of his intention to dispute the right-of-way or other easement…”
Walters v. Servidio, 227 Conn. App. 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2024). · cites it 4× “The court found that those affidavits of fact were legally defective because the affiants had no ownership inter- est in any of the land over which an easement was claimed and because General Statutes § 47-38 permits only the owner of land over which an easement is being claimed…”
Blow v. Konetchy, 946 A.2d 943 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). · cites it 4× “” Subsequently, he filed a notice affecting title to the land under General Statutes § 47-38. 3 Although the plaintiff had an easement, which granted him the use of the driveway as a right-of-way, the plaintiff had parked his vehicles on the driveway and left them there when he…”
Frech v. Piontkowski, 994 A.2d 84 (Conn. 2010). · cites it 4× “This finding is consistent with General Statutes § 47-38, which provides: “The owner of land over which a right-of-way or other easement is claimed or used may give notice in writing, to the person claiming or using the privilege, of his intention to dispute the right-of-way or…”
Faught v. Edgewood Corners, Inc., 772 A.2d 1142 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001). · cites it 2× “” General Statutes § 47-38 provides: “The owner of land over which a right-of-way or other easement is claimed or used may give notice in writing, to the person claiming or using the privilege, of his intention to dispute the right-of-way or other easement and to prevent the…”
Bowen v. Serksnas, 997 A.2d 573 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010). · cites it 2× “7 Both of these affidavits were filed in response to a notice to prevent claim of easement, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 47-38 and 47-39, filed by Elinor DeRenne on January 14, 1980.”
DiSorbo v. Grand Assocs. One Ltd. P'ship, 512 A.2d 940 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986). · cites it 2× “The plaintiff and her husband simply used the driveway and crossover as they wished.”
Andrzejczyk v. Advo Sys., Inc., 151 A.2d 881 (Conn. 1959). · cites it 2× “After the defendant took title, it razed the building on its land and built a fence along the boundary line between the two properties. This fence prevented the use of the driveway and precipitated the present action, the writ in which is dated June 18, 1957.”
Toms v. Settipane, 317 A.2d 467 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973). · cites it 2× “” Apparently the claim asserted is based on the action of the plaintiff in filing the second affidavit of the Lymans and also a notice under General Statutes § 47-38 for the purpose of preventing the defendants from acquiring any prescriptive rights over her property.”
Fogg v. Wakelee, 492 A.2d 843 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1983). “On February 17,1979, the defendant had served on the plaintiffs notice, pursuant to §§ 47-38 and 47-39 of the General Statutes, that he intended to dispute and *279 was disputing any claim on the part of the plaintiffs as to any proprietary interest in land at his eastern…”
Smith Brook Farms, Inc. v. Wall, 725 A.2d 1003 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997). · cites it 6× “On August 23, 1994, the defendant filed a notice in the Glastonbury land records of his dispute of any right-of-way across his premises by the plaintiff pursuant to General Statutes § 47-38 et seq. Despite this notice and various obstacles placed on the paths, the plaintiff…”
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