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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 48 — Eminent DomainChapter 835 — Eminent Domain

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 48-12 (2025)

Procedure for condemning land

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1961–2010 23citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 23 opinions since 1961. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

The procedure for condemning land or other property for any of the purposes specified in sections 48-3, 48-6, 48-8 and 48-9, if those desiring to take such property cannot agree with the owner upon the amount to be paid him for any property thus taken, shall be as follows: The Comptroller in the name of the state, any town, municipal corporation or school district, or the trustees or directors of any state institution in the name of the state, shall proceed in the same manner specified for redevelopment agencies in accordance with sections 8-128, 8-129, 8-129a, 8-130, 8-131, 8-132, 8-132a and 8-133.

(1949 Rev., S. 7181; 1959, P.A. 152, S. 65; 1961, P.A. 413; 1967, P.A. 808, S. 1; 1972, P.A. 294, S. 34.)

History: 1959 act applied provisions to municipal corporations, deleted references to county commissioners and counties, county government having been abolished by the act, added reference to Sec. 48-6 and deleted reference to repealed Sec. 48-2; 1961 act authorized state referee to rule on condemnation of land; 1967 act deleted detailed provisions re procedure for condemnation of land, requiring instead that procedure shall be that “specified for redevelopment agencies in accordance with sections 8-128, 8-129, 8-130, 8-131, 8-132, 8-132a and 8-133”; 1972 act deleted reference to condemnation of land or property for purposes of Sec. 48-4, the section having been repealed.

See Sec. 27-45 re state's authority to take land for purpose of locating permanent armories.

Necessity of finding a failure to agree. 69 C. 438; 72 C. 492; 80 C. 38; 85 C. 604; 86 C. 658. Injunction to restrain taking of land till compensation is made. 70 C. 616; 82 C. 157. Interest on award. 72 C. 277; 75 C. 239; 82 C. 51; Id., 379; 84 C. 122; 85 C. 552; 95 C. 6, 9; 108 C. 370. When motion to dismiss application lies. 72 C. 692. Proceedings before appraisers and on report. 74 C. 452; 75 C. 237; 76 C. 565; 79 C. 526; Id., 606; 80 C. 38; 82 C. 460; 92 C. 32. Appeal from appointment of appraisers. 75 C. 237; Id., 325; 78 C. 1; 85 C. 663. When judgment accepting report not to direct payment of damages. 75 C. 239. Just compensation. Id., 239; 76 C. 435; 82 C. 378; Id., 460; 92 C. 33. When application may be made to judge. 85 C. 602. Power of legislature to delegate determination of necessity to subordinate bodies. 86 C. 157; 100 C. 411. Necessity means a reasonable necessity. 86 C. 361. Notice of application; should describe property with certainty. Id.; 113 C. 655. Prayer for relief. 87 C. 199. All legal requirements must be complied with, and such compliance must appear on face of papers. 92 C. 435; 95 C. 3. Not necessary to include separate tracts of land in one petition if direct damage to one and consequential damage to the other. Id., 381. What costs should be allowed. 100 C. 412. Assessment of damages by subdivision of municipality; limited scope of section. Id., 606; Id., 408; 109 C. 632. Interest runs from time land is actually appropriated, not from time condemnation proceedings are instituted. 108 C. 370. Cited. 116 C. 124; 124 C. 32; 137 C. 443. Inability to agree is a condition precedent to relief under statute. 138 C. 82. Cited. Id., 372. Proper to consider existence of going business on land as indicative of highest economic use to which land may be put. 139 C. 73. Cited. 141 C. 135. Damage must be peculiar to land in connection with which it is claimed and not damage which is suffered by landowners in general. 145 C. 196. Cited. 146 C. 55. Question as to when a taking is complete is one of substantive law and depends upon the law of each state; under section, petitioner is not entitled to possession of the land before the amount of the judgment has been paid or deposited with the State Treasurer unless permission has been granted under Sec. 48-16 to enter into possession pending the condemnation proceedings. 148 C. 47. Court found that where negotiations with one co-owner fail, there is no necessity for further negotiations with the owner. 151 C. 633. Cited. 153 C. 292. Adequate remedy at law is here provided; parties not entitled to seek injunction or other equitable relief. 154 C. 446. Eminent domain cases are referred to referees by special statutory provision, so consent of parties is not required. 164 C. 360. Court found 6-month time period specified in Sec. 48-6 to apply and not the reasonableness time standard of Sec. 8-128 in case involving condemnation of land by a town. 256 C. 557.

Cited. 23 CA 554; 32 CA 611.

County commissioner must bring condemnation proceedings in the name of the county. 6 CS 142. Cited. 9 CS 317. Report of committee recommitted when it set forth the interest each party had in the property and made no finding of each in the award. Id., 484. Section expressly recognizes the right of a town to withdraw the proceedings even after possession of the property has been turned over. 16 CS 230. Condemnation proceedings can be instituted only by those on whom the requisite authority has been conferred by the legislature; such authority is strictly construed in favor of the owner of the property taken and against the condemnor; a municipality does not have the power of eminent domain which is vested in a parking authority. 19 CS 47. Cited. 20 CS 422.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 48-12 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENAvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Town of Orange, 775 A.2d 284 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 48-12 9×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“) We therefore turn to General Statutes § 48-12, 20 which provides in relevant part: “The procedure for condemning land .”
The case’s holding
Courts use federal fair housing law interpretations as guidance when analyzing state law housing discrimination claims despite differences between the statutes.
Later courts cite it for
“in addressing claims brought under both federal and state housing laws, we are guided by the cases interpreting federal fair housing laws; 42 u.s.c. 3601 through 3631; despite differences between the state and federal statutes.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 48-12 10×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“5 When the term “condemnation” is understood to mean the acquisition of property, it is accompanied by the phrase “by right of eminent domain” to distinguish the concept from condemnation for the purpose of declaring a building unfit for human habitation.”
The case’s holding
A finding of contractual intent regarding an ambiguous provision is a factual question that is reversed only if clearly erroneous.
Later courts cite it for
“although ordinarily the question of contract interpretation, being a question of the parties' intent, is a question of fact ... when there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their ... commitments is a question of law over which our review is plenary.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENSimmons v. State, 280 A.2d 351 (Conn. 1971).
cites § 48-12 22×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“The land is located in East Granby, and was condemned pursuant to § 48-12 of the General Statutes as amended by Public Acts 1967, No.”
The case’s holding
The authority to condemn is strictly construed in favor of the owner and the prescribed method of taking must be strictly pursued.
Later courts cite it for
“the authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor, and the prescribed method of taking must be strictly pursued.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENTown of Darien v. Est. of D'Addario, 784 A.2d 337 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 48-12 5×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“” General Statutes § 48-12 provides: “The procedure for condemning land or other property for any of the purposes specified in sections 48-3, 48-6, 48-8 and 48-9, if those desiring to take such property cannot agree with the owner upon the amount to be paid him for any property…”
Later courts cite it for
“because this court certainly is capable of determining, particularly when the facts are undisputed, whether the case is now moot as a result of the events that transpired while the appeal was pending” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENTown of Branford v. Barbara, 988 A.2d 221 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 48-12 4×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“See General Statutes § 48-6 (a) (any municipal corporation purchasing real property for its municipal purposes shall, if it cannot agree with owner regarding amount to be paid for property taken, proceed in accordance with General Statutes § 48-12); General Statutes § 48-12…”
6
GREENGold v. Town of East Haddam, 966 A.2d 684 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 48-12 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“oses which has, in accordance with its charter or the general statutes, voted to purchase the same shall have power to take or acquire such real property, within the corporate limits of such municipal corporation, and if such municipal corporation cannot agree with any owner…”
7
GREENTown of Trumbull v. Ehrsam, 166 A.2d 844 (Conn. 1961).
cites § 48-12 6×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“The parties were unable to agree on a price; in August, the plaintiff filed its petition to condemn the property, following the procedure outlined in § 48-12 of the General Statutes. Under the provisions of § 48-16, the plaintiff *50 obtained permission from tbe court to enter…”
8
GREENEisenberg v. Tuchman, 892 A.2d 1016 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 48-12 3×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“” We note that General Statutes § 48-12 describes the procedure for governmental condemnation of land, “if those desiring to take such property cannot agree with the owner upon the amount to be paid him for any property thus taken,” and includes a reference to § 48-6.”
9
GREENPowers v. Ulichny, 440 A.2d 885 (Conn. 1981).
cites § 48-12 2×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“In case such municipality or municipalities cannot agree with such owner upon the amount of such compensation, the amount shall be determined in the manner prescribed in section 48-12. An appeal from the amount so determined shall not act as a stay of the taking of such land,…”
The case’s holding
Obtaining a permanent injunction against an airport hazard is the functional equivalent of acquiring an interest in the hazard and requires compliance with statutory acquisition procedures.
Later courts cite it for
“make every effort to construe a statutory scheme as a consistent whole.” · 5 citing courts
10
GREENCrystal Lake Clean Water Pres. Ass'n v. Town of Ellington, 728 A.2d 1145 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
cites § 48-12 3×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“” General Statutes § 48-12 provides: “The procedure for condemning land or other property for any of the purposes specified in sections 48-3, 48-6, 48-8 and 48-9, if those desiring to take such property cannot agree with the owner upon the amount to be paid him for any property…”
11
GREENStocker v. City of Waterbury, 226 A.2d 514 (Conn. 1967).
cites § 48-12 2×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“Finally, the plaintiffs make the claim that they had a choice of remedies and that they could either raise their claims in answers to the condemnation petitions or institute an injunction action.”
The case’s holding
A property owner is entitled to equitable relief to review an agency taking if statutory provisions fail to provide an opportunity to contest the taking (because the owner lacks an adequate remedy at law).
Later courts cite it for
“an injunction is a harsh remedy . . . and when an equitable injunction is the specific relief claimed, it is incumbent upon the party seeking relief to allege facts showing irreparable damage and the lack of an adequate remedy at law.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENCity of Shelton v. Comm'r, 479 A.2d 208 (Conn. 1984).
cites § 48-12 1×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
““(e) Any condemnation proceedings of the authority shall be brought in accordance with section 48-12, except such proceedings shall in all cases be brought before the superior court of the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain.”
The case’s holding
State agency authority preempts municipal authority when local zoning ordinances irreconcilably conflict with state statutes addressing regional matters of statewide concern.
Later courts cite it for
“our constitutional home rule provision . . . prohibits the legislature from encroaching on the local authority to regulate matters of purely local concern, such as the organization of local government or local budgetary policy.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENHall v. Town of Weston, 355 A.2d 79 (Conn. 1974).
cites § 48-12 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“*59 On the facts as found, the court concluded that the defendant complied with General Statutes §§48-6, 48-12, 8-128 5 and 8-129; that the condemnation proceeding was begun in accordance with § 48-12 by the filing of a statement of compensation, lis pendens and service of a…”
14
GREENState v. Cholewinsk, 236 A.2d 339 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1967).
cites § 48-12 5×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“In the acquisition of a site in Bridgeport for a mental health center, the state on March 15, 1967, instituted this action under the provisions of General Statutes §48-12 for the ascertainment of the compensation which should be paid to the named defendant for her property at 68…”
15
GREENTown of Newington v. Est. of Young, 777 A.2d 219 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000).
cites § 48-12 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“General Statutes § 48-12. On December 9, 1998, Ravenswood filed its appeal and application for review of statement of compensation as an aggrieved party under § 8-132.”
16
GREENHalloran v. Town of North Canaan, 630 A.2d 145 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
cites § 48-12 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“which has, in accordance with its charter or the general statutes, voted to purchase the same shall have power to take or acquire such real property, within the corporate limits of such municipal corporation, and if such municipal corporation cannot agree with any owner upon the…”
17
GREENTown of Darien v. Kavookjian, 202 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1964).
cites § 48-12 3×cited by 7 cases
Later courts cite it for
“ijnability to agree with the owner of property sought to be condemned is a condition precedent to condemnation under the statute.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENBridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Council on Water Co., 453 F. Supp. 942 (D. Conn. 1978).
cites § 48-12 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“shall sell the land to the municipality or the state, as the case may be, or, if the parties cannot agree upon the amount to be paid therefor, the municipality or the state may proceed *949 to acquire the land in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 48-12…”
19
REDGold v. Town of East Haddam, 928 A.2d 1234 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 48-12 1×cited by 4 cases
Reversed by Gold v. TOWN OF EAST HADDAM (2009): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 48-12
“oses which has, in accordance with its charter or the general statutes, voted to purchase the same shall have power to take or acquire such real property, within the corporate limits of such municipal corporation, and if such municipal corporation cannot agree with any owner…”
cites § 48-12 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 48-12
“See § 48-12. Their successive appointments by the chief justice are limited to a term of not more than one year.”
Later courts cite it for
“that a state trial referee is not a 'judge of the superior court or the court of common pleas' but is sui generis, sits as a special tribunal, and is not restricted by the terms of 51-29.” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196119852010

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1967. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.13Conn. App. Ct.4Conn. Super. Ct.4D. Conn.1N.C. Ct. App.1
By subsection
(a)1 case
Griffin v. Griffin, 456 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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