Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-183b (2026)

Any judge of the Superior Court and any judge trial referee who has the power to render judgment, who has commenced the trial of any civil cause, shall have power to continue such trial and shall render judgment not later than one hundred and twenty days from the completion date of the trial of such civil cause. The parties may waive the provisions of this section.

(1949 Rev., S. 7706; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 80; 1963, P.A. 209; P.A. 74-183, S. 22, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 55, 681; P.A. 77-576, S. 26, 65; P.A. 81-52; P.A. 83-295, S. 6; P.A. 96-37, S. 7.)

History: 1959 act applied provisions to judges of newly created circuit court; 1963 act removed circuit court judges from purview of previously existing provisions and added provision specifically applicable to circuit court judges; P.A. 74-183 deleted provision requiring that judgment be rendered within 90 days of the conclusion of a civil trial in the circuit court, reflecting transfer of circuit court functions to court of common pleas, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 removed common pleas court judges from purview of section, reflecting transfer of common pleas court functions to superior court, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-576 replaced provision which had allowed continuance of trial and rendering of judgment after expiration of term or session at which trial commenced but required end of trial and judgment before the close of the next term or session with requirement that judgment be rendered not later than 8 months from trial's commencement and added provision allowing parties to waive provisions of section, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-29 transferred to Sec. 51-183b in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 81-52 changed the requirement that judgment be rendered not later than 8 months from the commencement of the trial to not later than 120 days from the completion of the trial; P.A. 83-295 applied provisions to any state trial referee who has the power to render judgment; P.A. 96-37 changed “state trial referee” to “judge trial referee”.

Annotations to former section 51-29:

A court has control over its judgments only during the term in which they are rendered. 47 C. 429; 108 C. 282. A judge has power to retain a case for consideration and decision after the close of the term. 47 C. 579. Amending memo of judgment at subsequent term. 74 C. 23. Violation may be waived. 76 C. 305; 86 C. 560. Violation of section makes judgment erroneous, not void. 97 C. 556. Statute expressly authorizes a judge to finish a trial and render judgment therein at any time prior to the close of the next succeeding term or session. 107 C. 383. Judgment must be rendered and trial ended before close of next term or session. 109 C. 54, but see 123 C. 15. In construing statute as to Superior Court, the word “term” is the equivalent of the word “session”. 109 C. 54. If no timely and appropriate advantage of delay is taken, consent of parties will be assumed. 112 C. 154. Cited. 115 C. 623. Judgment erroneous if not rendered during next session after that at which trial commenced, where no act or omission of the parties constitutes consent, waiver or estoppel. 117 C. 639, 645. When too late for court to render judgment, case may be claimed for trial as though no hearing had been held. 118 C. 418. Cited. 123 C. 583. Lack of jurisdiction after time expires does not pertain to subject matter but to the parties; subsequent filing of pleadings and participation in hearings held waiver. 132 C. 438. Cited. 134 C. 183. A judge must decide a case before the end of the session of court next succeeding the session at which it is tried, and a judgment rendered after that time is erroneous. 139 C. 263. On date of rendering, judgment was valid as in compliance with statute in effect while action was pending. 157 C. 434. Cited. Id., 525; 162 C. 534. Not applicable to state trial referees; prior constructions restated; history. 164 C. 360. Statute applies only to cases tried to the court and not to cases tried to a jury. Id., 554. Judge not continuing a trial to its end before close of next session of circuit court, lost jurisdiction; case properly determined by another judge sitting 15 months later. 168 C. 74. Cited. Id., 560.

Cited. 13 CS 121. Section not applicable to proceedings before state trial referee. 33 CS 560.

Order vacating judgment rendered by circuit court 17 months after completion of trial and ordering new trial was interlocutory and not a final judgment from which appeal lies. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 474, 475.

Annotations to present section:

Civil cause should be construed to encompass administrative appeals. 179 C. 415. Cited. 192 C. 484. Determination of “the completion date” discussed; availability of all elements directly or indirectly to be considered in rendering a decision included. Id., 601. Cited. 194 C. 187; 195 C. 174; 208 C. 21; 213 C. 813; 214 C. 801; 215 C. 435. Initial refusal to consent to late judgment rendered judgment void; judgment of Appellate Court in 20 CA 283 reversed. 215 C. 688. Cited. 220 C. 86; 233 C. 153; 234 C. 1; 237 C. 378. As long as order of trial court is issued within 120 days after completion of trial, order constitutes timely judgment within meaning of statute regardless of whether order is accompanied by memorandum of decision explaining legal and factual basis for order. 243 C. 495. Order of trial court constituted a “judgment” within meaning of section where order resolved the dispute and determined appeal in favor of plaintiff. 246 C. 251. 120 day decision period is stopped by a trial court's order requiring supplemental briefing, and such period is restarted after supplemental arguments are heard, despite a party's refusal to consent to the court's requested extension of the decision period. 330 C. 681.

Cited. 2 CA 689; 3 CA 531; 7 CA 136; 12 CA 702; 20 CA 283; judgment reversed; Id., 425; 21 CA 545; 26 CA 426; 28 CA 745. Does not violate separation of powers provision of Art. II of the Connecticut Constitution (now Art. XVIII of the Amendments to the Connecticut Constitution). 29 CA 157. Cited. 30 CA 204. Absent waiver of provisions of statute, a judgment rendered by a court beyond the time period permitted lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants. 39 CA 635. Cited. 40 CA 89; Id., 374; 44 CA 542; 45 CA 626. Court's order that parties submit their positions on release of judgment lien constituted request for briefs which, when filed, began 120-day period. 72 CA 692. Court, by ordering defendant attorney and Statewide Grievance Committee to appear at a subsequent hearing on the issue of sanctions against defendant, implicitly opened the case, which was within its province within the 120 days after trial's completion. 74 CA 464. Statutory time period runs from completion date of trial, not from time of filing of briefs on motion for judgment of dismissal. 82 CA 483. General Assembly did not intend to include within definition of “trial”, for purposes of the 120-day rule, arguments on motions addressed to whether plaintiff is precluded from an evidentiary hearing or trial because of prior trial on the same or similar issues between the same parties. 88 CA 795. Section does not apply to timeliness of judgment rendered following short calendar proceeding. 95 CA 713. Where court sent notice extending commencement of period to issue decision, express consent by parties not required for extension. 99 CA 367. Completion date of trial was date on which court last heard argument on the issues of liability and damages before it rendered judgment on those issues; court complied with section requirements regarding judgment as to liability and damages that was issued within 120 days from completion date of trial, and regarding subsequent judgment awarding punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs more than 120 days after completion date of trial; as long as trial court decides a case on its merits within 120 days, there is no statutory time limit within which it must decide ancillary issues such as punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs; section not intended to guarantee that a losing party will have a final judgment from which to appeal within 120 days of completion of trial. 121 CA 105. Section is not applicable when a matter is referred to and tried before an attorney fact finder. 124 CA 1. Habeas petitioner's silence before tardy judgment was rendered was not a waiver, and motion to set aside judgment, filed 9 days after judgment was rendered beyond the 120-day time limitation, was a seasonable objection. 125 CA 296. Completion date of trial was the date the court last heard argument on the issues of liability and damages, and the court complied with the 120-day time requirement. Id., 399. Where court requested extension of 120-day requirement from only one party, opposing party did not implicitly waive 120-day requirement through silence or inaction, or assume duty to object to or protest the late judgment. 137 CA 142. 120-day period begins to run from date parties file post-trial briefs or other materials the court finds necessary for a well-reasoned decision. 140 CA 697. Trial court's finding that plaintiff had waived the provisions of section by executing multiple agreements extending the period of time for the court to render judgment was clearly erroneous and voidable when the court ultimately rendered judgment after the date stipulated in the parties' second extension. 144 CA 62. When an extension is unaccompanied by any language of limitation or conditions, it necessarily operates as a waiver, and because defendants consented to an extension of the 120-day time period within which the court was required to issue its decision, and did not set forth any conditions or limitations on the agreed upon extension, the court's determination that they waived the 120-day rule was not clearly erroneous. 163 CA 1.

Cited. 44 CS 312.

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