Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-81h (2025)

Escrow agreement not invalid when attorney-at-law, law firm or agent is escrow holder

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(a) For the purposes of this section:

(1) “Escrow agreement” means a written or oral agreement under which money, documents, instruments or other property is delivered by a party to the agreement or another person to a third party to be held by such third party for delivery or disbursement to another party to the agreement or another person upon the occurrence of an event or condition specified in the agreement.

(2) “Escrow holder” means a third party to whom money, documents, instruments or other property is delivered for subsequent delivery or disbursement in accordance with the escrow agreement.

(b) No escrow agreement shall be ineffective, invalid or unenforceable because the escrow holder is the attorney-at-law, law firm or agent for one or more parties to the escrow agreement, whether in connection with the matter to which the escrow agreement is related or otherwise.

(P.A. 00-74, S. 1, 2.)

History: P.A. 00-74 effective May 16, 2000, and applicable to any escrow agreement in existence on or after that date.

Secs. 51-82 and 51-83. Admission to examination of attorneys admitted to practice in other states. Examination of veterans for admission. Sections 51-82 and 51-83 are repealed.

(1949, S. 3119d; 1957, P.A. 528; 597; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 43; P.A. 82-248, S. 163.)

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases, 1975–2005 · leading case: Collard & Roe, PC v. Klein, 865 A.2d 500 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
Collard & Roe, PC v. Klein, 865 A.2d 500 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 5× “2d 1150 (1999), governs the escrow agreement, not General Statutes § 51-81h. His claim raises an issue of law over which our review is plenary.”
Young v. Young, 781 A.2d 342 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001). · cites it 4× ““Accordingly, judgment for possession of the premises shall enter in favor of the plaintiff on the second count only, the prior right or privilege having been terminated.”
Lublin v. Brown, 362 A.2d 769 (Conn. 1975). “The second ground of the plaintiff’s claim that § 51-81b is unconstitutional is that the statute is *227 an attempt by the legislative department of government to regulate the judicial department and is, accordingly, in violation of article second 4 of the constitution of…”
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