Proof that the operator of a motor vehicle or a motorboat, as defined in section
15-127, was the husband, wife, father, mother, son or daughter of the owner shall raise a presumption that such motor vehicle or motorboat was being operated as a family car or boat within the scope of a general authority from the owner, and shall impose upon the defendant the burden of rebutting such presumption.
(1949 Rev., S. 7904; 1967, P.A. 310.)
History: 1967 act added motorboats to scope of section.
Complaint must allege relationship, but not necessary to allege agency. 117 C. 101. Statute procedural, not substantive. Id., 545. Presumption avails plaintiff until trier finds proven the circumstances re use of car and authority to drive it, whereupon burden is on plaintiff to establish that the car was being operated at the time of accident as a family car. 118 C. 58. Cited. Id., 656; 123 C. 462; 126 C. 587. Presumption compared with those under Secs. 52-114 and 52-183. 130 C. 187, 188. Cited. 132 C. 464. Mere production of evidence by defendant will not suffice to remove presumption created by statute for the court might disbelieve it; it is only when the facts are found that the presumption disappears. 135 C. 428. Conclusion of court that necessary conditions prevailed upheld. 138 C. 506. Doctrine held applicable. Id., 551. Cited. 142 C. 80. Wife can recover from husband because of delict of son who was agent of husband. 145 C. 663. Court below correct in applying family car doctrine, holding defendant liable, although decision in another case held defendant not an owner of the car causing accident; doctrine of collateral estoppel did not apply as plaintiff and defendant were not adversaries in prior case. 154 C. 328. Cited. 155 C. 218, 221; 157 C. 260. Married son living outside family not within scope of family car doctrine. 163 C. 89. Burden on defendant to rebut presumption of family car doctrine. Id., 91. Cited. 176 C. 285; 190 C. 774; 211 C. 555.
Cited. 9 CA 221; 38 CA 852.
Defendant must prove facts sufficient to rebut presumption, not merely introduce evidence. 5 CS 97. Doctrine not applicable to serviceman who, while overseas, loaned car to brother. 14 CS 236. Where father lived in Massachusetts and son in Connecticut, car not regarded as family car. 15 CS 146. In-law relationship does not come within section. 16 CS 195. Presumption avails plaintiff even where defendant driver was operating wife's vehicle on company business for which company was paying for gas and oil. 17 CS 64. Failure of plaintiff to allege agency under family car doctrine not demurrable. Id., 75. Presumption does not arise where driver is son of owner's employee; father and son relationship must be shown between driver and owner. 25 CS 35. Contributory negligence of operator of family car is imputable to plaintiff-owner so as to bar recovery by him for damage to it. 26 CS 387. Negligence of driver of family car is not imputed to owner-occupant and demurrer to defense of imputed negligence should be sustained. 28 CS 90. The purpose of section is to govern procedure, not to affect or create substantive rights. 32 CS 158. Cited. 42 CS 114.
Applies only to cases where plaintiff invokes statute to assist recovery against defendant and not to cases where defendant invokes statute to prevent recovery by plaintiff. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 654. Statute evidences no legislative intent to create a universally applicable vicarious responsibility. Id., 659. An indispensable requisite of the family purpose doctrine is that the person on whom it is sought to impose liability exercise some degree of control over the automobile's use. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 591, 594.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
23
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1963–2024 · leading case:
Cook v. Nye, 518 A.2d 77 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
Cook v. Nye, 518 A.2d 77 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
· cites it 11× “The trial court rendered judgment for each of the plaintiffs against the daughter, and also found the defendant to be jointly and severally liable under the family car doctrine as codified in General Statutes § 52-182. The court further held that the defendant was estopped from…”
Matthiessen v. Vanech, 836 A.2d 394 (Conn. 2003).
· cites it 3× “” Although the plaintiff originally had alleged that Nicholas Vanech was liable under General Statutes § 52-182, the so-called “family car doctrine,” the case ultimately was tried and presented to the jury under § 52-183, and not under § 52-182.”
Nowak v. Nowak, 394 A.2d 716 (Conn. 1978).
· cites it 2× “11 For the purpose of this opinion, we need not reach the question of whether, under these statutes, an instructor may be held criminally liable for misconduct by the operator without regard to the instructor’s own conduct.”
WU CHEN v. Bernadel, 922 A.2d 1142 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
· cites it 6× “On appeal, the defendant 2 claims *660 that the court improperly concluded that he could be held liable for the plaintiffs injuries under the family car doctrine, which has been codified as General Statutes § 52-182, 3 because (1) he was not the owner of the car and exercised no…”
Cima v. Sciaretta, 58 A.3d 345 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013).
· cites it 6× “” Count two alleged that the defendant was vicariously liable for the plaintiffs injuries as the owner of the vehicle that was negligently operated or caused to be operated by his son, citing General Statutes § 52-182. 4 Finally, count three alleged that the defendant was ha-ble…”
Musorofiti v. Vlcek, 783 A.2d 36 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
· cites it 2× “See General Statutes § 52-182. Ralph Vlcek and Judith A.”
Trichilo v. Trichilo, 462 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 1983).
· cites it 2× “*779 General Statutes § 52-183 6 creates a presumption that the operator of a motor vehicle is the “agent and servant of the owner of such motor vehicle and operating the same in the course of his employment, and the defendant shall have the burden of rebutting such presumption.”
Rhode v. Milla, 949 A.2d 1227 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 2× “The plaintiff brought this action against the defendants for economic and noneconomic damages, alleging that her injuries were the result of Milla’s negligent operation of the vehicle, which was imputed to Enamorado pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-182 and 52-183. Prior to…”
Hunt v. Richter, 302 A.2d 117 (Conn. 1972).
· cites it 8× “She made no complaint to the police about her son’s use of her automobile. The three remaining assignments of error, (1) that the court erred in failing to charge as requested, (2) in charging as it did, and (3) in failing to set aside the verdict, are concerned with whether…”
Bebry v. Zanauskas, 841 A.2d 282 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
· cites it 2× “Those facts were material, however, only to the plaintiffs’ claims under the family car doctrine embodied in General Statutes § 52-182 and as to the presumption of agency in General Statutes § 52-183.”
Bolmer v. McKulsky, 812 A.2d 869 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
· cites it 2× “Count two alleged that John McKulsky was the owner of the defendant’s vehicle and, hence, liable under the family car provision of *502 General Statutes § 52-182. Counts three and four alleged recklessness on the part of the defendant, statutory pursuant to General Statutes §…”
Rangel v. Parkhurst, 779 A.2d 1277 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
· cites it 2× “See General Statutes § 52-182. The defendants, therefore, could have no liability under that theory.”
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