(a) In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987, in which it is alleged that such injury or death resulted from the negligence of a health care provider, as defined in section
52-184b, the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider. The prevailing professional standard of care for a given health care provider shall be that level of care, skill and treatment which, in light of all relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably prudent similar health care providers.
(b) If the defendant health care provider is not certified by the appropriate American board as being a specialist, is not trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or does not hold himself out as a specialist, a “similar health care provider” is one who: (1) Is licensed by the appropriate regulatory agency of this state or another state requiring the same or greater qualifications; and (2) is trained and experienced in the same discipline or school of practice and such training and experience shall be as a result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.
(c) If the defendant health care provider is certified by the appropriate American board as a specialist, is trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as a specialist, a “similar health care provider” is one who: (1) Is trained and experienced in the same specialty; and (2) is certified by the appropriate American board in the same specialty; provided if the defendant health care provider is providing treatment or diagnosis for a condition which is not within his specialty, a specialist trained in the treatment or diagnosis for that condition shall be considered a “similar health care provider”.
(d) Any health care provider may testify as an expert in any action if he: (1) Is a “similar health care provider” pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of this section; or (2) is not a similar health care provider pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) of this section but, to the satisfaction of the court, possesses sufficient training, experience and knowledge as a result of practice or teaching in a related field of medicine, so as to be able to provide such expert testimony as to the prevailing professional standard of care in a given field of medicine. Such training, experience or knowledge shall be as a result of the active involvement in the practice or teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the incident giving rise to the claim.
(P.A. 86-338, S. 11; P.A. 87-227, S. 8.)
History: P.A. 87-227 amended Subsec. (a) to change applicability of section from “In any cause of action accruing on or after October 1, 1986, to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death” to “In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death occurring on or after October 1, 1987” and specified that a health care provider is “as defined in section 52-184b”.
Cited. 211 C. 555; 214 C. 1; 215 C. 701; 239 C. 574; 242 C. 1. There is no explicit incorporation of the definition in Sec. 52-184b with reference to a similar health care provider anywhere in this section; this suggests that legislature intended to incorporate the definition only with reference to defendant health care providers and not with reference to similar health care providers. 265 C. 79.
Cited. 34 CA 871; 44 CA 257; 46 CA 391.
Subsec. (a):
In claim for ordinary negligence for failure of health care provider to warn third party, expert testimony required to prove standard of care, breach of that standard and causation of injury. 262 C. 248. Expert testimony establishing standard of care at a particular hospital is relevant only if it comports with an accepted, applicable national standard of care. 289 C. 61.
Subsec. (b):
Absent evidence of specialized training, registered nurses are considered nonspecialists under Subsec. 172 CA 699.
Subsec. (c):
Good faith opinion letter from physician who is board certified in obstetrics and gynecology meets requirements of Subsec. because claims were related to care given by certified nurse-midwives and a registered nurse in same specialty. 314 C. 709.
Plaintiff's author of opinion letter does not fall within definition of “similar health care provider” under section because, unlike defendant physician, the author of the opinion letter is not board certified in emergency medicine. 168 CA 47. Author of plaintiff's opinion letter does not fall within definition of “similar health care provider” under section because, unlike defendant who is an anatomic pathologist, the author of the opinion letter is a clinical pathologist. 187 CA 555.
Subsec. (d):
Does not preclude board-certified physician from testifying as an expert solely because the physician was not board-certified at the time of the alleged malpractice. 262 C. 637.
Subsec. deals with situations where specialties overlap. 77 CA 307. Affords court discretion in determining whether an expert may testify and thus it is possible that expert could qualify to testify at trial under Subsec. but not qualify to provide a prelitigation opinion pursuant to Sec. 52-190a(a). 117 CA 535.
Notes of Decisions
Bennett v. New Milford Hosp., Inc., 12 A.3d 865 (Conn. 2011).
· cites it 60× “05-275), 1 namely: (1) *4 whether a surgeon, who likely would be qualified to testify as an expert witness at the trial of a medical malpractice action against a specialist physician pursuant to subsection (d) of General Statutes § 52-184c, 2 but who is not a “ ‘similar health…”
Grondin v. Curi, 817 A.2d 61 (Conn. 2003).
· cites it 47× “The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that an expert witness, testifying about the applicable standard of care in a medical malpractice action, must be board certified at the time of the alleged malpractice in order to qualify as a “…”
DiLieto v. Cnty. Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp., P.C., 828 A.2d 31 (Conn. 2003).
· cites it 41× “The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court improperly interpreted General Statutes § 52-184c to require the exclusion of the testimony of an expert witness proffered by the plaintiff trustee in bankruptcy, Michael J.”
Bell v. Hosp. of Saint Raphael, 36 A.3d 297 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
· cites it 44× “The plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the opinion letter filed in the present case failed to demonstrate that the author of the letter was a similar health care provider as defined in General Statutes § 52-184c. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”
Neuhaus v. DeCholnoky, 905 A.2d 1135 (Conn. 2006).
· cites it 14× “The plaintiffs claim that sum *194 mary judgment was inappropriate with respect to DeCholnoky because: (1) the Appellate Court improperly redefined the existence and scope of DeCholnoky’s duty to the plaintiffs outside the factual requirements of General Statutes § 52-184c; 3…”
Friedman v. Meriden Orthopaedic Grp., P.C., 861 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 34× “The dispositive issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-184c (d) (2), 1 properly precluded certain *59 portions of the testimony of the plaintiffs expert regarding the prevailing professional standard of care in this medical…”
Bennett v. New Milford Hosp., Inc., 979 A.2d 1066 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 26× “” 4 Lohse claimed that the opinion is not from a similar health care provider as defined in General Statutes § 52-184c because the opinion author is not board certified in emergency medicine and, therefore, fails to comply with the requirements of § 52-190a (a).”
Labissoniere v. Gaylord Hosp., Inc., 185 A.3d 680 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
· cites it 18× “In their respective motions, the defendants argued that because Mayer was board certified in surgery and not internal medicine, he was not a "similar health care provider," as defined in General Statutes § 52-184c, 3 and, therefore, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over…”
Plante v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp., 12 A.3d 885 (Conn. 2011).
· cites it 11× “” 11 Discussing the definition of “ ‘similar health care provider’ ” under General Statutes § 52-184c, 12 *43 which is cross-referenced in § 52-190a (a), the trial court concluded that Williamson was not a board certified physician and, therefore, not a similar health care…”
Doyle v. Aspen Dental of S. CT, PC, 179 A.3d 249 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
· cites it 18× “"Pursuant to [ § 52-184c ], the precise definition of similar health care provider depends on whether the defendant health care provider is certified by the appropriate American board as a specialist, is trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as a…”
Dias v. Grady, 972 A.2d 715 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 10× “See General Statutes § 52-184c (a) (“the claimant shall have the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider represented a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care for that health care provider”); see…”
Torres v. Carrese, 90 A.3d 256 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014).
· cites it 14× “” On November 13,2006, Yaari filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint on the ground that the written opinion letter submitted by the plaintiff was not written by a “similar health care provider,” as defined by General Statutes § 52-184c and as mandated by § 52-190a,…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-184c(a) — 2 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-184c(b) — 2 cases
Doyle v. Aspen Dental of S. CT, PC, 179 A.3d 249 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
“"Pursuant to [ § 52-184c ], the precise definition of similar health care provider depends on whether the defendant health care provider is certified by the appropriate American board as a specialist, is trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as a…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-184c(c) — 2 cases
Doyle v. Aspen Dental of S. CT, PC, 179 A.3d 249 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
“"Pursuant to [ § 52-184c ], the precise definition of similar health care provider depends on whether the defendant health care provider is certified by the appropriate American board as a specialist, is trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as a…”
Labissoniere v. Gaylord Hosp., Inc., 185 A.3d 680 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
“In their respective motions, the defendants argued that because Mayer was board certified in surgery and not internal medicine, he was not a "similar health care provider," as defined in General Statutes § 52-184c, 3 and, therefore, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over…”
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