Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-212a (2026)

Civil judgment or decree opened or set aside within four months only

✓ current as of May 2026

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Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which the notice of judgment or decree was sent. The continuing jurisdiction conferred on the court in preadoptive proceedings pursuant to subsection (o) of section 17a-112 does not confer continuing jurisdiction on the court for purposes of reopening a judgment terminating parental rights. The parties may waive the provisions of this section or otherwise submit to the jurisdiction of the court, provided the filing of an amended petition for termination of parental rights does not constitute a waiver of the provisions of this section or a submission to the jurisdiction of the court to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights.

(P.A. 77-576, S. 28, 65; P.A. 82-160, S. 103; P.A. 93-51; P.A. 98-241, S. 14, 18; P.A. 00-137, S. 16; P.A. 21-104, S. 44.)

History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section; P.A. 93-51 added provisions re reopening of judgments terminating parental rights; P.A. 98-241 changed reference from Subsec. (i) to Subsec. (h) of Sec. 17a-112, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 00-137 changed reference from Subsec. (h) to Subsec. (o) of Sec. 17a-112; P.A. 21-104 replaced “it was rendered or passed” with “the notice of judgment or decree was sent”, effective June 28, 2021.

Judgments obtained by fraud may be attacked at any time. 180 C. 129. A motion to open and vacate a judgment is addressed to the court's discretion. 184 C. 461. Cited. 185 C. 495; 187 C. 509; 191 C. 555; 196 C. 517; Id., 579; 211 C. 648; 214 C. 23; 215 C. 143; 217 C. 394; 223 C. 68; Id., 155. Court held legislature intended provisions of Sec. 17a-112 and this section to coexist so Superior Court has limited jurisdiction to open judgment for termination of parental rights for 4 months after its rendering but not thereafter in absence of waiver or consent. 224 C. 263. Cited. 225 C. 757; Id., 804. Prohibits trial court from entertaining motion to open and modify divorce decree with respect to nondisability military retired or retainer pay; time limitations on opening not preempted by federal law division of military retirement benefits. 226 C. 219. Cited. Id., 831; 228 C. 85; 232 C. 405. Judgment of Appellate Court in 34 CA 462 reversed. Id., 750. Cited. 236 C. 78; 239 C. 375. Section limits trial court's general authority to grant relief from a judgment, but does not limit its personal jurisdiction over the parties. 249 C. 94. Defendant did not prevail on its claim that, in the absence of a finding of contempt, court lacked jurisdiction to enter postjudgment orders after expiration of the 4-month statutory period for opening a judgment; court's continuing jurisdiction to enter orders in vindication of a prior judgment is grounded in its inherent powers and not its contempt powers and exercise of that jurisdiction in this case not barred by availability of appellate remedies. 260 C. 232. Trial court's clarification of injunctive order 7 months after original order and modification was proper because court had continuing jurisdiction due to nature of injunctive order and internal inconsistencies in prior order. 275 C. 420. Order restoring case to docket is immediately appealable when challenged on the basis of court's authority to restore case to the docket in light of the limitation period of section; court has continuing jurisdiction to vacate or modify a protective order after expiration of the 4-month limitation period of section. 276 C. 168. Plain language suggests that when a party files a motion to reargue, which would, if granted, alter substantive rights and duties of the parties, the 4-month limitation is measured from the court's decision on the motion to reargue, as opposed to the initial judgment; because plaintiff filed her motion to set aside summary judgment within 4 months of the trial court's denial of her motion to reargue, the motion to set aside was timely under section. 305 C. 654. Parties submitted to the jurisdiction of court by agreement and trial court acted within its authority in opening the dissolution judgment. 328 C. 376.

Cited. 2 CA 543; 5 CA 417; 8 CA 254; 9 CA 446; 10 CA 160; Id., 669; 11 CA 171; 15 CA 308; 18 CA 166; Id., 589; 19 CA 213; 22 CA 4; Id., 396; Id., 424; 27 CA 755; judgment reversed, see 225 C. 157; 29 CA 465; Id., 482; 32 CA 203; 33 CA 197; 34 CA 419; Id., 641; 36 CA 73. Defendant's filing of pleadings after judgment of dismissal could not have constituted a waiver of the 4-month period for opening judgment of dismissal. 37 CA 56. Cited. Id., 397; 38 CA 340; Id., 745; 39 CA 258; 40 CA 115; Id., 590; Id., 733; 42 CA 119; Id., 409; 44 CA 588; Id., 771; 45 CA 137; Id., 352; 46 CA 54; Id., 614. In absence of fraud, mistake, duress or accident, trial court was without jurisdiction to order rescission of stipulated judgment where request for rescission was made more than 4 months after entry of judgment. 49 CA 203. 4-month limitation period does not apply because the entry of nonsuit was a clerical error. 55 CA 655. Judgment against defendant that was contrary to law shocks the judicial conscience and violates principles of equity, and court's denial of motion to open judgment, although filed more than 4 months after rendition of judgment, perpetuated the injustice. 59 CA 351. Discussion of “otherwise provided by law” provision; failure to file renewed motion to open judgment within 4-month limitation period. 69 CA 349. Because trial court did not make an express finding of mutual mistake, it lacked authority to open the judgment beyond the 4-month period. 78 CA 734. Provisions of section do not operate to strip court of its jurisdiction over its judgments, but merely operate to limit period in which court may exercise its substantive authority to adjudicate merits of a case. 87 CA 735. Clerical error in recorded judgment with respect to amount of deficiency which is inconsistent with actual judgment, may be corrected by trial court at any time, even after expiration of 4-month period set forth in section. 88 CA 592. A judgment rendered may be opened after 4-month limitation if it is shown that judgment was obtained because of mutual mistake. 109 CA 33. As a result of the trial court's original order to “remove” cement blocks being open to different interpretations, it was appropriate for plaintiff to invoke the trial court's continuing jurisdiction to interpret and to effectuate the order with respect to the cement blocks, and that court properly clarified rather than modified the original order. 111 CA 436. Court had authority to open judgment more than 4 months after its entry because plaintiff had by his actions waived right to raise claim under section. 120 CA 459. Trial court permissibly opened judgment and issued corrected memoranda of decision within 4-month time frame permitted by section, and such correction did not support claim that court failed to issue decision within 120 days under Sec. 51-183b. 125 CA 207. Section does not abrogate court's common-law authority to open a judgment beyond the 4-month limitation upon a showing that the judgment was obtained by fraud, duress or mutual mistake; common-law reasons for opening a judgment seek to preserve fairness and equity. 146 CA 214. Trial court had authority to open summary judgment under section, and such motion was not the equivalent of a motion for a new trial or a motion to reargue. 150 CA 842. Section applicable to restoration of a withdrawn case. 154 CA 605. Court had authority to open judgment of dismissal pursuant to this section, rather than Sec. 52-212, where judgment of dismissal was rendered in response to failure of plaintiff's counsel to attend dormancy status conference; section does not require a supporting affidavit. 161 CA 594. Section does not preclude court from granting plaintiff's motion to correct a technical defect in a party's name pursuant to Sec. 52-123 filed beyond four months. 180 CA 461. Four month period for filing motion to open was not tolled by filing of prior appeal and said period had run when motion to open was filed. 180 CA 818. Ineffective assistance of counsel is sufficient to invoke court's equitable authority to open habeas judgment upon motion filed after expiration of four-month limitation period. 223 CA 803.

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Secs. 52-213 and 52-214. Justice of the peace to keep docket, entry fee. Jury in suit before justice of the peace. Sections 52-213 and 52-214 are repealed.

(1949 Rev., S. 7552, 7940; 1959, P.A. 28, S. 204.)

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Notes of Decisions

Cited in 291 cases (46 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case: Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 884 A.2d 981 (Conn. 2005).

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Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 884 A.2d 981 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 109× “Under General Statutes § 52-212a, [1] a civil judgment or decree may not be opened or set aside more than four months after it has been rendered unless the trial court has continuing jurisdiction over the case in which the judgment or decree has been rendered.”

In re Baby Girl B., 618 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1992). · cites it 43× “After consulting with counsel, she filed a motion to open the judgment pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212a 6 and Practice Book § 326 7 on December 16, 1991, four months and sixteen days after the rendering of the judgment terminating her parental rights.”

Kim v. Magnotta, 733 A.2d 809 (Conn. 1999). · cites it 30× “This certified appeal raises issues that are at the crossroads of the remedial provisions of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA); General Statutes §§ 42-110b and 42-llOg; 1 and the four month limitation period for opening judgments contained both in General…”

Broaca v. Broaca, 435 A.2d 1016 (Conn. 1980). · cites it 28× “The plaintiff claims that because the defendant's "Motion to Correct" [1] the judgment was not filed within four months from the date on which judgment was rendered and because the parties did not submit to the jurisdiction of the court, the court was without authority to open…”

Reinke v. Sing, 179 A.3d 769 (Conn. 2018). · cites it 14× “Accordingly, we reverse the Appellate Court's judgment and remand the case to that court for consideration of the merits of the plaintiff's claims.”

Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 825 A.2d 153 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 29× “The Diocese argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the emergency motion because no motion to open or to restore the cases to the docket had been made within four months of the date of withdrawal pursuant to General Statutes § 52-212a. Consequently, no…”

Ruiz v. Victory Props., LLC, 184 A.3d 1254 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 19× “In this appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying a motion to open a summary judgment, we consider the interplay between (1) General Statutes § 52-212a, 1 which places a four month limit on the trial court's inherent authority to open or set aside a judgment; (2) the…”

AvalonBay Communities, Inc. v. Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 796 A.2d 1164 (Conn. 2002). · cites it 12× “General Statutes § 52-212a provides in relevant part: “Unless otherwise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or…”

Sousa v. Sousa, 143 A.3d 578 (Conn. 2016). · cites it 9× “The court quoted General Statutes § 52-212a, which provides in relevant part that ‘a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside is filed within four months following the date on which it was…”

Wren v. MacPherson Interiors, Inc., 794 A.2d 1043 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 18× “First, they claim that their motion was filed within the statutory time frame set forth in General Statutes § 52-212a. Second, they claim that the court has continuing jurisdiction over their renewed motion to open the judgment because the four month limitation contained in §…”

State v. McCoy, 206 A.3d 725 (Conn. 2019). · cites it 8× “In civil cases, General Statutes § 52-212a permits parties to file a motion to open or set aside the judgment within four months from the date of judgment.”

Rome v. Album, 807 A.2d 1017 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 16× “” The court then issued a new order in which the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant $33,000, representing one-half of the amount of the appreciation of the securities account dining the term of the marriage.”

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