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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 52 — Civil ActionsChapter 925 — Statutory Rights of Action and Defenses

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572 (2025)

Parental liability for torts of minors

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1963–2025 48citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 48 opinions since 1963, 4 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (2 cases).

(a) The parent or parents or guardian, other than a temporary guardian appointed pursuant to section 45a-622, of any unemancipated minor or minors, which minor or minors wilfully or maliciously cause damage to any property or injury to any person, or, having taken a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner thereof, cause damage to the motor vehicle, shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor or minors for the damage or injury to an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars, if the minor or minors would have been liable for the damage or injury if they had been adults.

(b) This section shall not be construed to relieve the minor or minors from personal liability for the damage or injury.

(c) The liability provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other liability which may exist at law.

(d) As used in this section, “damage” shall include depriving the owner of his property or motor vehicle or of the use, possession or enjoyment thereof.

(1955, S. 3231d; 1959, P.A. 244; 549; 1969, P.A. 326; 1971, P.A. 314; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 75; P.A. 79-58; P.A. 82-160, S. 236; P.A. 93-26; P.A. 96-202, S. 8.)

History: 1959 acts added provision re taking of motor vehicle without permission and tripled maximum liability; 1969 act raised maximum liability from $750 to $1,500; 1971 act defined “damage” for purposes of section; 1972 act made no change in this section but did generally change age of majority from 21 to 18; P.A. 79-58 raised maximum liability to $3,000; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 93-26 raised maximum liability from $3,000 to $5,000; P.A. 96-202 amended Subsec. (a) to specify inapplicability to temporary guardians appointed pursuant to Sec. 45a-622.

New trial ordered as to second count where, in trial of causes of action alleged in two separate counts of common law negligence against child and his parents, jury returned verdict for plaintiff against child on first count and returned no verdict on second count against parents. 158 C. 553. Damage caused by auto tortiously taken by insured's son and damaged at place away from the insured's premises was not compensable to insured parents under their homeowners insurance policy coverage. 159 C. 252. Cited. 167 C. 499; 183 C. 470; 215 C. 316; 216 C. 29; Id., 563.

Parent is liable only where child himself might be required to respond in damages for his own tort. 20 CS 376. Parents sued for damage “wilfully or maliciously” caused by their child are in the same position with respect to the controlling statute of limitations as the child; cause of action is controlled by 3-year limitation under Sec. 52-577. 24 CS 320. Although child was in technical custody of welfare commissioner, he was sent home to his parents at which time he caused damage to plaintiff's automobile; held father as well as minor was liable. Id., 357. Cited. 33 CS 44. Statute, which imposes on parents of minor liability not to exceed $1,500 for property damage wilfully or maliciously caused by minor, is held constitutional on basis that regulation has rational relationship to preservation and promotion of public welfare. 34 CS 7. Cited. 38 CS 327. Control of minor is a determining factor in imposing liability under statute. 40 CS 185. Cited. 41 CS 367.

Fact that minor was technically in custody of state did not relieve father of liability under statute where son was under control of father. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 378. Cause of action brought under section governed by 3-year limitation set forth in Sec. 52-577. Id., 379. Relief of parental liability. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 672. Cited. Id., 715.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., 152 A.3d 1183 (Conn. 2016).
cites § 52-572 10×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“Foreseeability is only relevant to a defense that the product was not put to a foreseeable use ; see General Statutes § 52-572 l (codifying common-law defense of misuse); Norrie v.”
The case’s holding
Under the Connecticut Product Liability Act, a product is unreasonably dangerous only if it is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would contemplate, and the plaintiff must prove the defect caused the injury.
Later courts cite it for
“a product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user only if it is 'dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.” · 5 citing courts
2
GREENDacruz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 846 A.2d 849 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 52-572 4×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“4 In another count, the plaintiff alleged that Michael Bullock’s parents, Curtis Bullock and Sheila Meadows, were negligent in failing to use reasonable care to control and to restrain their son, and that they were jointly and severally liable under General Statutes § 52-572 5…”
The case’s holding
A declaratory judgment finding an insurer has no duty to defend necessarily establishes that the insurer has no duty to indemnify.
Later courts cite it for
“because the duty to defend is significantly broader than the duty to indemnify, where there is no duty to defend, there is no duty to indemnify.” · 10 citing courts
3
GREENKaminski v. Town of Fairfield, 578 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 52-572 4×cited by 77 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“Correctly, he does not assert that the plaintiffs’ alleged duty of care arises directly out of their parental relationship between the plaintiffs and Joseph. At common law, the torts of children do not impose vicarious liability upon parents qua parents, although parental…”
The case’s holding
A duty to control the behavior of another under the Restatement (Second) of Torts applies to professional custodians with special competence rather than parents of adult children.
Later courts cite it for
“the reported cases that have recognized a duty to control have generally done so in the context of professional custodians with special competence to control the behavior of those in their charge.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENLamb v. Peck, 441 A.2d 14 (Conn. 1981).
cites § 52-572 7×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“On appeal, the defendants 2 challenge the court’s conclusion that the defendants’ action was wilful and malicious within the meaning of General Statutes § 52-572 3 (as it *472 existed in 1975) and its finding that the minor defendants’ action was sufficiently united to support a…”
5
GREENPike v. Bugbee, 974 A.2d 743 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 52-572 8×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the count was legally sufficient because (1) the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff to protect social invitees on their premises from foreseeable harm, (2) the allegations provided a basis for a claim for parental liability…”
6
GREENBarrett Builders v. Miller, 576 A.2d 455 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 52-572 2×cited by 169 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“Moreover, the legislature has also on occasion been explicit in its desire to preserve common law remedies. The parental liability statute, for example, provides that “[t]he liability provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other liability…”
The case’s holding
A contractor cannot recover in quasi contract for home improvements if the written contract fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of the Home Improvement Act.
Later courts cite it for
“it is evident that the objective of the home improvement act is not only to protect homeowners from ct page 4728 substandard work, but also to ensure that homeowners are able to make an informed choice on a decision that has potentially significant financial consequences.” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENSnell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 212 A.3d 646 (Conn. 2019).
cites § 52-572 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“[B]ecause our statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants; see General Statutes § 52-572h ; and because Connecticut is a comparative negligence jurisdiction; General Statutes § 52-572 o ; the simpler and less confusing approach to cases .”
The case’s holding
Causation in negligence has factual and proximate components, both required for recovery; a third party's criminally reckless conduct may be a superseding cause only if the harm falls outside the scope of the risk.
Later courts cite it for
“causation in a negligence action has two components, both of which must be satisfied for the plaintiff to prevail.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENMahon v. B v. Unitron Mfg., Inc., 935 A.2d 1004 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 52-572 2×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“Mercury Marine also claims that, because the plaintiffs’ product liability claims do not implicate our statutory apportionment scheme; see General Statutes § 52-572 (h) (precluding apportionment of damages between parties on any basis other than negligence); we must construe §…”
The case’s holding
A trial court must instruct the jury on the applicable standard of care when evaluating a comparative negligence defense.
Later courts cite it for
“although we are aware that legislative inaction is not necessarily legislative affirmation ... we also presume that the legislature is aware of this court's interpretation of a statute, and that its subsequent nonaction may be understood as a validation of that interpretation.” · 2 citing courts
9
REDSnell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 158 A.3d 787 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 52-572 2×cited by 11 cases
Reversed by Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc. (2019): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 52-572
“The court explained that "because our statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants; see General Statutes § 52-572h ; and because Connecticut is a comparative negligence jurisdiction; General Statutes § 52-572 o ; the simpler and less confusing approach to cases .”
The case’s holding
The doctrine of superseding cause remains applicable in cases where an intervening criminal event occurs that is outside the scope of the risk created by the defendant's negligence.
10
GREENAbreu v. Leone, 968 A.2d 385 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 52-572 2×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“” Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572 (a), the defendant alleged that the department was the legal guardian of Geovanny and was liable for damages for the defendant’s injury in an amount not to exceed $5000.”
The case’s holding
A discovery order is immediately appealable as a final judgment if it terminates a separate and distinct judicial proceeding.
Later courts cite it for
“merely a step along the road to final judgment . . . .” · 1 citing court
11
GREENGearity v. Salvo, 485 A.2d 940 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984).
cites § 52-572 11×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“The second count of the complaint alleges that the defendant Plofkin is an unemancipated minor living with her mother and that, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572, the parents, Richard Plofkin and Barbara Poppa, are responsible for their daughter’s actions.”
cites § 52-572 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“, General Statutes § 37-3a (setting cap on interest rates); General Statutes § 52-572(a) (setting cap on damages for parent of minor tortfeasor).”
13
GREENLaBonte v. Fed. Mut. Ins., 268 A.2d 663 (Conn. 1970).
cites § 52-572 3×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“The second count names the plaintiffs as defendants and alleges that they are jointly and severally liable with Thomas for the damage to the Gagliardi vehicle by virtue of General Statutes § 52-572. No claim is made that the statute cited is not applicable or that the plaintiffs…”
The case’s holding
An insurance policy exclusion for off-premises automobile use bars coverage for statutory vicarious liability arising from such accidents.
Later courts cite it for
“arises if the complaint states a cause of action which appears on its face to be within the terms of the policy coverage.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENUyen Phan v. Delgado, 576 A.2d 603 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990).
cites § 52-572 2×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“*371 It should be noted that Sandra Vera was a defendant in her own right in this case as the mother of the named defendant, Gilberto Delgado, a minor, under General Statutes § 52-572 which imposes liability for the torts of minor children upon their parents.”
The case’s holding
Uncorroborated testimony from a defendant is insufficient to overcome the prima facie evidence of a sheriff's return to invalidate service of process.
Later courts cite it for
“the court must find that there was no service of process and that it acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant which would authorize it to render a valid judgment against him.” · 6 citing courts
15
GREENIn re Sheldon G., 583 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 52-572 2×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“Many judges exercised this discretion to release information necessary to facilitate civil recovery from the child’s parents as permitted by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572 . This discretion was limited by Pub.”
The case’s holding
Nonconsensual disclosure of juvenile records for civil litigation requires a showing of compelling need and the exhaustion of alternative discovery methods.
Later courts cite it for
“to discern the intent of the legislature, we look first to the words of the statute.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENIzzarelli v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2000).
cites § 52-572 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“(“Reynolds”) under the Connecticut Products Liability Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-572 et seq. (“PLA”) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn.”
Later courts cite it for
“cutpa's three-year limitation period is triggered upon the occurrence of the alleged violation, not the discovery of the alleged practice.” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENGen. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Okeke, 189 A.3d 158 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 52-572 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“Finally, Craft argues that the claims against Agatha are covered because they sound in negligence and in parental vicarious liability under General Statutes § 52-572. Parental vicarious liability is covered by an endorsement to the policy.”
Later courts cite it for
“the violent stabbing and beating of craft cannot plausibly be considered anything other than 'physical abuse.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENUnah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984).
cites § 52-572 1×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“2d 648 (1971); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572 (c) (Supp. 1981); Williams v.”
The case’s holding
An unemancipated minor may recover for injuries caused by a parent's negligent operation of a motor vehicle to the extent of the parent's liability insurance coverage.
Later courts cite it for
“brought by a minor child for injuries suffered due to a parent's ordinary negligence.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENAbreu v. Leone, 992 A.2d 331 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
cites § 52-572 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“However, through the process of discovery, it may be determined that [the department] knew, or should have known of the assaultive propensities of the foster child in question, and may indeed be liable to the [defendant] for its failure to act in some fashion.”
20
GREENR.S. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. S. v. Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., 534 F. Supp. 2d 284 (D. Conn. 2008).
cites § 52-572 5×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 52-572
“The court believes that the claims in the Second Count against Mr. M.L. and Mrs. M.L. must be dismissed.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196319942025

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1990. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.14Conn. App. Ct.12D. Conn.12Conn. Super. Ct.6W. Va.29th Cir.1Okla.1
By subsection
(a)2 cases
Corsair Special Situations Fund, L.P. v. Engineered Framing Sys., Inc., 174 A.3d 791 (Conn. 2018).“, General Statutes § 37-3a (setting cap on interest rates); General Statutes § 52-572(a) (setting cap on damages for parent of minor tortfeasor).”
R.S. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. S. v. Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., 534 F. Supp. 2d 284 (D. Conn. 2008).“The court believes that the claims in the Second Count against Mr. M.L. and Mrs. M.L. must be dismissed.”

Show all 48 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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