(a) The parent or parents or guardian, other than a temporary guardian appointed pursuant to section
45a-622, of any unemancipated minor or minors, which minor or minors wilfully or maliciously cause damage to any property or injury to any person, or, having taken a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner thereof, cause damage to the motor vehicle, shall be jointly and severally liable with the minor or minors for the damage or injury to an amount not exceeding five thousand dollars, if the minor or minors would have been liable for the damage or injury if they had been adults.
(b) This section shall not be construed to relieve the minor or minors from personal liability for the damage or injury.
(c) The liability provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other liability which may exist at law.
(d) As used in this section, “damage” shall include depriving the owner of his property or motor vehicle or of the use, possession or enjoyment thereof.
(1955, S. 3231d; 1959, P.A. 244; 549; 1969, P.A. 326; 1971, P.A. 314; 1972, P.A. 127, S. 75; P.A. 79-58; P.A. 82-160, S. 236; P.A. 93-26; P.A. 96-202, S. 8.)
History: 1959 acts added provision re taking of motor vehicle without permission and tripled maximum liability; 1969 act raised maximum liability from $750 to $1,500; 1971 act defined “damage” for purposes of section; 1972 act made no change in this section but did generally change age of majority from 21 to 18; P.A. 79-58 raised maximum liability to $3,000; P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 93-26 raised maximum liability from $3,000 to $5,000; P.A. 96-202 amended Subsec. (a) to specify inapplicability to temporary guardians appointed pursuant to Sec. 45a-622.
New trial ordered as to second count where, in trial of causes of action alleged in two separate counts of common law negligence against child and his parents, jury returned verdict for plaintiff against child on first count and returned no verdict on second count against parents. 158 C. 553. Damage caused by auto tortiously taken by insured's son and damaged at place away from the insured's premises was not compensable to insured parents under their homeowners insurance policy coverage. 159 C. 252. Cited. 167 C. 499; 183 C. 470; 215 C. 316; 216 C. 29; Id., 563.
Parent is liable only where child himself might be required to respond in damages for his own tort. 20 CS 376. Parents sued for damage “wilfully or maliciously” caused by their child are in the same position with respect to the controlling statute of limitations as the child; cause of action is controlled by 3-year limitation under Sec. 52-577. 24 CS 320. Although child was in technical custody of welfare commissioner, he was sent home to his parents at which time he caused damage to plaintiff's automobile; held father as well as minor was liable. Id., 357. Cited. 33 CS 44. Statute, which imposes on parents of minor liability not to exceed $1,500 for property damage wilfully or maliciously caused by minor, is held constitutional on basis that regulation has rational relationship to preservation and promotion of public welfare. 34 CS 7. Cited. 38 CS 327. Control of minor is a determining factor in imposing liability under statute. 40 CS 185. Cited. 41 CS 367.
Fact that minor was technically in custody of state did not relieve father of liability under statute where son was under control of father. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 378. Cause of action brought under section governed by 3-year limitation set forth in Sec. 52-577. Id., 379. Relief of parental liability. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 672. Cited. Id., 715.
Notes of Decisions
Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., 152 A.3d 1183 (Conn. 2016).
· cites it 10× “Foreseeability is only relevant to a defense that the product was not put to a foreseeable use ; see General Statutes § 52-572 l (codifying common-law defense of misuse); Norrie v.”
Dacruz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 846 A.2d 849 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 4× “4 In another count, the plaintiff alleged that Michael Bullock’s parents, Curtis Bullock and Sheila Meadows, were negligent in failing to use reasonable care to control and to restrain their son, and that they were jointly and severally liable under General Statutes § 52-572 5…”
Kaminski v. Town of Fairfield, 578 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 1990).
· cites it 4× “Correctly, he does not assert that the plaintiffs’ alleged duty of care arises directly out of their parental relationship between the plaintiffs and Joseph. At common law, the torts of children do not impose vicarious liability upon parents qua parents, although parental…”
Lamb v. Peck, 441 A.2d 14 (Conn. 1981).
· cites it 7× “On appeal, the defendants 2 challenge the court’s conclusion that the defendants’ action was wilful and malicious within the meaning of General Statutes § 52-572 3 (as it *472 existed in 1975) and its finding that the minor defendants’ action was sufficiently united to support a…”
Pike v. Bugbee, 974 A.2d 743 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 8× “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the count was legally sufficient because (1) the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff to protect social invitees on their premises from foreseeable harm, (2) the allegations provided a basis for a claim for parental liability…”
Barrett Builders v. Miller, 576 A.2d 455 (Conn. 1990).
· cites it 2× “Moreover, the legislature has also on occasion been explicit in its desire to preserve common law remedies. The parental liability statute, for example, provides that “[t]he liability provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other liability…”
Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 212 A.3d 646 (Conn. 2019).
· cites it 2× “[B]ecause our statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants; see General Statutes § 52-572h ; and because Connecticut is a comparative negligence jurisdiction; General Statutes § 52-572 o ; the simpler and less confusing approach to cases .”
Mahon v. B v. Unitron Mfg., Inc., 935 A.2d 1004 (Conn. 2007).
· cites it 2× “Mercury Marine also claims that, because the plaintiffs’ product liability claims do not implicate our statutory apportionment scheme; see General Statutes § 52-572 (h) (precluding apportionment of damages between parties on any basis other than negligence); we must construe §…”
Snell v. Norwalk Yellow Cab, Inc., 158 A.3d 787 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 2× “The court explained that "because our statutes allow for apportionment among negligent defendants; see General Statutes § 52-572h ; and because Connecticut is a comparative negligence jurisdiction; General Statutes § 52-572 o ; the simpler and less confusing approach to cases .”
Abreu v. Leone, 968 A.2d 385 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 2× “” Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572 (a), the defendant alleged that the department was the legal guardian of Geovanny and was liable for damages for the defendant’s injury in an amount not to exceed $5000.”
Gearity v. Salvo, 485 A.2d 940 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984).
· cites it 11× “The second count of the complaint alleges that the defendant Plofkin is an unemancipated minor living with her mother and that, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572, the parents, Richard Plofkin and Barbara Poppa, are responsible for their daughter’s actions.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572(a) — 2 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572(k) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572(m) — 1 case
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