No action or any other type of court proceeding shall be brought to enforce a private restriction recorded in the land records of the municipality in which the property is located or a notation on a filed map pertaining to the use of privately owned land, the type of structures that may be erected thereon or the location of same unless such action or proceeding shall be commenced within three years of the time that the person seeking to enforce such restriction had actual or constructive knowledge of such violation. This section shall be deemed not to apply to any private restriction or notation pertaining to (a) any public utility easement; (b) any right-of-way; (c) any park or open space land; (d) any private driveway, roadway or street, or (e) any sewer line or water line.
(1972, P.A. 283; P.A. 73-93; P.A. 90-169.)
History: P.A. 73-93 substituted “the party seeking to enforce such restriction” for “such party” for clarity; P.A. 90-169 replaced “a recorded private restriction” with “a private restriction recorded in the land records of the municipality in which the property is located”.
Cited. 214 C. 464.
Plaintiff's claim not barred by 3-year statute of limitations because provisions in covenant document that defined restrictions on two lots owned by defendants evinced an intent that restrictions were for the benefit of view easements over such lots for the benefit of lot owned by plaintiffs, and were not merely private restrictions. 141 CA 238.
Notes of Decisions
Vaccaro v. Shell Beach Condo., Inc., 148 A.3d 1123 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
· cites it 4× “See General Statutes § 52-575a ("[n]o action or any other type of court proceeding shall be brought to enforce a private restriction recorded in the land records of the municipality in which the property is located or a notation on a filed map pertaining to the use of privately…”
Wood v. Amer, 736 A.2d 162 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
· cites it 11× “By way of special defense, the defendant argued that the action was barred by the three year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-575a. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) held that the deed conveying the defendant’s property…”
Wood v. Amer, 755 A.2d 175 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 6× “The trial court rendered judgment for the named defendant on the basis of the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-575a. 1 The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of the plaintiffs claim.”
Schwartz v. Murphy, 812 A.2d 87 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
· cites it 2× “The defendants also claim that the court improperly (1) admitted certain evidence in violation of their due process rights, (2) permitted the plaintiff to amend his complaint, (3) effected a deed reformation, (4) ignored the statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes §…”
Kepple v. Dohrmann, 60 A.3d 1031 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013).
· cites it 11× “On appeal, the plaintiffs claim in relevant part that the court improperly concluded that the document entitled “RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND AGREEMENTS” (covenant document) created a private restriction on the defendants’ properties, rather than a view easement in favor of the…”
Casner v. Roberts, 352 A.3d 624 (Conn. App. Ct. 2026).
· cites it 15× “On appeal, the defendants claim that the court (1) improperly determined that the statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-575a, did not bar the plaintiff’s claims, (2) abused its discretion in denying their request for leave to file an amended special defense, (3)…”
Abel v. Johnson, 220 A.3d 843 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
· cites it 8× “The defendant raised four special defenses sounding in the following legal theories: (1) equitable estoppel and waiver; (2) unclean hands;2 (3) ripeness, mootness, and frustration of purpose; and (4) a claim that the action was time barred pursuant to General Statutes § 52-575a…”
Wood v. Amer, 739 A.2d 265 (Conn. 1999).
· cites it 2× “601 (AC 18410), is granted, limited to the following issues: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that: (1) the ‘Brush deed’ contained two separate restrictive covenants, and that, therefore, the grantor intended that only one house was to be located on either lot 10 or…”
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