(a) For the purposes of this section: (1) “Environment” means any surface water, ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata or ambient air within the state or under the jurisdiction of the state; (2) “exposure” means any contact, ingestion, inhalation or assimilation, including irradiation; (3) “hazardous chemical substance or mixture” means petroleum, a petroleum product or any chemical substance or mixture for which there is a federal standard, including any law, requirement, tolerance, prohibition, action level or similar legal authority adopted by an agency pursuant to federal law, including any such standard or legal authority adopted by a state or local government pursuant to federal law, generally intended to prevent, reduce or mitigate the risk of a disease or class or type of diseases to an individual or individuals resulting from exposure to such chemical substance or mixture; (4) “hazardous pollutant” means any designated, specified or referenced chemical considered to be a “hazardous substance” under Section 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 USC 9601(14); (5) “release” means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing into the environment.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 52-555, 52-577 and 52-577a, no action to recover damages for personal injury, death or property damage caused by exposure to a hazardous chemical substance or mixture or hazardous pollutant released into the environment shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury or damage complained of is discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.
(c) The provisions of subsection (b) of this section shall not apply to an action brought against (1) any municipal waterworks system established and operated under chapter 102 or any special act, (2) any regional water authority established under any general statute or special act, or (3) any water company as defined in section 16-1.
(P.A. 84-287; P.A. 98-140, S. 6; P.A. 15-67, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 98-140 redefined “hazardous chemical substance or mixture” to include petroleum and petroleum products; P.A. 15-67 amended Subsec. (b) by adding “52-555” and substituting “personal injury, death or property damage” for “personal injury or property damage”, effective October 1, 2015, and applicable to all cases pending on and cases filed on or after that date.
Cited. 205 C. 219; 214 C. 464; 228 C. 905; 230 C. 12; 238 C. 800. Subsec. (b) does not preempt Sec. 52-555. 277 C. 337.
Cited. 31 CA 824.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
22
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2022 · leading case:
Doty v. Mucci, 679 A.2d 945 (Conn. 1996).
Doty v. Mucci, 679 A.2d 945 (Conn. 1996).
· cites it 24× “The plaintiffs argued that the applicable statute of limitations for claims brought under § 22a-452 was General Statutes § 52-577c (b), 4 pursuant to which their claim was timely.”
Greco v. United Tech. Corp., 890 A.2d 1269 (Conn. 2006).
· cites it 32× “7 In response, the plaintiffs claimed that the applicable statute of limitations is not § 52-555 but, rather, General Statutes § 52-577c (b), 8 which provides in relevant part that an action to recover damages for personal injury “caused by exposure to a hazardous *343 chemical…”
Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 627 A.2d 1347 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
· cites it 15× “9 The issue was whether a two year statute of limitations provision, General Statutes § 52-577c (b), 10 or a three year provision, General Statutes § 52-577a, 11 applied in this case.”
Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 644 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1994).
· cites it 7× “The defendants also claimed that the plaintiffs’ action was barred by the sophisticated user doctrine 4 and the two year statute of limitations provision 5 contained in General Statutes § 52-577c (b). 6 The trial court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment and the…”
McCann Real Equities Series XXII, LLC v. David McDermott Chevrolet, Inc., 890 A.2d 140 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
· cites it 4× “The defendants’ second special defense as to count seven alleged that the plaintiffs’ claims were time barred pursuant to General Statutes § 52-577c (b) 6 because the plaintiffs’ discovery of the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations or omissions regarding the environmental…”
Calabrese v. McHugh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 243 (D. Conn. 2001).
· cites it 6× “2d 945 (refusing to decide whether § 52-577c or § 52-577 or § 52-584 is the appropriate statute of limitations for actions under § 22a-452 but holding that the statute of limitations would begin to run from the date of the defendant’s negligent acts or the date such negligence…”
Durham Mfg. Co. v. Merriam Mfg. Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Conn. 2003).
· cites it 7× “29, 1993) (holding that plaintiffs claims under § 22a-452 were barred by the statute of limitations regardless of whether § 52-577c, § 52-582, or § 52-577 was applied); Nielsen v.”
Hubbard-Hall, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 480 (D. Conn. 2015).
· cites it 8× “” Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577c(b). Defendants argue that Hubbard-Hall’s products liability claim founders on this statutory bar because it had notice of PCB contamination on its property long before June 17, 2008 (two years before it filed this lawsuit).”
Caprio v. Upjohn Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Conn. 2001).
· cites it 11× “§ 52-584 governed the third count because § 52-577c was enacted after § 52-584, and § 52-577c contained no reference to the earlier statute.”
Armotek Indus., Inc. v. Freedman, 790 F. Supp. 383 (D. Conn. 1992).
· cites it 7× “The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for Counts 3, 4 and 5 is Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-577c (“section 52-577c”).”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577c(a) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577c(b) — 9 cases
Hubbard-Hall, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 480 (D. Conn. 2015).
“” Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577c(b). Defendants argue that Hubbard-Hall’s products liability claim founders on this statutory bar because it had notice of PCB contamination on its property long before June 17, 2008 (two years before it filed this lawsuit).”
Calabrese v. McHugh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 243 (D. Conn. 2001).
“2d 945 (refusing to decide whether § 52-577c or § 52-577 or § 52-584 is the appropriate statute of limitations for actions under § 22a-452 but holding that the statute of limitations would begin to run from the date of the defendant’s negligent acts or the date such negligence…”
Durham Mfg. Co. v. Merriam Mfg. Co., 294 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Conn. 2003).
“29, 1993) (holding that plaintiffs claims under § 22a-452 were barred by the statute of limitations regardless of whether § 52-577c, § 52-582, or § 52-577 was applied); Nielsen v.”
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