(a) Except in the case of an appeal from an administrative agency governed by section
4-183, a cause or right of action shall not be lost because of the passage of the time limited by law within which the action may be brought, if the process to be served is personally delivered to a state marshal, constable or other proper officer within such time and the process is served, as provided by law, within thirty days of the delivery.
(b) In any such case, the officer making service shall endorse under oath on such officer's return the date of delivery of the process to such officer for service in accordance with this section.
(1967, P.A. 890; P.A. 82-160, S. 253; P.A. 88-317, S. 29, 107; P.A. 00-99, S. 116, 138, 154; P.A. 01-195, S. 66, 181; P.A. 03-224, S. 14; P.A. 10-36, S. 11; 10-178, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators; P.A. 88-317 inserted “Except in the case of an appeal from an administrative agency governed by section 4-183,” at the beginning of Subsec. (a), effective July 1, 1989, and applicable to all agency proceedings commencing on or after that date; P.A. 00-99 replaced reference to officer with state marshal and deleted provision re personal delivery to sheriff in Subsec. (a) and made technical changes in Subsec. (b), effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 01-195 substituted “state marshal” for “officer” in Subsec. (b), effective July 11, 2001; P.A. 03-224 increased time period for service of process from 15 to 30 days in Subsec. (a) and made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective July 2, 2003; P.A. 10-36 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “state marshal authorized to serve the process” with “state marshal, constable or other proper officer within such time” and amended Subsec. (b) to replace “state marshal” with “officer” and “state marshal's” with “officer's”, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 10-178 made identical changes as P.A. 10-36.
Cited. 170 C. 5; 191 C. 150; 214 C. 464. “Process to be served” must be delivered to marshal within applicable limitations period, and such delivery is not complete until marshal is given instruction to effectuate service. 294 C. 673. Endorsement requirement in Subsec. (b) is directory rather than mandatory, and Subsec. (a) embodies the substance of section. 328 C. 172. Subsec. (a): Successfully faxing process to the state marshal for service satisfies the personal delivery requirement and is consistent with the section's remedial purpose. 335 C. 138.
Cited. 10 CA 14; 43 CA 397. Action commences on date that process was delivered to sheriff for service, if defendant is served within 15 days of delivery to the sheriff. 53 CA 725. Delivery by mail is not precluded under section, the purpose of which is to ensure that process is received on time by the officer, but the determinative standard under section is when the marshal receives the process, not when it is mailed. 136 CA 67. Action saved from dismissal because marshal had original summons and complaint in his possession the day before the statute of limitations expired and process was served within 30 days of delivery; failure of marshal to include date of delivery in the return was not a fatal jurisdictional defect. 154 CA 146. Section applies to civil actions and not probate appeals. 173 CA 788. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that process was “personally delivered” to state marshal when transmitted to marshal's office by fax machine. 174 CA 285; judgment reversed, see 335 C. 138. Section is not implicated in habeas actions because, in a habeas action, service of process does not occur until after a petition is filed in court for a preliminary review, the court determines that the petition pleads a nonfrivolous claim upon which relief can be granted and over which the court has jurisdiction, and the writ issues. 212 CA 628.
Appeal to court from decision of administrative agency is cause of action within meaning of section. 33 CS 172. Service of process which came into hands of deputy sheriff by mail was personally delivered to him within meaning of section. Id., 677. Cited. 34 CS 565; 40 CS 299; 41 CS 425; 42 CS 187.
Notes of Decisions
Doe v. Town of W. Hartford, 177 A.3d 1128 (Conn. 2018).
· cites it 34× “**175 This certified appeal requires us to construe General Statutes § 52-593a, 1 a *1132 remedial savings statute that operates to render an action timely commenced as long as process is delivered to a marshal prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and…”
Tayco Corp. v. Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 986 A.2d 290 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 49× “Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-593a (a), 1 a cause of action is not lost because of the expiration of a statute of limitations if process is personally delivered to a state marshal who thereafter effectuates service within thirty days of its delivery.”
Johnson v. Preleski, 335 Conn. 138 (Conn. 2020).
· cites it 49× “1 General Statutes § 52-593a provides: ‘‘(a) Except in the case of an appeal from an administrative agency governed by section 4-183, a cause or right of action shall not be lost because of the passage of the time limited by law within which the action may be brought, if the…”
Doe v. Town of W. Hartford, 147 A.3d 1083 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
· cites it 18× “, after determining that the plaintiff's causes of action were time barred and were not saved by General Statutes § 52-593a. 2 The plaintiff also appeals from the decision of the court, Dubay, J.”
Lacasse v. Burns, 572 A.2d 357 (Conn. 1990).
· cites it 8× “, General Statutes § 52-592, 1 when seeking to bring an action for personal injuries allegedly caused by a defective highway maintained by the state? (2) Does a dismissal entered pursuant to Practice Book § 251 2 constitute a failure “for *466 any matter of form,” and thus allow…”
Johnson v. Preleski, 166 A.3d 783 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 48× “The petitioner claims that, in concluding that the petitioner's action was time barred under General Statutes § 52-282, the court improperly rejected his argument that General Statutes § 52-593a saved his cause of action.”
Gianetti v. Connecticut Newspapers Publ'g Co., 44 A.3d 191 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
· cites it 11× “The marshal’s return is silent as to when service of process was received from the plaintiff, and, thus, does not comply with the provisions set forth in General Statutes § 52-593a (b). 2 See Zarillo v.”
Nine State Street, LLC v. Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 850 A.2d 1032 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 5× “8 The defendants also contend that our decisions in Lamberti and Brennan essentially have been vitiated by General Statutes § 52-593a (a), 9 which provides: “Except in the case of an appeal from an administrative agency governed by section 4-183, a cause or right of action shall…”
Girard v. Weiss, 682 A.2d 1078 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
· cites it 4× “4 The plaintiff instituted this action by the delivery of process to a sheriff on July 8, 1993, which was served on the defendant on July 23,1993, in accordance with General Statutes § 52-593a. 5 On September 28,1993, the defendant served requests for interrogatories and…”
Rios v. Ccmc Corp., 943 A.2d 544 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 4× “Nowhere in their brief do the plaintiffs invoke General Statutes § 52-593a (a), which provides that a cause of action “shall not be lost” by virtue of the passage of a statute of limitations “if the process to be served is personally delivered to a state marshal authorized to…”
Zarillo v. Peck, 366 A.2d 1165 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976).
· cites it 6× “The issue raised by the first assignment of error and the principal issue involved in this appeal is whether a writ, summons and com *677 plaint received by a sheriff, by mail, had been “personally delivered” within the meaning of § 52-593a 1 of the General Statutes. We hold…”
Stingone v. Elephant's Trunk Flea Mkt., 732 A.2d 200 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
· cites it 6× “Furthermore, the parties agree that service of process was originally made within the time allowed by General Statutes § 52-593a (a). The issue in dispute is when this action was filed.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-593a(a) — 4 cases
Doe v. Town of W. Hartford, 177 A.3d 1128 (Conn. 2018).
“**175 This certified appeal requires us to construe General Statutes § 52-593a, 1 a *1132 remedial savings statute that operates to render an action timely commenced as long as process is delivered to a marshal prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and…”
Rios v. Ccmc Corp., 943 A.2d 544 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
“Nowhere in their brief do the plaintiffs invoke General Statutes § 52-593a (a), which provides that a cause of action “shall not be lost” by virtue of the passage of a statute of limitations “if the process to be served is personally delivered to a state marshal authorized to…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-593a(b) — 2 cases
Doe v. Town of W. Hartford, 177 A.3d 1128 (Conn. 2018).
“**175 This certified appeal requires us to construe General Statutes § 52-593a, 1 a *1132 remedial savings statute that operates to render an action timely commenced as long as process is delivered to a marshal prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and…”
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