Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202k (2026)

Commission of a class A, B or C felony with a firearm: Five-year nonsuspendable sentence

✓ current as of May 2026

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Any person who commits any class A, B or C felony and in the commission of such felony uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of, or displays, or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses any firearm, as defined in section 53a-3, except an assault weapon, as defined in section 53-202a, shall be imprisoned for a term of five years, which shall not be suspended or reduced and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed for conviction of such felony.

(P.A. 93-306, S. 9.)

Cited. 234 C. 455; 241 C. 665. Section is a sentence enhancer rather than a separate offense; a separate conviction under section is improper. 242 C. 143. When jury convicts based on an underlying felony, jury must also determine issue of whether a firearm was used in commission of the felony. 253 C. 210. Unarmed accomplice is subject to an enhanced penalty under section. 255 C. 782. Where court failed to instruct jury as to elements of statute which provided for enhancement of sentence, enhanced sentence was vacated and case remanded for trial on that issue. 256 C. 785. Based on plain language of section, its legislative history, and prior court decisions interpreting its provisions, application of sentence enhancement to manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, a class B felony, does not violate double jeopardy; based on section's language and its legislative history, trial court properly applied section's sentence enhancement to defendant's split sentence. 257 C. 544. State need not prove that firearm was capable of discharging a shot to apply statute as sentence enhancement. 259 C. 799. Section imposes separate enhancements of 5 years each where defendant is convicted of multiple qualifying felonies arising from the same incident. 263 C. 136. Possession of firearm by one coconspirator is not attributable to other coconspirators for purposes of enhancement statute. 276 C. 452. State is required to prove only that defendant was guilty of being an accessory to underlying robbery and that a firearm was used in the commission of the robbery, and need not prove that defendant intended that firearm would be used during the robbery. 315 C. 500.

Cited. 43 CA 801; 44 CA 561; 48 CA 361. Since section is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime, conviction under section must be vacated. 49 CA 420. Trial court improperly rendered judgment convicting defendant of the crime of commission of class A, B or C felony with a firearm because statute does not establish a separate criminal offense but is a sentence enhancement provision. 51 CA 171. Section intended to serve as sentence enhancement provision, not as a separate crime. Id., 541. Reaffirmed ruling that statute is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime. 52 CA 599. Reaffirmed prior holdings that statute is sentence enhancement provision and not a separate crime. 54 CA 18. Under section, state is not required to demonstrate that defendant actually had a gun, but that defendant represented, by words or conduct, that he was holding a gun. 60 CA 487. Failure to instruct jury re elements of statute was harmless error, since evidence against defendant was overwhelming and uncontested, and not violative of due process. 61 CA 417. Trial court determination that defendant fulfilled requirements of sentence enhancement pursuant to statute results in harmless error if jury would have, upon proper instruction, reached the same determination. 65 CA 551. Statute permits multiple enhancements. 69 CA 717. Failure of court to instruct jury that finding defendant used a firearm was harmless error where state has proven the elements necessary for sentence enhancement. 74 CA 129. Plaintiff's claim that trial court did not put issue of enhancement under statute to the jury was harmless error since verdict required finding that the murder was committed with a firearm. Id., 391. Court declines to create a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness when the state seeks sentence enhancement pursuant to section after defendant elects a jury trial; sentence enhancement pursuant to section not treated as essential element of statute and state need only prove to jury the two elements of statute and is not required to prove that length of defendant's incarceration should be increased. 81 CA 824. Legislature's use of “shall” in section, coupled with precedent, amply supports conclusion that legislature intended sentence enhancement to apply to conviction under Sec. 53a-59(a)(5). 90 CA 445. Since section is a sentence enhancement provision and not a separate offense, conviction under section must be vacated. 94 CA 715. Trial court properly applied sentence enhancement provisions of section in a matter where defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled nolo contendere to section's provisions; in doing so, defendant waived his right to a jury determination of the facts with respect to that charge. 103 CA 100. Enhancement of defendant's sentence for conviction of conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree was improper because section does not apply to unarmed coconspirators; where defendant was convicted of risk of injury to a child only as a principal, and not as an accessory, and there was no evidence that defendant personally had used a firearm in the commission of the offense, sentence enhancement pursuant to section was not appropriate; section is not an offense. 160 CA 815. Enhancement of sentences for unarmed accomplices is permissible under section; finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm had been used in the commission of each of the crimes of which defendant was found guilty as an accessory provided sufficient basis to impose sentence enhancement pursuant to section. Id., 851. Brandishing a gun as a show of force to indicate to victims that the gun could be fired satisfies the statutory definition of firearm for sentence enhancement pursuant to section so that jury instruction regarding operability of firearm is not required. 215 CA 167.

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Sec. 53-202l. Armor piercing and incendiary .50 caliber ammunition: Definition. Sale or transfer prohibited. Class D felony. (a) For the purposes of this section:

(1) “Armor piercing bullet” means (A) any .50 caliber bullet that (i) is designed for the purpose of, (ii) is held out by the manufacturer or distributor as, or (iii) is generally recognized as having a specialized capability to penetrate armor or bulletproof glass, including, but not limited to, such bullets commonly designated as “M2 Armor-Piercing” or “AP”, “M8 Armor-Piercing Incendiary” or “API”, “M20 Armor-Piercing Incendiary Tracer” or “APIT”, “M903 Caliber .50 Saboted Light Armor Penetrator” or “SLAP”, or “M962 Saboted Light Armor Penetrator Tracer” or “SLAPT”, or (B) any bullet that can be fired from a pistol or revolver that (i) has projectiles or projectile cores constructed entirely, excluding the presence of traces of other substances, from tungsten alloys, steel, iron, brass, bronze, beryllium copper or depleted uranium, or (ii) is fully jacketed with a jacket weight of more than twenty-five per cent of the total weight of the projectile, is larger than .22 caliber and is designed and intended for use in a firearm, and (iii) does not have projectiles whose cores are composed of soft materials such as lead or lead alloys, zinc or zinc alloys, frangible projectiles designed primarily for sporting purposes, or any other projectiles or projectile cores that the Attorney General of the United States finds to be primarily intended to be used for sporting purposes or industrial purposes or that otherwise does not constitute “armor piercing ammunition” as defined in federal law. “Armor piercing bullet” does not include a shotgun shell.

(2) “Incendiary .50 caliber bullet” means any .50 caliber bullet that (A) is designed for the purpose of, (B) is held out by the manufacturer or distributor as, or (C) is generally recognized as having a specialized capability to ignite upon impact, including, but not limited to, such bullets commonly designated as “M1 Incendiary”, “M23 Incendiary”, “M8 Armor-Piercing Incendiary” or “API”, or “M20 Armor-Piercing Incendiary Tracer” or “APIT”.

(b) Any person who knowingly distributes, transports or imports into the state, keeps for sale or offers or exposes for sale or gives to any person any ammunition that is an armor piercing bullet or an incendiary .50 caliber bullet shall be guilty of a class D felony, except that a first-time violation of this subsection shall be a class A misdemeanor.

(c) Any person who knowingly transports or carries a firearm with an armor piercing bullet or incendiary .50 caliber bullet loaded shall be guilty of a class D felony.

(d) The provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall not apply to the following:

(1) The sale of such ammunition to the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, police departments, the Department of Correction or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States for use in the discharge of their official duties;

(2) A sworn and duly certified member of the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or a police department when transporting or carrying a firearm with an armor piercing bullet or incendiary .50 caliber bullet loaded;

(3) A person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes such ammunition that is disposed of as authorized by the Probate Court; or

(4) The transfer of such ammunition by bequest or intestate succession, or, upon the death of a testator or settlor: (A) To a trust, or (B) from a trust to a beneficiary who is eligible to possess such ammunition.

(e) If the court finds that a violation of this section is not of a serious nature and that the person charged with such violation (1) will probably not offend in the future, (2) has not previously been convicted of a violation of this section, and (3) has not previously had a prosecution under this section suspended pursuant to this subsection, it may order suspension of prosecution in accordance with the provisions of subsection (i) of section 29-33.

(P.A. 01-130, S. 2; P.A. 03-19, S. 122; P.A. 11-51, S. 134; P.A. 13-3, S. 32; 13-220, S. 17; P.A. 23-53, S. 17.)

History: P.A. 03-19 made technical changes in Subsec. (a), effective May 12, 2003; pursuant to P.A. 11-51, “Department of Public Safety” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection” in Subsec. (c)(1), effective July 1, 2011; P.A. 13-3 amended Subsec. (a)(1) to replace definition of “armor piercing .50 caliber bullet” with definition of “armor piercing bullet”, added new Subsec. (c) re class D felony for knowingly transporting or carrying firearm with armor piercing bullet or incendiary .50 caliber bullet loaded, redesignated existing Subsecs. (c) and (d) as Subsecs. (d) and (e), and made technical changes, effective April 4, 2013; P.A. 13-220 amended Subsec. (d) to add new Subdiv. (2) re sworn and duly certified member of Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or police department when transporting or carrying firearm with bullet loaded, redesignate existing Subdivs. (2) and (3) as Subdivs. (3) and (4) and amend redesignated Subdiv. (4) to make a technical change and allow transfer upon death of testator or settlor to a trust or from a trust to an eligible beneficiary; P.A. 23-53 amended Subsec. (e) by changing reference to Sec. 29-33(h) to Sec. 29-33(i).

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Notes of Decisions

Cited in 183 cases (16 in the last 5 years), 1996–2025 · leading case: State v. Patterson, 886 A.2d 777 (Conn. 2005).

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State v. Patterson, 886 A.2d 777 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 57× “2 In accordance with the jury’s verdict and the jury’s additional findings regarding the commission of a class A, B or C felony with a firearm, the trial court rendered judgment of conviction and enhanced the defendant’s sentence pursuant to General Statutes § 53-202k. 3 On…”

State v. Velasco, 751 A.2d 800 (Conn. 2000). · cites it 60× “The principal issue raised by this appeal 1 is whether General Statutes § 53-202k 2 permits the trial court, rather than the jury, to find that a defendant, who was convicted by a jury of a class A, B or C felony, had used a firearm in the commission of such felony.”

State v. Davis, 772 A.2d 559 (Conn. 2001). · cites it 45× “The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether General Statutes § 53-202k/ which requires that a defendant receive an additional five year sentence when a firearm is involved in the commission of certain felonies, applies to unarmed accomplices.”

State v. McMahon, 778 A.2d 847 (Conn. 2001). · cites it 58× “” Second, he contends that the trial court unconstitutionally subjected him to double jeopardy by applying the sentence enhancement provision of General Statutes § 53-202k 4 to his sentence for manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm.”

State v. Dash, 698 A.2d 297 (Conn. 1997). · cites it 33× “The principal issue raised by this appeal is whether General Statutes § 53-202k, 1 which provides for a consecutive, nonsuspendable five year prison term for a person who commits a class A, B or C felony with a firearm, is itself a felony offense or, instead, a sentence…”

State v. Montgomery, 759 A.2d 995 (Conn. 2000). · cites it 23× “” General Statutes § 53-202k provides: “Any person who commits any class A, B or C felony and in the commission of such felony uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of, or displays, or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses any firearm, as defined in section…”

State v. Cator, 781 A.2d 285 (Conn. 2001). · cites it 16× “53a-54c, 2 murder in violation *788 of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), 3 conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-48, 4 kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a), 5 conspiracy to commit kidnapping in the second degree…”

State v. Brown, 792 A.2d 86 (Conn. 2002). · cites it 26× “The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the definition of a firearm under General Statutes § 53a-3 (19), 6 when it instructed the *802 jury on the elements of commission of a class A, B or C felony with a firearm under…”

VanDeusen v. Comm'r of Corr., 212 Conn. App. 427 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022). · cites it 110× “1 On appeal, the petitioner primarily claims that the habeas court improperly concluded that she failed to demonstrate that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by neglecting to request a jury instruction setting forth the statutory elements of General Statutes §…”

State v. Price, 767 A.2d 107 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001). · cites it 22× “3 The trial court also found, as a matter of *419 law, that the defendant had committed a class B felony with a firearm, warranting a mandatory, nonsuspendable five year term of imprisonment pursuant to General Statutes § 53-202k. 4 On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the…”

State v. Martinez, 900 A.2d 485 (Conn. 2006). · cites it 19× “In Patterson , we concluded that General Statutes § 53-202k, 20 which provides for a mandatory sentence enhancement as a consequence for the use or threatened use of a firearm in connection with the commission of a class A, B or C felony, does not permit the enhancement of a…”

State v. Rivera, 810 A.2d 824 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 16× “” General Statutes § 53-202k provides: “Any person who commits any class A, B or C felony and in the commission of such felony uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of, or displays, or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses any firearm, as defined in section…”

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