(a) The following definitions are applicable to this part: (1) “Building” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, railroad car or other structure or vehicle or any building with a valid certificate of occupancy. Where a building consists of separate units, such as, but not limited to separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, any unit not occupied by the actor is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate building; (2) “dwelling” means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present; (3) “night” means the period between thirty minutes after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise; and (4) “public land” means a state park, state forest or municipal park or any other publicly-owned land that is open to the public for active or passive recreation.
(b) The following definition is applicable to sections 53a-100aa to 53a-106, inclusive: A person “enters or remains unlawfully” in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 102; P.A. 74-186, S. 10, 12; P.A. 79-570, S. 7; P.A. 92-260, S. 40; P.A. 05-234, S. 8; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 74-186 included railroad cars in definition of “building”; P.A. 79-570 included buildings “with a valid certificate of occupancy” in definition of “building”; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in definition of “building”; P.A. 05-234 added Subsec. (a)(4) defining “public land”, effective January 1, 2006; Jan. Sp. Sess. P.A. 08-1 amended Subsec. (a) to make definitions applicable to Sec. 53a-100aa, included in existing reference to “this part”, and amended Subsec. (b) to add reference to Sec. 53a-100aa, effective March 1, 2008.
Cited. 191 C. 180; 195 C. 598; Id., 611; 209 C. 322; 210 C. 199; 216 C. 367.
Failure of court to define the phrase “enters unlawfully” misled jury. 6 CA 24. Cited. 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 35 CA 714; 39 CA 1; 44 CA 62.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 188 C. 542, 218 C. 273; 240 C. 708; 242 C. 523.
Cited. 14 CA 119; 22 CA 440; 34 CA 823; 38 CA 231; 43 CA 488. Although it is true that the crime of burglary in the second degree requires the element of a “dwelling” as opposed to “building”, statute defines “dwelling” as a type of building “which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present”; an individual apartment, within an apartment home, while a dwelling, also is a separate building. 76 CA 779. Subdiv. (1): Under the ordinary definition of a “building”, one's home is clearly a building. 78 CA 610. State does not need to furnish valid certificate of occupancy or prove specific ability to occupy if structure in question falls within ordinary meaning of building. 106 CA 295. Subdiv. (2): Evidence was sufficient to find that the breezeway constituted part of the family's “dwelling”. 125 CA 529. Subdiv. (1): Trial court properly determined that shed was a “building” for purposes of section. 151 CA 732. Subdiv. (1): Charges for home invasion, arising under Subsec., and burglary in the first degree, under Sec. 53a-101(a)(3), are susceptible to separation into parts, thus defendant's conviction of both offenses did not violate his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 187 CA 847.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 8 CA 528; 19 CA 179; 24 CA 563; 42 CA 507. Defendant's presence in an apartment that was not his own, his attempts to evade police and his flight were sufficient evidence from which jury could infer that he had entered apartment unlawfully. 66 CA 357. Restaurant was not open to the public at time defendant entered and management office was a separate area not open to public and defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon premises. 74 CA 607.
Secs. 53a-100a to 53a-100z. Reserved for future use.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
218
cases (
10 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case:
State v. Grant, 502 A.2d 945 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
State v. Grant, 502 A.2d 945 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
· cites it 16× “The entire portion of the charge on the definition of burglary in the third degree is as follows: “The Burglary Statute reads, — It is a very short Statute. ‘A person is guilty of Burglary in the Third Degree when he enters or remains unlawfully in a building with the intent to…”
State v. Bailey, 551 A.2d 1206 (Conn. 1988).
· cites it 8× “The defendant argues, however, that the definition of “dwelling” recited by the trial court materially differed from that of General Statutes § 53a-100, the definition required for self-defense instructions.”
State v. Allen, 579 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 1990).
· cites it 9× “II The defendant next claims that the trial court did not adequately explain in its charge the element of “remaining unlawfully” pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-100 (b) 5 for the offenses of burglary in the first degree and felony murder with burglary as its predicate felony.”
State v. Baker, 489 A.2d 1041 (Conn. 1985).
· cites it 10× “For a definition of the word “building,” the arson statute specifically refers to General Statutes § 53a-100, which defines “building” to include “in addition to its ordinary meaning .”
State v. Russell, 588 A.2d 1376 (Conn. 1991).
· cites it 11× “The state counters that because it was secured sufficiently to restrict public access, the service area is a “building” as that term is defined in General Statutes § 53a-100 (a) (1) and that, therefore, the judgment of conviction must be affirmed.”
State v. Whitford, 799 A.2d 1034 (Conn. 2002).
· cites it 4× “Section 53a-19 (b) (1) also provides, however, that “the actor shall not be required to retreat if he is in his dwelling, as defined in section 53a-100, or place of work and was not the initial aggressor “ ‘Dwelling’ ” is defined under General Statutes § 53a-100 (a) (2) as “a…”
State v. Ward, 821 A.2d 822 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
· cites it 7× “” General Statutes § 53a-100 (a) (2). An apartment is a place usually occupied by a person lodging there at night.”
State v. Morocho, 888 A.2d 164 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
· cites it 8× “” General Statutes § 53a-102 (a) (1). General Statutes § 53a-100 (a) provides in relevant part: “(1) .”
State v. Hafford, 746 A.2d 150 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 5× “See General Statutes § 53a-100 (b) (“[a] person ‘enters or remains unlawfully’ in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so” [emphasis added]).”
Connecticut v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739 (Conn. 1997).
· cites it 3× “General Statutes § 53a-111 provides in relevant part: “Arson in the first degree: Class A felony, (a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and .”
State v. Calabrese, 975 A.2d 126 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 8× “” General Statutes § 53a-100 (b). Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully entered the victim’s house,…”
State v. Perez, 828 A.2d 626 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
· cites it 6× “General Statutes § 53a-100 (a) defines a building, in relevant part, as having “its ordinary meaning.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-100(a) — 4 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-100(b) — 3 cases
State v. Calabrese, 975 A.2d 126 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
“” General Statutes § 53a-100 (b). Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully entered the victim’s house,…”
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