(a) A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section
53a-100, (1) he starts a fire or causes an explosion and (A) such act subjects another person to a substantial risk of bodily injury; or (B) such fire or explosion was intended to conceal some other criminal act; or (C) such fire or explosion was intended to subject another person to a deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States; or (2) a fire or explosion was caused by an individual hired by such person to start such fire or cause such explosion.
(b) Arson in the second degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 114; P.A. 79-570, S. 4; P.A. 80-229, S. 2; P.A. 82-290, S. 2; P.A. 84-4.)
History: P.A. 79-570 made second degree arson a Class B, rather than a Class C felony; P.A. 80-229 added reference to building definition of Sec. 53a-100; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting (1) intent to destroy or damage a building of another (2) fires or explosions caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds and (3) subjecting another building to risk of destruction or damage and adding (1) fires or explosions intended to conceal some criminal act and (2) fires or explosions caused by person hired to set fire or cause explosion; P.A. 84-4 added Subsec. (a)(1)(C) re a fire or explosion intended to subject another person to a deprivation of certain rights, privileges or immunities.
Cited. 172 C. 298; 178 C. 67; 189 C. 228; 191 C. 636; 194 C. 617; 195 C. 600. More reasonable to conclude that legislature intended arsonists to be held culpable under statute for creating substantial risk to other buildings, regardless of how close such risks come to being fulfilled. 197 C. 158. Cited. 198 C. 92; 199 C. 389; 204 C. 769; 219 C. 605; 236 C. 375.
Term “another person” includes firefighters. 8 CA 581. Cited. 17 CA 466.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 174 C. 73; 189 C. 201; Id., 752; 195 C. 128; Id., 598; 199 C. 14; 202 C. 93; 215 C. 716.
Cited. 10 CA 422; 28 CA 9. Subdiv. (2): Holding in 99 C. 432, that solicitation of another to set a fire was insufficient to establish the crime of attempt to commit arson, has been legislatively overruled by enactment of P.A. 82-290. 59 CA 362.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
47
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 1977–2025 · leading case:
State v. Parmalee, 496 A.2d 186 (Conn. 1985).
State v. Parmalee, 496 A.2d 186 (Conn. 1985).
· cites it 22× “” General Statutes § 53a-112 (a). At trial, the state introduced evidence that the fire started by the defendant subjected neighboring buildings to risk of damage.”
State v. Baker, 489 A.2d 1041 (Conn. 1985).
· cites it 12× “After a jury trial, the defendant, James Baker, was found guilty of the crimes of arson in the second degree and conspiracy to commit arson in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-112 (a) 1 and 53a-48 (a), 2 respectively, and sentenced on September 10,1981,…”
State v. Zindros, 456 A.2d 288 (Conn. 1983).
· cites it 8× “In an information filed *230 in April, 1977, the defendant was accused of starting this fire and was charged with arson in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-112. [1] On June 21, 1977, the defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence, and related…”
State v. Ferguson, 796 A.2d 1118 (Conn. 2002).
· cites it 4× “Ferguson, following a jury trial, was convicted of five counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), 1 two counts of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b (8), 2 one count of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §…”
State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 4× “The defendant, Anthony Rivera, was convicted, following a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, 1 felony murder in violation *353 of General Statutes § 53a-54c, 2 burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (2), 3 arson…”
State v. Famiglietti, 595 A.2d 306 (Conn. 1991).
· cites it 4× “Parmalee, supra, 161-62 (construing substantially similar language in General Statutes § 53a-112). The fortunate fact that the two firefighters who were injured at the scene suffered minor rather than major harm is therefore not dispositive.”
State v. Banks, 484 A.2d 444 (Conn. 1984).
· cites it 8× “The defendant, Thomas Banks, appeals from the judgment rendered upon the jury verdict convicting him of arson in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-112. 1 The accusation of arson in the second degree was made in an amended information which in substance…”
State v. Chasse, 721 A.2d 1212 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
· cites it 5× “The defendant, Patrick Chasse, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-lll (a) (1), arson in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-112 (a) (1) and attempt to…”
State v. Moye, 507 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1986).
· cites it 6× “An automobile is included in the definition of a “building” for the purposes of General Statutes § 53a-112. State v. Baker, 195 Conn.”
State v. Shindell, 486 A.2d 637 (Conn. 1985).
· cites it 4× “The defendant, Sydney Shindell, was charged with two counts of arson in the second degree, in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-112 (a) (1) (B) and (a) (2) 1 and 53a-8, 2 and two matching conspiracy counts, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-48.”
Boyce v. Allstate Ins., 673 A.2d 77 (Conn. 1996).
· cites it 4× “6 Subsequently, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with arson in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-112 7 in connection with the fire.”
Irma Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018).
“120(1) ("A person commits the offense of kidnapping in the second degree if he or she knowingly restrains another unlawfully and without consent so as to interfere substantially with his or her liberty and exposes him or her to a substantial risk of serious physical injury.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-112(a)(1) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-112(a)(1)(A) — 3 cases
Irma Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018).
“120(1) ("A person commits the offense of kidnapping in the second degree if he or she knowingly restrains another unlawfully and without consent so as to interfere substantially with his or her liberty and exposes him or her to a substantial risk of serious physical injury.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-112(a)(1)(B) — 2 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-112(a)(2) — 2 cases
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