(a) When a defense other than an affirmative defense, is raised at a trial, the state shall have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
(b) When a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 12.)
Cited. 186 C. 414; 191 C. 659; 196 C. 519. Instructing jury that it was the state's burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt did not adequately inform jury that it was the state's burden to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. 199 C. 273. Cited. 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; Id., 733; 218 C. 349; 219 C. 314; 225 C. 450; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 281; 230 C. 183; 236 C. 342.
Cited. 6 CA 701; 8 CA 667; 10 CA 697; 11 CA 665; 14 CA 511; 17 CA 200; Id., 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579.
Cited. 34 CS 612. Statute does not become constitutionally vulnerable by reason of imposing on defendants the burden of establishing affirmative defenses. 35 CS 555.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 186 C. 654; 188 C. 237; Id., 653; 194 C. 376; 203 C. 212; 209 C. 322; 210 C. 110; 220 C. 602; 228 C. 335; 231 C. 484; 232 C. 537; 233 C. 1; 234 C. 381.
Cited. 3 CA 289; 5 CA 338; 10 CA 643, 647; 11 CA 102; 17 CA 97; 20 CA 75; 24 CA 556; Id., 624; 29 CA 262; 31 CA 140; 33 CA 782; 34 CA 368, see also 233 C. 517; 46 CA 216.
Cited. 38 CS 619.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 182 C. 388; 193 C. 695; 207 C. 374; 209 C. 733; 214 C. 540; 217 C. 648; 227 C. 456; 228 C. 281; 229 C. 328; 230 C. 351; 233 C. 403; 236 C. 189; Id., 342; 242 C. 93. Legislature not required to expressly declare an exception to culpability to be an affirmative defense for it to operate as an affirmative defense; statute does not prohibit judicially recognized affirmative defenses. 254 C. 107.
Cited. 12 CA 32; 14 CA 511; 20 CA 342; 24 CA 678; Id., 670; 28 CA 91.
Held unconstitutional insofar as it places a burden of proof on the defense. 33 CS 28.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
136
cases (
11 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case:
State v. Joyner, 625 A.2d 791 (Conn. 1993).
State v. Joyner, 625 A.2d 791 (Conn. 1993).
· cites it 17× “II The defendant’s second contention is that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court improp *457 erly instructed the jury, in accordance with General Statutes §§ 53a-12 and 53a-13, 2 that he bore the burden of establishing the existence of his claimed mental…”
State v. Hughes, 341 Conn. 387 (Conn. 2021).
· cites it 6× “I The defendant’s first claim is that he is entitled to an acquittal on the charge of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm because the state failed to meet its burden, pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-12 (a), of disproving, beyond a reasonable doubt, any of the…”
State v. Person, 673 A.2d 463 (Conn. 1996).
· cites it 10× “Proof of this defense by a preponderance of the evidence; 14 General Statutes § 53a-12; entitles the defendant to a conviction of manslaughter in the first degree, instead of a conviction of murder.”
State v. Clark, 826 A.2d 128 (Conn. 2003).
· cites it 7× “See General Statutes § 53a-12. 9 Consequently, a defendant has no burden of persuasion for a claim of self-defense; he has only a burden of production.”
State v. Swebilius, 159 A.3d 1099 (Conn. 2017).
· cites it 5× “Section 53a-12(b), which provides that "[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence," was incorporated into our Penal Code in 1969 "largely" on…”
State v. Valinski, 756 A.2d 1250 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 12× “In support of this argument, the Appellate Court and the defendant rely on General Statutes § 53a-12 (b), which provides: “When a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden *127 of establishing such defense by a…”
State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318 (Conn. 1994).
· cites it 4× “The defendant argues that the statutes imposing this burden of proof upon him violate the due process clause contained in article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution.”
State v. DeJesus, 481 A.2d 1277 (Conn. 1984).
· cites it 6× “See General Statutes § 53a-12 (a).’ State v. Miller, 186 Conn.”
State v. Saunders, 838 A.2d 186 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 4× “I The defendant first contends that the state failed to disprove his claim of self-defense; see General Statutes § 53a-19; 6 beyond a reasonable doubt as required by General Statutes § 53a-12 (a).”
State v. D'antuono, 441 A.2d 846 (Conn. 1982).
· cites it 7× “2d 607 (1981); see General Statutes § 53a-12 (b); 2 State v.”
State v. Suggs, 553 A.2d 1110 (Conn. 1989).
· cites it 6× “General Statutes § 53a-12 (b). 8 In 1981, the General Assembly enacted legislation specifically proscribing compelled sexual intercourse by a spouse or cohabitor upon the other spouse or cohabitor.”
State v. Miller, 443 A.2d 906 (Conn. 1982).
· cites it 4× “General Statutes § 53a-3 (5) provides that when the term "deadly physical force" is used in the Connecticut penal code it "means physical force which can be reasonably expected to cause death or serious physical injury.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-12(b) — 4 cases
State v. Swebilius, 159 A.3d 1099 (Conn. 2017).
“Section 53a-12(b), which provides that "[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence," was incorporated into our Penal Code in 1969 "largely" on…”
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