(a) A person is guilty of larceny in the first degree when such person commits larceny, as defined in section
53a-119, and: (1) The property or service, regardless of its nature and value, is obtained by extortion, (2) the value of the property or service exceeds twenty thousand dollars, or (3) the property is obtained by defrauding a public community, and the value of such property exceeds two thousand dollars.
(b) Larceny in the first degree is a class B felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 124; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 25; P.A. 73-639, S. 7; P.A. 81-248, S. 1; 81-351, S. 3; P.A. 82-271, S. 1; P.A. 86-275, S. 1; P.A. 92-260, S. 51; P.A. 00-103, S. 1; P.A. 09-138, S. 1; P.A. 22-115, S. 8.)
History: 1971 act deleted detailed description of extortionist acts in Subsec. (a)(1), i.e. threat of physical injury, damage to property, etc., and made first degree larceny a Class C, rather than a Class D, felony; P.A. 73-639 made first degree larceny a Class B felony; P.A. 81-248 amended Subsec. (a) to clarify the proscribed conduct; P.A. 81-351 included property consisting of a motor vehicle having a value exceeding $2,000 in the definition of larceny in the first degree inserted new Subsec. (b) enumerating conditions constituting prima facie evidence of a larcenous intent in regard to motor vehicles and relettered former Subsec. (b) accordingly; P.A. 82-271 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by increasing from $2,000 to $10,000 the value of the property or service obtained and added Subsec. (a)(4) concerning defrauding a public community; P.A. 86-275 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to increase the value of a motor vehicle subject to the section from in excess of $2,000 to in excess of $10,000; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a)(3); P.A. 00-103 made technical changes in Subsecs. (a) and (b) and amended Subsec. (b) by defining “motor vehicle” and by adding provisions re prima facie evidence of knowledge that vehicle is stolen and possession of vehicle with larcenous intent; P.A. 09-138 amended Subsec. (a) to increase in Subdiv. (2) the value of the property or service obtained from in excess of $10,000 to in excess of $20,000 and increase in Subdiv. (3) the value of a motor vehicle obtained from in excess of $10,000 to in excess of $20,000; P.A. 22-115 amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change, delete Subdiv. (3) re property consisting of a motor vehicle and redesignate existing Subdiv. (4) as Subdiv. (3), deleted former Subsec. (b) defining “motor vehicle” and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (b).
Inference based on possession of recently stolen property (driver versus passenger of motor van containing stolen property); meaning of “possession”. 171 C. 119. Mere presence of passenger in vehicle containing stolen goods is insufficient to support conviction. Id., 127. Cited. 174 C. 253; Id., 338; 182 C. 52; 183 C. 383; 186 C. 648; 188 C. 715; 189 C. 717; 190 C. 559; 194 C. 361; 196 C. 185; 197 C. 201; Id., 247; 199 C. 30; Id., 207; 202 C. 86; 204 C. 52; 213 C. 233; 224 C. 711; 237 C. 501; 241 C. 413; Id., 439.
Cited. 3 CA 359; 5 CA 113; Id., 347; 6 CA 164; 7 CA 326; Id., 532; 9 CA 349; 12 CA 585; 14 CA 272; 20 CA 810; 21 CA 431; 29 CA 843; 34 CA 599; Id., 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 36 CA 364; 37 CA 40; 45 CA 455.
Cited. 31 CS 501.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 169 C. 581; 176 C. 239; 177 C. 243; 178 C. 427; Id., 163; Id., 416; Id., 480; Id., 649; 180 C. 182; Id., 662. 181 C. 172; Id., 254, 255; Id., 299; 182 C. 52; 183 C. 225; 185 C. 211; 188 C. 671; Id., 681; 189 C. 114; Id., 201; Id., 337; Id., 383; 190 C. 541; 192 C. 405; 195 C. 421; 196 C. 225; 197 C. 17; Id., 413; Id., 629; 198 C. 348; Id., 369; 199 C. 14; 208 C. 420; 214 C. 132; Id., 717; 218 C. 151; 219 C. 93; 221 C. 685; 227 C. 611; 232 C. 691; 233 C. 527; Id., 552; 235 C. 502; 242 C. 345. Subdiv. (2): Although lack of consent is not specifically enumerated as element of larceny in the first degree, donative victim's inability to consent to a taking is a factor properly considered in the context of a traditional understanding of larceny statute. 256 C. 135.
Cited. 3 CA 633; 4 CA 251; 5 CA 129; 7 CA 292; Id., 445; 8 CA 125; Id., 376; 9 CA 121; Id., 313; Id., 365; 10 CA 447; 11 CA 684; 13 CA 576; 15 CA 416; 16 CA 402; 17 CA 50; Id., 359; Id., 486; 20 CA 354; Id., 665; 21 CA 386; 22 CA 449; 24 CA 502; 25 CA 149; Id., 181; 26 CA 279; 28 CA 306; Id., 521; 29 CA 394; 30 CA 190; 31 CA 614; 33 CA 368; 34 CA 694; 35 CA 566; Id., 740; 36 CA 774; 37 CA 589; Id., 619; 38 CA 481; Id., 643; 39 CA 96; 41 CA 695; 43 CA 499; 44 CA 187; Id., 476; 47 CA 1. Defendant's claim that evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of larceny in the first degree was unavailing; the evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to sustaining verdict, was sufficient to support jury's finding that value of victim's car exceeded $10,000, as required by statute, and it was not improper for trial court to permit victim to testify as to his opinion of car's value at time of the crime. 81 CA 377. Subdiv. (3): Vehicle's owner was competent to testify as to the value of his property and that testimony was sufficient to satisfy statutory element that its value exceeded ten thousand dollars. 95 CA 248.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
218
cases (
10 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case:
State v. Waterman, 509 A.2d 518 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
State v. Waterman, 509 A.2d 518 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
· cites it 24× “The defendant was found guilty by a jury of the crime of larceny in the first degree, by defrauding a public community, in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-122 (a) (4) and 53a-119 (6) (3).”
State v. Calonico, 770 A.2d 454 (Conn. 2001).
· cites it 8× “*137 to 1995) § 53a-122 (a) (2). 1 She was sentenced to five *138 years imprisonment, suspended after one year, and five years probation.”
State v. Papandrea, 991 A.2d 617 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
· cites it 12× “The defendant, John Papandrea, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of nine counts of larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a)(2). [1] On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the evidence adduced at trial was…”
State v. Baker, 437 A.2d 843 (Conn. 1980).
· cites it 8× “The defendant was convicted after a jury trial of burglary in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-103 and of larceny *54 in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (2) in connection with an unlawful entry in a building with intent to…”
State v. Sumner, 422 A.2d 299 (Conn. 1979).
· cites it 7× “The defendant has appealed from the judgment rendered, and has briefed the following claims of error: (1) that the provisions of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (2) do not set forth a specific crime, and that the defendant could, thus, not be convicted for a violation of that…”
State v. Golding, 567 A.2d 823 (Conn. 1989).
· cites it 2× “84-471 of the 1984 Public Acts, to subject a person convicted of general assistance fraud to the penalties for larceny under General Statutes §§ 53a-122 through 53a-125b.”
State v. Pearl, 613 A.2d 304 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
· cites it 16× “The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (2) 1 and General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (4), 2 and second degree forgery in viola *523 tion of General…”
State v. Desimone, 696 A.2d 1235 (Conn. 1997).
· cites it 8× “Desimone, of larceny in the first degree by receiving various items of stolen property in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-122 and 53a-119 (8), 1 and larceny in the *441 fourth degree by receiving certain other items of stolen property in violation of General Statutes §§…”
State v. Anderson, 988 A.2d 276 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 8× “In connection with the alleged embezzlement of tens of thousands of dollars, the defendants, Richard Anderson and Janice Anderson, each were charged with, in separate informations, two counts of larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (2), 3…”
State v. Gabriel, 473 A.2d 300 (Conn. 1984).
· cites it 5× “The state, claiming the evidence was sufficient, argues that he did act with reference to the Bell jewelry in the back room of his newsstand, either physically or constructively, in a manner that caused that jewelry to be withheld permanently from the Bells.”
State v. Boucino, 506 A.2d 125 (Conn. 1986).
· cites it 5× “After a trial by jury, the defendant, Steven Boucino, was convicted of robbery in the first degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4), and larceny in the first degree, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (2).”
State v. Rivera, 736 A.2d 790 (Conn. 1999).
· cites it 8× “On October 24, 1994, the defendant was charged in the present case with one count of larceny in the first degree 5 in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (4) 6 prior to trail, the defendant moved in limine to *194 preclude the state from using his grand jury testimony as…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-122(a) — 3 cases
State v. Anderson, 988 A.2d 276 (Conn. 2010).
“In connection with the alleged embezzlement of tens of thousands of dollars, the defendants, Richard Anderson and Janice Anderson, each were charged with, in separate informations, two counts of larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (2), 3…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-122(a)(2) — 3 cases
State v. Anderson, 988 A.2d 276 (Conn. 2010).
“In connection with the alleged embezzlement of tens of thousands of dollars, the defendants, Richard Anderson and Janice Anderson, each were charged with, in separate informations, two counts of larceny in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-122 (a) (2), 3…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-122(a)(4) — 2 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.