In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced by the use or threatened imminent use of physical force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. The defense of duress as defined in this section shall not be available to a person who intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 14.)
Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Duress as defense discussed. 184 C. 157. Instruction to jury that it was the state's burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt did not adequately inform jury that it was the state's burden to disprove duress beyond a reasonable doubt. 199 C. 273. Cited. 201 C. 211; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75. Trial court did not err in refusing to provide a jury instruction that would have allowed jury to factor defendant's age into his defense of duress, independent and regardless of how defendant's age relates to age of his coercers, so as to account for the differences in how adolescents evaluate risk; duress defense has both subjective and objective components; subjective component is that defendant actually must have been coerced into the criminal action; objective component requires that defendant have been coerced in circumstances under which a reasonable person in his situation would have been likewise unable to resist. 282 C. 281.
Cited. 15 CA 34; 26 CA 367; 46 CA 486. Court did not err in charging jury re statutory exception to defense of duress by failing to define the term “situation”; because “situation” is not defined in section, it is taken that the jury, as a matter of common knowledge, comprehends the term and, therefore, the trial court was not obligated to define it. 125 CA 125.
Cited. 34 CS 612.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
23
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1977–2021 · leading case:
State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278 (Conn. 2007).
State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278 (Conn. 2007).
· cites it 11× “Specifically, he claims that the recognized differences between juveniles and adults should be taken into account when assessing the proper standard by which to judge the defendant’s actions in conjunction with his defense of duress. According to the defendant, the court…”
State v. Fuller, 506 A.2d 556 (Conn. 1986).
· cites it 7× “The defendant filed a written request to charge concerning his claimed defense of duress in which he asked the trial court to charge the entire text of General Statutes § 53a-14 2 and also to instruct the jury that it was the burden of the state to disprove the defense of duress…”
State v. Rouleau, 528 A.2d 343 (Conn. 1987).
· cites it 8× “General Statutes § 53a-14. 5 Essentially, the defendant claims that the trial court erred in its instruction on this nonaffirmative defense because it did not instruct that the burden of proof was on the state to disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt and/or because it…”
State v. Helmedach, 8 A.3d 514 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
· cites it 12× “On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) declined to alleviate the juiy’s confusion regarding the statutory exception to the defense of duress by failing to define the term “situation,” as that term appears in General Statutes § 53a-14, 1 to refer to the…”
State v. Boone, 544 A.2d 217 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
· cites it 8× “See General Statutes § 53a-14.” 2 State v. Fuller, supra, 277-78 .”
State v. Hopes, 602 A.2d 23 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
· cites it 4× “I The defendant’s first claim concerns the trial court’s refusal to charge the jury on the defense of duress pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-14. 3 The following facts are pertinent to this claim.”
State v. Johnson, 138 A.3d 1108 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 53a-14 provides: "In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced by the use or threatened imminent use of physical force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened…”
State v. Aponte, 784 A.2d 991 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
· cites it 4× “The defendant thus argues that the instructions were flawed and improperly suggested that the jury could reject the duress defense on a ground not provided by the legislature in General Statutes § 53a-14. The defendant seeks review of his unpreserved claim pursuant to Golding or…”
State v. Pierson, 514 A.2d 724 (Conn. 1986).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes §§ 53a-14, 53a-15. Though the state bears the burden of disproving these defenses, once they are raised by the presentation of some evidence supporting them, there is no requirement that evidence negating them be produced as part of the state’s prima facie case.”
In re Juv. Appeal, 439 A.2d 958 (Conn. 1981).
· cites it 3× “General Statutes § 53a-14, entitled “Duress as defense,” states: “In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced by the use or threatened imminent use of physical force upon him or a third…”
State v. Connelly, 700 A.2d 694 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
· cites it 2× “” General Statutes § 53a-14. The defendant *508 produced no evidence purporting to show that anyone used or threatened to use physical force upon him or upon a third person.”
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 971 N.E.2d 783 (Mass. 2012).
“§ 5-2-208 (LexisNexis 2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-14 (West 2007); Del.”
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