Connecticut General Statutes
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-15 (2026)
Entrapment as defense
✓ current as of May 2026
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In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, for the purpose of institution of criminal prosecution against the defendant, and that the defendant did not contemplate and would not otherwise have engaged in such conduct.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 15.)
Cited. 173 C. 197; Id., 431. Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 195 C. 70; 201 C. 211; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 229 C. 60. Trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on defense of entrapment because there was no evidence presented that defendant was initially unwilling to commit a crime or that the actions of the officers actually implanted a criminal design in defendant's mind. 305 C. 330.
Cited. 8 CA 158; 20 CA 395; 21 CA 326; 23 CA 392; 30 CA 470; 42 CA 751; 46 CA 486.
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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24
cases, 1977–2016 · leading case: State v. Lee, 640 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1994).
State v. Lee, 640 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1994). “The defendant’s primary defense was entrapment under General Statutes § 53a-15. 4 The defendant, a fifty-five year old woman with no prior criminal record, testified that her son was currently incarcerated in Florida and that Augustus Buckley was in prison with him.”
State v. Lee, 620 A.2d 1303 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). “She sought to establish a defense based on entrapment within the purview of General Statutes § 53a-15. 5 The jury, however, returned a verdict of guilty and judgment was rendered accordingly.”
State v. Daniel G., 84 A.3d 9 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014). “5 The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment, as set forth in General Statutes § 53a-15. He also requested that the court instruct the jury with respect to the first amend- ment to the United States constitution.”
State v. Sorabella, 891 A.2d 897 (Conn. 2006). “Although the police may not entrap an otherwise innocent person; see General Statutes § 53a-15; 42 they may ensnare a person already inclined to violate the law.”
Holley v. Comm'r of Corr., 774 A.2d 148 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001). “The petitioner’s sole defense was entrapment pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-15. 4 “Since its codification, § 53a-15 has consistently been interpreted to impose a subjective standard.”
State v. King, 958 A.2d 731 (Conn. 2008). “See General Statutes § 53a-15. 4 He claims that his testimony gave rise to a defense of entrapment, thereby necessitating an instruction.”
State v. Connelly, 700 A.2d 694 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997). “” The defendant did not produce any evidence, however, that would make the defense of duress applicable, and the trial court properly refused to allow the defendant to address it in his closing argument and properly refused to instruct the jury on it.”
State v. Devino, 485 A.2d 1302 (Conn. 1985). “General Statutes § 53a-15 provides: “entrapment as defense.”
United States v. Olga Valencia & William Suarez Valencia, 645 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1980). “§ 41-209 (1977); Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 53a-15 (West 1972); Del.”
State v. Messam, 949 A.2d 1246 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). “1 General Statutes § 53a-15, our entrapment statute, provides: “In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public…”
State v. Wilder, 17 A.3d 1116 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). “General Statutes § 53a-15, our entrapment statute, provides: “In any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public…”
State v. Rosado, 425 A.2d 108 (Conn. 1979). “…intoxication; § 53a-7; renunciation of criminal purpose; § 53a-10; insanity; § 53a-13; duress; § 53a-14; entrapment; § 53a-15; justification; § 53a-16, as defined in §§ 53a-17 through 53a-23; use of firearms; §§ 53a-16a and 53a-16b; and renunciation of criminal purpose in a…”
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