(a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the first degree when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, such person: (1) Initiates or circulates a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a fire, explosion, catastrophe or emergency under circumstances in which it is likely that public alarm or inconvenience will result; (2) reports, by word or action, to any official or quasi-official agency or organization having the function of dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property, an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a fire, explosion or other catastrophe or emergency which did not in fact occur or does not in fact exist; (3) violates subdivision (1) or (2) of this subsection with intent to cause a large scale emergency response; or (4) violates subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection with specific intent to falsely report another person or group of persons because of the actual or perceived race, religion, ethnicity, disability, sex, sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of such other person or group of persons. For purposes of this section, “large scale emergency response” means an on-site response to any such reported incident by five or more first responders, and “first responder” means any peace officer or firefighter or any ambulance driver, emergency medical responder, emergency medical technician or paramedic, as those terms are defined in section
19a-175.
(b) Falsely reporting an incident in the first degree is a (1) class D felony for a violation of subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of this section, or (2) class C felony for a violation of subdivision (4) of subsection (a) of this section.
(c) In addition to any sentence imposed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, if (1) a person is convicted of an offense in violation of subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of this section that resulted in a large scale emergency response, (2) any agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state requests financial restitution for costs associated with such emergency response, and (3) the court finds that the agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state incurred costs associated with such emergency response as a result of such offense, the court shall order the offender to make financial restitution under terms that the court determines are appropriate. In determining the appropriate terms of financial restitution, the court shall consider: (A) The financial resources of the offender and the burden restitution will place on other obligations of the offender; (B) the offender's ability to pay based on installments or other conditions; (C) the rehabilitative effect on the offender of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and (D) other circumstances, including the financial burden and impact on the agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state, that the court determines make the terms of restitution appropriate. If the court determines that the current financial resources of the offender or the offender's current ability to pay based on installments or other conditions are such that no appropriate terms of restitution can be determined, the court may forego setting such terms. The court shall articulate its findings on the record with respect to each of the factors set forth in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subsection. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be based on easily ascertainable damages for actual expenses associated with such emergency response. Restitution ordered by the court pursuant to this subsection shall be imposed or directed by a written order of the court containing the amount of actual expenses associated with such emergency response, as ascertained by the court. The order of the court shall direct that a certified copy of the order be delivered by certified mail to the agency or department of the state or political subdivision of the state. Such order is enforceable in the same manner as an order pursuant to subsection (c) of section 53a-28.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 182; P.A. 81-353, S. 1; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2, S. 1, 9; P.A. 17-72, S. 1; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1, S. 24.)
History: P.A. 81-353 increased the penalty from a class B to a class A misdemeanor; Nov. 15 Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-2 renamed offense by replacing “falsely reporting an incident” with “falsely reporting an incident in the first degree” where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to make a technical change for purposes of gender neutrality, delete in Subdiv. (1) a false report or warning re a “crime” and delete former Subdiv. (3) re a gratuitous report to a law enforcement officer or agency re an offense or incident, said provision being reenacted as Sec. 53a-180c by same act, and amended Subsec. (b) to increase penalty from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony, effective January 1, 2002; P.A. 17-72 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (3) re large scale emergency response and added Subsec. (c) re financial restitution in case of a violation of Subsec. (a)(3); July Sp. Sess. P.A. 20-1 amended Subsec. (a) by adding Subdiv. (4) re a violation of Subdiv. (1), (2) or (3) and amended Subsec. (b) by designating existing penalty as Subdiv. (1) for a violation of Subsec. (a)(1), (a)(2) or (a)(3) and adding Subdiv. (2) re class C felony.
Cited. 186 C. 265; 188 C. 161; 200 C. 743; 216 C. 301; 219 C. 529; Id., 557; 221 C. 93; 223 C. 635; 224 C. 627; 227 C. 1; 238 C. 588.
Cited. 14 CA 548; 19 CA 396; 29 CA 843; 36 CA 556. Evidence was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict under section. 55 CA 475.
Cited. 34 CS 666.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
35
cases (
5 in the last 5 years), 1977–2025 · leading case:
Green v. Donroe, 440 A.2d 973 (Conn. 1982).
Green v. Donroe, 440 A.2d 973 (Conn. 1982).
· cites it 4× “NOTES [1] General Statutes § 53a-180 provides in part as follows: "(a) A person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, he .”
State v. Ancona, 854 A.2d 718 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 3× “to 1997) § 53a-180 (a) (3) (C). 3 The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict, 4 from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court.”
State v. Bell, 739 A.2d 714 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
· cites it 10× “The defendant, Frank Bell, appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a) (3), criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107 and…”
State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300 (Conn. 1992).
· cites it 2× “Pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-180, if Edwin had made a false statement to the police, he would have been guilty of a class A misdemeanor and, thus, could have received a term of imprisonment of up to one year.”
State v. Barton, 594 A.2d 917 (Conn. 1991).
· cites it 2× “Those consequences might range from a loss of confidence or *551 indulgence by the police to prosecution for the class A misdemeanor of falsely reporting an incident under General Statutes § 53a-180, had the information supplied proved to be a fabrication.”
State v. Johnson, 944 A.2d 297 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 2× “The fact that an informant’s identity is known to police is significant because “the informant could expect adverse consequences if the information that he provided was erroneous. Those consequences might range from a loss of confidence or indulgence by the police to prosecution…”
State v. Newsome, 682 A.2d 972 (Conn. 1996).
· cites it 2× “Furthermore, Womble’s out-of-court statement to DeSarli had, as noted in Whelan , the “added assurance of reliability that, if untrue, [Womble] faced prosecution for falsely reporting an incident to the police; General Statutes § 53a-180; State v. Altrui, 188 Conn.”
State v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631 (Conn. 2021).
· cites it 2× “is significant because the informant could expect adverse conse- quences if the information that he provided was errone- ous. Those consequences might range from a loss of confidence or indulgence by the police to prosecution for .”
State v. Alvarez, 579 A.2d 515 (Conn. 1990).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 53a-180. Further, the declarant testified at trial and was available to be extensively cross-examined by the defendant.”
State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993).
· cites it 2× “Finally, the issuing judge could properly have inferred the informant’s reliability from the fact that “the informant was not anonymous, but known [by the police,] and therefore risked both loss of credibility with the police and possible prosecution for falsely reporting an…”
State v. Altrui, 448 A.2d 837 (Conn. 1982).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 53a-180. In these circumstances the privilege against self-incrimination removed him from the horns of his dilemma.”
State v. Whelan, 513 A.2d 86 (Conn. 1986).
“This statement, given to a police officer, had the added assurance of reliability that, if untrue, Garassino faced prosecution for falsely reporting an incident to the police; General Statutes *755 § 53a-180; State v. Altrui, 188 Conn. 161, 175 , 448 A.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-180(c) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-180(d) — 1 case
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