(a) An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody or institution to which he was sentenced.
(b) A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced. Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows: (1) If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run; (2) if the sentences run consecutively, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term.
(c) When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense or for an offense based on the same act, the new sentence shall be calculated as if it had commenced at the time the vacated sentence commenced, and all time served under or credited against the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence.
(d) When a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment escapes, the escape shall interrupt the sentence and such interruption shall continue until the return of such person to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 38; P.A. 92-260, S. 17.)
History: P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (c).
Calculations of terms of imprisonment discussed. 185 C. 124. Cited. 230 C. 17.
Cited. 9 CA 686; 33 CA 205; 45 CA 566.
Cited. 40 CS 354.
Subsec. (b):
Cited. 209 C. 23; 217 C. 568; 228 C. 384. Where habeas corpus petitioner was convicted and sentenced on separate charges in April and September of same year, and the September sentence was to run concurrent to the April sentence, petitioner's September sentence began to run in September, because that is when he was “received in the custody to which he was sentenced”. 274 C. 563.
Cited. 34 CA 503.
Subsec. (c):
Cited. 202 C. 343; 215 C. 695; 216 C. 220. Fundamental purpose is to afford inmate credit toward current sentence for time that he was confined as direct result of his initial trial on same charges and therefore petitioner entitled to credit toward his prison sentence for time that he was confined in mental health facility. 258 C. 394.
Cited. 30 CA 190; 39 CA 455. Proper method for calculating terms of imprisonment discussed. 90 CA 460.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
46
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 1981–2026 · leading case:
Moscone v. Manson, 440 A.2d 848 (Conn. 1981).
Moscone v. Manson, 440 A.2d 848 (Conn. 1981).
· cites it 52× “The governing statutes are, on the one hand, General Statutes §§ 18-7 and 18-7a, and, on the other hand, General Statutes § 53a-38. For present purposes, the two former sections are notable because they prescribe different formulae by which to calculate good time credit…”
Connelly v. Comm'r of Corr., 780 A.2d 903 (Conn. 2001).
· cites it 27× “The primary issue raised by this appeal is whether an insanity 1 acquittee who succeeds in having his acquittal vacated and, following a retrial, is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, is entitled, under General Statutes § 53a-38 (c), 2 to credit *397 toward his…”
Harris v. Comm'r of Corr., 860 A.2d 715 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 14× “Since the Hartford II sentence was *814 ordered to ran concurrently with all other sentences that the petitioner was serving, it became the controlling sentence for the purpose of establishing the petitioner’s discharge date pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-38 (b). 9 The…”
Whitaker v. Comm'r of Corr., 878 A.2d 321 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
· cites it 31× “The petitioner contends that the court improperly concluded that (1) the respondent properly construed and applied General Statutes § 18-98d and did not violate his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process, as well as the separation of powers doctrine, and (2)…”
Washington v. Comm'r of Corr., 950 A.2d 1220 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 8× “Because a sentencing court may order sentences to be served concurrently, we also must consider the language of General Statutes § 53a-38 (b). That statute provides in relevant part: “Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as…”
Rivera v. Comm'r of Corr., 756 A.2d 1264 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 9× “It provides in relevant part: ‘If the sentences run concurrently, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest term to run [General Statutes § 53a-38 (b)]. “In [Payton], the [commissioner] determined that the two and one-half year term…”
State v. Brown, 192 Conn. App. 147 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
· cites it 17× “’’ 2 General Statutes § 53a-38 (b) provides: ‘‘A definite sentence of imprison- ment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced.”
Wright v. Comm'r of Corr., 578 A.2d 1071 (Conn. 1990).
· cites it 16× “General Statutes § 53a-38 (c) provides: “When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense or for an offense based on the same act .”
Tyson v. Comm'r of Corr., 808 A.2d 653 (Conn. 2002).
· cites it 10× “” General Statutes § 53a-38 (b) (l) 3 (concurrent sentences “satisfied by *809 discharge of the term which has the longest term to run”).”
Oliphant v. Comm'r of Corr., 877 A.2d 761 (Conn. 2005).
· cites it 6× “General Statutes § 53a-38 (b) provides in relevant part that “[a] definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the custody to which he was sentenced.”
James v. Comm'r of Corr., 170 A.3d 662 (Conn. 2017).
· cites it 10× “Therefore, General Statutes § 53a-38(b) is applicable.”
Sutton v. Lopes, 521 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1987).
· cites it 13× “The respondent, however, argues that General Statutes § 53a-38 (c) 9 applies and that it provides that only “time served” on the vacated sentence be credited against the new sentence.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-38(b) — 4 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-38(b)(1) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-38(c) — 1 case
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