(a) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or (2) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument other than by means of the discharge of a firearm; or (3) the actor recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (4) for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, the actor intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to such person, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or (5) the actor is a parolee from a correctional institution and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee or member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, the actor causes physical injury to such employee or member; or (6) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person by rendering such other person unconscious, and without provocation by such other person, the actor causes such injury to such other person by striking such other person on the head; or (7) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, the actor causes such injury to such person by striking or kicking such person in the head while such person is in a lying position.
(b) Assault in the second degree is a class D felony or, if the offense resulted in serious physical injury, a class C felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 61; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 18; P.A. 73-639, S. 20; P.A. 84-236, S. 4; P.A. 93-246, S. 3; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2, S. 5; P.A. 04-234, S, 2; P.A. 14-220, S. 1; P.A. 15-211, S. 4; P.A. 16-193, S. 28.)
History: 1971 act added Subsec. (a)(6) re physical injury to employee of department of correction or member of parole board; P.A. 73-639 deleted former Subsec. (a)(3) re physical injury to peace officer or fireman resulting from intentional attempt to prevent such person from performing his duty, renumbering accordingly; P.A. 84-236 amended Subsec. (a)(5) by changing “committed to” to “in the custody of” and adding phrase “confined in any institution or facility of the department of correction”; P.A. 93-246 amended Subsec. (a)(5) to delete from the scope of the offense a person who is in the custody of the commissioner of correction or confined in any institution or facility of the department of correction and with intent to cause physical injury to an employee of the department of correction causes physical injury to such employee; July Sp. Sess. P.A. 94-2 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add “other than by means of the discharge of a firearm” to reflect changes made to Sec. 53a-59 by same public act; P.A. 04-234 replaced Board of Parole with Board of Pardons and Paroles, effective July 1, 2004; P.A. 14-220 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (6) re serious physical injury by rendering person unconscious by striking on the head; P.A. 15-211 amended Subsec. (a) to add Subdiv. (7) re striking or kicking a person in the head and make technical changes, and amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re offense resulting in serious physical injury is a class C felony; P.A. 16-193 amended Subsec. (a)(5) by making a technical change.
Illegal confinement is no defense to assault on correctional officer. 169 C. 438. Cited. 171 C. 264; 172 C. 275; 173 C. 254; 184 C. 157; Id., 520; 193 C. 144; Id., 232; 197 C. 602; 198 C. 23; 199 C. 146; 216 C. 647; 222 C. 331; 231 C. 545; 237 C. 238.
Cited. 5 CA 590; Id., 612; 7 CA 701; 12 CA 221; Id., 320; Id., 679; 13 CA 667; 17 CA 200; 20 CA 75; 24 CA 13; 32 CA 224; 34 CA 1; 35 CA 138; Id., 431; 36 CA 59; 37 CA 338; 38 CA 598; 46 CA 486; Id., 691; Id., 741. To convict a defendant of assault in the second degree under Subsec. (a)(1), the state was required to prove that the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to another person and, acting with such intent, the defendant caused serious physical injury to that person. 223 CA 270.
Cited. 34 CS 531.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 171 C. 395; 175 C. 155; 185 C. 63; 188 C. 574; 190 C. 143; 193 C. 48; 194 C. 119; Id., 408; 195 C. 636; Id., 651; 198 C. 405; Id., 424; 199 C. 322; 201 C. 103; Id., 289; 202 C. 520; 204 C. 207; Id., 714; 209 C. 733; 211 C. 151; 220 C. 385; 221 C. 447; 222 C. 556; 223 C. 243; 226 C. 618; 227 C. 153; Id., 711; Id., 751; 228 C. 147; Id., 910; 230 C. 591; 235 C. 748; 239 C. 481.
Cited. 1 CA 584; 5 CA 40; 6 CA 701; 7 CA 27; Id., 95; Id., 377; 8 CA 35; 9 CA 161; 10 CA 50; Id., 330; Id., 462; 11 CA 665; 13 CA 386; 14 CA 463; Id., 472; Id., 493; Id., 586; 15 CA 586; Id., 704; 17 CA 226; 19 CA 245; Id., 576; Id., 618; 20 CA 27; 22 CA 586; 23 CA 83; Id., 447; Id., 502; Id., 705; 24 CA 264; Id., 563; Id., 624; Id., 685; 25 CA 104; Id., 275; Id., 565; 26 CA 114; Id., 145; Id., 242; 27 CA 73; Id., 322; 28 CA 290; Id., 645; 29 CA 262; 30 CA 95; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 147; 31 CA 58; Id., 140; Id., 448; 33 CA 647; 34 CA 691; 36 CA 641; Id., 805; 37 CA 437; 38 CA 247; Id., 777; Id., 868; 39 CA 789; 40 CA 757; 41 CA 47; Id., 333; Id., 515; Id., 565; 43 CA 205; Id., 252; 44 CA 125; Id., 307; 45 CA 591; 46 CA 24. Defendant's rights under double jeopardy clause of fifth amendment to U.S. Constitution were violated by his conviction of two counts of assault in the second degree resulting from conduct against one victim that was nonsexual, continuous, uninterrupted and close in time. 92 CA 586. Subdiv. (1): The question of intent is purely a question of fact and intent may be inferred from conduct, and whether such an inference should be drawn is a question for the jury to decide. 118 CA 315.
Cited. 39 CS 494. It is possible to prove assault in the second degree without necessarily proving risk of injury pursuant to Sec. 53-21(a), so assault in the second degree and risk of injury do not stand in relationship to each other as greater and lesser offenses. 48 CS 610.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
409
cases (
36 in the last 5 years), 1974–2026 · leading case:
State v. Ovechka, 975 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009).
State v. Ovechka, 975 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 46× “2 The state appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification, 3 from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court’s judgment convicting the defendant, Paul Ovechka, of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2). 4…”
State v. Nixon, 651 A.2d 1264 (Conn. 1995).
· cites it 50× “We granted the defendant’s petition for certification, limited to the following issue: “Under the circumstances of this case, did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant’s convictions, as an accessory, of assault in the second degree in violation of General…”
State v. Reid, 894 A.2d 963 (Conn. 2006).
· cites it 18× “[2] On April 25, 1997, the *967 state filed a substitute short form information charging the defendant with one count of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60. [3] That same day, the defendant entered a guilty plea to the substitute information.”
State v. Petion, 211 A.3d 991 (Conn. 2019).
· cites it 16× “The state disagrees but requests, in the event that we conclude otherwise, that a judgment of acquittal not be rendered on that charge and, instead, that the judgment be modified to reflect a conviction of the lesser included offense of assault in the second degree; see General…”
State v. Sandoval, 821 A.2d 247 (Conn. 2003).
· cites it 9× “found the defendant, Edwin Sandoval, guilty of one count each of the crimes of attempt to commit aggravated sexual assault in the first degree *527 in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-70a (a) (2) 1 2and 53a-49 (a) (2), 2 sexual assault in the first degree in violation of…”
State v. Nixon, 630 A.2d 74 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
· cites it 17× “General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) provides in pertinent part: “A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when .”
State v. Jones, 961 A.2d 322 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 12× “2 (third degree negligent assault) under count one of the information, (2) failed to instruct the jury on assault in the third degree in violation of § 53a-61 (a) (2) 3 (third degree reckless assault) as a lesser included offense of first degree reckless assault under count two…”
Luurtsema v. Comm'r of Corr., 12 A.3d 817 (Conn. 2011).
· cites it 8× “On February 17, 2000, the petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial, of attempted sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a)(2) and 53a-70 (a)(1), kidnapping in the first degree in violation of § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A), assault in the second…”
State v. Rios, 156 A.3d 18 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 8× “" We note that although § 53a-60 has been amended since the events at issue in this appeal, those amendments are not relevant here.”
United States v. Torres-Diaz, 438 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2006).
· cites it 8× “§ 53a-70b (“Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B felony”) and with assault in the second degree, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-60. Torres was represented by counsel.”
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 4× “ly, the crime of kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony that is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than twenty years; see General Statutes §§ 53a-94 (b) and 53a-35a; whereas robbery in the second degree and most offenses of sexual assault in the second…”
State v. Nixon, 886 A.2d 475 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
· cites it 12× “The defendant, James Nixon, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2). 1 The defendant was sentenced to a term of two and one-half years imprisonment,…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60(1) — 2 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60(a) — 6 cases
State v. Rios, 156 A.3d 18 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
“" We note that although § 53a-60 has been amended since the events at issue in this appeal, those amendments are not relevant here.”
United States v. Torres-Diaz, 438 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2006).
“§ 53a-70b (“Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B felony”) and with assault in the second degree, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-60. Torres was represented by counsel.”
State v. Ovechka, 975 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009).
“2 The state appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification, 3 from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court’s judgment convicting the defendant, Paul Ovechka, of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2). 4…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60(a)(1) — 2 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60(a)(2) — 9 cases
State v. Ovechka, 975 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2009).
“2 The state appeals, upon our grant of its petition for certification, 3 from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court’s judgment convicting the defendant, Paul Ovechka, of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2). 4…”
State v. Rios, 156 A.3d 18 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
“" We note that although § 53a-60 has been amended since the events at issue in this appeal, those amendments are not relevant here.”
United States v. Torres-Diaz, 438 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2006).
“§ 53a-70b (“Sexual assault in spousal or cohabiting relationship: Class B felony”) and with assault in the second degree, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-60. Torres was represented by counsel.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60(a)(3) — 5 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60(a)(l) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-60(l) — 2 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.