(a) A person is guilty of assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree when such person commits assault in the second degree under section
53a-60 or larceny in the second degree under section
53a-123(a)(3) and (1) the victim of such assault or larceny has attained at least sixty years of age, is blind or physically disabled, as defined in section
1-1f, or is pregnant, or (2) the victim of such assault or larceny is a person with intellectual disability, as defined in section
1-1g, and the actor is not a person with intellectual disability.
(b) No person shall be found guilty of assault in the second degree or larceny in the second degree under section 53a-123(a)(3) and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree upon the same incident of assault or larceny, as the case may be, but such person may be charged and prosecuted for all such offenses upon the same information.
(c) In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being pregnant it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was pregnant. In any prosecution for an offense under this section based on the victim being a person with intellectual disability, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know the victim was a person with intellectual disability.
(d) Assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person or a person with intellectual disability in the second degree is a class D felony and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(P.A. 77-422, S. 2; P.A. 80-442, S. 18, 28; P.A. 92-260, S. 29; P.A. 99-122, S. 2; 99-186, S. 15; P.A. 01-84, S. 6, 26; P.A. 11-129, S. 12.)
History: P.A. 80-442 amended Subsec. (c) to require that two years of sentence imposed must be served, effective July 1, 1981; P.A. 92-260 made a technical change in Subsec. (a); P.A. 99-122 changed the name of the offense from “assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree” to “assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or mentally retarded person in the second degree”, where appearing, added Subsec. (a)(2) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is a person with mental retardation and the actor is not a person with mental retardation, and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being a person with mental retardation that the actor did not know the victim was a person with mental retardation, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 99-186 changed the name of the offense from “assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree” to “assault of an elderly, blind, disabled or pregnant person in the second degree” where appearing, amended Subsec. (a) to include within the offense an assault where the victim is pregnant and added new Subsec. (c) to establish an affirmative defense in a prosecution based on the victim being pregnant that the actor did not know the victim was pregnant, relettering former Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d); P.A. 01-84 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add “or larceny”, effective July 1, 2001; (Revisor's note: In 2005, the Revisors recodified Subsec. (c) to reflect the separate affirmative defenses established by P.A. 99-122 and P.A. 99-186); P.A. 11-129 substituted “person with intellectual disability” for “mentally retarded person” and “person with mental retardation” and made conforming changes.
See Secs. 53a-321 to 53a-323, inclusive, re abuse of elderly, blind or disabled person or person with intellectual disability.
Cited. 180 C. 557; 199 C. 146; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282; 223 C. 243; 230 C. 400. Subsec. (a)(1): Subdiv. is unconstitutionally overinclusive because it can be applied to assaults that have no reasonable and substantial relation to the statute's purpose of protecting those who have a diminished capacity to defend themselves or who are particularly vulnerable to injury, but Subdiv. can be constitutionally applied to an assault on a person with a physical disability that (1) diminishes the ability of the person, or a part or organ of the person, to function properly, thereby limiting the person's ability to perform life's activities, and (2) diminishes the person's ability to defend himself from assault or renders him particularly vulnerable to injury. 340 C. 463.
Cited. 5 CA 594; 13 CA 133; Id., 420; 33 CA 616; 44 CA 307.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
48
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 1980–2023 · leading case:
State v. Dojnia, 210 A.3d 586 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
State v. Dojnia, 210 A.3d 586 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
· cites it 21× “Dojnia, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of assault of a disabled person in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60b (a) (1). 1 The defendant claims that (1) § 53a-60b (a) (1) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to…”
State v. Calabrese, 902 A.2d 1044 (Conn. 2006).
· cites it 7× “The defendant, Edan Calabrese, appeals from the judgment of conviction of one count of assault of an elderly person in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60b 1 in one case, and one count of violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes…”
State v. Kirk R., 857 A.2d 908 (Conn. 2004).
· cites it 4× “, General Statutes § 53a-59a (five years not suspendable for assault in first degree); General Statutes § 53a-60b (two years not suspendable for assault in second degree); General Statutes § 53a-60c (three years not suspendable for assault in second degree with firearm); General…”
Bowden v. Comm'r of Corr., 888 A.2d 1131 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
· cites it 4× “1 Under that docket number, the petitioner was charged with two counts of robbery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-136 (a), two counts of larceny in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-123 (a) (3), assault in the second degree of a…”
State v. Mandrell, 506 A.2d 100 (Conn. 1986).
· cites it 5× “, the defendant, Peter Mandrell, also known as Paul MacDonald, was convicted of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (3), 1 assault of a victim sixty years or older in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60b, 2 for *148…”
State v. Watson, 718 A.2d 497 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
· cites it 5× “The defendant, Robert Watson, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after *593 a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-59 (a) (1) and 53a-8, 1 assault of a victim sixty or older in the second degree in violation of General…”
State v. Bowden, 729 A.2d 795 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
· cites it 7× “Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court violated General Statutes § 53a-60b (b) when it *245 accepted his guilty plea, and, as a result of this impropriety, the trial court (1) misinformed him of the maximum sentence to which he could be exposed, (2) misinformed…”
State v. Metz, 645 A.2d 965 (Conn. 1994).
· cites it 2× “The defendant, Thomas Metz, was originally charged with assault of a victim over the age of sixty in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60b, a class D felony, and with interfering with a police officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a, a class A…”
State v. McColl, 813 A.2d 107 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
· cites it 2× “McColl, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (2), assault of a victim sixty years of age or older in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60b (a),…”
State v. Norman P., 151 A.3d 877 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
· cites it 3× “, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of three counts of sexual assault in a spousal relationship in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70b, one count of assault of an elderly person in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §…”
State v. Campbell, 429 A.2d 960 (Conn. 1980).
· cites it 2× “; (3) burglary in the first degree if the defendant was armed at the time of the crime, General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1); (4) robbery in the first degree if the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the crime; General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2) ; (5) assault…”
State v. Crosswell, 612 A.2d 1174 (Conn. 1992).
· cites it 2× “The trial court acquitted the defendant, as well as Howard, of the count of the information charging assault of a victim sixty years or older in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60b. The evidence at trial established Edwards’ age as over sixty.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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