(a) In any prosecution for an offense under this part based on the victim's being mentally incapacitated, physically helpless or impaired because of mental disability or disease, it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.
(b) In any prosecution for an offense under this part, except an offense under section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or section 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, living together by mutual consent in a relationship of cohabitation, regardless of the legal status of their relationship.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 68; P.A. 75-619, S. 2; P.A. 81-27, S. 3; P.A. 90-162; P.A. 13-47, S. 4; P.A. 19-189, S. 22.)
History: P.A. 75-619 deleted former Subsec. (b) which had allowed as affirmative defense the actor's belief that alleged victim was above the specified age in cases where age is an element of offense unless victim is under 14, relettering Subsec. (c) accordingly; P.A. 81-27 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under Sec. 53a-70b; P.A. 90-162 amended Subsec. (b) to exempt prosecutions for an offense under Sec. 53a-70, 53a-70a, 53a-71, 53a-72a or 53a-72b; P.A. 13-47 amended Subsec. (a) to substitute “impaired because of mental disability or disease” for “mentally defective”; P.A. 19-189 amended Subsec. (b) by replacing “53a-70b,” with “section 53a-70b of the general statutes, revision of 1958, revised to January 1, 2019, or”.
Cited. 192 C. 154; 198 C. 190; 202 C. 86.
Cited. 3 CA 374.
Subsec. (b):
Discussion of “cohabitation” and burden of producing evidence thereof for entitlement to a charge on the affirmative defense under statute. 181 C. 426. Cited. 209 C. 733; 233 C. 813.
Cited. 1 CA 724; 10 CA 709; 11 CA 102; 25 CA 384; 28 CA 581; judgment reversed, see 226 C. 601; 41 CA 604.
Secs. 53a-68 and 53a-69. Corroboration; exceptions. Time limitation for complaint. Sections 53a-68 and 53a-69 are repealed.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 69, 70; P.A. 74-131; P.A. 76-216; P.A. 87-223.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
18
cases, 1980–2017 · leading case:
State v. Suggs, 553 A.2d 1110 (Conn. 1989).
State v. Suggs, 553 A.2d 1110 (Conn. 1989).
· cites it 9× “The defendant contended that because cohabitation is an affirmative defense to the first degree sexual assault charge of § 53a-70; see General Statutes § 53a-67 (b); 5 the state, by charging the defendant with both the cohabiting and noncohabiting sexual assault crimes, placed…”
State v. Swebilius, 159 A.3d 1099 (Conn. 2017).
· cites it 4× “rm offense if defendant was unarmed and "had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed"); General Statutes § 53a-67(a) (affirmative defense for sexual offenses involving mentally incapacitated or physically helpless victim, or victim impaired because…”
State v. Kelly, 770 A.2d 908 (Conn. 2001).
· cites it 2× “2d 858 (1985) (failure to charge on General Statutes § 53a-67 [b], which provides affirmative defense of cohabitation to sexual assault charge); State v.”
State v. Preyer, 502 A.2d 858 (Conn. 1985).
· cites it 4× “By virtue of General Statutes § 53a-67 (b), 4 cohabitation is an affirmative defense to this charge of sexual assault.”
State v. Ignatowski, 525 A.2d 542 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
· cites it 8× “The first count charged the defendant with assault in the third degree on September 17, 1984, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 (a). Counts two, three and four continued to charge the defendant with sexual assault in the first degree on September 18, 1984, in violation…”
United States v. James Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2013).
· cites it 2× “, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-67(a). No state in this circuit, except possibly Iowa whose highest court has not decided the question, imposes strict liability.”
State v. Day, 661 A.2d 539 (Conn. 1995).
· cites it 2× “199 (failure to charge on General Statutes § 53a-67 [b], which provides affirmative defense of cohabitation to sexual assault charge); State v.”
State v. Arroyo, 435 A.2d 967 (Conn. 1980).
· cites it 3× “” 2 General Statutes § 53a-67 (b) reads: “In any prosecution for an offense under this part, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant and the alleged victim were, at the time of the alleged offense, living together by mutual consent in a relationship of…”
State v. Plude, 621 A.2d 1342 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
· cites it 3× “Commission to Revise the Criminal Statutes, Penal Code Comments, Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-67 (1969), p. 27. By enacting No.”
State v. Cayouette, 594 A.2d 1020 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
· cites it 5× “II The Cohabitation Charge The defendant objects to the trial judge’s charge on his affirmative defense of cohabitation under General Statutes § 53a-67 (b). 1 Before reaching the defendant’s claims, we must first address the state’s assertion that this issue was not properly…”
State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998).
· cites it 2× “Code §§ 61-8B-3, 61-8B-9 and 61-8B-12 (Michie 1997) (critical age of eleven and one-tofive-year range if victim less than age eleven and ninety days if victim under age sixteen); Wyo. Stat.Ann. § 6-2-303, 6-2-306(iii) and 6-2-308 (1997) (critical age fourteen raised from twelve…”
State v. Tozier, 46 A.3d 960 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
· cites it 2× “it shall be an affirmative defense that the actor, at the time such actor engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of such condition of the victim.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-67(a) — 3 cases
State v. Swebilius, 159 A.3d 1099 (Conn. 2017).
“rm offense if defendant was unarmed and "had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed"); General Statutes § 53a-67(a) (affirmative defense for sexual offenses involving mentally incapacitated or physically helpless victim, or victim impaired because…”
United States v. James Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2013).
“, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-67(a). No state in this circuit, except possibly Iowa whose highest court has not decided the question, imposes strict liability.”
State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759 (R.I. 1998).
“Code §§ 61-8B-3, 61-8B-9 and 61-8B-12 (Michie 1997) (critical age of eleven and one-tofive-year range if victim less than age eleven and ninety days if victim under age sixteen); Wyo. Stat.Ann. § 6-2-303, 6-2-306(iii) and 6-2-308 (1997) (critical age fourteen raised from twelve…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-67(b) — 1 case
State v. Swebilius, 159 A.3d 1099 (Conn. 2017).
“rm offense if defendant was unarmed and "had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed"); General Statutes § 53a-67(a) (affirmative defense for sexual offenses involving mentally incapacitated or physically helpless victim, or victim impaired because…”
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