(a) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person.
(b) Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony for which three years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 96; P.A. 93-148, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 93-148 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re three-year nonsuspendable sentence.
Cited. 169 C. 242; 171 C. 47; 172 C. 22; 177 C. 335; Id., 637; 178 C. 549; Id., 634; 185 C. 163; 186 C. 179; 188 C. 406; 190 C. 822; 191 C. 604; 196 C. 430; 198 C. 68; Id., 190; 199 C. 537; 200 C. 586; 202 C. 343; Id., 520; 206 C. 40; Id., 685; 208 C. 365; 211 C. 672; 213 C. 388; 231 C. 195. Omission of Salamon instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 302 C. 236.
Cited. 1 CA 697; 12 CA 268; Id., 613; 20 CA 437; 21 CA 411; 27 CA 786; 35 CA 740; 42 CA 768; 46 CA 486; Id., 691.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 178 C. 600; 179 C. 328; 180 C. 565; 182 C. 449; 187 C. 681; 190 C. 327; 192 C. 166; 197 C. 485; 198 C. 314; 238 C. 784. The legislature intended to exclude from the scope of the more serious crime of kidnapping and its accompanying severe penalties those confinements or movements of a victim that are merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of another crime against that victim. 287 C. 509. The court's repeated pronouncements that there are no minimum time or distance requirements to establish restraint within the meaning of Subsec., coupled with Subsec.'s prohibition of the act of restraint only when it is accomplished with the specific intent of preventing a victim's liberation, defeats defendant's claim that Subsec. is unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's actions. 294 C. 753. Lack of Salamon instruction was harmless because defendant was acquitted of all charges other than kidnapping and unlawful restraint. 299 C. 447.
There is neither any time requirement for the restraint, nor any distance requirement for the asportation to constitute the crime of kidnapping. 1 CA 697. By its plain terms, Subsec. gives fair warning to the public that if a person abducts another he is guilty of that offense. 83 CA 142. Statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the particular facts in issue because it failed to put defendant on notice that forcibly taking victim's arm but not moving her was a violation. 95 CA 332; judgment reversed, see 294 C. 753. Section not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant whose actions over a 2-hour period included using stun gun and restraints against victim and confining victim in defendant's car and home. 137 CA 29. Defendant possessed specific intent to prevent victim's liberation immediately prior to and during struggle; Subsec. not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant; defendant not subject to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement; cumulative convictions of kidnapping in the second degree and attempted kidnapping in the second degree violate constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 147 CA 598.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
146
cases (
12 in the last 5 years), 1975–2025 · leading case:
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 38× “A jury found the defendant, Scott Salamon, guilty of one count each of the crimes of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94, [1] unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95, [2] and risk of injury to a child…”
State v. Winot, 988 A.2d 188 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 46× “Accordingly, Justices Palmer and McLachlan were added to the panel, and they have read the record, briefs and transcript of oral argument.”
State v. Kitchens, 10 A.3d 942 (Conn. 2011).
· cites it 18× “The defendant, Marvin Kitchens, appeals [1] from the judgment of conviction, *947 rendered after a jury trial, of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a) [2] and unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §…”
State v. Shockley, 453 A.2d 441 (Conn. 1982).
· cites it 14× “[6] The proposed fourth count charged kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 and the fifth count charged sexual assault *703 in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2).”
State v. Winot, 897 A.2d 115 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
· cites it 15× “After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a), 1 attempt to commit kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-94 (a) and 53a- *335 49 (a) (2), and risk of injury to a…”
State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 4× “Ultimately, the defendant was charged with kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94, unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95, and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes (Rev.”
State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2006).
· cites it 5× “The defendant, Russell Kirby, appeals 2 from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94, 3 and one count of assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes §…”
State v. Truppi, 438 A.2d 712 (Conn. 1980).
· cites it 8× “After a trial to the jury the defendant was convicted on a four count information of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree, General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (2); assault in the first degree, General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1); robbery in the first degree, General Statutes…”
State v. Peeler, 140 A.3d 811 (Conn. 2016).
· cites it 4× “In Salamon, this court was confronted with whether an accused could be convicted under a kidnap- ping statute, General Statutes § 53a-94, even though the restraint involved in the kidnapping of the victim was incidental to the commission of another criminal offense; see State v.”
State v. Franko, 64 A.3d 807 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013).
· cites it 9× “Franko, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of kidnapping in the second *453 degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a). 1 On appeal the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion in…”
State v. Vega, 788 A.2d 1221 (Conn. 2002).
· cites it 4× “The defendant, Joe Burgos Vega, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of assault in the first degree *377 in violation of General Statutes § Boa-59 1 and one count of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §…”
State v. Williamson, 539 A.2d 561 (Conn. 1988).
· cites it 6× “to 1972) § 53a-72 2 and kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 3 in a jury trial arising out of an incident that occurred on October 17, 1971.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-94(a) — 1 case
State v. Winot, 988 A.2d 188 (Conn. 2010).
“Accordingly, Justices Palmer and McLachlan were added to the panel, and they have read the record, briefs and transcript of oral argument.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-94(b) — 1 case
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