Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41m (2026)

Motion to suppress

✓ current as of May 2026
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Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body or other authority of the state of Connecticut, or of a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that the communication was unlawfully intercepted under the provisions of this chapter; the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval. Such motion shall be made before the trial, hearing or proceeding unless there was no opportunity to make such motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the motion, in which case such motion may be made at any time during the course of such trial, hearing or proceeding. If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire communication, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of this chapter and shall not be received in evidence in any such trial, hearing or proceeding. The panel, upon the filing of such motion by the aggrieved person, shall make available to the aggrieved person or his counsel for inspection the intercepted communication and evidence derived therefrom.

(1971, P.A. 68, S. 13.)

Cited. 176 C. 17. Motion to suppress upheld since state's attorney failed to make formal oath or affirmation in connection with application. 180 C. 345. Cited. 191 C. 360; 194 C. 447; 199 C. 591; 212 C. 485; 224 C. 593; 238 C. 692.

Cited. 3 CA 477; 5 CA 634; 7 CA 660; 10 CA 347; 14 CA 605; 27 CA 596; 44 CA 249.

Cited. 30 CS 302.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18 cases, 1973–2019 · leading case: State v. Grant, 404 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1978).
State v. Grant, 404 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1978). · cites it 20× “The court concluded that suppression of the evidence was required by General Statutes § 54-41m and Practice Book, 1963, § 2234 and subsequently, the defendant's motion to dismiss was granted.”
State v. McVeigh, 620 A.2d 133 (Conn. 1993). · cites it 10× “The trial court ruled that the interception of the defendants’ conversations over their cordless telephone: (1) did not constitute interceptions of wire communications within the meaning of § 54-41a (1) and, therefore, the defendants’ communications had not been “unlawfully…”
State v. Brown, 202 A.3d 1003 (Conn. 2019). · cites it 4× “By contrast, as the state points out, General Statutes § 54-41m expressly provides that a person aggrieved by a communication that was allegedly "unlawfully intercepted" pursuant to chapter 959a, which governs wire-tapping and electronic surveillance, may file a motion to…”
State v. Calash, 563 A.2d 660 (Conn. 1989). · cites it 9× “” According to this argument, § 54-41e requires, at a minimum, a pro forma written statement that fully tracks the statutory language of § 54-41d (1) through (9).”
State v. Formica, 489 A.2d 1060 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985). · cites it 7× “General Statutes § 54-41m provides for suppression of the contents of any intercepted wire communication or evidence derived therefrom on the ground, inter alia, that “the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.”
State v. Brown, 543 A.2d 750 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988). · cites it 2× “Neither the language nor the purpose of General Statutes § 54-41k supports the defendant’s argument.”
State v. Assuntino, 429 A.2d 900 (Conn. 1980). · cites it 2× “If the application is improper, the statute itself, General Statutes § 54-41m, provides that unauthorized and hence unlawfully intercepted communications “or evidence derived therefrom” may be suppressed upon the motion of “[a]ny aggrieved person in any trial .”
State v. Scott, 522 A.2d 1245 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987). · cites it 4× “” General Statutes § 54-41a (10), in turn, defines the term “aggrieved person” to mean “a person who was a party to any intercepted wire communication, a person against whom the interception was directed, a person named in any order authorizing an interception, or a person…”
State v. Ralston, 510 A.2d 1346 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986). · cites it 2× “) Thus, this statutory distinction between the language of General Statutes §§ 54-41c (5) (D) and 54-41d (1) belies the defendant’s argument. The defendant’s interests are adequately protected in the statute by permitting him *680 to challenge the validity of the wiretap order…”
State v. Telesca, 508 A.2d 1367 (Conn. 1986). · cites it 2× “Challenging both the sufficiency and veracity of Lawlor’s affidavit the defendants filed pretrial motions to suppress the contents of the intercepted communications, and the evidence derived therefrom, pursuant *595 to General Statutes § 54-41m.”
State v. Ross, 481 A.2d 730 (Conn. 1984). “The provision in § 54-41m that any “aggrieved person” may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire communication or any of the evidence derived therefrom on any of the several grounds is one demonstration of the legislature’s comprehensive efforts to protect fully…”
State v. Novoa, 607 A.2d 900 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992). · cites it 4× “The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress such evidence pursuant to General Statutes § 54-41m. 4 General Statutes § 54-41b provides that an application may be made to a panel of judges to obtain authorization for the interception of a wire communication when…”
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