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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 54 — Criminal ProcedureChapter 960 — Information, Procedure and Bail

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56 (2025)

Dismissal of information by court

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1959–2025 67citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 67 opinions since 1959, 6 of them in the last five years.

All courts having jurisdiction of criminal cases shall at all times have jurisdiction and control over informations and criminal cases pending therein and may, at any time, upon motion by the defendant, dismiss any information and order such defendant discharged if, in the opinion of the court, there is not sufficient evidence or cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information or the placing of the person accused therein on trial.

(1949 Rev., S. 8769.)

Cited. 170 C. 337. In absence of statutory authority, court may not of its own motion dismiss a criminal prosecution unless there is fundamental legal defect in information or indictment or constitutional defect such as denial of speedy trial or illegality of arrest. 172 C. 608. Cited. 189 C. 42; 193 C. 474; Id., 602; 198 C. 435; 200 C. 440. Trial court did not abuse its discretion having properly found “cause” to dismiss with prejudice. Id., 453. Cited. 204 C. 187; 207 C. 374; 209 C. 225; 213 C. 708; 214 C. 657; 229 C. 716; 242 C. 409. Absent compliance with section, trial court did not have authority to dismiss pending misdemeanor charge because, in trial court's view, case was not sufficiently important to warrant time and expense of jury trial. 243 C. 690. Dismissal of an information may be predicated upon either insufficient evidence or insufficient cause, but only in the most compelling of circumstances. 305 C. 330.

Cited. 4 CA 520; 5 CA 347; 7 CA 46; 8 CA 607; 11 CA 224. Insufficient cause “prong” of statute is inappropriate basis for dismissal of information preceded by arrest warrant where no trial has yet been held. 19 CA 495. Cited. 20 CA 321; 21 CA 210; 24 CA 195; 29 CA 689; 40 CA 789; 45 CA 722.

Purpose and history of law. 13 CS 112. Cited. 21 CS 246. Resort to section is not proper method to raise issue of jurisdiction of court over person of defendant. 28 CS 512. Purpose of motion to dismiss is to prevent unchecked powers by prosecuting attorney. 29 CS 118. Insufficient evidence and insufficient cause grounds of section may not be raised through pretrial dismissal motion in case where defendant was arrested on warrant signed by a judge. 49 CS 248.

Motion to dismiss count having been previously granted, motion for directed verdict on that count was properly denied. 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 78.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 54-56 13×cited by 157 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“374 , to dismiss the penaltyphase proceedings was improperbecause, by sanctioning a court’s exercise of discretion pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56, Daniels violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, as set forth in article second of the state…”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by instructing a jury that a deadlocked verdict results in a mandatory life sentence, as this improperly shifts sentencing responsibility away from the jury.
Later courts cite it for
“the first two prongs of golding involve a determination of whether the claim is reviewable; the second two . . . involve a determination of whether the defendant may prevail.” · 10 citing courts
2
GREENState v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 54-56 10×cited by 197 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“Indeed, the majority's universal rule of retrial will no doubt give pause to trial judges as to whether to exercise their discretion to dismiss these cases for insufficient evidence pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56. [30] State v. Kinchen, 243 Conn.”
The case’s holding
Courts may admit evidence of uncharged misconduct more liberally in sexual assault cases than in other criminal cases due to strong public policy reasons.
Later courts cite it for
“a limited exception to the prohibition on the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence in sex crime cases to prove that the defendant had a propensity to engage in aberrant and compulsive criminal sexual behavior.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Daniels, 550 A.2d 885 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 54-56 28×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“In such circumstances, we determined that the trial court may pursue one of three courses of action: it may declare a mistrial; it may make factual findings “acquitting” the defendant of the death penalty; or it may exercise its discretion, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56,…”
The case’s holding
A trial court may properly exercise its discretion to dismiss a death penalty proceeding and impose a life sentence when a jury is deadlocked on mitigating factors.
4
GREENState v. Dills, 563 A.2d 733 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
cites § 54-56 36×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“This case requires us to resolve the apparent conflict between General Statutes § 54-56 1 and Practice Book §§ 815 (5) and 816.”
Later courts cite it for
“where practice book 816 now 41-8 is invoked, the insufficient cause prong of the statute is an inappropriate basis for dismissal of an information preceded by an arrest warrant.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENState v. Kinchen, 707 A.2d 1255 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 54-56 27×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“We conclude that, in the absence of compliance with the relevant statute, General Statutes § 54-56, the trial court did not have such authority.”
The case’s holding
Trial courts are afforded significant deference when making factual findings (explaining in detail reasons for this deference).
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court is empowered to dismiss a case for insufficient cause under 54-56 only in the most compelling of circumstances” · 1 citing court
6
GREENState v. Bellamy, 495 A.2d 724 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 54-56 22×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“Upon the defendant’s timely motion, the trial court dismissed the information on three separate bases: (1) there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; (2) since the state’s “offer of proof” showed that no violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 could have been…”
7
GREENState v. Corchado, 512 A.2d 183 (Conn. 1986).
cites § 54-56 12×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“We need not reach any question of whether constitutional principles of due process or fundamental fairness may be the basis for the inherent judicial authority to dismiss with prejudice a criminal case in the posture of the one before us because we draw upon General Statutes §…”
The case’s holding
A trial court may dismiss a criminal case with prejudice if there is insufficient cause to justify continuing the prosecution.
Later courts cite it for
“there is not sufficient evidence or cause to justify the bringing or continuing of such information or the placing of the person accused therein on trial.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Mitchell, 527 A.2d 1168 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 54-56 8×cited by 108 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“” See General Statutes § 54-56; Practice Book § 815 (5).”
The case’s holding
An inherently suggestive one-on-one show-up identification is admissible if it is reliable under the totality of the circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“balances the nature of the intrusion upon personal security against the importance of the governmental interest inducing the intrusion.” · 5 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Pelella, 170 A.3d 647 (Conn. 2017).
cites § 54-56 7×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“The standard to be applied in determining whether the state can satisfy this burden in the context of a pretrial motion to dismiss under General Statutes § 54-56 and Practice Book § 41-8(5) is no different from the standard applied to other claims of evidentiary sufficiency.”
The case’s holding
A statement need not be imminent to qualify as an unprotected true threat; imminence is only one factor considered in determining whether a statement is a true threat.
10
GREENState v. Winer, 945 A.2d 430 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 54-56 8×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“ant thereafter filed two motions, which were ultimately consolidated in his *672 January 11,2005 pleading captioned, “Corrected Motion To Construe A Nolle And To Dismiss With Prejudice”: one motion to construe the charge as having been nolled and to dismiss with prejudice…”
The case’s holding
The recording of nolles and the subsequent erasure of criminal records are administrative rather than substantive in intent.
Later courts cite it for
“connecticut courts have made clear that the erasure provision spak cites is a purely administrative measure, state v. winer, 286 conn. 666, 679-80 (2008) (holding that 'the recording of nolles and later, the erasure of criminal records,' are 'administrative rather than substantive in intent').” · 4 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 54-56 7×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“30 If no Gerstein hearing is required, the defendant nonetheless has the opportunity to move to dismiss the charges pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56. 31 The court may dismiss the charges if it finds that there is inadequate evidence to support a finding of probable cause…”
The case’s holding
A juvenile possesses no constitutionally cognizable liberty interest in juvenile status because any special treatment based on age results from statutory authority rather than an inherent right.
Later courts cite it for
“any special treatment accorded to a juvenile because of his or her age with respect to proceedings relative to a criminal offense results from statutory authority, rather than from any inherent or constitutional right.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Daniels, 542 A.2d 306 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 54-56 6×cited by 77 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“See General Statutes § 54-56; State v. Corchado, 200 Conn.”
The case’s holding
A deadlocked jury in the penalty phase of a capital case does not constitute a finding regarding whether death or life imprisonment is warranted.
Later courts cite it for
“both the trial court and this court, on appeal, have the power, at any time, to correct a sentence that is illegal” · 4 citing courts
13
GREENState v. Jimenez-jaramill, 38 A.3d 239 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
cites § 54-56 15×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“In so doing, the court agreed with the state that, under the circumstances of that case, the dismissal of the charge against the defendant by the trial court “constituted an impermissible usurpation of the prosecutor’s authority to charge the defendant in violation of the…”
14
GREENState v. Rizzo, 31 A.3d 1094 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 54-56 4×cited by 63 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“[17] In the event of a hung jury in the penalty phase of a capital trial, the trial court has three options: "it may declare a mistrial; it may make factual findings `acquitting' the defendant of the death penalty; or it may exercise its discretion, pursuant to General Statutes…”
The case’s holding
A defendant's waiver of the right to a sentencing jury is valid if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates the choice was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Later courts cite it for
“opinions that judges may form as a result of what they learn in earlier proceedings in the same case 'rarely' constitute the type of bias, or appearance of bias, that requires recusal.” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Hammond, 778 A.2d 108 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 54-56 4×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“See General Statutes § 54-56. 5 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court, Schimelman J.”
The case’s holding
An anonymous tip lacking predictive information and sufficient corroboration of non-innocuous facts does not provide the reasonable suspicion required for a valid investigatory stop.
16
GREENState v. Eady, 733 A.2d 112 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 54-56 4×cited by 77 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“Subsequently, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56, 5 the defendant moved to dismiss the charges *434 against him for lack of sufficient evidence.”
The case’s holding
A warrantless seizure of contraband in plain view is reasonable if the initial intrusion was lawful and there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.
Later courts cite it for
“the immediately apparent requirement of the plain view exception is satisfied if, at the time of discovery of the contraband or evidence, there is probable cause to associate the property in plain view with criminal activity without further investigation.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Samuel M., 151 A.3d 815 (Conn. 2016).
cites § 54-56 4×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“If the action is dismissed or nolled or if such child is found not guilty of the charge for which such child was transferred or of any lesser included offenses, the child shall resume such child's status as a juvenile until such child attains the age of eighteen years.”
18
GREENState v. Joyner, 774 A.2d 927 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 54-56 3×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“General Statutes § 54-56 provides: “All courts having jurisdiction of criminal cases shall at all times have jurisdiction and control over informations and criminal cases pending therein and may, at any time, upon motion by the defendant, dismiss any information and order such…”
The case’s holding
Collateral estoppel applies only when the issue sought to be relitigated is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding.
Later courts cite it for
“for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue concerning which relitigation is sought to be estopped must be identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Cyr, 967 A.2d 32 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 54-56 5×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“The trial court rejected the defendant’s contention that dismissal of the charges pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56 was warranted. Under the authority of § 54-56, trial courts overseeing criminal prosecutions “may, at any time, upon motion by the defendant, dismiss any…”
Later courts cite it for
“because the statute and its predecessors did not define the term 'operate,' and the legislative history of the statute is unilluminating, that task is left to the courts” · 1 citing court
20
GREENState v. Anthony, 588 A.2d 214 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
cites § 54-56 6×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 54-56
“On the eve of the trial, the defendant complained that the state had not complied with the court’s discovery order and moved to dismiss the case pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56 7 claiming that the state’s failure to comply with the discovery order had prevented him from…”

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Citing cases by year
195819912025

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 5 cases in 1986–1987. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Conn.31Conn. App. Ct.30Conn. Super. Ct.6
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