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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 54 — Criminal ProcedureChapter 960 — Information, Procedure and Bail

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-57 (2025)

Joinder of offenses of the same character

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1963–2026 89citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 89 opinions since 1963, 8 of them in the last five years.

Whenever two or more cases are pending at the same time against the same party in the same court for offenses of the same character, counts for such offenses may be joined in one information unless the court orders otherwise.

(1949 Rev., S. 8770.)

Court may compel state to elect between counts; 75 C. 201; 81 C. 1; or direct jury to find separately on each count. 34 C. 299. Effect of general verdict. 34 C. 299; 70 C. 73. Where same offense is charged in different counts. 74 C. 525. Where one count only is good. 66 C. 255. Right of accused to call for separate verdicts. 83 C. 298. Relation of counts to each other. 96 C. 427. One count charging two accused as principals may properly be joined with a second count charging one as principal and the other as accessory. 98 C. 460. Refusal to compel state to elect between counts held proper. Id., 461. Cited. 126 C. 84. Whether there shall be separate trials on different counts joined in indictment or information lies within trial court's discretion. 134 C. 109. Whenever two or more cases are pending at the same time against the same party in the same court for offenses of the same character, counts for such offenses may be joined in one information. 169 C. 566. Whether joinder of indictments and informations is controlled by statute or Sec. 829 of the 1978 Practice Book discussed; since rule regulates court procedure and does not infringe on any substantive right, rule controlled and court did not abuse its discretion by ordering joinder of two informations not of the same character. 187 C. 292; judgment reversed, see 303 C. 538. Cited. 204 C. 714; 205 C. 61; 209 C. 458; 210 C. 78; 215 C. 538; 216 C. 647; 234 C. 324; 235 C. 748; 236 C. 112. Joinder of manslaughter count and risk of injury to minor count permissible when factors weighed. 243 C. 523. Defendant did not suffer substantial prejudice by consolidation of charges against him because the evidence in both cases would have been cross admissible at separate trials to show a common scheme or plan on the part of the defendant. 287 C. 608. Under section, there is no blanket presumption in favor of joinder; section is directed at prosecutors and governs whether they may join multiple charges in a single information, while Practice Book is directed at trial courts; trial court abused its discretion in finding defendant's alleged conduct in felony murder case not so brutal or shocking to require separate trials, but error was harmless. 303 C. 538.

Cited. 10 CA 503; Id., 624; Id., 709; 14 CA 526; Id., 710; 15 CA 161; 18 CA 406; Id., 482; 19 CA 48; 24 CA 502; 25 CA 181; Id., 503; 28 CA 645; 33 CA 133; 35 CA 781; 36 CA 805; 37 CA 437; 41 CA 584; 42 CA 382; 43 CA 527; Id., 680; 45 CA 207. Joinder permitted where defendant holding knife injured victim while attacking her because physical harm not brutal or shocking; consolidation of three informations for trial ameliorated by court's explicit instruction to jury that offenses should be considered separately. 59 CA 529. Trial court is authorized by statute and rule to order a joint trial of charges against the same defendant. 70 CA 462. Joinder was proper because evidence relating to each crime would have been admissible in each separate trial to prove a common plan or scheme. 87 CA 150. Defendant was not subject to substantial injustice or deprived of due process when trial court granted state's motion for joinder because the matters were not so complex as to confuse a jury. 112 CA 711. Court did not abuse its discretion by joining charges of violating a protective order and threatening in the second degree because evidence from incidents on the relevant date for which defendant was charged for both crimes was admissible in both cases. 132 CA 414.

Where defendants were put to plea on a single information charging similar offenses concerning different complainants, court did not abuse its discretion in making such joinder. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 514. Cited. Id., 585.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-57 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Payne, 34 A.3d 370 (Conn. 2012).
cites § 54-57 13×cited by 144 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“In King , the defendant claimed that pursuant to General Statutes § 54-57, 4 only offenses of the “same character” may be joined for trial.”
The case’s holding
A defendant claiming prosecutorial misconduct must prove that improper remarks were so egregious that they collectively amounted to a denial of due process.
Later courts cite it for
“infringed a specifically enumerated constitutional right, such as the fifth amendment right to remain silent ....” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Gupta, 998 A.2d 1085 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 54-57 16×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“We conclude that the evidence in M's case was not cross admissible in the other two cases under the rule allowing evidence of other misconduct in cases involving sex crimes, that the denial of severance resulted in substantial injustice and that any resulting prejudice was…”
The case’s holding
Consolidating sex crime cases is improper when the evidence of one incident is not cross-admissible as propensity evidence and the resulting prejudice is beyond the curative power of jury instructions.
3
GREENState v. Davis, 942 A.2d 373 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 54-57 10×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“" See also General Statutes § 54-57 ("[w]henever two or more cases are pending at the same time against the same party in the same court for offenses of the same character, counts for such offenses may be joined in one information unless the court orders otherwise").”
The case’s holding
Thorough and repeated jury instructions to consider evidence separately cure the risk of prejudice from joining a brutal offense with less violent, legally unrelated offenses.
4
GREENState v. Jennings, 583 A.2d 915 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 54-57 6×cited by 99 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“The two informations were joined for trial pursuant to General Statutes § 54-57 and Practice Book § 829.”
The case’s holding
Crimes of assault and kidnapping are not considered brutal and shocking if the physical harm is not disabling and lacks elements of sexual derangement (State v. Jennings).
Later courts cite it for
“jury instructions cannot be read as sanctioning a nonunanimous verdict.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Atkinson, 670 A.2d 276 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 54-57 5×cited by 109 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“The defendant argues on appeal that the trial court incorrectly granted the state’s motion because “[t]he risk that the jury would improperly use the evidence of the escape to establish the murder, or that the defendant’s rights would be otherwise prejudiced, was great . . .…”
The case’s holding
Consolidation of offenses is proper when evidence of an escape offense is admissible to prove the consciousness of guilt regarding other factually unrelated offenses (State v. Atkinson).
Later courts cite it for
“we have previously acknowledged that prosecu-torial misconduct can occur in the course of closing argument.” · 4 citing courts
6
REDState v. Sanseverino, 949 A.2d 1156 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 54-57 4×cited by 58 cases
Overruled in part by State v. DeJesus: 15 citing opinions say in part, 3 limit it to other grounds, and 1 adds another limit ("to the extent").
Where it cites § 54-57
“*628 General Statutes § 54-57 17 and Practice Book § 41-19 18 permit a trial court to join similar charges in pending cases against a common defendant.”
The case’s holding
A kidnapping conviction cannot stand if the restraint of the victim is merely incidental to and necessary for the commission of a separate sexual assault.
Later courts cite it for
“under the facts of sanseverino, no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of kidnapping in the first degree on the basis of the evidence that the state proffered at trial.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Pollitt, 530 A.2d 155 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 54-57 4×cited by 108 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“In granting the state’s motion for consolidation pursuant to Practice Book § 829 2 and General Statutes § 54-57, 3 the court found that, because there was “a substantial probability that certain evidence in each case may be admissible in the other on the issues of identification…”
The case’s holding
A witness who has previously been hypnotized is competent to testify if the testimony is consistent with their pre-hypnotic recollections.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court will not have manifestly abused its discretion in denying severance if the state's orderly presentation of evidence has prevented confusion of the jury and has enabled the jury to consider the evidence relevant to each charge separately and distinctly.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Boscarino, 529 A.2d 1260 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 54-57 3×cited by 187 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“The defendant claims further that the complexity of the evidence and the manner of its presentation confused the jury, enhancing the probability that it would be unable to separate the evidence in each case. We agree with the defendant that, in these circumstances, the trial…”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by joining factually similar but legally unrelated offenses if the cumulative evidence risks preventing independent jury consideration of each charge.
Later courts cite it for
“practice book sec. 829.-trial together of indictments or infor-mations "the judicial authority may, upon his own motion or the motion of any party, order that two or more indictments or informations or both, whether against the same defendant or different defendants, be tried together.” · 2 citing courts
9
YELLOWState v. Johnson, 958 A.2d 713 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 54-57 4×cited by 31 cases
Overruled by State v. Payne on other grounds: 4 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 54-57
““General Statutes § 54-57 18 and Practice Book § 41-19 19 permit a trial court to join similar charges in pending cases against a common defendant.”
The case’s holding
An appellate court sustains a trial court decision if proper grounds exist to support the outcome even if the trial court reached the correct decision on mistaken grounds.
Later courts cite it for
“as this court repeatedly has observed, if a trial court reaches a correct decision but on mistaken grounds, an appellate court will sustain the trial court's action if proper grounds exist to support it” · 1 citing court
10
GREENState v. Jones, 662 A.2d 1199 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 54-57 4×cited by 84 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“Practice Book § 829; General Statutes § 54-57. A judicial authority may also order separate trials if it appears that a defendant is prejudiced by joinder.”
The case’s holding
Trial proceedings in capital felony cases must be bifurcated when a prior conviction is used solely to enhance the penalty to death to prevent undue prejudice.
Later courts cite it for
“that which the law allows and even encourages.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENState v. Greene, 551 A.2d 1231 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 54-57 4×cited by 77 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“The defendant argues that the joinder of these offenses prejudiced him in that the jurors were unable to keep the evidence of these offenses separate in their minds because the charges arose from factually similar but legally unrelated incidents.”
The case’s holding
A trial court may properly join two offenses for trial if evidence from each case would have been admissible in the other to demonstrate a common scheme.
Later courts cite it for
“the trial court properly joined the two cases for trial because, in the event of separate trials, evidence relating to each of the cases would have been admissible in the other” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Delgado, 707 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 54-57 6×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
““General Statutes § 54-57 8 and Practice Book § 829 9 expressly authorize a trial court to order a defendant to be tried jointly on charges arising separately.”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing severance where the joined counts involve distinguishable facts, the trial is not unduly lengthy, and jury instructions cure any prejudice.
13
GREENState v. Stevenson, 686 A.2d 500 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
cites § 54-57 6×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“General Statutes § 54-57; 3 Practice Book § 829.”
Later courts cite it for
“when all of the cases sought to be consolidated are brutal or shocking, they may be joined properly, if consolidation does not cause a high risk of one case being tainted by the unusually shocking . . . or brutal nature of the other, or others” · 1 citing court
14
GREENState v. David P., 800 A.2d 541 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
cites § 54-57 4×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“Specifically, he argues that because the cases against him were similar factually but unrelated legally, joinder was inappropriate.”
Later courts cite it for
“the respondent's failure to address the four prongs of golding amounts to an inadequate briefing of the issue and results in the unpreserved claim being deemed abandoned.” · 3 citing courts
15
YELLOWState v. McKenzie-Adams, 915 A.2d 822 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 54-57 2×cited by 90 cases
Overruled by State v. Payne on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 54-57
“General Statutes § 54-57 provides: “Whenever two or more cases are pending at the same time against the same party in the same court for offenses of the same character, counts for such offenses may be joined in one information unless the court orders otherwise.”
The case’s holding
The constitutional right to sexual privacy does not protect consensual sexual intercourse between a teacher and a student because the relationship is inherently coercive.
Later courts cite it for
“this court consistently has recognized a clear presumption in favor of joinder and against severance . . . and, therefore, absent an abuse of discretion . . . will not second guess the considered judgment of the trial court as to the joinder or severance of two or more charges.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Randolph, 933 A.2d 1158 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 54-57 2×cited by 89 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
““General Statutes § 54-57 provides: Whenever two or more cases are pending at the same time against the same party in the same court for offenses of the same character, counts for such offenses may be joined in one information unless the court orders otherwise.”
The case’s holding
The sixth amendment right of confrontation is a trial right that does not apply to preliminary examinations.
Later courts cite it for
“because, generally, the exclusion of evidence from the jury is ... a drastic sanction, one that is limited to identification testimony which is manifestly suspect . . . an identification procedure is unnecessarily suggestive only if it gives rise to a veiy substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Ellis, 852 A.2d 676 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 54-57 2×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“General Statutes § 54-57 provides: “Whenever two or more cases are pending at the same time against the same party in the same court for offenses of the same character, counts for such offenses may be joined in one information unless the court orders otherwise.”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by joining cases involving different victims if the misconduct against one victim is substantially more egregious than the others and jury instructions cannot cure the prejudice.
Later courts cite it for
“that the trial court's instructions to the jury were insufficient to cure the substantial prejudice to the defendant that resulted from the improper joinder.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENState v. Walsh, 728 A.2d 15 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
cites § 54-57 4×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“Pursuant to General Statutes § 54-57 4 and Practice Book § 829, now § 41-19, 5 the trial court, pursuant to the state’s motion, consolidated both informations for trial.”
The case’s holding
Joinder of sexual assault charges involving different child victims is proper where the incidents are discrete, the trial is not lengthy, and the jury is properly instructed to avoid prejudice.
Later courts cite it for
“on appeal, this court has the responsibility of conducting its own in camera inspection of the sealed records to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to release those records to the defen dant.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Herring, 554 A.2d 686 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 54-57 2×cited by 111 cases
Where it cites § 54-57
“The two then got out of the car and ran away. Shannon also testified that the defendant had admitted that he had participated in the Littman killing to the extent of carrying the body to the car and driving to the cemetery.”
The case’s holding
Delays by custodial state officials in processing interstate detainers do not mandate dismissal and are subject to a balancing test considering the length and reason for the delay.
Later courts cite it for
“under our case law, there are two points at which a witness' possible mental unsoundness is relevant: at or around the time of trial or of the incident about which he is to testify.” · 2 citing courts
20
REDState v. Gupta, 937 A.2d 746 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 54-57 4×cited by 10 cases
Reversed in part by State v. Gupta (2010): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case ("The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed in part and the case is remanded with direction to order a new trial in each…
Where it cites § 54-57
“General Statutes § 54-57 provides: "Whenever two or more cases are pending at the same time against the same party in the same court for offenses of the same character, counts for such offenses may be joined in one information unless the court orders otherwise.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196319942026

One bar per year. Tallest: 9 cases in 2008. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Conn. App. Ct.62Conn.27
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Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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