In accordance with the provisions of section
51-14, the judges of the Superior Court shall make such rules as they deem necessary to provide a procedure to assure a speedy trial for any person charged with a criminal offense on or after July 1, 1985. Such rules shall provide that (1) in any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of a criminal offense shall commence within twelve months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of the arrest, whichever is later, except that when such defendant is incarcerated in a correctional institution of this state pending such trial and is not subject to the provisions of section
54-82c, the trial of such defendant shall commence within eight months from the filing date of the information or indictment or from the date of arrest, whichever is later; and (2) if a defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit set forth in subdivision (1) of this section and a trial is not commenced within thirty days of a motion for a speedy trial made by the defendant at any time after such time limit has passed, the information or indictment shall be dismissed. Such rules shall include provisions to identify periods of delay caused by the action of the defendant, or the defendant's inability to stand trial, to be excluded in computing the time limits set forth in subdivision (1) of this section.
(P.A. 82-349, S. 2, 4; P.A. 83-1, S. 2, 3; P.A. 07-217, S. 194.)
History: P.A. 82-349, S. 2, effective July 1, 1985; P.A. 83-1 made provisions applicable to person charged with criminal offense on or after July 1, 1985, effective March 24, 1983; P.A. 07-217 made technical changes, effective July 12, 2007.
Cited. 202 C. 443; 218 C. 85; 233 C. 813. Exception to 60-day limitation period for acts of God and misconduct on part of defendant is a necessary implication. 242 C. 389. Cited. 243 C. 115. Trial court properly determined that the time that co-defendant's attorney was unavailable was excludable time for computing the commencement of defendant's trial. 252 C. 714. Administrative incompetence, whether founded in negligence, recklessness or a serious dereliction of duty, does not constitute “exceptional circumstances”, and therefore “good cause”, for the failure to bring defendant to trial before the 30-day period has expired. 265 C. 437.
Cited. 14 CA 244; 33 CA 184; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 707; 37 CA 384; 38 CA 868. Statutory right to speedy trial cited. 40 CA 483. Cited. Id., 643; Id., 757; 42 CA 144; 43 CA 488. Right to protection of statute waived by withdrawing motion and not filing for dismissal. 47 CA 91. Cited. 54 CA 361. Section codifies defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial and confers on Superior Court judges authority to make such rules as they deem necessary to establish procedure for implementing that right. 66 CA 357. Defendant not deprived of right to speedy trial when trial delay was occasioned by continuances requested by defendant's counsel, rather than by defendant, and defendant did not object. 78 CA 659.
Secs. 54-82n to 54-82p. Reserved for future use.
Notes of Decisions
Rivers v. City of New Britain, 950 A.2d 1247 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 14× “…action against a defendant when the reason that the trial failed to commence within thirty days of the defendant's speedy trial motion was because the defendant's attorney was engaged in a trial in another case. We first looked to the language of § 54-82m, noting that it…”
State v. McCahill, 828 A.2d 1235 (Conn. 2003).
· cites it 28× “McCahill, *439 after he was not brought to trial within thirty days after he filed a motion for a speedy trial pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82m 1 and Practice Book § 43-41.”
State v. Brown, 699 A.2d 943 (Conn. 1997).
· cites it 26× “The issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court was required by General Statutes § 54-82m 1 and Practice Book §§ 956B, 956C and *391 956D, 2 to dismiss the information against the defendant, Kenya Omari Brown, because he was not brought to trial within the time…”
State v. Bonner, 964 A.2d 73 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 10× “The defendant seeks to characterize this issue as a question of statutory interpretation subject to plenary review, framing his arguments as a challenge to the trial court’s interpretation of General Statutes § 54-82m 9 and Practice Book § 43-39 et seq.”
State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991).
· cites it 10× “A The defendant first asserts that his statutory right to a speedy trial, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82m, 21 was violated.”
State v. Joseph, 165 A.3d 241 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 10× “On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) violated his statutory right under General Statutes § 54-82m to a speedy trial, (2) violated his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, (3) violated his right to procedural due process by not holding hearings on his…”
State v. Miller, 998 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
· cites it 11× “On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) admitted into evidence certain out-of-court statements by the victim 1 and (2) denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82m. We disagree and,…”
State v. Day, 661 A.2d 539 (Conn. 1995).
· cites it 7× “, improperly accelerated his case to “on trial” status after the filing of his motion for a speedy trial pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82m. 14 The grava *831 men of this claim relates to standing.”
State v. Winer, 945 A.2d 430 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 8× “General Statutes § 54-82m provides in relevant part: “[T]he judges of the Superior Court shall make such rules as they deem necessary to provide a procedure to assure a speedy trial for any person charged with a criminal offense on or after July 1, 1985.”
State v. Ortiz, 252 Conn. 533 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 6× “23 Ortiz argues that his rights, pursuant to the sixth amendment of the United States constitution 24 and General Statutes § 54-82m (2), 25 were denied by virtue of the trial court’s decision.”
State v. Fernando a., 981 A.2d 427 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 4× “[18] General Statutes § 54-82m provides in relevant part that, "in any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of a criminal offense shall commence within twelve months from the filing…”
State v. Cote, 922 A.2d 322 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
· cites it 11× “On March 8, 2004, the defendant filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82m and Practice Book § 43-39 (d).”
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