(a) For the purposes of the general statutes, “state marshal” means a qualified deputy sheriff incumbent on June 30, 2000, under section
6-38 or appointed pursuant to section
6-38b who shall have authority to provide legal execution and service of process in the counties in this state pursuant to section
6-38 as an independent contractor compensated on a fee for service basis, determined, subject to any minimum rate promulgated by the state, by agreement with an attorney, court or public agency requiring execution or service of process.
(b) Any state marshal, shall, in the performance of execution or service of process functions, have the right of entry on private property and no such person shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused by the discharge of such functions.
(P.A. 00-99, S. 7, 154; P.A. 03-224, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 00-99 effective December 1, 2000; P.A. 03-224 amended Subsec. (a) by adding “For the purposes of the general statutes”, effective July 2, 2003.
See Sec. 2-90a re authority of Auditors of Public Accounts to audit trust accounts maintained by state marshals.
State marshals are not state officials or state employees, thus the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not available as a defense to an action for tortious conduct against a state marshal. 207 CA 490.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
8
cases (
3 in the last 5 years), 2003–2024 · leading case:
Decorso v. Calderaro, 985 A.2d 349 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
Decorso v. Calderaro, 985 A.2d 349 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 5× “5 On February 12, 2005, Longobardi evicted the plaintiff from the premises pursuant to the judgment of possession and General Statutes § 6-38a. 6 On February 24, 2007, the plaintiff commenced the present action against Calderaro, Zullo and Longobardi.”
Page v. State Marshal Comm'n, 950 A.2d 529 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 6× “Specifically, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the commission had “(1) exceeded [its] statutory authority, by implementing a policy that treated] state marshals as state employees, in violation of General Statutes § 6-38a; 3 (2) deprived state marshals of the use…”
Fine Homebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, 911 A.2d 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
· cites it 4× “That subsection provides: “Any state marshal, shall, in the performance of execution or service of process functions, have the right of entry on private property and no such person shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused by the…”
Thomas v. Zaharek, 289 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2003).
· cites it 2× “Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 6-38a, 6-38f, 6-38i (2000).”
Vossbrinck v. Hobart (Conn. App. Ct. 2021).
· cites it 16× “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) concluded that the defendant, as a state marshal, was entitled to sovereign immunity, (2) concluded that the defendant was entitled to statutory immunity pursu- ant to General Statutes § 6-38a (b),1 and (3) failed to…”
Magana v. Lupo (D. Conn. 2022).
· cites it 2× “” § 6-38a(b). A separate law specifies the authority of a state marshal in the context of a residential eviction.”
Kim v. Emt (Conn. App. Ct. 2014).
· cites it 2× “Rather, state marshals are independent contractors; General Statutes § 6-38a (a); see also Page v.”
State v. Richey, 226 Conn. App. 234 (Conn. App. Ct. 2024).
“3d 601 (2022) (holding that defendant did not uphold his burden of production and was not entitled to instruction of self-defense); see also General Statutes § 6-38a (b) (providing in relevant part that ‘‘[a]ny state marshal, shall, in the performance of execu- tion or service…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6-38a(b) — 2 cases
Fine Homebuilders, Inc. v. Perrone, 911 A.2d 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
“That subsection provides: “Any state marshal, shall, in the performance of execution or service of process functions, have the right of entry on private property and no such person shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused by the…”
Magana v. Lupo (D. Conn. 2022).
“” § 6-38a(b). A separate law specifies the authority of a state marshal in the context of a residential eviction.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.