(a) “Criminal negligence”. — A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to an element of an offense when the person fails to perceive a risk that the element exists or will result from the conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
(b) “Intentionally”. — A person acts intentionally with respect to an element of an offense when:
(1) If the element involves the nature of the person’s conduct or a result thereof, it is the person’s conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause that result; and
(2) If the element involves the attendant circumstances, the person is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist.
(c) “Knowingly”. — A person acts knowingly with respect to an element of an offense when:
(1) If the element involves the nature of the person’s conduct or the attendant circumstances, the person is aware that the conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(2) If the element involves a result of the person’s conduct, the person is aware that it is practically certain that the conduct will cause that result.
(d) “Negligence”. — A person acts with negligence with respect to an element of an offense when the person fails to exercise the standard of care which a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
(e) “Recklessly”. — A person acts recklessly with respect to an element of an offense when the person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element exists or will result from the conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.
11 Del. C. 1953,
§
231;
58 Del. Laws, c. 497,
§
1;
63 Del. Laws, c. 88,
§
6;
70 Del. Laws, c. 186,
§
1;
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
48
cases (
25 in the last 5 years), 1999–2026 · leading case:
Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507 (Del. 2006).
Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507 (Del. 2006).
“11 Del. C. § 231(a)(1), See Burrell v. State, 766 A.”
Pardo v. State, 160 A.3d 1136 (Del. 2017).
“11 Del. C. § 231(e) (emphasis added). 49 .”
Capano Mgmt. Co. v. Transcontinental Ins., 78 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D. Del. 1999).
“The risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation, a person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary…”
McLaughlin v. Carroll, 270 F. Supp. 2d 490 (D. Del. 2003).
“See 11 Del.Code Ann. § 231(d). 16 . Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are not subject to the procedural default rule because the Delaware Supreme Court will not hear such claims for the first time on appeal.”
White v. State, 173 A.3d 78 (Del. 2017).
“11 Del. C. § 231. 24 . 11 Del. C. § 604; 11 Del.”
El-Abbadi v. State (Del. 2024).
· cites it 3× “74 11 Del. C. § 231(a). 75 11 Del. C. § 231(d).”
Collins v. State (Del. 2025).
· cites it 3× “(25) Here, the Superior Court defined “recklessly” for the jury according to the language of 11 Del. C. § 231(e) but omitted the final sentence of the statutory definition, which pertains to voluntary intoxication.”
Amalfitano v. Cocolin (Del. Super. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 2× “50 11 Del. C. § 231. 51 Brown v. United Water Del.”
Wonnum v. Way, III (Del. Super. Ct. 2017).
· cites it 2× “24 11 Del. C. § 231. 25 J.L., 33 A.3d at 916 ; Higgins, 901 A.”
State of Delaware v. Leroy Berry (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. 2018).
· cites it 2× “”46 Regarding intent, 11 Del. C. § 231(b) states, A person acts intentionally with respect to an element of an offense when: (1) If the element involves the nature of the person's conduct or a result thereof, it is the person's conscious object to engage in conduct of that…”
XRI Inv. Holdings LLC v. Holifield (Del. Ch. 2024).
· cites it 2× “44 Under this framework, gross negligence “signifies more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention,” but it remains “a degree of negligence, while recklessness connotes a different type of conduct akin to the intentional infliction of harm.”
PJT Holdings, LLC v. Costanzo (Del. Ch. 2025).
· cites it 2× “87 11 Del. C. § 231(a). 27 Under this framework, gross negligence “signifies more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention,” but it remains “a degree of negligence, while recklessness connotes a different type of conduct akin to the intentional infliction of harm.”
— 11 Del. C. § 231(3) — 1 case
— 11 Del. C. § 231(a) — 17 cases
— 11 Del. C. § 231(a)(1) — 1 case
Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507 (Del. 2006).
“11 Del. C. § 231(a)(1), See Burrell v. State, 766 A.”
— 11 Del. C. § 231(b) — 4 cases
State of Delaware v. Leroy Berry (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. 2018).
“”46 Regarding intent, 11 Del. C. § 231(b) states, A person acts intentionally with respect to an element of an offense when: (1) If the element involves the nature of the person's conduct or a result thereof, it is the person's conscious object to engage in conduct of that…”
— 11 Del. C. § 231(b)(1) — 3 cases
— 11 Del. C. § 231(c) — 3 cases
Capano Mgmt. Co. v. Transcontinental Ins., 78 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D. Del. 1999).
“The risk must be of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation, a person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary…”
— 11 Del. C. § 231(d) — 5 cases
McLaughlin v. Carroll, 270 F. Supp. 2d 490 (D. Del. 2003).
“See 11 Del.Code Ann. § 231(d). 16 . Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are not subject to the procedural default rule because the Delaware Supreme Court will not hear such claims for the first time on appeal.”
— 11 Del. C. § 231(e) — 11 cases
Pardo v. State, 160 A.3d 1136 (Del. 2017).
“11 Del. C. § 231(e) (emphasis added). 49 .”
Collins v. State (Del. 2025).
“(25) Here, the Superior Court defined “recklessly” for the jury according to the language of 11 Del. C. § 231(e) but omitted the final sentence of the statutory definition, which pertains to voluntary intoxication.”
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