Delaware Code

6 Del. C. § 1-201 (2026)

General definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) Unless the context otherwise requires, words or phrases defined in this section, or in the additional definitions contained in other articles of the Uniform Commercial Code that apply to particular articles or parts thereof, have the meanings stated.

(b) Subject to definitions contained in other articles of the Uniform Commercial Code that apply to particular articles or parts thereof:

(1) “Action”, in the sense of a judicial proceeding, includes recoupment, counterclaim, set-off, suit in equity, and any other proceeding in which rights are determined.

(2) “Aggrieved party” means a party entitled to pursue a remedy.

(3) “Agreement”, as distinguished from “contract”, means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in Section 1-303.

(4) “Bank” means a person engaged in the business of banking and includes a savings bank, savings and loan association, credit union, and trust company.

(5) “Bearer” means a person in control of a negotiable electronic document of title or a person in possession of a negotiable instrument, negotiable tangible document of title, or certificated security that is payable to bearer or indorsed in blank.

(6) “Bill of lading” means a document of title evidencing the receipt of goods for shipment issued by a person engaged in the business of directly or indirectly transporting or forwarding goods. The term does not include a warehouse receipt.

(7) “Branch” includes a separately incorporated foreign branch of a bank.

(8) “Burden of establishing” a fact means the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its nonexistence.

(9) “Buyer in ordinary course of business” means a person that buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind. A person buys goods in the ordinary course if the sale to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the seller is engaged or with the seller’s own usual or customary practices. A person that sells oil, gas, or other minerals at the wellhead or minehead is a person in the business of selling goods of that kind. A buyer in ordinary course of business may buy for cash, by exchange of other property, or on secured or unsecured credit, and may acquire goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract for sale. Only a buyer that takes possession of the goods or has a right to recover the goods from the seller under Article 2 may be a buyer in ordinary course of business. “Buyer in ordinary course of business” does not include a person that acquires goods in a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.

(10) “Conspicuous”, with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is “conspicuous” or not is a decision for the court.

(A), (B) [Repealed.]

(11) “Consumer” means an individual who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes

(12) “Contract”, as distinguished from “agreement”, means the total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement as determined by the Uniform Commercial Code as supplemented by any other applicable laws.

(13) “Creditor” includes a general creditor, a secured creditor, a lien creditor, and any representative of creditors, including an assignee for the benefit of creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver in equity, and an executor or administrator of an insolvent debtor’s or assignor’s estate.

(14) “Defendant” includes a person in the position of defendant in a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim.

(15) “Delivery”, with respect to an electronic document of title, means voluntary transfer of control and, with respect to an instrument, a tangible document of title, or an authoritative tangible copy of a record evidencing chattel paper, means voluntary transfer of possession.

(16) “Document of title” means a record (i) that in the regular course of business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the person in possession or control of the record is entitled to receive, control, hold, and dispose of the record and the goods the record covers and (ii) that purports to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and to cover goods in the bailee’s possession which are either identified or are fungible portions of an identified mass. The term includes a bill of lading, transport document, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt, and order for delivery of goods. An electronic document of title means a document of title evidenced by a record consisting of information stored in an electronic medium. A tangible document of title means a document of title evidenced by a record consisting of information that is inscribed on a tangible medium.

(16A) “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.

(17) “Fault” means a default, breach, or wrongful act or omission.

(18) “Fungible goods” means:

(A) Goods of which any unit, by nature or usage of trade, is the equivalent of any other like unit; or

(B) Goods that by agreement are treated as equivalent.

(19) “Genuine” means free of forgery or counterfeiting.

(20) “Good faith”, except as otherwise provided in Article 5, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.

(21) “Holder” means:

(A) The person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person that is the person in possession;

(B) The person in possession of a negotiable tangible document of title if the goods are deliverable either to bearer or to the order of the person in possession; or

(C) The person in control, other than pursuant to Section 7-106(g), of a negotiable electronic document of title.

(22) “Insolvency proceeding” includes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or other proceeding intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the estate of the person involved.

(23) “Insolvent” means:

(A) Having generally ceased to pay debts in the ordinary course of business other than as a result of bona fide dispute;

(B) Being unable to pay debts as they become due; or

(C) Being insolvent within the meaning of federal bankruptcy law.

(24) “Money” means a medium of exchange that is currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government. The term includes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental organization, or pursuant to an agreement between 2 or more countries. The term does not include an electronic record that is a medium of exchange recorded and transferable in a system that existed and operated for the medium of exchange before the medium of exchange was authorized or adopted by the government.

(25) “Organization” means a person other than an individual.

(26) “Party”, as distinguished from “third party”, means a person that has engaged in a transaction or made an agreement subject to the Uniform Commercial Code.

(27) “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, statutory trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, any other legal or commercial entity, or any series of any of the foregoing.

(28) “Present value” means the amount as of a date certain of one or more sums payable in the future, discounted to the date certain by use of either an interest rate specified by the parties if that rate is not manifestly unreasonable at the time the transaction is entered into or, if an interest rate is not so specified, a commercially reasonable rate that takes into account the facts and circumstances at the time the transaction is entered into.

(29) “Purchase” means taking by sale, lease, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or reissue, gift, or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property.

(30) “Purchaser” means a person that takes by purchase.

(31) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.

(32) “Remedy” means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort to a tribunal.

(33) “Representative” means a person empowered to act for another, including an agent, an officer of a corporation or association, and a trustee, executor, or administrator of an estate.

(34) “Right” includes remedy.

(35) “Security interest” means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. “Security interest” includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9. “Security interest” does not include the special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of those goods to a contract for sale under § 2-401, but a buyer may also acquire a “security interest” by complying with Article 9. Except as otherwise provided in § 2-505, the right of a seller or lessor of goods under Article 2 or 2A to retain or acquire possession of the goods is not a “security interest”, but a seller or lessor may also acquire a “security interest” by complying with Article 9. The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer under § 2-401 is limited in effect to a reservation of a “security interest.” Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a “security interest” is determined pursuant to § 1-203.

(36) “Send”, in connection with a record or notification, means:

(A) To deposit in the mail, deliver for transmission, or transmit by any other usual means of communication, with postage or cost of transmission provided for, addressed to any address reasonable under the circumstances; or

(B) To cause the record or notification to be received within the time it would have been received if properly sent under subparagraph (A).

(37) “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:

(A) Execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or

(B) Attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic symbol, sound, or process.

“Signed”, “signing”, and “signature” have corresponding meanings.

(38) “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

(39) “Surety” includes a guarantor or other secondary obligor.

(40) “Term” means a portion of an agreement that relates to a particular matter.

(41) “Unauthorized signature” means a signature made without actual, implied, or apparent authority. The term includes a forgery.

(42) “Warehouse receipt” means a document of title issued by a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire.

(43) “Writing” includes printing, typewriting, or any other intentional reduction to tangible form. “Written” has a corresponding meaning.

5A Del. C. 1953, §§  1-20155 Del. Laws, c. 34964 Del. Laws, c. 152, §  268 Del. Laws, c. 249, §  370 Del. Laws, c. 86, §  172 Del. Laws, c. 401, §§  3-573 Del. Laws, c. 329, §  573 Del. Laws, c. 330, §  274 Del. Laws, c. 332, §  180 Del. Laws, c. 305, § 181 Del. Laws, c. 353, § 184 Del. Laws, c. 174, § 1
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case: Aventis Env't Sci. USA LP v. Scotts Co., 383 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
Aventis Env't Sci. USA LP v. Scotts Co., 383 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). “See 6 Del.Code §§ 1-201(19), 1-203, l-302(b) & 1-304.”
Off. Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), 486 B.R. 596 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). “6 Del. C. § 1-201. . See Official Comment 3 to UCC § 9-509 (6 Del.”
Friendly Fin. Corp. v. Bovee, 702 A.2d 1225 (Del. 1997). · cites it 3× “7 this Court held that written notice must be timely sent in accord with the mandate of 6 Del.C. § 1-201(38) (UCC). The Court reasoned that “such an interpretation gives greater protection to the debtor, eliminates the problems of proof associated with oral notice, and…”
Rushton v. Shea, 419 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1976). “6 Del.C. § 1-201(37). Section 9-102 also provides that Article 9, dealing with secured transactions, applies to “any transaction (regardless of form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property”.”
Comput. Sciences Corp. v. SCI-TEK, Inc., 367 A.2d 658 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976). “6 Del.C. § 1-201(37). But, the agreement between SciTek and Am-Fin contains both of the above terms and several other indicia of a financing device.”
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Bancorp Bank, 691 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D. Del. 2009). “6 Del. C. § 1-201(21)(a) (to be a holder, the check must be payable either to the person in possession of the check or to bearer).”
Wurtzel v. Park Towne Place Apts. Ltd. P'ship, 62 Pa. D. & C.4th 330 (2001). “§3-302 (defining holder in due course) and 6 Del.C. §1-201(9) (defining buyer in the ordinary course of business).”
Waters v. Delaware Moving & Storage, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2023). · cites it 4× “173 6 Del. C. § 1-201(10). 174 Id. 175 Plaintiff cites to one case to support her contention that a provision must be entirely in bold to be held conspicuous as a matter of law.”
Ballard Concrete, LLC v. CDE Global, ID (Del. Super. Ct. 2025). · cites it 4× “’”109 The term “Conspicuous” is defined in 6 Del. C. § 1-201(b)(10), and is laid out below: “Conspicuous”, with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person against which it is to operate…”
In re Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Trusts Litig. (Del. Ch. 2020). “220 Commenters likewise have recognized “precautionary” financing statements protect sophisticated parties’ option to structure a true assignment so that it also creates a security interest as a failsafe in 217 6 Del. C. § 1-201(35); N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 1–201(35) (McKinney)…”
Weinstein v. Luxeyard, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2022). “32 6 Del. C. § 1-201(24). 11 ‘commercial paper’ are not negotiable instruments and not subject to the rules of Article 3.”
In Re: Andrea Genrette (D. Del. 2019). “(citing 6 Del. C. § 1-201(b)(21)(A) and WBCMT 2006-C29 Office 4250, LLC v.”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(10) — 1 case
Waters v. Delaware Moving & Storage, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2023). “173 6 Del. C. § 1-201(10). 174 Id. 175 Plaintiff cites to one case to support her contention that a provision must be entirely in bold to be held conspicuous as a matter of law.”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(16) — 1 case
Waters v. Delaware Moving & Storage, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2023). “173 6 Del. C. § 1-201(10). 174 Id. 175 Plaintiff cites to one case to support her contention that a provision must be entirely in bold to be held conspicuous as a matter of law.”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(19) — 1 case
Aventis Env't Sci. USA LP v. Scotts Co., 383 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). “See 6 Del.Code §§ 1-201(19), 1-203, l-302(b) & 1-304.”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(21)(a) — 1 case
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Bancorp Bank, 691 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D. Del. 2009). “6 Del. C. § 1-201(21)(a) (to be a holder, the check must be payable either to the person in possession of the check or to bearer).”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(24) — 1 case
Weinstein v. Luxeyard, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2022). “32 6 Del. C. § 1-201(24). 11 ‘commercial paper’ are not negotiable instruments and not subject to the rules of Article 3.”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(35) — 1 case
In re Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Trusts Litig. (Del. Ch. 2020). “220 Commenters likewise have recognized “precautionary” financing statements protect sophisticated parties’ option to structure a true assignment so that it also creates a security interest as a failsafe in 217 6 Del. C. § 1-201(35); N.Y. U.C.C. Law § 1–201(35) (McKinney)…”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(37) — 2 cases
Rushton v. Shea, 419 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1976). “6 Del.C. § 1-201(37). Section 9-102 also provides that Article 9, dealing with secured transactions, applies to “any transaction (regardless of form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property”.”
Comput. Sciences Corp. v. SCI-TEK, Inc., 367 A.2d 658 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976). “6 Del.C. § 1-201(37). But, the agreement between SciTek and Am-Fin contains both of the above terms and several other indicia of a financing device.”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(38) — 1 case
Friendly Fin. Corp. v. Bovee, 702 A.2d 1225 (Del. 1997). “7 this Court held that written notice must be timely sent in accord with the mandate of 6 Del.C. § 1-201(38) (UCC). The Court reasoned that “such an interpretation gives greater protection to the debtor, eliminates the problems of proof associated with oral notice, and…”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(42) — 1 case
Waters v. Delaware Moving & Storage, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2023). “173 6 Del. C. § 1-201(10). 174 Id. 175 Plaintiff cites to one case to support her contention that a provision must be entirely in bold to be held conspicuous as a matter of law.”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(6) — 1 case
Waters v. Delaware Moving & Storage, Inc. (Del. Super. Ct. 2023). “173 6 Del. C. § 1-201(10). 174 Id. 175 Plaintiff cites to one case to support her contention that a provision must be entirely in bold to be held conspicuous as a matter of law.”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(88) — 1 case
Friendly Fin. Corp. v. Bovee, 702 A.2d 1225 (Del. 1997). “7 this Court held that written notice must be timely sent in accord with the mandate of 6 Del.C. § 1-201(38) (UCC). The Court reasoned that “such an interpretation gives greater protection to the debtor, eliminates the problems of proof associated with oral notice, and…”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(9) — 1 case
Wurtzel v. Park Towne Place Apts. Ltd. P'ship, 62 Pa. D. & C.4th 330 (2001). “§3-302 (defining holder in due course) and 6 Del.C. §1-201(9) (defining buyer in the ordinary course of business).”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(b)(10) — 1 case
Ballard Concrete, LLC v. CDE Global, ID (Del. Super. Ct. 2025). “’”109 The term “Conspicuous” is defined in 6 Del. C. § 1-201(b)(10), and is laid out below: “Conspicuous”, with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person against which it is to operate…”
— 6 Del. C. § 1-201(b)(21)(A) — 4 cases
In Re: Andrea Genrette (D. Del. 2019). “(citing 6 Del. C. § 1-201(b)(21)(A) and WBCMT 2006-C29 Office 4250, LLC v.”
Nationstar Mortg., LLC v. Sears. (Del. Super. Ct. 2015).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.