Bath v. Bushkin, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990). · Go Syfert
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Bath v. Bushkin, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
76 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 23 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Robert L. Kroenlein Trust Ex Rel. Alden v. Kirchhefer (ca10, 2014-08-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 43 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert L. Kroenlein Trust Ex Rel. Alden v. Kirchhefer
10th Cir. · 2014 · confidence medium
Courts applying the injury-pattern rule required discovery of the pattern of racketeering activity because a “pattern of racketeering activity” is a required element of § 1962(c) — the RICO subsection at issue in Rotella. 6 See, e.g., Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.1991), overruled by Rotella, 528 U.S. at 553 , 120 S.Ct. 1075 ; Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990), overruled by Rotella, 528 U.S. at 553 , 120 S.Ct. 1075 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wade v. Gaither
D. Utah · 2009 · confidence medium
The Clayton Act provides a four year statute of limitations, which begins to run at the time when a cause of action under the statute first accrues. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (b). “ ‘[A] civil RICO cause of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the existence and the source of his injury and that the injury is part of a pattern. ’ ” Bath v. Bushkin, Gains, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546 , 1553 n. 2 (11th Cir.1990)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cory v. Aztec Steel Building, Inc.
10th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
In Rotella, 528 U.S. at 554 , 120 S.Ct. 1075 , the Supreme Court rejected the "injury and pattern discovery rule,” which this court had adopted in Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that "a civil RICO cause of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the existence and source of his injury and that the injury is part of a pattern” (quotation omitted)). 6 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Poling v. K. Hovnanian Enterprises
D.N.J. · 2000 · confidence medium
See As sociation of Commonwealth Claimants v. Moylan, 71 F.3d 1398, 1402 (8th Cir.1995); Bivens Gardens Office Building, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546 , 1554-1555 (11th Cir.1990), ce rt. denied, 500 U.S. 910 , 111 S.Ct. 1695 , 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990). 8 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rotella v. Wood
SCOTUS · 2000 · confidence medium
See, e. g., Caproni v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 15 F. 3d 614, 619-620 (CA6 1994); Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F. 2d 150, 154 (CA8 1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F. 2d 817, 820-821 (CA10 1990); Bivens Gardens Office *554 Building, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F. 2d 1546, 1554-1555 (CA11 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lares Group, II v. Tobin
D.R.I. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990), rev’d on other grounds, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 354 , 111 S.Ct. 2773 , 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546 , 1554-55 (11th Cir.1990); Keystone Ins.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marshall v. American Federation of Government Employees
W.D. Okla. · 1998 · confidence medium
Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines, & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Klehr v. A. O. Smith Corp. (2×)
SCOTUS · 1997 · confidence medium
Bivens Gardens Office Building, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F. 2d 1546 , 1554-1555 (CA11 1990), cert. denied, 500 U. S. 910 (1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F. 2d 817, 820 (CA10 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc.
4th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir. 1990), rev. on other grounds, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 , 354 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2773 , 2777 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991); and Bivens Gardens v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1554-55 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910 , 111 S.Ct. 1695 , 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Guy R. Detrick Donna Detrick Fast Forward, Incorporated, and Northeast Container Corporation v. Panalpina, Incorporated Panalpina Air Freight, Incorporated Multi-Modal Freight Systems, Incorporated Multi-Modal Freight Systems of Virginia Sylvan Friedman, and American Motor Lines, Incorporated Baltimore Freightways, Incorporated Blue Star Freight Lines, Incorporated General Motor Lines, Incorporated Hagerstown Motor Express, Incorporated Jennifer Motor Express, Incorporated Maryland Transport and Storage Company Mills Trucking, Incorporated National Motor Lines, Incorporated New Windsor Express, Incorporated South Carolina Motor Express, Incorporated Tidewater Trucking Company, Incorporated U.S. Motor Express, Incorporated U.S. Transport Group Vista Motor Express, Incorporated John Does, 1-10, Guy R. Detrick Donna Detrick Fast Forward, Incorporated, and Northeast Container Corporation v. Panalpina, Incorporated Panalpina Air Freight, Incorporated, and Multi-Modal Freight Systems, Incorporated Multi-Modal Freight Systems of Virginia Sylvan Friedman American Motor Lines, Incorporated Baltimore Freightways, Incorporated Blue Star Freight Lines, Incorporated General Motor Lines, Incorporated Hagerstown Motor Express, Incorporated Jennifer Motor Express, Incorporated Maryland Transport and Storage Company Mills Trucking, Incorporated National Motor Lines, Incorporated New Windsor Express, Incorporated South Carolina Motor Express, Incorporated Tidewater Trucking Company, Incorporated U.S. Motor Express, Incorporated U.S. Transport Group Vista Motor Express, Incorporated John Does, 1-10
4th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990), rev. on other grounds, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 , 354 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2773 , 2777 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991); and Bivens Gardens v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546 , 1554-55 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910 , 111 S.Ct. 1695 , 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitney v. New Mexico Guarantee
10th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994) (§ 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 107 (1994); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir. 1990) (cause of action under RICO accrues as soon as plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, existence and source of injury and that injury is part of a pattern), overruled in part on other grounds Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). -6- In light of our conclusion that the entire complaint is time-b…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitney v. New Mexico Guarantee Student Loan Agency
1st Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.1994) ( § 1983 claim accrues when plaintiff knows or has reason to know of injury), cert. denied 115 S.Ct. 107 (1994); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990) (cause of action under RICO accrues as soon as plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, existence and source of injury and that injury is part of a pattern), overruled in part on other grounds Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). 15 In light of our conclusion that the entire complaint is time-barr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tom Grimmett, as Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Vincent Siragusa, and Joanne Siragusa v. Patricia L. Brown Patricia L. Brown, Ltd., a Nevada Corporation Beckley, Singleton, Delanoy, Jemison & List, Chartered, a Nevada Corporation, Tom Grimmett, as Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Vincent Siragusa v. Patricia L. Brown Patricia L. Brown, Ltd., a Nevada Corporation Beckley, Singleton, Delanoy, Jemison & List, Chartered, a Nevada Corporation
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Under this rule, the plaintiff must "discover, or be in a position to discover, the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity in addition to the existence ... of the injury." Caproni v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 15 F.3d 614, 619-20 (6th Cir.1994) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820-21 (10th Cir.1990); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546 , 1554 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Grimmett v. Brown
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Under this rule, the plaintiff must “discover, or be in a position to discover, the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity in addition to the existence ... of the injury.” Caproni v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 15 F.3d 614, 619-20 (6th Cir.1994) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820-21 (10th Cir.1990); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546 , 1554 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied sub nom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Galen Schrag Merlin Kaufman Michael Maloney Dale McCurry A.J. McCurry Robert McCurry Odel McCurry Cecil McCurry James Meier William G. Schwartz, John R. Nickelson, Individually, and in His Capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Neola Nickelson, James Craig Dodd, Esq. v. Ted Dinges, Jr. Gary Dinges Mark Youngers Charles Brooks Jay Ewing Robert \Bob\" Simpson Bonaventure A. Kreutzer
unknown court · 1995 · confidence medium
We have held that a cause of action under RICO accrues " 'as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the existence and source of his injury and that the injury is part of a pattern.' " Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990)(quoting Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Fla., Inc., 906 F.2d 1546 , 1554-55 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910 (1991)), overruled in part on other grounds by Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hamilton v. Cunningham
D. Colo. · 1995 · confidence medium
Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820-21 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Integrated Resources Real Estate Ltd. Partnerships Securities Litigation
S.D.N.Y. · 1994 · confidence medium
Tenth Circuit A district court sitting in the Tenth Circuit faced with the prospect of borrowing a state statute of limitations for federal purposes in a pre-Ceres case would follow the “most analogous state law limitations period.” Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 819 (10th Cir.1990) (rejecting district court’s application of Data Access); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1120-21 (10th Cir.1982) (applying Colorado’s statute of limitations for fraud); accord Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Schrag v. Dinges
D. Kan. · 1993 · confidence medium
Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines, & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546 , 1555 (11th Cir.1990), cert denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1695 , 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Industries, Inc.
D. Colo. · 1992 · confidence medium
Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines, and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCOOL v. STRATA OIL COMPANY
7th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Co. v. Bayshore Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir.1986); Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546 , 1553 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1695 , 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991); see also Mary Humes, Note, RICO and a Uniform Rule of Accrual, 99 Yale L.J. 1399 , 1407 (1990) (use of discovery rule is appropriate since most civil RICO claims will involve fraud).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCool v. Strata Oil Co.
7th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Co. v. Bayshore Nat’l Bank, 805 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir.1986); Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546 , 1553 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1695 , 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991); see also Mary Humes, Note, RICO and a Uniform Rule of Accrual, 99 Yale L.J. 1399 , 1407 (1990) (use of discovery rule is appropriate since most civil RICO claims will involve fraud).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Finkel v. The Stratton Corporation
2d Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1107 (4th Cir.1988) (en banc); Landry v. All American Assurance Corp., 688 F.2d 381, 391 (5th Cir.1982); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 943 (7th Cir.1989); Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 805 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir.1986); In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 823 F.2d 1349, 1358 (9th Cir.1987) (en banc); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 819-20 (10th Cir.1990); Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 784-85 (11th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Finkel v. Stratton Corp.
2d Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1107 (4th Cir.1988) (en banc); Landry v. All American Assurance Corp., 688 F.2d 381, 391 (5th Cir.1982); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 943 (7th Cir.1989); Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 805 F.2d 326, 328 (8th Cir.1986); In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 823 F.2d 1349, 1358 (9th Cir.1987) (en banc); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 819-20 (10th Cir.1990); Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 784-85 (11th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Calabrese v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
N.D. Ill. · 1992 · confidence medium
Several other circuits have added the fillip that in order to start the limitations clock ticking the plaintiff must also know, or at least should have known, that his or her injury was suffered as the result of conduct that was part of a pattern of racketeering activity (see Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d 702, 706-08 (3d Cir.1991); Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 153-54 (8th Cir.1991); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820-21 (10th Cir.1990); and Bivens Gardens Office Building, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Florida, Inc., 906 F.2d 1546, 1552-55 (11th Cir.1990)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Covell v. Photo Images, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
D. Kan. · 1991 · confidence medium
Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 819 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that no private right of action exists under 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Majir Kornblit, an Individual, Pat Wilsey, an Individual, Abe Barber, an Individual, Ralph W. Burnett, an Individual, Joe Esco Tire Company, a Corporation, Frank Merrill, an Individual, Jimmie R. Phagan, an Individual v. C.W. Cameron, an Individual, William M. Cameron, an Individual, Linda Cameron, an Individual, Commercial Bank, N.A., a National Banking Association, Commercial Bankstock, a Corporation, American Fidelity Corporation, a Corporation, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a Corporation, John Rex, an Individual, Steve Garrett, an Individual, and Jim D. Scott, an Individual, Roger Laubauch, an Individual, Henry B. Boecking, Iii, an Individual, Robert T. Helm, an Individual, Louis H. Brigham, an Individual, Earl C. Madison, Ii, an Individual, James A. Smelzer, an Individual, Harry Merson, an Individual, Majir Kornblit, an Individual, Pat Wilsey, an Individual, Abe Barber, an Individual, Ralph W. Burnett, an Individual, Joe Esco Tire Company, a Corporation, Frank Merrill, an Individual, Jimmie R. Phagan, an Individual v. C.W. Cameron, an Individual, William M. Cameron, an Individual, Linda Cameron, an Individual, Commercial Bank, N.A., a National Banking Association, Commercial Bankstock, a Corporation, American Fidelity Corporation, a Corporation, John Rex, an Individual, Steve Garrett, an Individual
10th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Granite Falls Bank v. John Henrikson, Mark Lindell, Clayton Management, Inc., and Lease Resources Corporation
8th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines, and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820-21 (10th Cir.1990); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Florida, Inc., 906 F.2d 1546 , 1553-54 (11th Cir.1990); Keystone Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnston v. CIGNA Corp.
D. Colo. · 1991 · confidence medium
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 146-47 , 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2762 , 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987); Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 818-19 (10th Cir.1990); State of Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 691 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 , 102 S.Ct. 392 , 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981); Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 743 F.Supp. 758, 759-60 (D.Colo.1990).
discussed Cited "see" WADDEKK & REED FINANCIAL, INC. v. Torchmark Corp.
D. Kan. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990) (RICO cause of action accrues when plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, existence and source of injury and that injuiy is part of pattern), overruled in part on other grounds Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 , 111 S.Ct. 2773 , 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991); K.S.A. § 60-513 (cause of action accrues when act giving rise to cause of action first causes substantial injury or, if fact of injury is not reasonably ascertainable until some time after initial act, when the fa…
discussed Cited "see" Gottstein v. National Ass'n for the Self Employed
D. Kan. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 , 107 S.Ct. 2759 , 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987). “[W]ith respect to each independent injury to the plaintiff, a civil RICO cause of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the existence and source of his injury and that the injury is part of a pattern.” Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990) (quoting Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546 , 1554-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 910 , 111 S.Ct. 1…
discussed Cited "see" Robert F. Davis v. James Grusemeyer, Raymond Gurak, Donald Yingling, David v. Brody, and Charles E. Waldron
3rd Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
We address these arguments in turn. *624 A. The Fraudulent Concealment Tolling Doctrine Fraudulent concealment is an “equitable doctrine [that] is read into every federal statute of limitations.” Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 , 66 S.Ct. 582, 585 , 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946); see Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 821 (10th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (standard tolling exceptions, such as fraudulent concealment, apply to civil RICO causes of action); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir.1988) (same), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 , 109 S.Ct. 1642 , 104…
cited Cited "see" Morin v. Trupin
S.D.N.Y. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 818-19 (10th Cir.1990); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir.1982); see also Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod.
cited Cited "see" Titus v. Geo-Engineering
10th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 818-19 (10th Cir.1990).
cited Cited "see" Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc.
D. Colo. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 818-19 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited "see" Ceres Partners v. GEL Associates
2d Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.1990) (declining to follow Data Access); Smith v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir.1990) (declining to follow Data Access without consideration en banc); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.1990) (same).
discussed Cited "see" Ceres Partners v. Gel Associates
2d Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.1990) (declining to follow Data Access); Smith v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir.1990) (declining to follow Data Access without consideration en banc); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.1990) (same).
examined Cited "see" Raul F. Rodriguez v. Banco Central, Raul Rodriguez Rodriguez v. Banco Central Corporation, Raul F. Rodriguez v. Banco Central (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
1st Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bath, 913 F.2d at 820 (rejecting “last predicate act rule” while holding that statute does not start running until plaintiff discovers pattern); Bivens Gardens, 906 F.2d at 1553-54 (same).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Exxon Mobil Corp. Securities Litigation
3rd Cir. · 2007 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 818 (10th Cir.1990); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir.1990); O’Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 , 17 (4th Cir.1980); Forrestal Vill., Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir.1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re: Exxon Mobil
3rd Cir. · 2007 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 818 (10th Cir. 1990); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1990); O’Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 , 17 (4th Cir. 1980); Forrestal Vill., Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411, 413 (5th Cir. 1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Waddell & Reed Financial, Inc. v. Torchmark Corp.
D. Kan. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 669 F.2d 490 , 494 (7th Cir.1982) (antitrust); see also Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990) (RICO cause of action accrues when plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, existence and source of injury and that injury is part of pattern), overruled in part on other grounds, Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 111 S.Ct. 2773 , 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991). 15 Because plaintiffs have alleged conduct under RICO which extended beyond the date when they filed their Alabama coun- *1282 terciarais and…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Appleseed Jesusdaughter v. Mesa County Department of Social Services Mesa County Sheriff's Department Mesa County Police Department
10th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir.1987); see also Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820 (10th Cir.1990)
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dababneh v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
10th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines, and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 819-20 (10th Cir.1990) (affirming district court's dismissal under erroneous time-bar application on alternative ground of failure to state a claim); Pullman v. Chorney, 712 F.2d 447, 449 (10th Cir.1983) ("When dispositive, indisputable, alternative grounds appear in the record and are raised on appeal, an appellate court may rely on them to sustain the judgment of the court below.") 3 Section 91 reads in relevant part: All transfers of ... evidences of debt owing to any national banking association, or of deposits to its cred…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dababneh v. Federal Deposit Insurance
10th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines, and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 819-20 (10th Cir.1990) (affirming district court's dismissal under errone ous time-bar application on alternative ground of failure to state a claim); Pullman v. Chorney, 712 F.2d 447, 449 (10th Cir.1983) ("When dispos-itive, indisputable, alternative grounds appear in the record and are raised on appeal, an appellate court may rely on them to sustain the judgment of the court below.”). .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John W. Bath James H. Benson Catherine E. Benson C. Rex Beougher Laurie Beougher Maurice Faler Helen Faler Terry Happel Joan Happel G.M. Harrison Mary Harrison H.S. Jackman Jeanne Jackman R.R. Lansang Clare Lansang Fred Ockers Sarahmae Ockers Cecilia Pickett Tom Smith Oscar Tellefson William Wilson Nancy Wilson Paul Yedinak Nancy Yedinak Robert Pickett and John Scott, Doing Business as Scith Enterprises, a Wyoming Partnership
v.
Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas, a California Partnership, Including a Professional Corporation, Formerly Known as Bushkin, Kopelson, Gaims and Gaines Henry I. Bushkin Arnold Kopelson John Gaims Frederick N. Gaines Jerry K. Staub and Judy B. Bushkin, and Michael Miller Patricia Kathleen Miller Ralph Smith Kathleen Roedeinger Jay Anderson Producer's Liaison Corporation, a California Corporation John Does, 1-20 and Jane Does, 1-20, and Metro Productions, Inc., a California Corporation Trafalgar Acceptance Corporation and Michael Roedeinger, Defendants-Counter-Claimants, and Cross-Claimants-Appellees
88-2587.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Aug 30, 1990.
913 F.2d 817
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 77%
Citer courts: Fourth Circuit (1)

913 F.2d 817

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,458, RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 7563

John W. BATH; James H. Benson; Catherine E. Benson; C.
Rex Beougher; Laurie Beougher; Maurice Faler; Helen
Faler; Terry Happel; Joan Happel; G.M. Harrison; Mary
Harrison; H.S. Jackman; Jeanne Jackman; R.R. Lansang;
Clare Lansang; Fred Ockers; Sarahmae Ockers; Cecilia
Pickett; Tom Smith; Oscar Tellefson; William Wilson;
Nancy Wilson; Paul Yedinak; Nancy Yedinak; Robert
Pickett; and John Scott, doing business as Scith
Enterprises, a Wyoming partnership, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BUSHKIN, GAIMS, GAINES AND JONAS, a California partnership,
including a professional corporation, formerly known as
Bushkin, Kopelson, Gaims and Gaines; Henry I. Bushkin;
Arnold Kopelson; John Gaims; Frederick N. Gaines; Jerry
K. Staub and Judy B. Bushkin, Defendants,
and
Michael Miller; Patricia Kathleen Miller; Ralph Smith;
Kathleen Roedeinger; Jay Anderson; Producer's Liaison
Corporation, a California corporation; John Does, 1-20;
and Jane Does, 1-20, Defendants-Appellees,
and
Metro Productions, Inc., a California Corporation;
Trafalgar Acceptance Corporation; and Michael
Roedeinger,
Defendants-Counter-claimants,
and Cross-claimants-Appellees.

Nos. 88-2587, 88-2659 and 88-2936.

United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.

Aug. 30, 1990.

Sandra Dougherty and Thomas H. Dahlk, of Lieben, Dahlk, Whitted, Houghton & Jahn, Omaha, Neb., and Dean Borthwick, of Borthwick, Lewis & Blythe, Cheyenne, Wyo., for plaintiffs-appellants.

No submission from defendants-appellees.

Before TACHA, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.[*]

PER CURIAM.

[*~817]1

By these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs seek review of a judgment of the district court dismissing their claims as time-barred.[1] Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines & Jonas, 695 F.Supp. 1156 (D.Wyo.1988). The facts underlying plaintiffs' involvement in defendants' tax shelter scheme are outlined adequately in Bath, 695 F.Supp. at 1158-1159, and we need not repeat them. Our resolution of this appeal turns on the answers to three questions:

2

1. Did the district court err in determining that plaintiffs' alleged violations of Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. Sec. 240.10b-5 (1989)) were time-barred based on a federal limitations period as stated in In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849, 109 S.Ct. 131, 102 L.Ed.2d 103 (1988)?

3

2. Does a private right of action exist under Sec. 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77q(a)?

4

3. When does a cause of action accrue for claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1961-1968?

I.

5

In Data Access, the Third Circuit held that the proper period of limitations for a complaint charging violations of Sec. 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Sec. 78j(b)), and Rule 10b-5 is one year after the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the violation, and in no event more than three years after such violation. 843 F.2d at 1550. Because Sec. 10(b) has no statute of limitations, the court looked not to analogous state law periods, but to other 1934 Act provisions which provide for the one/three-year limits. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-49; see also 15 U.S.C. Secs. 77m, 78i(e), 78r(c), 78cc(b).

6

While we recognize the simplicity of having a single limitations period for all Sec. 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims, the rule in this circuit is that such suits are subject to the appropriate limitations statute of the state in which the alleged violation occurred. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir.1982). Further, we are unaware of any circuit court electing to follow Data Access. See, e.g., Smith v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1569-70 (11th Cir.1990) (rejecting Data Access rule); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir.1990) (same).

7

The district court is bound to follow the precedent of this circuit, regardless of its views concerning the advantages of the precedent of our sister circuits. See Zuniga v. United Can. Co., 812 F.2d 443, 450 (9th Cir.1987) (district court is bound by law of its circuit); Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 867 (3rd Cir.1984) (just as one panel of the court of appeals is bound by earlier panel decisions, a fortiori, the district court is bound by this circuit's decisions); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, 663 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.1981) (district courts "are not to resolve splits between circuits no matter how egregiously in error they may feel their own circuit to be"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828, 103 S.Ct. 63, 74 L.Ed.2d 65 (1982). Accordingly, as to plaintiffs' Sec. 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims, the judgment of the district court is reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings under the most analogous state law limitations period in accordance with Tenth Circuit precedent.

II.

[*~818]8

The district court did not decide whether a private right of action exists under Sec. 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77q(a), because the court held that the limitations period would be the same as that for the Sec. 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims and, therefore, also time-barred. Bath, 695 F.Supp. at 1162. Because we have determined that the district court erred in choosing the Sec. 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 limitations period, we should address the issue of whether a private right of action exists under Sec. 17(a).

9

We do so because we signaled in 1981 that no such private right of action exists, Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 689 n. 1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S.Ct. 392, 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981), and because a conflict among the district courts within this circuit exists. Compare Richey v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 667 F.Supp. 752, 756-57 (W.D.Okla.1986) (private right of action under Sec. 17(a)); Westland Energy, 1981-1, Ltd. v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 603 F.Supp. 698, 710 (N.D.Okla.1984) (same) with Bradford v. Moench, 670 F.Supp. 920, 927-28 (D.Utah 1987) (no private right of action under Sec. 17(a)); Creech v. Federal Land Bank, 647 F.Supp. 1097, 1100 (D.Colo.1986) (same); Woods v. Homes & Structures, Inc., 489 F.Supp. 1270, 1288 (D.Kan.1980) (same).

10

Although the circuit courts have issued conflicting rulings, see Craighead v. E.F. Hutton Co., 899 F.2d 485, 492 (6th Cir.1990) (discussing split), six circuits (Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh) find no private right of action under Sec. 17(a). Sears v. Likens, 912 F.2d 889, 893 (7th Cir.1990) (finding no Sec. 17(a) private right of action based upon earlier decision in Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 942-43 (7th Cir.1989)); Newcome v. Esrey, 862 F.2d 1099, 1104-07 (4th Cir.1988) (en banc) (overruling prior precedent and finding no Sec. 17(a) private right of action); Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 783-85 (11th Cir.1988) (following reasoning of Fifth and Ninth Circuits finding no Sec. 17(a) private right of action); In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349, 1358 (9th Cir.1987) (en banc) (overruling prior precedent and finding no Sec. 17(a) private right of action); Brannan v. Eisenstein, 804 F.2d 1041, 1043 n. 1 (8th Cir.1986) (no Sec. 17(a) private right of action); Landry v. All American Assur. Co., 688 F.2d 381, 389 (5th Cir.1982) (same); Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 159 (8th Cir.1977) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98 S.Ct. 1281, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978); see also Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir.1990) (questioning validity of Second Circuit holding that a Sec. 17(a) private right of action exists). We agree with the analysis of our six sister circuits, including those which have reconsidered and overruled prior cases permitting private actions under Sec. 17(a). Joining the majority, we hold that no private right of action exists under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77q(a) (Sec. 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act). Thus, we affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal on this claim, but on different grounds.

III.

[*~819]11

We next consider the RICO accrual question. In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 2767, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a civil RICO claim must be brought within four years after the earliest time the cause of action could have accrued. See Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1273 n. 12 (10th Cir.1989) (following Malley-Duff ). The Court did not decide, however, the appropriate time of accrual for a RICO claim. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 157, 107 S.Ct. at 2768. Accrual of a cause of action based on federal law is a question of federal law. Ebrahimi v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 852 F.2d 516, 520 (10th Cir.1988); Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir.1987) (en banc agreement on this point).

12

The district court indicated that a civil RICO claim accrued when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which is the basis for the action, relying upon Compton v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir.1984). Bath, 695 F.Supp. at 1162. The district court held that plaintiffs were on notice of their RICO or fraud claim in the time period between 1978, the date of the last sale of the video tapes, and 1982. Id. at 1163. The complaint was filed April 16, 1987, more than four years after 1982; accordingly the civil RICO claim was time-barred. Id.

13

The Ninth Circuit elaborated upon its decision in Compton, explaining that a civil RICO plaintiff may recover "for new injuries inflicted within four years after accrual." Beneficial Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir.1988); see also State Farm Ins. Co. v. Ammann, 828 F.2d 4, 5 (9th Cir.1987) (Kennedy J., concurring). The Second Circuit has adopted a similar formulation for accrual:

14

In sum, we hold today that civil RICO actions are subject to a rule of separate accrual. Under this rule, each time plaintiff discovers or should have discovered an injury caused by defendant's violation of Sec. 1962, a new cause of action arises as to that injury, regardless of when the actual violation occurred. A plaintiff under Malley-Duff, must then bring his action within four years of this accrual to recover damages for the specific injury. Naturally, as with all rules of accrual, the standard tolling exceptions apply.

15

Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1105 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1642, 104 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989).

16

Two courts have noted that the Bankers Trust rule of separate accrual does not address the pattern element of a civil RICO claim, focusing solely on the injury element. Bivens Gardens Office Bldg. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir.1990); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1129 (3rd Cir.1988). Because a civil RICO action requires predicate acts which constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity," see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5), we think that the more complete rule is

17

that with respect to each independent injury to the plaintiff, a civil RICO cause of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, both the existence and source of his injury and that the injury is part of a pattern.

18

Bivens Gardens, 906 F.2d at 1554-55.[2] This rule recognizes that a civil RICO plaintiff must allege not only injury, but also that the injury is part of a pattern of racketeering activity, to state a claim. Id. Standard tolling exceptions continue to apply. Bankers Trust, 859 F.2d at 1105.

19

Because the district court did not consider the limitations issue in terms of injury and pattern, and because standard tolling exceptions might apply, we vacate that portion of the judgment dismissing the civil RICO claims and remand the RICO accrual determination for reconsideration in view of this opinion.[3]

[*~820]20

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART and REMANDED.

*

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not assist materially the determination of these appeals. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cases therefore are ordered submitted without oral argument

1

During the pendency of this appeal, defendant-appellee Smith filed a chapter seven bankruptcy petition which remains pending. In re Smith, No. 90-30220-TCB (Bankr.S.D.Fla., filed Jan. 11, 1990). Accordingly, the automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362, which stays judicial actions "against the debtor" prohibited us from adjudicating the plaintiffs' claims against Smith. Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir.1990) (inception of case determines applicability of automatic stay). On January 31, 1990, we abated proceedings in these appeals due to Smith's bankruptcy. We are not enjoined from proceeding with this matter, however, as to Smith's remaining and presumably solvent codefendants. Otoe County Nat'l Bank v. W & P Trucking Inc., 754 F.2d 881, 882-83 (10th Cir.1985); Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1329-31 (10th Cir.1984). Moreover, appellants now have filed a motion to dismiss Smith from the appeal; that motion is granted and the abatement order is lifted

2

The court in Keystone phrased the rule:

The rule which we announce provides that the limitations period for a civil RICO claim runs from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known that the elements of the civil RICO cause of action existed unless, as part of the same pattern of racketeering activity, there is further injury to the plaintiff or further predicate acts occur, in which the accrual period shall run from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known of the last injury or the last predicate act which is part of the same pattern of racketeering activity. The last predicate act need not have resulted in injury to the plaintiff but must be part of the same pattern. If the complaint was filed within four years of the last injury or the last predicate act, the plaintiff may recover for injuries caused by other predicate acts which occurred outside of an earlier limitations period but which are part of the same "pattern."

863 F.2d at 1130-31. We agree with the court in Bivens Gardens that, under this rule, analysis of "when each plaintiff knew or should have known that his injuries were the result of a pattern of racketeering activity" should be required when deciding a civil RICO accrual issue; merely because "a plaintiff can identify one predicate act that occurred within four years of the filing of the complaint" does not render irrelevant "the question of when the plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered that his injury is part of a pattern of racketeering activity." 906 F.2d at 1554.

3

The court's dismissal of various state law claims was predicated on its dismissal of the federal claims. We vacate the dismissal of these claims and remand for potential reinstatement