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Florida Statute 901.15 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 901.15 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLVII
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CORRECTIONS
Chapter 901
ARRESTS AND TEMPORARY DETENTIONS
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 901.15
901.15 When arrest by officer without warrant is lawful.A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when:
(1) The person has committed a felony or misdemeanor or violated a municipal or county ordinance in the presence of the officer. An arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor or the violation of a municipal or county ordinance shall be made immediately or in fresh pursuit.
(2) A felony has been committed and he or she reasonably believes that the person committed it.
(3) He or she reasonably believes that a felony has been or is being committed and that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it.
(4) A warrant for the arrest has been issued and is held by another peace officer for execution.
(5) A violation of chapter 316 has been committed in the presence of the officer. Such an arrest may be made immediately or in fresh pursuit. Any law enforcement officer, upon receiving information relayed to him or her from a fellow officer stationed on the ground or in the air that a driver of a vehicle has violated chapter 316, may arrest the driver for violation of those laws when reasonable and proper identification of the vehicle and the violation has been communicated to the arresting officer.
(6) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed a criminal act according to s. 790.233 or according to s. 741.31, s. 784.047, or s. 825.1036 which violates an injunction for protection entered pursuant to s. 741.30, s. 784.046, or s. 825.1035 or a foreign protection order accorded full faith and credit pursuant to s. 741.315, over the objection of the petitioner, if necessary.
(7) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed an act of domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28, or dating violence, as provided in s. 784.046. The decision to arrest shall not require consent of the victim or consideration of the relationship of the parties. It is the public policy of this state to strongly discourage arrest and charges of both parties for domestic violence or dating violence on each other and to encourage training of law enforcement and prosecutors in these areas. A law enforcement officer who acts in good faith and exercises due care in making an arrest under this subsection, under s. 741.31(4) or s. 784.047, or pursuant to a foreign order of protection accorded full faith and credit pursuant to s. 741.315, is immune from civil liability that otherwise might result by reason of his or her action.
(8) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed child abuse, as defined in s. 827.03, or has violated s. 787.025, relating to luring or enticing a child for unlawful purposes. The decision to arrest does not require consent of the victim or consideration of the relationship of the parties. It is the public policy of this state to protect abused children by strongly encouraging the arrest and prosecution of persons who commit child abuse. A law enforcement officer who acts in good faith and exercises due care in making an arrest under this subsection is immune from civil liability that otherwise might result by reason of his or her action.
(9) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed:
(a) Any battery upon another person, as defined in s. 784.03.
(b) An act of criminal mischief or a graffiti-related offense as described in s. 806.13.
(c) A violation of a safety zone, security zone, regulated navigation area, or naval vessel protection zone as described in s. 327.461.
(d) A racing, street takeover, or stunt driving violation as described in s. 316.191(2).
(e) An exposure of sexual organs in violation of s. 800.03.
(10) The officer has determined that he or she has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been committed, based upon a signed affidavit provided to the officer by a law enforcement officer of the United States Government, recognized as such by United States statute, or a United States military law enforcement officer, recognized as such by the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the United States Department of Defense Regulations, when the misdemeanor was committed in the presence of the United States law enforcement officer or the United States military law enforcement officer on federal military property over which the state has maintained exclusive jurisdiction for such a misdemeanor.
(11)(a) A law enforcement officer of the Florida National Guard, recognized as such by the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the United States Department of Defense Regulations, has probable cause to believe a felony was committed on state military property or when a felony or misdemeanor was committed in his or her presence on such property.
(b) All law enforcement officers of the Florida National Guard shall promptly surrender all persons arrested and charged with a felony to the sheriff of the county within which the state military property is located, and all persons arrested and charged with misdemeanors shall be surrendered to the applicable authority as may be provided by law, but otherwise to the sheriff of the county in which the state military property is located. The Florida National Guard shall promptly notify the applicable law enforcement agency of an arrest and the location of the prisoner.
(c) The Adjutant General, in consultation with the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, shall prescribe minimum training standards for such law enforcement officers of the Florida National Guard.
(12) He or she is employed by the State of Florida as a law enforcement officer as defined in s. 943.10(1) or part-time law enforcement officer as defined in s. 943.10(6), and:
(a) He or she reasonably believes that a felony involving violence has been or is being committed and that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing the felony;
(b) While engaged in the exercise of his or her state law enforcement duties, the officer reasonably believes that a felony has been or is being committed; or
(c) A felony warrant for the arrest has been issued and is being held for execution by another peace officer.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the authority of an officer pursuant to this subsection is statewide. This subsection does not limit the arrest authority conferred on such officer by any other provision of law.

(13) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed an act that violates a condition of pretrial release provided in s. 903.047 when the original arrest was for an act of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28, or when the original arrest was for an act of dating violence as defined in s. 784.046.
(14) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed trespass in a secure area of an airport when signs are posted in conspicuous areas of the airport which notify that unauthorized entry into such areas constitutes a trespass and specify the methods for gaining authorized access to such areas. An arrest under this subsection may be made on or off airport premises. A law enforcement officer who acts in good faith and exercises due care in making an arrest under this subsection is immune from civil liability that otherwise might result by reason of the law enforcement officer’s action.
(15) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed assault upon a law enforcement officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical care provider, public transit employees or agents, or other specified officers as set forth in s. 784.07 or has committed assault or battery upon any employee of a receiving facility as defined in s. 394.455 who is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties.
(16) There is probable cause to believe that the person has committed a criminal act of sexual cyberharassment as described in s. 784.049.
History.s. 15, ch. 19554, 1939; CGL 1940 Supp. 8663(15); s. 1, ch. 21782, 1943; s. 6, ch. 70-339; s. 4, ch. 71-982; s. 1, ch. 77-67; s. 1, ch. 83-119; s. 11, ch. 84-343; s. 1, ch. 85-198; s. 2, ch. 85-216; s. 1, ch. 86-130; s. 102, ch. 86-220; s. 1, ch. 87-45; s. 1, ch. 87-285; s. 2, ch. 88-344; s. 4, ch. 88-373; ss. 53, 71, ch. 88-381; s. 1, ch. 90-165; s. 68, ch. 91-110; s. 7, ch. 91-210; ss. 27, 29, ch. 94-134; ss. 27, 29, ch. 94-135; s. 20, ch. 95-195; s. 4, ch. 96-215; s. 24, ch. 96-322; s. 8, ch. 96-392; s. 68, ch. 96-413; ss. 1830, 1831, 1832, ch. 97-102; s. 10, ch. 97-155; s. 2, ch. 97-298; s. 2, ch. 98-93; s. 4, ch. 98-284; s. 105, ch. 99-3; s. 57, ch. 99-193; s. 6, ch. 2000-369; s. 1, ch. 2002-255; s. 4, ch. 2004-17; s. 7, ch. 2004-74; s. 8, ch. 2006-299; s. 4, ch. 2007-112; s. 3, ch. 2008-252; s. 9, ch. 2009-215; s. 4, ch. 2015-17; s. 2, ch. 2015-24; s. 7, ch. 2016-187; s. 4, ch. 2018-100; s. 2, ch. 2019-53; s. 2, ch. 2019-125; s. 2, ch. 2020-84; s. 6, ch. 2022-180.

F.S. 901.15 on Google Scholar

F.S. 901.15 on Casetext

Amendments to 901.15


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 901.15
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

S901.15 4 - OUT-OF-COUNTY WARRANT - - N: N
S901.15 4 - FAILURE TO APPEAR - FELONY WARRANT - F: N



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

J. NELSON, a k a v. STATE, 268 So. 3d 837 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Although the State argues that section 901.15(1), Florida Statutes (2016), permits an officer to arrest . . . In Thomas, the supreme court held that an "arrest" under section 901.15(1) does not mean a full custodial . . .

BENT, v. STATE, 257 So. 3d 501 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. In State v. . . .

A. SOSNOWSKI, v. STATE, 245 So. 3d 885 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 901.15(7), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

WEAVER, v. STATE, 233 So. 3d 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . State, 933 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing § 901.15(1), Fla. . . . State, 722 So.2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)); see also § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . .

KUMAR, v. C. PATEL,, 227 So. 3d 557 (Fla. 2017)

. . . committed -a felony, law enforcement is authorized to immediately effectuate the arrest, under section 901.15 . . .

STEPHENS, v. DEGIOVANNI,, 852 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 901.15(1) ('A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when ... . . .

BRATT, v. GENOVESE,, 660 F. App'x 837 (11th Cir. 2016)

. . . . § 901.15(1). . . . whether a warrantless entry into a residence for the purposes of a misdemeanor arrest is authorized by § 901.15 . . .

STATE v. McRAE,, 194 So. 3d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See § • 901.15(2), Fla. Stat. . . .

HAWXHURST, v. STATE, 159 So. 3d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . See § 901.15(9)(b) (providing that a “law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when . . . See § 901.15(6), Fla. . . .

M. CORDOVES, v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY,, 92 F. Supp. 3d 1221 (S.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . . § 901.15(1)). . . .

MADGE, v. STATE, 160 So. 3d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . To the extent that prior decisions have cited or relied upon section 901.15(1), Florida Statutes (2014 . . . Section 901.15(1) requires an officer to witness a misdemeanor to make a warrantless arrest. . . .

MARKUS, v. STATE, 160 So. 3d 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Had Appellant been arrested while outside the home, we agree with the trial court that section 901.15 . . . Section 901.15 does not specifically address the legality of a warrantless arrest occurring in the home . . .

PASHTENKO, v. PASHTENKO,, 148 So. 3d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . F.S. 741.29(2) & (3) and F.S. 901.15(7) & (9) are applicable re investigation /arrest/reports, etc. . . . The trial court also incorrectly cited to sections 741.29(2), .29(3), 901.15(7), and .15(9) which apply . . .

STATE v. LORD,, 150 So. 3d 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . The circuit court granted defendant’s motion to suppress, because under sections 901.15 and 812.015, . . . The circuit court erred by concluding that section 901.15 applied in this case by either supplanting . . . Section 901.15(1) permits an officer to arrest without securing a warrant when the suspect has committed . . . expressly enacted the retail theft provision to meet a need that was not being addressed by section 901.15 . . . that the officers lacked probable cause for the stop; only that they lacked authority under section 901.15 . . .

BLACK, v. STATE, 141 So. 3d 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . contended that Officer Maultsby could not rely on the statements of his fellow officer, citing section 901.15 . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS, 142 So. 3d 856 (Fla. 2014)

. . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without a warrant pursuant to Section 901.15 . . . ENFORCEABLE IN ALL COUNTIES OF FLORIDA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MAY EFFECT ARRESTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 901.15 . . .

UNITED STATES v. L. BURROWS,, 566 F. App'x 889 (11th Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 901.15(5). . . . Stat. §§ 316.194500(a)(4), 901.15(5); Harris, 526 F.3d at 1337. . . .

DELGADO, v. CITY OF MIAMI, a, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1381 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . . § 901.15(3). . . .

STATE v. K. CRUSE,, 121 So. 3d 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 901.15, Fla. Stat. (2011); Henry v. . . .

PIERRE, v. CITY OF MIRAMAR, FLORIDA, INC. a Al, 537 F. App'x 821 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 901.15(1). . . . McNeal (as an observer) must have qualified as a “law enforcement officer” for purposes of section 901.15 . . . correctional officer inherently qualifies as a “law enforcement officer” as that term is used in section 901.15 . . . First, the statutory definition of “law enforcement officer,” as referenced in section 901.15, is separate . . . authority to the contrary, McNeal seems to be no “law enforcement officer” for purposes of section 901.15 . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS, 113 So. 3d 781 (Fla. 2013)

. . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without a warrant pursuant to Section 901.15 . . . ENFORCEABLE IN ALL COUNTIES OF FLORIDA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MAY EFFECT ARRESTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without a warrant pursuant to Section 901.15 . . . ENFORCEABLE IN ALL COUNTIES OF FLORIDA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MAY EFFECT ARRESTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 901.15 . . .

STATE v. DEATON,, 109 So. 3d 338 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . .” § 901.15(2), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

JENKINS, v. STATE, 102 So. 3d 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 901.15(f), Fla. Stat. (2009); Baymon v. State, 933 So.2d 1269, 1270 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). . . . See § 901.15(1), Fla. . . . See § 901.15(1); Baymon, 933 So.2d at 1270. We agree. . . . NORTHCUTT and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. . 901.15. . . .

PATRICK, v. STATE, 104 So. 3d 1046 (Fla. 2012)

. . . United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); § 901.15 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

SMITH, Jr. v. STATE, 95 So. 3d 966 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); § 901.15, Fla. Stat.). . . .

JEANTY, v. CITY OF MIAMI, a a, 876 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

. . . . § 901.15(5). . . . Stat. § 901.15(5). . . . Stat. § 901.15(5) provides that a law enforcement officer may arrest a person without warrant when “[ . . . .2d 1085, 1087 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983) (police officer was acting within the authority conferred by § 901.15 . . .

BETHEL, v. STATE, 93 So. 3d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 901.15(1), Fla. . . .

GOMEZ, v. LOZANO, 839 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

. . . . § 901.15(9)(a). Thus, Officer Chambers had the authority to arrest Mr. . . . STAT. § 901.15. No one here disputes that, after Officer Chambers grabbed Mr. Gomez’s arm, Mr. . . .

E. TERRELL, F. F. v. SMITH, a, 668 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 901.15(1) (“A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when ... . . .

UNITED STATES v. OWENS,, 445 F. App'x 248 (11th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 901.15(1). . . .

FRIAS, v. L. DEMINGS, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . But, Frias was not a suspect and Cavis, therefore, had no authority to detain her under § 901.15. . . .

C. D. v. STATE, 82 So. 3d 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . municipal ordinance is a fine, an “arrest” for the violation of such an ordinance, as authorized in section 901.15 . . .

COFFIN, v. BRANDAU, f. k. a., 642 F.3d 999 (11th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 901.15 & (1) (“A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when [t]he person . . . Ann. § 901.15 & (1). . . .

M. W. v. STATE, 51 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . In pertinent part, section 901.15, Florida Statutes (2009), authorizes a law enforcement officer to arrest . . . felony or misdemeanor or violated a municipal or county ordinance in the presence of the officer.” § 901.15 . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS, 59 So. 3d 792 (Fla. 2010)

. . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . ENFORCEABLE IN ALL COUNTIES OF FLORIDA, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MAY EFFECT ARRESTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 901.15 . . .

S. J. a v. STATE, 50 So. 3d 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . .” § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). S.J. cites D.G. v. . . .

BENNETT, v. STATE, 46 So. 3d 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 901.15(2) (authorizing officer to make warrantless arrest when “[a] felony has been committed and . . .

STATE v. CUOMO,, 43 So. 3d 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . .”); § 901.15(2), Fla. . . .

FILS v. CITY OF AVENTURA,, 768 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (S.D. Fla. 2010)

. . . . § 901.15(1)); Atwater v. . . .

CALDWELL, v. STATE, 41 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 2010)

. . . United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); § 901.15, Fla. Stat. (1991)). . . .

STATE v. BROWN,, 36 So. 3d 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Indeed, section 901.15, Florida Statutes (2008) specifically provides: A law enforcement officer may . . . literally applied, the court’s language in Ortiz unacceptably would nullify the portion of section 901.15 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES- REPORT NO. In No. In No. In No. In No. s In No. In No. In No. In No., 35 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 2010)

. . . Various statutes justify restraint under stated circumstances, e.g., F.S. 812.015, 901.15, 901.151 (2006 . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. STATE, 29 So. 3d 310 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 901.15(1); see, e.g., Smith v. . . . See § 901.15(7), (9). . Although Ms. . . .

D. AMISON, Jr. v. STATE, 5 So. 3d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Howard, 411 So.2d 372, 376 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (citing section 901.15, governing lawful arrest without . . .

SINQUEFIELD, v. STATE, 1 So. 3d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See §§ 901.15, .25, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

L. B. B. v. STATE, 998 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . ordinance regulating conduct that is noncriminal in nature, such as in the traffic control area, section 901.15 . . .

ROSA, v. CITY OF FORT MYERS, FL,, 297 F. App'x 830 (11th Cir. 2008)

. . . . § 901.15(7); Wheeler v. . . .

SOSA, v. HAMES,, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (S.D. Fla. 2008)

. . . . § 901.15(1)). . . .

L. RACHEL, v. STATE, 987 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See Popple, 626 So.2d at 186; see also § 901.15, Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .

VIRGINIA v. MOORE, 553 U.S. 164 (U.S. 2008)

. . . . § 901.15(2) (West Supp. 1973). . . .

G. M. a v. STATE, 981 So. 2d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); § 901.15, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

STATE v. TRIANA,, 979 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); § 901.15 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

S. McKNIGHT, v. STATE, 972 So. 2d 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . provision drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked); § 901.15 . . .

BRAVO, v. STATE, 963 So. 2d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . See § 901.15(3), Fla. . . .

J. M. C. a v. STATE, 962 So. 2d 960 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Simons, 549 So.2d 785, 786 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); see also 901.15, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . .

WHITTINGTON, v. TOWN OF SURFSIDE, a, 490 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (S.D. Fla. 2007)

. . . According to section 901.15(9)(b), Florida Statutes, a police officer can make an arrest without a warrant . . . Specifically, section 901.15(9)(b) states in relevant part that an arrest without a warrant is permitted . . . This argument is without merit because a plain reading of 901.15(9) indicates that the presence of a . . . Plaintiffs argument is at best a misreading of section 901.15, which outlines the situations where an . . . However, there are circumstances outlined in 901.15 where a police officer may arrest an individual without . . .

POWELL, v. STATE, 958 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . . § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). . . .

WOODS, v. VALENTINO, Jr., 511 F. Supp. 2d 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2007)

. . . . § 901.15(6) permits the warrantless arrest of a person when an officer has probable cause that the . . .

WHEELER, v. STATE, 956 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Pursuant to section 901.15, Florida Statutes (2005), an officer may arrest a suspect on a charge of domestic . . .

J. H. M. v. STATE, 945 So. 2d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . See § 901.15, Fla. . . .

WHYTE, v. STATE, 940 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); § 901.15 Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, v. WILLIAMS,, 937 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . lawful arrest had occurred, because the arresting officer had not observed the offense, whereas section 901.15 . . .

BAYMON, v. STATE, 933 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2004); Nickell v. State, 722 So.2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). . . .

A. INGRAM, v. STATE, 928 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . See § 901.15, Fla. Stat. (2004); Devenpeck v. . . .

RUCKER, v. STATE, 921 So. 2d 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

STATE v. FRIERSON,, 926 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2006)

. . . .; §§ 901.15(4), 901.16, F.S.A. . . .

JOHNSON, v. BARNES NOBLE BOOKSELLERS, INC., 437 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir. 2006)

. . . . § 901.15(1); B.D.K. v. State, 743 So.2d 1155, 1157 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999) (citing Smiley v. . . .

STATE v. WALLER,, 918 So. 2d 363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . . § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. . . .

SAWYER, v. STATE, 905 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . State, 690 So.2d 706, 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (citing §§ 316.645, 901.15(1), Fla. . . .

L. J. S. v. STATE, 905 So. 2d 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 901.15, Fla. Stat. (2004); Towne v. State, 495 So.2d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). . . .

STATE v. W. BOATMAN,, 901 So. 2d 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . He bases this argument on section 901.15(1), Florida Statutes (2003), which states that an officer is . . . See § 901.15(1). We disagree with his argument. . . . Of course, under section 901.15(1), that delegated arrest power must still be exercised “immediately” . . . Boatman argues that the language of section 901.15(5), which explicitly provides that an arresting officer . . . Boatman relies upon was added to section 901.15(5) in 1996. See ch. 96-413, § 68, Laws of Fla. . . .

PHANTOM OF CLEARWATER, INC. d b a v. PINELLAS COUNTY,, 894 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Violations shall subject an offender to arrest pursuant to Florida Statutes, § 901.15 and prosecution . . . Violations shall subject an offender to arrest pursuant to Florida Statutes, § 901.15 and prosecution . . .

H. DANIEL, v. VILLAGE OF ROYAL PALM BEACH,, 889 So. 2d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Section 901.15(5), Florida Statutes (2003), authorizes a warrantless misdemeanor arrest for violations . . .

STATE v. BAEZ,, 894 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2004)

. . . United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); § 901.15 Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

A. MYLES, v. STATE, 886 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . State, 452 So.2d 520 (Fla.1984); § 901.15(2), Fla. . . .

COOK, v. STATE, 873 So. 2d 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . . § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . .

AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS- SEXUAL VIOLENCE FORMS, 871 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2004)

. . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without a warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . .

DURRUTHY, v. PASTOR,, 351 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 901.15(5). . . . Stat. § 901.15(1) (“A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when ... . . .

BYFORD, v. STEPHENS, a, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (S.D. Fla. 2003)

. . . . § 901.15(1) (“A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when ... . . . The Policy further states, "No law enforcement officer shall be held liable, pursuant to FSS 901.15(7 . . . Stat. § 901.15(1)). . . .

FRIERSON, v. STATE, 851 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . .” § 901.15(5), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

TAYLOR, II, v. STATE, 855 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2003)

. . . United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); § 901.15 Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

J. RIEBSAME, v. PRINCE, s, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (M.D. Fla. 2003)

. . . ENFORCEABLE IN ALL COUNTIES OF FLORIDA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MAY EFFECT ARRESTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 901.15 . . .

STATE v. BAGLEY,, 844 So. 2d 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See § 901.15 Fla. . . .

PARKER, v. STATE, 843 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2003)

. . . See, e.g., § 901.15(6), Fla. . . .

GUITTERREZ, v. STATE, 837 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See § 901.15, Fla. Stat. . . .

DURRUTHY, v. THE CITY OF MIAMI,, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2002)

. . . . § 901.15(1) and Atwater v. . . .

AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT APPROVED FAMILY LAW FORMS- DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FORMS, 830 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 2002)

. . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . ENFORCEABLE IN ALL COUNTIES OF FLORIDA AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MAY EFFECT ARRESTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . ENFORCEABLE IN ALL COUNTIES OF FLORIDA, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MAY EFFECT ARRESTS PURSUANT TO SECTION 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . .

KNIGHT, v. JACOBSON,, 300 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 901.15(1). The misdemeanor assault in this case was not. . . .

BLICE, v. STATE, 825 So. 2d 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Sec. 901.15, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

ALEXIS, INC. M L v. PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2002)

. . . Stat. ch. 30.15; 901.15(1)). . . . Stat. ch 901.15 ("A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when: (l)[t]he person . . .

D. LEE, f. k. a. D. v. FERRARO, a, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 901.15(1) (“A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when ... . . .

LIGHT, v. STATE, 796 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See §§ 790.15, 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1993). They began to pursue Mr. . . . See §§ 843.02, 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1993); Mosley v. State, 739 So.2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). . . .

STATE v. FREEMAN,, 796 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 901.15(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

ESPIET, v. STATE, 797 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . The provisions of section 901.15(7) which allow a law enforcement officer to arrest a person for an act . . . warrant, regardless of the classification of the offense, and (2) where he has the power under section 901.15 . . . We note with interest that the 1979 version of section 901.15 under consideration in Johnson specifically . . . See §§ 784.03(2), 901.15, Fla. Stat. (1979). . . .

HARRIS, v. STATE, 790 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 901.15(5), Fla. Stat. (2000); Howell v. State, 725 So.2d 429, 430 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). . . .

ATWATER v. CITY OF LAGO VISTA, 532 U.S. 318 (U.S. 2001)

. . . . §901.15(1) (Supp. 2001) (for misdemeanor or ordinance violation committed in presence of the officer . . .

L. SMITH, v. STATE, 778 So. 2d 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 901.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1997); Carter v. State, 516 So.2d 312 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). In A.L. v. . . .

AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA FAMILY LAW RULES OF PROCEDURE AND FAMILY LAW FORMS, 810 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2000)

. . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . . the provisions of this injunction and are authorized to arrest without a warrant pursuant to section 901.15 . . .

R. RUSZALA, v. WALT DISNEY WORLD COMPANY,, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2000)

. . . Dean, 564 So.2d 510, 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Section 901.15(2), Fla.Stat. (1987) (“A law enforcement . . .

ELLIS, v. STATE, 755 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 901.15(5), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .