O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
As used in this Code or in any other law of this state, defined words shall have the meanings specified, unless the context in which the word or term is used clearly requires that a different meaning be used.
Annotations
JUDICIAL DECISIONS ‘‘Children.’’ - A ward’s stepchildren were not ‘‘children’’ under the guardianship statute, nor were they next of kin and, because there were individuals related to the ward by blood, who were not notified of the guardianship proceedings, the appointment of the guardian was void. Wilson v. James, 260 Ga. 234, 392 S.E.2d 5 (1990). ‘‘Person.’’ - Non-profit association with the purpose of focusing on public interest matters of self-defense and gun laws of the State of Georgia was not a ‘‘person’’ which could claim to have an interest in the offices held by the Georgia Code Revision Commission members for
purposes of pursuing a writ of quo warranto under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-60. No association standing was shown because the interests the association sought to protect were not shown to be germane to its purpose. Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. Allen, 299 Ga. 716, 791 S.E.2d 800 (2016). ‘‘Property’’ in apportionment statute included tangible and intangible property. - O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33, Georgia’s apportionment statute, applied to tort claims for damage to tangible and intangible property and, therefore, applied to purely pecuniary losses. FDIC v. Loudermilk, 305 Ga. 558, 826 S.E.2d 116 (2019).
Notes of Decisions
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk, 826 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. 2019).
· cites it 4× “(g) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Code section or any other provisions of law which might be construed to the contrary, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to receive any damages if the plaintiff is 50 percent or more responsible for the injury or damages claimed.”
Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 632 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2006).
· cites it 2× “See OCGA § 1-3-2. Further, the General Assembly has expressly stated its intent that the Georgia RICO Act be “liberally construed” in order to effectuate its remedial purposes.”
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk, 305 Ga. 558 (Ga. 2019).
· cites it 4× “To that end, the Black’s Law Dictionary definitions of “property” — both as it is used more generally, and as it is used with respect to “personal 3 See OCGA § 1-3-2 (legislatively defined words “shall have the meanings specified, unless the context in which the word or term is…”
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Allen, 791 S.E.2d 800 (Ga. 2016).
· cites it 2× “See OCGA § 1-3-2 (“As used in this Code or in any other law of this state, defined.”
Staley v. State, 672 S.E.2d 615 (Ga. 2009).
· cites it 2× “Moreover, contrary to appellant’s contention, this Court’s authority to construe statutes neither violates the constitutional separation of powers nor constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.”
City of Griffin v. McDaniel, 606 S.E.2d 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “…to interpretation adopted by administrative agency charged with enforcing statute). 18 OCGA §36-71-2 (10.1). 19 OCGA § 1-3-2.”
Wilson v. James, 392 S.E.2d 5 (Ga. 1990).
· cites it 2× “OCGA § 1-3-2 provides that the words used in the code “shall have the meaning specified, unless the context in which the word or term is used clearly requires that a different meaning be used.”
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