Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 15-11-52 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 15-11-52 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 15-11-52

TITLE 15 COURTS

Section 11. Juvenile Code, 15-11-1 through 15-11-747.

ARTICLE 2 JUVENILE COURT ADMINISTRATION

15-11-52. Terms and compensation of judges.

  1. Each appointed juvenile court judge shall serve for a term of four years.
  2. The compensation of the full-time or part-time juvenile court judges shall be set by the superior court with the approval of the governing authority or governing authorities of the county or counties for which the juvenile court judge is appointed.
  3. Out of funds appropriated to the judicial branch of government, the state shall contribute toward the salary of the judges on a per circuit basis in the following amounts:
    1. Each circuit with one or more juvenile court judges who are not superior court judges assuming the duties of juvenile court judges shall receive a state grant of $100,000.00;
    2. In addition to the amount set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection, each circuit which has more than four superior court judges shall be eligible for additional state grants in the amount of $25,000.00 per superior court judgeship exceeding four judges in such circuit;
    3. In circuits where the superior court judges elect to use the state grant for one or more part-time judges, the amount of the state grant shall be as follows; provided, however, that such grant shall not exceed the amount the circuit is eligible to receive under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection:
      1. For each part-time judge who works one day

        weekly............ $20,000.00

      2. For each part-time judge who works two days

        weekly............ 40,000.00

      3. For each part-time judge who works three days

        weekly............ 60,000.00

      4. For each part-time judge who works four days

        weekly............ 80,000.00; and

    4. All state grants provided by this subsection shall be spent solely on salaries for juvenile court judges and shall not be used for any other purposes.

(Code 1981, §15-11-52, enacted by Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 1-1/HB 242; Ga. L. 2017, p. 122, § 2-1/HB 5.)

The 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, substituted "state grant of $100,000.00" for "state base grant of $85,000.00" at the end of paragraph (c)(1); and rewrote paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3).

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2017, p. 122, § 3-1(b)/HB 5, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that Part II of this Act shall become effective on July 1, 2017, only if funds are appropriated for purposes of Part II of this Act in an appropriations Act enacted at the 2017 regular session of the General Assembly. If funds are not so appropriated, then Part II of this Act shall not become effective and shall stand repealed on July 1, 2017. Funds were appropriated at the 2017 session of the General Assembly.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-3, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Setting of compensation.

- Superior court was authorized to fix the compensation of a juvenile court judge without the approval of the governing authority of the county. Peters v. Followill, 269 Ga. 119, 497 S.E.2d 789 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-201 and pre-2000 Code Section 15-11-3, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section. See the Editor's notes at the beginning of the chapter.

Existing terms unaffected by new judicial district.

- Terms of the existing juvenile court judge for the counties of Pickens, Fannin, Gilmer, Forsyth, and Cherokee are not affected by the creation of the new Appalachian Judicial Circuit. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-26 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3).

Superior court judge may fix salary of juvenile court judge.

- Judge of a superior court may not fix the salary of the juvenile court judge until such time as the salary of the juvenile court judge is no longer fixed by legislative act. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-68 (decided under former Code 1933, § 24A-201).

Term of office.

- Term of office of juvenile court judges appointed under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-18 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-50 and15-11-52) was four years to run from the date of the expiration of the term of office of the juvenile court judge's predecessor in office. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-32 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3).

All juvenile court judgeships are to be appointed to a term equal to that of superior court judges, which is currently four years. The provision for state contribution for circuit-wide juvenile court judges' compensation conditioned upon appropriation of the necessary funds for that purpose does not delay enactment of the remainder of the 1982 amendment. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U87-5 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 15-11-3).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 15-11-52

Total Results: 1  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

Wilkins v. Dep't of Human Resources, 337 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 27, 1985 | 255 Ga. 230

...pointed representation. Rather, the crucial *232 inquiry is whether the putative father was a "party" to any of the proceedings within the meaning of OCGA § 15-11-30 (b). The outcome of this question depends, in turn, upon an interpretation of OCGA § 15-11-52 (b), as it relates to OCGA § 15-11-30 (b). In this regard, GDHR, relying on OCGA § 15-11-52 (b), contends that an indigent putative father does not obtain the status of a party to a termination proceeding until he first makes an adequate showing of paternity. GDHR further contends that, since the trial court found that Wilkins did not make an adequate showing of paternity, he was not entitled to appointed counsel at the termination hearing. OCGA § 15-11-52 (b) provides that "[i]f the paternity of a child born out of wedlock has been established in a judicial proceeding to which the father was a party prior to the filing of the petition [to terminate parental rights], the father shall be served with summons as provided by this chapter....
...At the time of the hearing, upon proof of paternity being shown to the court, the father shall be allowed to petition for custody of the child and the court shall grant same, if such is in the best interests of the child." (Emphasis supplied.) 2. (a) At the outset we must decide whether or not OCGA § 15-11-52 (b) applies to Wilkins. OCGA § 15-11-52 (b) permits the putative father of a child "born out of wedlock" to appear at the paternity hearing mandated by that subsection and present proof of paternity. If the phrase "born out of wedlock" only includes children born to an unmarried woman, then § 15-11-52 (b) does not permit Wilkins to introduce proof of paternity in a termination proceeding, as he is the putative father of a child born to a married woman. We find that the phrase "born out of wedlock" refers to either a child born to an unmarried mother or one born to a married woman, but begotten by a man not her husband. Under this interpretation, OCGA § 15-11-52 (b) does apply to Wilkins....
...State, 252 Ga. 201 (2) (312 SE2d 601) (1984). To construe the phrase "born out of wedlock" to include only children born to unwed mothers would lead to unjust (and perhaps unconstitutional) results. First, pursuant to such a construction, under OCGA § 15-11-52 (b) the putative father of a child born to an unwed mother would be allowed to present evidence of paternity in a termination proceeding, but the putative father of a child born to a wed mother would not....
...Moreover, a putative father of a child born to a woman married at the time the child was begotten could be sued for the support of the child, OCGA § 19-7-40 through § 19-7-53; yet, he would not have the right to present evidence of paternity under OCGA § 15-11-52 (b) in a termination proceeding....
...for children "born in wedlock," that the phrase "born out of wedlock" must refer to children born to unwed mothers. However, we disagree. As already noted, statutes must be construed with the purpose and intent of the General Assembly in mind. OCGA § 15-11-52 (b) focuses on rights of putative fathers in termination proceedings, while OCGA § 19-7-20 deals with the longstanding evidentiary presumption that a child born to a married woman is legitimate....
...Lane, supra, 291 NYS2d at 138; Smith v. Robbins, supra, 283 NW2d at 727. Applying the foregoing to the instant case, we hold that a man claiming to be the putative father of a child born to a married woman is entitled to appear and introduce proof of paternity under OCGA § 15-11-52 (b), bearing in mind that he must overcome the presumption of legitimacy created by OCGA § 19-7-20. 3. Having decided that OCGA § 15-11-52 (b) applies to Wilkins, we now address the issue of whether he is entitled, as an indigent, to have court-appointed counsel assist him....
...Cowart, 27 Ga. 187, 192 (1859). We find that a putative father clearly falls within the general definition of a "party," see Berry v. Slappey, supra, 229 Ga.; Roberts v. Hill, supra, 81 Ga. App., for the purposes of the paternity hearing mandated by OCGA § 15-11-52 (b)....
...ross-examine witnesses. See Berry v. Slappey, supra, 229 Ga.; Roberts v. Hill, supra, 81 Ga. App. As is evident, this stage of a termination proceeding is a decisive one for a putative father, and, because of the burden imposed upon *236 him by OCGA § 15-11-52 (b), is one at which he has a critical need for legal representation....
...J., and Weltner, J., who dissent. HILL, Chief Justice, dissenting. We deal here with the rights of a putative father of a child born in wedlock. One of the Code sections upon which the majority relies to establish this father's right to counsel, OCGA § 15-11-52 (b), applies to children "born out of wedlock." In my view, we make a serious mistake by expanding this Code section and declaring that putative fathers of children born in wedlock are entitled to the appointment of counsel at state expense....
...I therefore would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Marshall and Justice Weltner join in this dissent. NOTES [1] A termination petition alleging that a parent has abandoned the child, OCGA § 15-11-52 (a) (1), or that the child is a deprived child, OCGA § 15-11-52 (a) (2), is a proceeding alleging deprivation within the meaning of OCGA § 15-11-30 (b)....