O.C.G.A.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
The judges of the superior courts have authority: (1) To grant for their respective circuits writs of certiorari, supersedeas, quo warranto, mandamus, habeas corpus, and bail in actions ex delicto; (2) To entertain bills quia timet; (3) To grant writs of injunction, prohibition, and ne exeat; (4) To grant all other writs, original or remedial, either legal or equitable, which may be necessary to the exercise of their jurisdiction and which are not expressly prohibited; (5) To hear and determine questions arising upon: (A) Writs of habeas corpus or bail, when properly brought before them; (B) All motions to grant, revive, or dissolve injunctions; and (C) The giving of new security or the lessening of the amount of bail; (6) To perform any and all other acts required of them at chambers; (7) To hear and determine all motions to dismiss petitions for equitable relief, and all motions to revoke or change orders appointing receivers, after ten days’ written notice has been given to the opposite party or his attorney by either party by service with a copy of such motion to dismiss or to revoke or change such order; and (8) To administer oaths and to exercise all other powers necessarily appertaining to their jurisdiction or which may be granted them by law.
History
Orig. Code 1863, § 243; Code 1868, § 237; Code 1873, § 247; Code 1882, § 247; Civil Code 1895, § 4321; Penal Code 1895, § 792; Civil Code 1910, § 4850; Penal Code 1910, § 792; Code 1933, § 24-2616; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 15.
Annotations
Cross references. - Writ of prohibition, § 9-6-40 et seq. Exclusive jurisdiction of superior courts over habeas corpus actions involving persons detained by virtue of sentence imposed by state court of record, § 9-14-43. Authority of superior court judges in certain counties to appoint
judges of juvenile courts, § 15-11-50. Power of judges of superior courts to appoint court reporters, §§ 15-14-1, 15-14-3,
Notes of Decisions
O'donnell v. Durham, 573 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. 2002).
· cites it 16× “Reliance upon the general provisions of OCGA § 15-6-9, rather than upon the specific statutory limitation imposed by OCGA § 9-14-52(c) would be contrary to the principle that "`a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary…”
Roberts v. Grigsby, 339 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 8× “Subsections (4) and (8) of OCGA § 15-6-9 provide that superior courts have authority to "exercise all other powers necessarily appertaining to their jurisdiction" and to "grant all other writs .”
In Re Lawsuits of Carter, 510 S.E.2d 91 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 4× “25 Although the court may in some circumstances issue sua sponte dismissals pursuant to its inherent authority recognized in OCGA § 15-6-9 (8), 26 we have not found a case where a blanket pre-filing order was entered outside of a pending suit, imposing restrictions on the pro se…”
Palmer v. State, 369 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 2× “Appellant’s fifth enumerated error is that the trial court erred *896 in not allowing appellant’s sole defense.”
Giles v. State, 570 S.E.2d 375 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 4× “Under OCGA § 15-6-9 (3), superior court judges have the inherent authority to enjoin a person from engaging in certain behavior.”
Durham v. Durham, 728 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. 2012).
· cites it 2× “See OCGA § 15-6-8 (2) (saying that superior courts have the authority “[t]o exercise the powers of a court of equity”); OCGA § 15-6-9 (3) (saying that superior courts have the authority “[t]o grant writs of injunction”); Lee v.”
Paden v. Rudd, 669 S.E.2d 548 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “See OCGA § 15-6-9 (8); Smith v. Adamson, 226 Ga.”
Smith v. Nichols, 512 S.E.2d 279 (Ga. 1999).
· cites it 2× “OCGA § 15-6-9. 7 We see the filing of a pre-trial habeas petition as analogous to a criminal defendant’s filing of a demand for speedy trial.”
Stewart v. Tricord, LLC, 676 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 2× “” Under OCGA § 15-6-9, the superior court is authorized to grant supersedeas, which “deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to take further proceedings towards the enforcement of the judgment superseded.”
Ganny v. Ganny, 518 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “See generally OCGA § 15-6-9. *127 Decided May 18, 1999 — Cert.”
— 15-6-9(1) — 1 case
O'donnell v. Durham, 573 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. 2002).
“Reliance upon the general provisions of OCGA § 15-6-9, rather than upon the specific statutory limitation imposed by OCGA § 9-14-52(c) would be contrary to the principle that "`a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary…”
— 15-6-9(5)(A) — 1 case
O'donnell v. Durham, 573 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. 2002).
“Reliance upon the general provisions of OCGA § 15-6-9, rather than upon the specific statutory limitation imposed by OCGA § 9-14-52(c) would be contrary to the principle that "`a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary…”
— 15-6-9(8) — 2 cases
In Re Lawsuits of Carter, 510 S.E.2d 91 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
“25 Although the court may in some circumstances issue sua sponte dismissals pursuant to its inherent authority recognized in OCGA § 15-6-9 (8), 26 we have not found a case where a blanket pre-filing order was entered outside of a pending suit, imposing restrictions on the pro se…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.