Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Penal Code 1895, § 984, Penal Code 1910, § 1010, Code 1933, § 38-109, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Meaning of the former statute was so clear and manifest as not to require explanation. Morris v. State, 176 Ga. 243, 167 S.E. 509 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Statute constitutes standard of proof.

- Although former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was designated as a rule of evidence, in substance the former statute was actually a standard of proof required for a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence. Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925, 108 S. Ct. 287, 98 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Standard in federal court.

- In setting out the federal constitutional standard in Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the standard of proof now embodied in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, and that state standard has no place in a federal appellate court's sufficiency of the evidence analysis in a habeas corpus case. Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925, 108 S. Ct. 287, 98 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Bishop v. Kelso, 914 F.2d 1468 (11th Cir. 1990);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Question of admissibility of circumstantial evidence is largely in the discretion of the trial court, and when facts are such that the jury may or may not make an inference pertinent to the issue, it is not error to permit the jury to hear the circumstantial evidence. Bond v. State, 104 Ga. App. 627, 122 S.E.2d 310 (1961) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Statute applicable to municipal court sitting as a jury. Hanjaras v. City of Atlanta, 6 Ga. App. 575, 65 S.E. 356 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Porter v. Mayor of Athens, 18 Ga. App. 232, 89 S.E. 173 (1916);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010).

Statute applies to circumstantial evidence, not direct evidence.

- Defendant's reliance on the circumstantial evidence rule of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to assert defendant's innocence for the crimes of armed robbery and hijacking a motor vehicle was misplaced as use of that rule presumed that only circumstantial evidence was offered, but, in fact, direct evidence was offered in the form of the victim's positive identification of defendant at the scene of the arrest. Lane v. State, 255 Ga. App. 274, 564 S.E.2d 857 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as direct evidence that defendant fired at the victim and defendant's own admission that defendant fired at the victim was sufficient to submit the question of whether defendant was guilty of aggravated assault to the jury; no error occurred pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, involving a conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence, as the state offered more than circumstantial evidence to support the state's case against defendant. Cobb v. State, 268 Ga. App. 66, 601 S.E.2d 443 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to disprove alternative hypotheses of innocence necessarily presumed that the evidence was entirely circumstantial, failed in light of the direct evidence of the victim's in-court identification of defendant. Banks v. State, 269 Ga. App. 653, 605 S.E.2d 47 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

In attacking defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony arising from a shooting death, defendant's reliance on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was misplaced because there was direct evidence of defendant's guilt in the form of defendant's own statement and eyewitness testimony that defendant approached the victim's car armed with a pistol and that multiple shots were fired. Wallace v. State, 279 Ga. 26, 608 S.E.2d 634 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When defendant sat in a stolen would-be getaway car while the accomplice murdered a victim, and then defendant and the accomplice abandoned that car and fled the scene, defendant's conviction for the accomplice's crime was not based solely on circumstantial evidence, as a neighbor saw a person leaning into the stolen car who fit defendant's physical appearance, and defendant admitted to being that person. Jackson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 279, 617 S.E.2d 249 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence supported a defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon as defendant's possession of the victim's handgun and shotgun on the night of the crimes was shown by the victim's direct testimony since: (1) the victim testified that two men forced their way into the victim's house, hit the victim in the head with a blunt object, recovered a .380 caliber handgun and a 20-gauge single-barrel shotgun, forced the victim to give them thousands of dollars the victim had hidden in the attic; (2) during a consensual search, the police found a .380 caliber handgun hidden in the defendant's bedroom that was identified as the victim's by the victim and that bore the same serial number as the victim's gun; and (3) the victim identified defendant in a photo array and at trial; the evidence authorized the jury to find that the defendant was in actual possession of the handgun on February 21 and that the defendant continued to be in at least constructive possession of the gun when the gun was found in the defendant's bedroom. Tanksley v. State, 281 Ga. App. 61, 635 S.E.2d 353 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's argument that the evidence presented by the state failed to exclude every alternative, reasonable hypothesis failed; the reasonable hypothesis rule, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, had no application to the case as there was direct evidence of the defendant's guilt in the form of the victim's prior inconsistent statements about being beaten by the defendant. Meeks v. State, 281 Ga. App. 334, 636 S.E.2d 77 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

In a drug possession case, the defendant was not convicted based on circumstantial evidence that, in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, failed to exclude every other hypothesis save that of the defendant's guilt; the passenger's testimony that the defendant handed the passenger drugs and told the passenger to discard the drugs provided direct evidence that the defendant possessed more than an ounce of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30. Curtis v. State, 282 Ga. App. 322, 638 S.E.2d 773 (2006), cert. denied, No. S07C0427, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 203 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Because the victim's testimony provided direct evidence of defendant's guilt, the rule that the facts had to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused was not at issue. Mack v. State, 294 Ga. App. 518, 669 S.E.2d 487 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Because a codefendant's prior inconsistent statements were based on the codefendant's eyewitness account of what occurred, the statements were direct evidence of the defendant's guilt, rendering the reasonable hypothesis rule inapplicable. Green v. State, 298 Ga. App. 17, 679 S.E.2d 348 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

There was no merit to the defendant's argument that the state's evidence failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant's guilt because the prior statement of the defendant's father to an investigator provided direct evidence that the defendant had moved and supported the charge that the defendant had changed residences without notifying the local authorities as required by O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12. State v. Canup, 300 Ga. App. 678, 686 S.E.2d 275 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Venue may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Graham v. State, 16 Ga. App. 221, 84 S.E. 981 (1915) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010) Dickerson v. State, 186 Ga. 557, 199 S.E. 142 (1938);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Evidence was sufficient to prove venue in Effingham County, Georgia beyond a reasonable doubt because the state showed that the crime was committed at the defendant's residence and that Effingham County9-1-1 dispatchers received the defendant's9-1-1 call and dispatched Effingham County EMS and police to the defendant's address; the victim's attending physician telephoned the Effingham County sheriff's office to report that a crime was committed at the defendant's address. Brinson v. State, 289 Ga. 150, 709 S.E.2d 789 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Case involving life or imprisonment.

- Statute should never be relaxed in a case involving life or imprisonment. Cook v. State, 114 Ga. 523, 40 S.E. 703 (1902) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Creech v. State, 30 Ga. App. 631, 118 S.E. 501 (1923);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010).

Incriminatory statements.

- When the defendant makes incriminatory statements after the victim's death, the case is not one depending entirely upon circumstantial evidence. Phipps v. State, 203 Ga. App. 128, 416 S.E.2d 319, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 319 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant was not convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) merely based on circumstantial evidence that failed, in violation of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt; the defendant made several admissions to officers that constituted direct evidence, including that the defendant had a gun in the defendant's bedroom and that the defendant used the gun to hunt. Parramore v. State, 277 Ga. App. 372, 626 S.E.2d 567 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Confession was not circumstantial evidence; thus, defendant was not entitled to directed verdict under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 since the defendant failed to prove that defendant's confession was unlawfully obtained. Bigham v. State, 222 Ga. App. 353, 474 S.E.2d 254 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's admission that the defendant shot the victim but did so in self-defense removed the case from the rule that a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence can be affirmed only if every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt is excluded. Wright v. State, 294 Ga. App. 20, 668 S.E.2d 505 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Proven facts must be inconsistent with innocence to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence. Riley v. State, 1 Ga. App. 651, 57 S.E. 1031 (1907) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Middleton v. State, 7 Ga. App. 1, 66 S.E. 22 (1909);(decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984).

When the circumstances authorize a mere conjecture of guilt. Fowler v. State, 32 Ga. App. 361, 123 S.E. 43 (1924) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Vinson v. State, 120 Ga. App. 425, 170 S.E.2d 749 (1969); Jackson v. State, 152 Ga. App. 441, 263 S.E.2d 181 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hall v. State, 155 Ga. App. 211, 270 S.E.2d 377 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Witness credibility does convert direct evidence into circumstantial evidence.

- Appellate court rejected the defendant's argument that the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient to support the defendant's convictions based on the state's two key witnesses being so unreliable that the witnesses' testimony should be considered circumstantial rather than direct evidence because direct evidence from a witness who observed a crime does not convert into circumstantial evidence by the witness's credibility or lack thereof. Lewis v. State, 296 Ga. 259, 765 S.E.2d 911 (2014).

Cited in Lomax v. State, 319 Ga. App. 693, 738 S.E.2d 152 (2013); Rodriguez-Nova v. State, 295 Ga. 868, 763 S.E.2d 698 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Walker v. State, 329 Ga. App. 369, 765 S.E.2d 599 (2014); Villegas v. State, 334 Ga. App. 108, 778 S.E.2d 363 (2015); Martinez v. State, 337 Ga. App. 374, 787 S.E.2d 308 (2016); Jones v. State, 299 Ga. 377, 788 S.E.2d 477 (2016); In the Interest of T. W., 344 Ga. App. 338, 810 S.E.2d 582 (2018); Willis v. State, 304 Ga. 122, 816 S.E.2d 656 (2018).

In general.

- When the state relies for a conviction on circumstantial evidence alone, the proved facts must not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused. Amorous v. State, 1 Ga. App. 313, 57 S.E. 999 (1907) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Toomer v. State, 130 Ga. 63, 60 S.E. 198 (1908); Carter v. State, 57 Ga. App. 180, 194 S.E. 842 (1938) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Blakeley v. State, 78 Ga. App. 516, 51 S.E.2d 598 (1949); McQuire v. State, 82 Ga. App. 132, 60 S.E.2d 526 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Diggs v. State, 90 Ga. App. 853, 84 S.E.2d 611 (1954); Crane v. State, 123 Ga. App. 226, 180 S.E.2d 289 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Ridley v. State, 232 Ga. 646, 208 S.E.2d 466 (1974); Wright v. State, 147 Ga. App. 111, 248 S.E.2d 183 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Barnett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 430, 265 S.E.2d 348 (1980); Perry v. State, 158 Ga. App. 349, 280 S.E.2d 390 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 497, 283 S.E.2d 711 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

If the state relies upon circumstantial evidence, that evidence must be so strong as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused. It must be inconsistent with the accused's innocence. This court has ruled on several occasions that, in cases involving life or liberty, this rule must not be relaxed. Parks v. State, 202 Ga. 84, 42 S.E.2d 103 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1097).

In a trial for aggravated assault, although there were certain discrepancies in the evidence, and a portion of the evidence was circumstantial rather than direct, the quantum of evidence in the defendant's favor fell far short of that necessary to "demand" a verdict of acquittal; since there was direct evidence pointing to the same conclusion as the circumstantial evidence, the verdict was not disturbed on appeal. Cobb v. State, 195 Ga. App. 429, 393 S.E.2d 723 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

In a prosecution of the offense of terroristic threats, the state's failure to present evidence excluding a reasonable hypothesis of innocence resulted in a failure of proof in regard to several elements of the crime charged and should have precluded the jury's return of a verdict of guilty. Cooley v. State, 219 Ga. App. 176, 464 S.E.2d 619 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Applicability.

- Evidence was sufficient to support a defendant's conviction for aggravated assault. The reasonable hypothesis rule in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not applicable in the case as the evidence was not entirely circumstantial, in that the state presented direct evidence of the defendant's participation in the events at issue, that the defendant carried a shotgun from the scene of the assault, that the defendant rode away with the weapon near the defendant in the car, and that the defendant fled from police, both in the car and on foot. Emerson v. State, 315 Ga. App. 105, 726 S.E.2d 600 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence is worth nothing if circumstances are reasonably consistent with the hypothesis of innocence as well as the hypothesis of guilt. Johnson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 497, 283 S.E.2d 711 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

"Exclusion of reasonable hypothesis" only applied in cases when evidence was purely circumstantial; hence, the defendant could not benefit from the that legal principle when all the state's evidence, including the identification evidence, was direct evidence. Morales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 698, 649 S.E.2d 873 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Term "hypothesis" refers to such reasonable inferences as are ordinarily drawn by men in the light of their experience in everyday life. White v. State, 18 Ga. App. 214, 89 S.E. 175 (1916) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Wrisper v. State, 193 Ga. 157, 17 S.E.2d 714 (1941); Kalb v. State, 195 Ga. 544, 25 S.E.2d 24 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); 237 Ga. 471, 228 S.E.2d 860 (1976); Hunter v. State, 91 Ga. App. 136, 85 S.E.2d 90 (1954), overruled on other grounds, Townsend v. State, 115 Ga. App. 529, 154 S.E.2d 788 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson v. State, 126 Ga. App. 93, 189 S.E.2d 900 (1972); D.O.D. v. State, 156 Ga. App. 301, 274 S.E.2d 696 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); McGee v. State, 159 Ga. App. 763, 285 S.E.2d 224 (1981); Barnes v. State, 175 Ga. App. 621, 334 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); 255 Ga. 396, 339 S.E.2d 229 (1986); Holland v. State, 176 Ga. App. 343, 335 S.E.2d 739 (1985) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Lewis v. State, 186 Ga. App. 349, 367 S.E.2d 123 (1988); Redwine v. State, 188 Ga. App. 638, 373 S.E.2d 804 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); 188 Ga. App. 912, 373 S.E.2d 804, 489 U.S. 1069, 109 S. Ct. 1347, 103 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1989); Sanford v. State, 193 Ga. App. 18, 386 S.E.2d 899 (1989) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);aff'd in part, rev'd in part,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);cert. denied,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Reasonableness question for jury.

- Whether or not in a given case circumstances are sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the accused is primarily a question for determination by the jury. Fortson v. State, 69 Ga. App. 378, 25 S.E.2d 820 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Townsend v. State, 115 Ga. App. 529, 154 S.E.2d 788 (1967); Brown v. State, 125 Ga. App. 300, 187 S.E.2d 301 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jackson v. State, 129 Ga. App. 901, 201 S.E.2d 816 (1973); Neal v. State, 130 Ga. App. 708, 204 S.E.2d 451 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Murray v. State, 135 Ga. App. 264, 217 S.E.2d 293 (1975); Harris v. State, 236 Ga. 242, 223 S.E.2d 643 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Parker v. State, 140 Ga. App. 92, 230 S.E.2d 99 (1976); Collins v. State, 146 Ga. App. 857, 247 S.E.2d 602 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Dowdy v. State, 150 Ga. App. 137, 257 S.E.2d 41 (1979); Anglin v. State, 244 Ga. 1, 257 S.E.2d 513 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Butler v. State, 150 Ga. App. 751, 258 S.E.2d 691 (1979); Baldwin v. State, 153 Ga. App. 35, 264 S.E.2d 528 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hendrix v. State, 153 Ga. App. 791, 266 S.E.2d 568 (1980); Estep v. State, 154 Ga. App. 1, 267 S.E.2d 314 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 497, 268 S.E.2d 714 (1980); Humphries v. State, 154 Ga. App. 596, 269 S.E.2d 90 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Brewer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 468, 274 S.E.2d 817 (1980); Wood v. State, 156 Ga. App. 810, 275 S.E.2d 694 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Walker v. State, 157 Ga. App. 728, 278 S.E.2d 487 (1981); Barfield v. State, 160 Ga. App. 228, 286 S.E.2d 516 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); In re J.P., 160 Ga. App. 896, 288 S.E.2d 607 (1982);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Question of whether every other reasonable hypothesis has been excluded is generally a question for the jury. Muckle v. State, 165 Ga. App. 873, 303 S.E.2d 54 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Bird v. State, 178 Ga. App. 687, 344 S.E.2d 468 (1986);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

What is a reasonable hypothesis is generally a question for the jury, and there is no yardstick to determine what is a "reasonable" hypothesis save the opinion of the jurors. Jenkins v. State, 201 Ga. App. 395, 411 S.E.2d 122 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Only reasonable hypotheses need be excluded.

- To sustain a conviction, it is not required that the evidence exclude every possibility or every inference that may be drawn from proven facts; it is only necessary to exclude reasonable inferences and reasonable hypotheses which may be drawn from the evidence under all the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular case. Reese v. State, 94 Ga. App. 387, 94 S.E.2d 741 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Bobo v. State, 100 Ga. App. 643, 112 S.E.2d 205 (1959); Samsell v. State, 222 Ga. 235, 149 S.E.2d 367 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Alexander v. State, 223 Ga. 34, 153 S.E.2d 431 (1967); Townsend v. State, 115 Ga. App. 529, 154 S.E.2d 788 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Vinson v. State, 120 Ga. App. 425, 170 S.E.2d 749 (1969); Wheeler v. State, 228 Ga. 402, 185 S.E.2d 900 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Townsend v. State, 127 Ga. App. 797, 195 S.E.2d 474 (1972); Murray v. State, 135 Ga. App. 264, 217 S.E.2d 293 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); McConnell v. State, 235 Ga. 366, 220 S.E.2d 5 (1975); Rogers v. State, 139 Ga. App. 656, 229 S.E.2d 132 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Weatherington v. State, 139 Ga. App. 795, 229 S.E.2d 676 (1976); Parker v. State, 142 Ga. App. 396, 236 S.E.2d 141 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Runnels v. State, 146 Ga. App. 75, 245 S.E.2d 475 (1978); Lewis v. State, 149 Ga. App. 181, 254 S.E.2d 142 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Dowdy v. State, 150 Ga. App. 137, 257 S.E.2d 41 (1979); Creamer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 428, 258 S.E.2d 212 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Baldwin v. State, 153 Ga. App. 35, 264 S.E.2d 528 (1980); Thompson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 704, 269 S.E.2d 474 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Brewer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 468, 274 S.E.2d 817 (1980); Strickland v. State, 156 Ga. App. 475, 274 S.E.2d 823 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Perry v. State, 158 Ga. App. 349, 280 S.E.2d 390 (1981); Slack v. State, 159 Ga. App. 185, 283 S.E.2d 64 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); In re J.P., 160 Ga. App. 896, 288 S.E.2d 607 (1982);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Rule as to the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to support a conviction is that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt, not that it remove every possibility of the innocence of the defendant. Barfield v. State, 160 Ga. App. 228, 286 S.E.2d 516 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

To sustain the judgment of conviction, the evidence need not exclude every inference or hypothesis except guilt of the accused, but only reasonable inferences and hypotheses so as to justify the inference, beyond reasonable doubt, of guilt. Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Hulsey v. State, 210 Ga. App. 251, 435 S.E.2d 713 (1993);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Conviction based solely upon circumstantial evidence must be supported by facts which not only are consistent with guilt of the accused, but should exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused. This does not mean that the state must exclude every possible hypothesis showing innocence, but any reasonable hypothesis showing innocence. Robinson v. State, 168 Ga. App. 569, 309 S.E.2d 845 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence must include only reasonable hypothesis; it need not exclude every inference or hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt. Smith v. State, 257 Ga. 381, 359 S.E.2d 662 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, although the circumstantial evidence must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the defendant's guilt, it need not exclude every inference or hypothesis. Mason v. State, 199 Ga. App. 691, 405 S.E.2d 747 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the evidence connecting a defendant to the charged crime is circumstantial, to warrant a conviction the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused. Dean v. State, 203 Ga. App. 836, 418 S.E.2d 117 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Beyond the witnesses' identification of a juvenile's hairstyle and clothing as those worn by one of the burglars, and beyond the burglars' going to the juvenile's home to escape, the juvenile's possession of the stolen items soon after the burglary was sufficient to uphold the court's adjudication of delinquency on that charge; furthermore, any reasonable hypothesis of innocence was undermined by the identification of the juvenile's hairstyle and clothes and by the identification of the juvenile's residence as the place to which the burglars escaped. In the Interest of A.D., 282 Ga. App. 586, 639 S.E.2d 556 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Jury was not required to find that the defendant's hypothesis that the husband committed the crimes acting alone was a reasonable one because the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the murder of the defendant's 11-month-old son and the aggravated assault and child cruelty of the defendant's two-year-old daughter because the defendant was alone with the children for almost the entire time during which the medical evidence established that someone inflicted the fatal injury on the son's head; and a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was - either directly or as a party to the husband's criminal activity - guilty of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Black v. State, 296 Ga. 658, 769 S.E.2d 898 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence supporting two theories.

- When the circumstantial evidence supports more than one theory, one consistent with guilt and another with innocence, it does not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except guilt and is not sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Carr v. State, 119 Ga. App. 540, 167 S.E.2d 707 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Roberson v. State, 145 Ga. App. 687, 244 S.E.2d 629 (1978); Kreager v. State, 148 Ga. App. 548, 252 S.E.2d 1 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson v. State, 159 Ga. App. 497, 283 S.E.2d 711 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

When evidence failed to establish whether the defendant first took property and then killed the victim and ransacked the house, or first killed the victim and then took the property and ransacked the house, the evidence was insufficient to meet the standard of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 and, moreover, was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found the defendant guilty of armed robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Miles v. State, 261 Ga. 232, 403 S.E.2d 794 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Consideration of defendant's explanation.

- In making a determination of whether any other reasonable hypothesis exists, the defendant's explanation must be taken into consideration insofar as it is consistent with the circumstantial evidence properly admitted. Elam v. State, 125 Ga. App. 427, 187 S.E.2d 920 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Townsend v. State, 127 Ga. App. 797, 195 S.E.2d 474 (1972); Wright v. State, 147 Ga. App. 111, 248 S.E.2d 183 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jackson v. State, 152 Ga. App. 441, 263 S.E.2d 181 (1979); Barnett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 430, 265 S.E.2d 348 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Bogan v. State, 158 Ga. App. 1, 279 S.E.2d 229 (1981); Ragan v. State, 250 Ga. App. 89, 550 S.E.2d 476 (2001) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions on four counts of aggravated battery and one count of cruelty to children in the first degree after the 17-month-old daughter of a girlfriend was found with hot-water immersion burns incurred while defendant was watching the daughter for the girlfriend; the jury was free to reject the explanation that defendant had no criminal intent at the time the burns were incurred and that defendant maliciously and intentionally immersed the baby in hot water after the baby soiled a diaper, especially since defendant's explanations were not consistent with the evidence. Lee v. State, 275 Ga. App. 93, 619 S.E.2d 767 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Because sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding that the defendant was intoxicated to the level that the intoxication caused both the defendant's loss of consciousness and an accident resulting in the defendant's truck straddling a ditch with the truck's nose down at close to a 90-degree angle, and the responding deputies testified that the defendant appeared to be under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe to drive, the defendant's conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) was supported by sufficient direct evidence of guilt; moreover, based on the evidence, the trial court could reasonably reject as unreasonable the hypothesis that the defendant became intoxicated after the accident occurred. Stewart v. State, 288 Ga. App. 735, 655 S.E.2d 328 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's convictions on one count of simple assault and two counts of battery, which arose from a fight with a romantic friend, as it was within the jury's province to consider defendant's self-defense theory and reject the defense; jury heard witnesses and observed testimony and was more capable of determining reasonableness of the hypothesis produced by evidence or lack of evidence than appellate court. Thompson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 355, 662 S.E.2d 135 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for the malice murder of the defendant's mother based on the facts adduced at trial that showed that, contrary to the defendant's version of events that the mother died from smoke inhalation from a kitchen fire, or another version that someone else committed the crime, the medical examiner established that the mother died from strangulation by hands, and the fire investigator established that the kitchen fire was insignificant. Nichols v. State, 292 Ga. 290, 736 S.E.2d 407 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder based on the testimony of several witnesses that the defendant hit the victim in the back of the head with a brick and, despite the defendant asserting that another individual hit the victim, it was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Wilson v. State, 295 Ga. 84, 757 S.E.2d 825 (2014).

Evidence raising an inference of a defendant's innocence improperly excluded.

- During a trial for felony murder while in the commission of cruelty to a child arising from the death of a defendant's child from brain trauma sustained while the child was in the defendant's care, the defendant was improperly prevented from cross-examining a person who was in the apartment at the time about the person's history of inappropriate behavior toward the person's own child, including allegations of child abuse, because it was a crucial element of the defense that the person was a likely suspect, and, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, the circumstantial evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the person was the likely culprit; the defendant's conviction required reversal because it was not highly improbable that the jury's verdict would have been different if the evidence had been admitted, and the error therefore could not be considered harmless. Scott v. State, 281 Ga. 373, 637 S.E.2d 652 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Although evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of the murder of the defendant's girlfriend's adopted child, the conviction was reversed because the defendant was prevented from introducing testimony from the girlfriend's ex-husband that the girlfriend had slapped her infant in the face for refusing to eat and threatened the children. Gilreath v. State, 298 Ga. 670, 784 S.E.2d 388 (2016).

Error to charge guilt in less reasonable explanation.

- Charge given by trial court in theft case that the jury could have inferred guilt unless there was from the evidence a reasonable explanation of possession consistent with a plea of innocence was not a sufficient restatement of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. The jury was not adequately instructed that the state's circumstantial evidence of guilt should "exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused." McChargue v. State, 209 Ga. App. 612, 434 S.E.2d 153 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Proof to moral certainty.

- It is not necessary to show that it was impossible for the offense to have been committed by anybody else or that it might not, by bare possibility, have been done by another; it is sufficient to show to a moral certainty that it was the defendant. Johnson v. State, 126 Ga. App. 93, 189 S.E.2d 900 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Neal v. State, 130 Ga. App. 708, 204 S.E.2d 451 (1974); Harris v. State, 236 Ga. 766, 225 S.E.2d 263 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Van Voltenburg v. State, 138 Ga. App. 628, 227 S.E.2d 451 (1976); Castleberry v. State, 152 Ga. App. 769, 264 S.E.2d 239 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Strickland v. State, 156 Ga. App. 475, 274 S.E.2d 823 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 did not mean that the act might by bare possibility have been done by somebody else, but that the state should show to a moral certainty that it was the defendant's act. McGee v. State, 159 Ga. App. 763, 285 S.E.2d 224 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Burden on state.

- Defendant does not have the obligation to offer a theory consistent with innocence. Rather, the state has the burden of proving guilt. Howard v. State, 148 Ga. App. 598, 251 S.E.2d 829 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Burden under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to present evidence excluding every other reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, was upon the state. Cornish v. State, 187 Ga. App. 140, 369 S.E.2d 515 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Hypothesis considered by jury.

- Questions as to the reasonableness of hypothesis are generally to be decided by the jury and when the jury finds that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, that finding will not be disturbed unless the verdict of guilty is insupportable as a matter of law. Robbins v. State, 269 Ga. 500, 499 S.E.2d 323 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Callahan v. State, 249 Ga. App. 108, 547 S.E.2d 741 (2001);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for felony murder and two aggravated assaults because despite no eyewitness able to say who fired the shot that fatally wounded the victim, the defendant was among a group that fired at least three handguns, one of which fatally wounded the victim, and the state was not required to prove that the defendant personally fired the fatal shot, so long as it proved that the defendant was a party to the fatal shooting. Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 784 S.E.2d 759 (2016).

Although a murder defendant admitted beating the victim for looking at the defendant's girlfriend, the defendant claimed that the victim died due to the victim's intoxication and falling and striking the victim's head on the bumper of a van; however, the jury was not required to accept this hypothesis because the medical examiner testified that it was unlikely that such a fall caused the victim's death. Gibson v. State, 300 Ga. 494, 796 S.E.2d 712 (2017).

Evidence did not exclude very reasonable hypothesis.

- Circumstantial evidence was insufficient for adjudication as a delinquent for acts that would have constituted cocaine possession if committed by an adult because the circumstantial evidence of defendant's spatial proximity to cocaine found in a car's console and the fact that the defendant did not live near the parking lot where the car was parked did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than constructive possession. In the Interest of J.S., 303 Ga. App. 788, 694 S.E.2d 375 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Abstract principles for jury.

- In trying a case depending upon circumstantial evidence, very few abstract principles should be given to the jury. Dacus v. State, 56 Ga. App. 439, 193 S.E. 93 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Request to charge not waived when request not in writing.

- As the defendant's request to charge the jury on circumstantial evidence as set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 directed the trial court to the language in the pattern jury instructions that defendant wished to have the trial court use, and the trial court recognized what was requested, the defendant's request to charge the principle stated in § 24-4-6 was not waived by the failure to properly submit the request in writing under Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 10.3. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 176, 674 S.E.2d 879 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When charge required.

- When the conviction depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the court's failure to charge the law pertaining to circumstantial evidence is reversible error, even in the absence of a timely written request. Harris v. State, 18 Ga. App. 710, 90 S.E. 370 (1916) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Coggin v. State, 41 Ga. App. 659, 154 S.E. 376 (1930); Towler v. State, 44 Ga. App. 262, 161 S.E. 164 (1931) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Cofer v. State, 178 Ga. 742, 174 S.E. 331 (1934); Grooms v. State, 53 Ga. App. 348, 185 S.E. 596 (1936) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); De Loach v. State, 57 Ga. App. 799, 196 S.E. 924 (1938); Kinsey v. State, 57 Ga. App. 813, 197 S.E. 61 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Williams v. State, 196 Ga. 503, 26 S.E.2d 926 (1943); Dyer v. State, 71 Ga. App. 41, 29 S.E.2d 922 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Steed v. State, 80 Ga. App. 360, 56 S.E.2d 171 (1949); Culver v. State, 80 Ga. App. 438, 56 S.E.2d 197 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jones v. State, 91 Ga. App. 662, 86 S.E.2d 724 (1955); McGruder v. State, 213 Ga. 259, 98 S.E.2d 564 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Ledford v. State, 215 Ga. 799, 113 S.E.2d 628 (1960); Harvey v. State, 111 Ga. App. 279, 141 S.E.2d 604 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Campbell v. State, 129 Ga. App. 836, 201 S.E.2d 666 (1973); Hethcox v. State, 138 Ga. App. 207, 225 S.E. 764 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Williams v. State, 239 Ga. 12, 235 S.E.2d 504 (1977); Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 584, 255 S.E.2d 702 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Nelms v. State, 150 Ga. App. 720, 258 S.E.2d 531 (1979); Russell v. State, 152 Ga. App. 693, 263 S.E.2d 689 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Arnett v. State, 245 Ga. 470, 265 S.E.2d 771 (1980); Thompson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 704, 269 S.E.2d 474 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Caylor v. State, 155 Ga. App. 489, 270 S.E.2d 924 (1980); Stephens v. State, 208 Ga. App. 291, 430 S.E.2d 29 (1993) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Dunaway v. State, 214 Ga. App. 128, 447 S.E.2d 153 (1994); Stubbs v. State, 265 Ga. 883, 463 S.E.2d 686 (1995) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Charge on circumstantial evidence must be given when the defendant has made a timely written request therefor. Hancock v. State, 158 Ga. App. 829, 282 S.E.2d 401 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Dunaway v. State, 214 Ga. App. 128, 447 S.E.2d 153 (1994);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

If the state's case depends, in whole or in part, on circumstantial evidence, a charge on the law of circumstantial evidence must be given on request whether or not the jury is authorized to find that the direct evidence presented by witness testimony has been impeached. Gidden v. State, 205 Ga. App. 245, 422 S.E.2d 30, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 900, 422 S.E.2d 30 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the state's case depends, in whole or in part, on circumstantial evidence, a charge on the law of circumstantial evidence must be given on request. Postell v. State, 261 Ga. 842, 412 S.E.2d 831 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the case against the defendant is close or doubtful and is composed solely of circumstantial evidence, it is reversible error for a trial court to fail to charge former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 even absent a request. Jenkins v. State, 209 Ga. App. 19, 432 S.E.2d 270 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Since no drugs were found in the defendant's actual possession, the case was dependent on circumstantial evidence and it was error to refuse to so charge upon written request. Lowe v. State, 208 Ga. App. 49, 430 S.E.2d 169 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Kelly v. State, 212 Ga. App. 278, 442 S.E.2d 462 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Failure to charge on circumstantial evidence did not constitute plain error.

- Because the evidence of the defendant's participation in the first burglary was wholly circumstantial, the clear and longstanding precedent required the trial court to instruct the jury on proof by circumstantial evidence even though the defendant did not request such an instruction; however, the defendant did not meet the burden under the plain error test to show that the omission of the instruction likely affected the jury's verdict as the trial court's charge sufficiently informed the jury of the state's burden of excluding all other reasonable hypotheses except the defendant's guilt with respect to the first burglary, and the defendant never suggested that the defendant's brother committed the first burglary alone. Gadson v. State, 303 Ga. 871, 815 S.E.2d 828 (2018)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Instruction required in DUI conviction.

- In a prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, defendant was entitled to defendant's requested instruction on circumstantial evidence based on a reasonable hypothesis from defendant's use of Benadryl that the defendant was not guilty of the crime charged. Cato v. State, 212 Ga. App. 417, 441 S.E.2d 900 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

It is error to fail to charge the substance of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 when the circumstances from which a guilty intent can be inferred are consistent with an innocent intention or an intention different from that charged against the accused. Hathcock v. State, 214 Ga. App. 188, 447 S.E.2d 104 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

In a prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, evidence upon which an officer based the officer's opinion that defendant was impaired and a less safe driver was circumstantial, and the failure to give a requested charge on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was reversible error. Tomko v. State, 233 Ga. App. 20, 503 S.E.2d 300 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Instruction required in child molestation conviction.

- In a prosecution for child molestation, it was reversible error to refuse to give defendant's requested charge on circumstantial evidence, when defendant offered evidence of an intention other than to arouse defendant's or the child's sexual desires and the trial court gave the jury no instructions under which the jury could consider this evidence. Hathcock v. State, 214 Ga. App. 188, 447 S.E.2d 104 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Two different rules governed when the trial court must instruct the jury on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 were: (1) the charge must be given absent a request if the case against the defendant was wholly circumstantial; and (2) the charge must be given upon request if the case relied to any degree upon circumstantial evidence. Yarn v. State, 215 Ga. App. 883, 452 S.E.2d 537 (1994), aff'd, 265 Ga. 787, 462 S.E.2d 359 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Whenever the state introduces circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt, it is error not to charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 if such has been timely requested; however, it is not error to fail to give such a charge in the absence of a timely request when the state's case depends both upon direct and circumstantial evidence. Stubbs v. State, 215 Ga. App. 873, 452 S.E.2d 571 (1994), rev'd in part on other grounds, 265 Ga. 883, 463 S.E.2d 686 (1995), vacated on other grounds, 219 Ga. App. 871, 467 S.E.2d 612 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 801, 471 S.E.2d 191 (1996);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Instruction required in DUI conviction and operating unsafe motor vehicle.

- In a prosecution for driving under the influence and driving an unsafe motor vehicle with defective equipment, the state was required to prove defendant was driving the car, proof of which was dependent in part on circumstantial evidence requiring the giving of a charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Coates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 93, 453 S.E.2d 35 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the state's case is composed solely of circumstantial evidence, a defendant is relieved from the necessity of requesting a charge on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6; even in the absence of such a request, it may be reversible error to fail to give the instruction. Yarn v. State, 265 Ga. 787, 462 S.E.2d 359 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court must charge on the law of circumstantial evidence, even absent a request, if the case against the defendant is wholly circumstantial, and if the case relies to any degree upon circumstantial evidence, a charge on circumstantial evidence is required upon written request. Massey v. State, 270 Ga. 76, 508 S.E.2d 149 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Instruction in kidnapping case not required when direct evidence exists.

- Trial court's failure to give a charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not harmful as a matter of law because the state presented direct evidence that the defendant committed the crime of kidnapping. Holden v. State, 287 Ga. App. 472, 651 S.E.2d 552 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0189, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 153 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Charge on circumstantial evidence is required, upon request in appropriate cases, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Kelly v. State, 212 Ga. App. 278, 442 S.E.2d 462 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Only when evidence is wholly circumstantial is substance of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 required to be given in charge, and when there was direct evidence, as well as circumstantial, and when there was no such equality of theories of guilt or innocence as to require such charge it was not error to refuse charge as requested by defendant. Bearden v. State, 163 Ga. App. 434, 294 S.E.2d 667 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Only when the case is wholly dependent on circumstantial evidence is a charge on circumstantial evidence required. Galloway v. State, 165 Ga. App. 536, 301 S.E.2d 894 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Jury charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, though requested by a defendant, is required only when the evidence relied on for conviction is entirely circumstantial. Griffith v. State, 172 Ga. App. 255, 322 S.E.2d 921 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Todd v. State, 184 Ga. App. 750, 362 S.E.2d 400 (1987);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Because the state presented direct evidence that the defendant committed a drive-by shooting and the defendant did not request the full circumstantial evidence instruction in writing, the trial court did not commit reversible error; the trial court instructed the jury on the definition of circumstantial evidence and gave a full instruction on reasonable doubt. Walker v. State, 295 Ga. 688, 763 S.E.2d 704 (2014).

Instruction not required in DUI trial.

- When the defendant was charged with driving under the influence with a blood alcohol percentage of .10, the evidence introduced by the state in support of this charge, the results from the breath test, was characterized as direct evidence, not circumstantial evidence, and the trial court did not err in refusing to give a circumstantial evidence instruction. Cawthon v. State, 235 Ga. App. 791, 510 S.E.2d 586 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Charge required if possession of stolen goods is only evidence of burglary.

- In a burglary prosecution, if the only evidence tending to connect the accused with the alleged offense is the accused's unsatisfactorily explained possession of recently stolen goods, it is error for the trial court to fail to give, with or without request, a charge on the principle contained in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Price v. State, 180 Ga. App. 215, 348 S.E.2d 740 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When charge not required.

- Unless the evidence relied upon for conviction is entirely circumstantial, it is not error to fail to charge the law of circumstantial evidence in the absence of a request to do so. Wilson v. State, 152 Ga. 337, 110 S.E. 8 (1921) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Chamblee v. State, 50 Ga. App. 251, 177 S.E. 824 (1934); Roberts v. State, 50 Ga. App. 307, 177 S.E. 825 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wyatt v. State, 50 Ga. App. 266, 177 S.E. 840 (1934); Summers v. State, 63 Ga. App. 445, 11 S.E.2d 409 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hall v. State, 66 Ga. App. 655, 19 S.E.2d 40 (1942); Allen v. State, 194 Ga. 430, 22 S.E.2d 65 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Miller v. State, 69 Ga. App. 847, 26 S.E.2d 851 (1943); Newsome v. State, 69 Ga. App. 445, 26 S.E.2d 113 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Daniels v. State, 199 Ga. 818, 35 S.E.2d 362 (1945); Johnson v. State, 84 Ga. App. 745, 67 S.E.2d 246 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Young v. State, 85 Ga. App. 122, 68 S.E.2d 219 (1951); Hicks v. State, 86 Ga. App. 365, 71 S.E.2d 695 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Weaver v. State, 86 Ga. App. 699, 71 S.E.2d 901 (1952); Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. 333, 72 S.E.2d 291 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); King v. State, 86 Ga. App. 786, 72 S.E.2d 502 (1952); Marshman v. State, 88 Ga. App. 250, 76 S.E.2d 443 (1953) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jones v. State, 88 Ga. App. 330, 76 S.E.2d 810 (1953); Wiggins v. State, 92 Ga. App. 65, 87 S.E.2d 652 (1955) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Nelson v. State, 92 Ga. App. 746, 90 S.E.2d 91 (1955); Weatherby v. State, 213 Ga. 188, 97 S.E.2d 698 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Whiting v. State, 108 Ga. App. 374, 133 S.E.2d 50 (1963); Ryder v. State, 121 Ga. App. 796, 175 S.E.2d 882 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Bryant v. State, 229 Ga. 60, 189 S.E.2d 435 (1972); Johnson v. State, 235 Ga. 486, 220 S.E.2d 448 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 584, 255 S.E.2d 702 (1979); Fuller v. State, 166 Ga. App. 734, 305 S.E.2d 463 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Whittington v. State, 252 Ga. 168, 313 S.E.2d 73 (1984); McGarity v. State, 212 Ga. App. 17, 440 S.E.2d 695 (1994) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 531 S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 948, 121 S. Ct. 350, 148 L. Ed. 2d 282 (2000);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Refusal to give a requested instruction on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 is not error except when the case is totally dependent upon circumstantial evidence. Heath v. State, 186 Ga. App. 655, 368 S.E.2d 346 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Lewis v. State, 198 Ga. App. 808, 403 S.E.2d 233; 198 Ga. App. 898, 403 S.E.2d 233 (1991), cert. denied,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When there is some direct evidence against the defendant, it is not error to fail to charge on circumstantial evidence. Terrell v. State, 258 Ga. 722, 373 S.E.2d 751 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction on circumstantial evidence since the evidence in the case was not entirely circumstantial. Ebenezer v. State, 191 Ga. App. 901, 383 S.E.2d 373 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Rainey v. State, 216 Ga. App. 557, 455 S.E.2d 73 (1995), aff'd, 266 Ga. 163, 465 S.E.2d 447 (1996); Carter v. State, 240 Ga. App. 203, 523 S.E.2d 47 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence since direct evidence of guilt obviated the requirement of such a charge. Baines v. State, 201 Ga. App. 354, 411 S.E.2d 95 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

In a case involving both direct and circumstantial evidence, it was not reversible error for the trial court to fail to give a charge on circumstantial evidence as contained in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, nor to fail to instruct the jury that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence was permissible only if the offense charged was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. This type of instruction was required only when the case was totally dependent upon circumstantial evidence. Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 566, 405 S.E.2d 716 (1991) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in failing to give a charge on circumstantial evidence, since the requested charge was not adjusted to the principles involved in the case since a charge on how the jury should treat a defendant's testimony in the context of a circumstantial evidence case was included but defendant did not testify. Minor v. State, 264 Ga. 195, 442 S.E.2d 754 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Failure to charge on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not reversible error when the case was not close or doubtful, the charge on reasonable doubt was full and fair, and no other reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt was offered. Cato v. State, 212 Ga. App. 417, 441 S.E.2d 900 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Even if the victims were impeached, a charge on circumstantial evidence was not warranted because there was no other evidence authorizing a verdict of guilty. Miller v. State, 212 Ga. App. 193, 441 S.E.2d 443 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

In a prosecution for trafficking in cocaine involving direct and circumstantial evidence, in the absence of any evidence evincing a plausible explanation or reasonable hypothesis of innocence and, particularly in the context of the entire charge in the case, the omission of a charge reciting the principle in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not reversible error. Roura v. State, 214 Ga. App. 43, 447 S.E.2d 52 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Because there was some direct evidence of defendant's guilt and no request was made for a charge on circumstantial evidence, the trial court's failure to give an instruction in the language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not error. Brooks v. State, 265 Ga. 548, 458 S.E.2d 349 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the state's case includes both direct and circumstantial evidence, a defendant is not relieved from the necessity of requesting the charge and, in the absence of such a request, it is not error to fail to give the charge. Yarn v. State, 265 Ga. 787, 462 S.E.2d 359 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Failure to give a requested circumstantial evidence charge was not error because the evidence was consistent only with defendant's guilt as to the acts alleged in the indictment and was completely inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Carroll v. State, 224 Ga. App. 543, 481 S.E.2d 562 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant must request a circumstantial evidence charge within a similar transaction charge since the case against the defendant is not wholly circumstantial. Johnson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 252, 511 S.E.2d 603 (1999), aff'd, 272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

In a prosecution for child molestation, a charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not appropriate since the evidence directly contradicted defendant's contention that inadvertent contact was made with the victim's leg or thigh as a result of a trip and fall. Turner v. State, 245 Ga. App. 294, 536 S.E.2d 814 (2000), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Since there was no request to charge on the circumstantial evidence rule, the charge was needed only if the state's case was based wholly on circumstantial evidence, and no such charge was needed when defendant's cousin testified that the cousin saw defendant rob a store; that was direct evidence, not circumstantial. Moore v. State, 268 Ga. App. 398, 601 S.E.2d 854 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defense counsel was not ineffective in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XIV, for failing to request a charge on circumstantial evidence based on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, which imposed certain requirements for convictions based on circumstantial evidence; the trial court adequately charged the jury on reasonable doubt, and direct evidence for both offenses was presented. Guillen v. State, 275 Ga. App. 316, 620 S.E.2d 518 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Because the defendant did not request a charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to give the charge. Barrino v. State, 282 Ga. App. 496, 639 S.E.2d 489 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Prosecution against the defendant on charges of burglary, theft by taking, and criminal trespass included both direct and circumstantial evidence, and convictions on those charges were not subject to being reversed merely because the trial court failed to charge former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 as the defendant failed to request that charge. Rodriguez v. State, 283 Ga. App. 752, 642 S.E.2d 705 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Because the defendant made an oral request that the jury be charged on the law under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, but did not make a written request for that charge, the trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury as the defendant requested. Attaway v. State, 284 Ga. App. 855, 644 S.E.2d 919 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the evidence at trial consisted of both direct and circumstantial evidence, the defendant did not request in writing a charge regarding former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, and defense counsel stated that the trial court's proposed charges were sufficient, it was not error not to give a charge based on former § 24-4-6. Moore v. State, 286 Ga. App. 313, 649 S.E.2d 337 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Because the evidence rested largely on the direct evidence provided by the eyewitnesses to the event, and there was no reasonable likelihood that had the circumstantial evidence charge been given to the jury the outcome of the trial would have differed, the defendant's trial counsel could not be found ineffective in failing to request the instruction. Holden v. State, 287 Ga. App. 472, 651 S.E.2d 552 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0189, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 153 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Because the testimony from the medical examiner amounted to direct, and not circumstantial, evidence that: (1) the accident the defendant was charged with causing caused the decedent's death; (2) either the defendant's or the other impact caused the blunt force trauma to the decedent's head; and (3) any of the impacts, alone, could have caused the trauma, the defendant's requested circumstantial evidence charge was properly denied by the trial court. Kirk v. State, 289 Ga. App. 125, 656 S.E.2d 251 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

In a defendant's prosecution for, inter alia, felony murder, the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence as set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 because both direct and circumstantial evidence were presented by the state and the defendant failed to request a circumstantial evidence instruction. Sumlin v. State, 283 Ga. 264, 658 S.E.2d 596 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

In convictions of aggravated sodomy, kidnapping, burglary, and aggravated assault, a trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury about circumstantial evidence because the victims provided direct evidence of defendant's guilt. Fortune v. State, 300 Ga. App. 550, 685 S.E.2d 466 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury on circumstantial evidence because nothing of record showed that the defendant requested such a charge; nevertheless, the record showed that the trial court properly charged the jury sua sponte on circumstantial evidence, and when trial counsel was asked if counsel objected to the jury charge as given counsel indicated that counsel did not, which resulted in waiver on appeal. Jackson v. State, 303 Ga. App. 149, 692 S.E.2d 758 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Reasonable hypothesis rule regarding circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 did not apply in a defendant's trial for the murder and involuntary manslaughter of defendant's 17-month-old son because the evidence was not entirely circumstantial, given the defendant's direct admissions that the defendant had shaken defendant's son to make the child stop crying. Lewis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 831, 698 S.E.2d 365 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court failed to give a complete jury charge on circumstantial evidence because the evidence against the defendant was both direct and circumstantial and, thus, the statutory language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was not required. Evans v. State, 288 Ga. 571, 707 S.E.2d 353 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in refusing to give a requested jury instruction based on former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, concerning a conviction based on circumstantial evidence because such a charge was not warranted since the state's evidence supporting the defendant's conviction was not circumstantial; the state relied on direct evidence in the form of the eyewitness testimony of the two police officers. Crawford v. State, 314 Ga. App. 796, 726 S.E.2d 58 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial premised on the defendant's contention that the defendant was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel due to defense counsel failing to request a jury charge because the state adduced both direct eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence at trial in the case, thus, the trial court was not required to charge the jury on circumstantial evidence pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Russell v. State, 319 Ga. App. 472, 735 S.E.2d 797 (2012)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Because the defendant's admissions of guilt following the killing were direct evidence of the defendant's guilt, the state's case was not based solely on circumstantial evidence and the additional circumstantial evidence charge requested by the defendant was not required. Rodriguez-Nova v. State, 295 Ga. 868, 763 S.E.2d 698 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Charge not required when guilt is the only reasonable hypothesis.

- Even in a case which is wholly dependent on circumstantial evidence, if from the proved facts only one reasonable hypothesis presents itself, i.e., that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, then a failure to charge former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 does not furnish cause for a new trial. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Stewart v. State, 232 Ga. App. 565, 502 S.E.2d 502 (1998) But see (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Better practice to charge statute on circumstantial evidence when the evidence upon which the state depends for conviction is both direct and circumstantial. Loomis v. State, 78 Ga. App. 153, 51 S.E.2d 13 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Jackson v. State, 92 Ga. App. 774, 90 S.E.2d 29 (1955); Ramsey v. State, 212 Ga. 381, 92 S.E.2d 866 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Holton v. State, 192 Ga. App. 745, 386 S.E.2d 404 (1989);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence charge should have been given.

- When state introduced circumstantial as well as direct evidence in the state's case against defendant, defendant was entitled to have defendant's requested charge on circumstantial evidence given to the jury. Mims v. State, 264 Ga. 271, 443 S.E.2d 845 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

A trial court's failure to give the circumstantial evidence charge under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 constituted reversible error, even though the defendant failed to request such a charge, because the evidence against the defendant in a cocaine trafficking case under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1) was entirely circumstantial based on the defendant's participation in the crime with the defendant's sibling and a third party. Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 71, 692 S.E.2d 737 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Charging precise language of statute unnecessary.

- Failure of the court to charge the law of circumstantial evidence in the exact language of the statute is not error. Sellers v. State, 36 Ga. App. 653, 137 S.E. 912 (1927) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Thompson v. State, 166 Ga. 512, 143 S.E. 896 (1928); Brent v. State, 44 Ga. App. 777, 163 S.E. 319 (1932) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Pound v. State, 180 Ga. 83, 178 S.E. 291 (1935); Rowland v. State, 51 Ga. App. 54, 179 S.E. 585 (1935) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Sanders v. State, 71 Ga. App. 334, 30 S.E.2d 810 (1944); Townsend v. State, 86 Ga. App. 459, 71 S.E.2d 738 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Roman v. State, 155 Ga. App. 355, 271 S.E.2d 21 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Trial court need not track the exact language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 in order to satisfy the requirement that the jury be instructed on the principle of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to warrant a conviction. Price v. State, 180 Ga. App. 215, 348 S.E.2d 740 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court was not required to give the exact language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 in the court's charge to the jury. Richards v. State, 189 Ga. App. 146, 375 S.E.2d 278 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Charge on circumstantial evidence which added the word "alone" to the statutory phrase "to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence," was the functional equivalent of the statutory language because the trial court did not have to track the exact language in order to properly instruct the jury on the principle contained therein. Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 180, 476 S.E.2d 583 (1996) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Wynn v. State, 236 Ga. App. 98, 511 S.E.2d 201 (1999); Morris v. State, 239 Ga. App. 100, 520 S.E.2d 485 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When a circumstantial evidence charge given to the jury added the word "alone" to the phrase "to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence," it was the functional equivalent of the rule contained in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 and was not error. Martin v. State, 235 Ga. App. 844, 510 S.E.2d 602 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in giving a circumstantial evidence charge that was the functional equivalent of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 since the trial court added the word "alone" twice, substituted the word "theory" for "hypothesis," and amplified upon the statutory language. Johnson v. State, 251 Ga. App. 455, 554 S.E.2d 587 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Failure to track statute's language held to be error.

- Even though the trial court instructed the jury on the definitions of direct and circumstantial evidence and the difference between them, its refusal to give defendant's requested charge tracking the language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was reversible error. Waits v. State, 232 Ga. App. 357, 501 S.E.2d 870 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Charge using the statutory language satisfied the requirement that, where the state's case depends, in whole or in part, on circumstantial evidence, a charge on the law of circumstantial evidence must be given on request. Wiley v. State, 238 Ga. App. 334, 519 S.E.2d 10 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the defendant makes incriminatory statements after the victim's death, the case is not one depending entirely upon circumstantial evidence. Stewart v. State, 163 Ga. App. 735, 295 S.E.2d 112 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Yarborough v. State, 183 Ga. App. 198, 358 S.E.2d 484 (1987);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Instruction defining circumstantial evidence and its weight approved.

- Following instruction was entirely consistent with former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6: "Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances by direct evidence from which you may infer other related or connected facts which are reasonable and justified in the light of your experience. Circumstantial evidence alone will not justify a finding of guilt unless the circumstances are entirely consistent with the defendant's guilt, wholly inconsistent with any reasonable theory of the defendant's innocence, and are so convincing as to exclude a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." Carpenter v. State, 167 Ga. App. 634, 307 S.E.2d 19 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 79, 310 S.E.2d 912 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Court's instruction was proper which instructed the jury concerning the differences between direct and circumstantial evidence and charged that the comparative weight of circumstantial evidence and direct evidence on any given issue is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Grier v. State, 217 Ga. App. 409, 458 S.E.2d 139 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's request that the court give a "two theories" charge did not constitute a request for a charge on circumstantial evidence. Grier v. State, 217 Ga. App. 409, 458 S.E.2d 139 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Charge language describing two equal theories.

- Charge language describing two equal theories, one of guilt and the other of innocence, did not accurately state the principle addressed. The charge related to the weight of the evidence and therefore was not an accurate statement of the "two theories" principle. Langston v. State, 208 Ga. App. 175, 430 S.E.2d 365 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Blue v. State, 212 Ga. App. 847, 433 S.E.2d 635 (1994);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant was not entitled to an instruction that, when the facts, evidence and all reasonable deductions therefrom present two reasonable theories, one of guilt and the other consistent with innocence, the justice and humanity of the law compels acceptance of the theory which is consistent with innocence; the requested charge was not substantially equivalent to the principle set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Jones v. State, 213 Ga. App. 11, 444 S.E.2d 89 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the trial court properly charged the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence, the presumption of innocence and the need to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it was not error to refuse to give the "two theories" charge. Stephens v. State, 214 Ga. App. 183, 447 S.E.2d 26 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

It is never error to refuse to give a requested "two equal theories" charge when a trial court properly instructs the jury on circumstantial evidence. Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 857, 452 S.E.2d 494 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Mitchell v. State, 233 Ga. App. 92, 503 S.E.2d 293 (1998);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Failure to charge circumstantial evidence harmless error since the case is not close or doubtful and the charge on reasonable doubt is full and fair. Germany v. State, 235 Ga. 836, 221 S.E.2d 817 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977); Stewart v. State, 232 Ga. App. 565, 502 S.E.2d 502 (1998) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109). Playmate Cinema, Inc. v. State, 154 Ga. App. 871, 269 S.E.2d 883 (1980) But see Hinton v. State, 215 Ga. App. 750, 452 S.E.2d 519 (1994) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Livery v. State, 233 Ga. App. 882, 506 S.E.2d 165 (1998); Burks v. State, 246 Ga. App. 22, 538 S.E.2d 769 (2000) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court's failure to instruct a jury on the burden of proof required to convict defendant of armed robbery with circumstantial evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming direct evidence of defendant's guilt, which included a videotape of the robbery, defendant's parent's identification of defendant as the person on the videotape with a gun, and defendant's accomplice's confession and implication of defendant in the crime. Bradwell v. State, 262 Ga. App. 651, 586 S.E.2d 355 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Although the state's case against the defendant was based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the trial court's failure to give the requested jury charge on circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Gregory v. State, 277 Ga. App. 664, 627 S.E.2d 79 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

With regard to defendant's malice murder conviction, the trial court did not err by refusing to give defendant's requested jury instruction in the language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, which provided that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence could be affirmed only if every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt was excluded, as defendant's admission to having shot the victim, but claiming self-defense, removed the case from that rule. Even assuming that the state introduced circumstantial evidence to establish some item of proof, and that defendant's requested charge should have been given, any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Thompson v. State, 283 Ga. 581, 662 S.E.2d 124 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Failure to charge reversible error.

- Failure to give the defendant's requested charge, which tracked former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, and instructed the jury that, to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the facts must exclude every reasonable theory other than guilt of the accused, was reversible error in a driving under the influence case, since the officer's opinion that the defendant was impaired was based on circumstantial evidence. Taylor v. State, 278 Ga. App. 181, 628 S.E.2d 611 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

As the defendant's request to charge directed the trial court to the language in the pattern jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, which was a proper statement of the law as set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, the case largely depended on circumstantial evidence, and evidence of the defendant's guilt was not overwhelming, the failure to give the requested instruction was reversible error. Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 176, 674 S.E.2d 879 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's conviction for serving alcohol to a minor, under O.C.G.A. § 3-3-23(a)(1), was reversed because: (1) the state relied on circumstantial evidence to show that defendant knowingly served alcohol to a minor; and (2) the trial court erroneously refused defendant's request for an instruction on circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Butler v. State, 298 Ga. App. 129, 679 S.E.2d 361 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court's refusal to give the defendant's requested charge on circumstantial evidence amounted to plain error because the charges as given failed to provide the jury with the proper guideline for determining the defendant's guilt or innocence and, thus, the error likely affected the outcome of the trial. Stroud v. State, 344 Ga. App. 827, 812 S.E.2d 309 (2018)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Effect of jury discrediting direct evidence.

- When the only direct evidence comes from a witness who the jury was authorized to find had been impeached, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law of impeachment, it is error requiring the grant of a new trial for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence. Horne v. State, 93 Ga. App. 345, 91 S.E.2d 824 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Gibson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 718, 258 S.E.2d 537 (1979);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

It was not erroneous for the court, in the absence of a timely and appropriate request, to omit to charge the law of circumstantial evidence to be applied in the event the jury should not believe that the confession which had been introduced into evidence had been made. Ellis v. State, 51 Ga. App. 557, 181 S.E. 87 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Elaboration unnecessary.

- When the judge sufficiently covered the provisions of the former statute in the judge's charge to the jury, refusal of a request to elaborate upon the former statute was not error. Reynolds v. State, 170 Ga. 810, 154 S.E. 229 (1930) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Dacus v. State, 56 Ga. App. 439, 193 S.E. 93 (1937); Flynn v. State, 77 Ga. App. 791, 50 S.E.2d 91 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Extraneous charge concerning circumstantial evidence.

- Charge relating to circumstantial evidence, if erroneous because of contention that only direct evidence was introduced, was not injurious to the accused, as it gave a rule more favorable than the accused could claim. Latimer v. State, 188 Ga. 775, 4 S.E.2d 631 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Charge invading province of jury.

- When in a prosecution for possession of beer for purposes of sale, charge to the jury that frequent presence of quantities of beer was sufficient to meet the circumstantial evidence rule was error in that it constituted an invasion of the province of the jury. Crider v. State, 98 Ga. App. 164, 105 S.E.2d 506 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Charge containing opinion of court.

- When in prosecution for larceny the state's evidence was wholly circumstantial, charge that the state had introduced evidence tending to establish the fact that the defendant was guilty of the charge was clearly, though inadvertently, an intimation of the court's opinion as to what had been proved in the case and constituted reversible error. Rowland v. State, 71 Ga. App. 154, 30 S.E.2d 368 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Failure to recharge not error.

- When the court defined direct and circumstantial evidence and then charged when circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict after a conviction is sought on circumstantial evidence, an omission to recharge the law of circumstantial evidence in immediate connection with the law of reasonable doubt did not amount to an expression of opinion that direct evidence had been introduced, and did not exclude from the consideration of the jury the law that requires the evidence to be sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused before a conviction would be authorized in a case depending upon circumstantial evidence only. Lucas v. State, 48 Ga. App. 42, 171 S.E. 850 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Charge using "should" instead of "must", in quoting the former statute, did not require a new trial. Adams v. State, 34 Ga. App. 144, 128 S.E. 924 (1925) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Poulos v. State, 71 Ga. App. 730, 32 S.E.2d 101 (1944);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Effect of admission.

- Rule of the former statute should not have been omitted from the instructions to the jury since the state relied wholly on circumstantial evidence and on an admission. Harvey v. State, 111 Ga. App. 279, 141 S.E.2d 604 (1965) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Instruction held not erroneous.

- When the trial court charged the jury that "when the facts in evidence and all reasonable deductions therefrom present two theories, one of guilt and the other consistent with innocence, justice and humanity of the law compel the acceptance of the theory that is consistent with innocence," instruction was at least as beneficial to defendant if not more so, than a charge in the exact language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, and thus was not error. Price v. State, 180 Ga. App. 215, 348 S.E.2d 740 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6).

In a prosecution for burglary, the trial court did not err in giving an instruction as to recent possession of stolen property after a charge on circumstantial evidence. Martin v. State, 228 Ga. App. 59, 491 S.E.2d 142 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6).

Since the state's case was based upon direct as well as circumstantial evidence, the trial court did not err under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 by sua sponte charging the jury on the standard of proof necessary to convict an accused on circumstantial evidence. Cupe v. State, 327 Ga. App. 642, 760 S.E.2d 647 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Direct evidence was presented in the following cases, obviating the need to charge circumstantial evidence.

- See Ellis v. State, 51 Ga. App. 557, 181 S.E. 87 (1935) (confession) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Gilder v. State, 52 Ga. App. 252, 183 S.E. 95 (1935) (presumption derived from direct evidence) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Kittle v. State, 54 Ga. App. 231, 187 S.E. 611 (1936) (confession) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Walker v. State, 63 Ga. App. 297, 11 S.E.2d 45 (1940) (confession) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Summers v. State, 63 Ga. App. 445, 11 S.E.2d 409 (1940) (testimony that contract never existed) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wilson v. State, 76 Ga. App. 257, 45 S.E.2d 709 (1947) (admission) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Lyons v. State, 90 Ga. App. 25, 81 S.E.2d 890 (1954) (statement of guilt) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Ryals v. State, 193 Ga. App. 68, 387 S.E.2d 33 (1989) (confession) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Brown v. State, 214 Ga. App. 481, 448 S.E.2d 259 (1994);(child molestation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Instruction not warranted when evidence is not entirely circumstantial.

- When a case is not entirely based on circumstantial evidence, a requested charge on circumstantial evidence is not warranted. Fuller v. State, 166 Ga. App. 734, 305 S.E.2d 463 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When there is direct evidence, the trial court does not err by not also charging that the defendant's explanation must be taken into consideration insofar as it is consistent with the circumstantial evidence properly admitted. Brown v. State, 251 Ga. 598, 308 S.E.2d 182 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Preston v. State, 183 Ga. App. 20, 357 S.E.2d 825; 183 Ga. App. 906, 357 S.E.2d 825 (1987), cert. denied,(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the state's case included both direct and circumstantial evidence and the defendant did not request a charge on circumstantial evidence, the failure of the court to give such a charge was not error. Livery v. State, 233 Ga. App. 882, 506 S.E.2d 165 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

No direct evidence presented in the following cases, hence charge on circumstantial evidence was required.

- Turner v. State, 40 Ga. App. 662, 151 S.E. 120 (1929) (possession of stolen goods in burglary or larceny case) (decided under former law); Hodges v. State, 52 Ga. App. 378, 183 S.E. 216 (1936) (whiskey on property adjoining defendant's) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); De Loach v. State, 57 Ga. App. 799, 196 S.E. 924 (1938) (possession of stolen goods in larceny case) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Sufficiency is for jury even though all evidence is circumstantial.

- When, at the close of the state's case, all six defendants move for directed verdicts of acquittal, if there is any evidence of guilt, it is for the jury to decide whether that evidence, circumstantial though it may be, is sufficient to warrant a conviction. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817, 305 S.E.2d 629 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant must be connected with criminal act. Newman v. State, 26 Ga. 633 (1859) (decided under former law); Griffin v. State, 2 Ga. App. 534, 58 S.E. 781 (1907); Dougherty v. State, 7 Ga. App. 91, 66 S.E. 276 (1909) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984);(decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984).

Despite defendant's assertion that the evidence against the defendant was completely circumstantial and did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant's guilt, any inconsistencies in the evidence presented were for the jury to resolve, and resolution of such conflicts did not render the evidence insufficient. Sims v. State, 278 Ga. 587, 604 S.E.2d 799 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for DUI conviction.

- When evidence of defendant's intoxication may have been circumstantial in nature, but the defense put up no evidence of a reasonable alternative hypothesis, and the arguments that were offered by the defense were rejected by the jury, the evidence was sufficient to find that defendant was intoxicated so as to support a DUI conviction. Green v. State, 244 Ga. App. 565, 536 S.E.2d 240 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Sufficient circumstantial evidence existed to support the defendant's convictions given that: (1) the defendant admitted to drinking and driving the vehicle that an officer testified to as having a warm engine; (2) the defendant had slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and swaying movements; and (3) the surrounding circumstances helped to show that the defendant had been drinking and driving recently enough to satisfy the three-hour requirement under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(5). O'Connell v. State, 285 Ga. App. 835, 648 S.E.2d 147 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient to show knowledge that car was unregistered.

- Evidence that a defendant received and drove a car following the defendant's father's death was insufficient to prove a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-6-15 because there was no evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant knew that the car was not registered. Lawson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 751, 722 S.E.2d 446 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's conviction of murder and armed robbery was supported by sufficient evidence; pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the evidence had to exclude all reasonable hypotheses other than the defendant's guilt, and there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have excluded all reasonable hypotheses other than defendant's guilt, based on the facts that defendant was the last person in the victim's store on the night of the murder, the victim's blood was found on defendant's shoes, and defendant began spending money heavily after the crime even though the defendant did not have a job at the time. Bibbs v. State, 275 Ga. 659, 571 S.E.2d 770 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for armed robbery conviction.

- Although defendant was convicted on circumstantial evidence, the conviction was properly supported by that evidence as the facts that were proven at trial were not only consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but excluded every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of defendant since the defendant could not explain the presence of a distinctive boot print on the bathroom floor of the store defendant was accused of burglarizing, the presence of defendant's fingerprints on the bathroom wall seven feet off the ground, or defendant's fingerprints on a drink bottle in a space above the bathroom ceiling where defendant had hidden while defendant waited for the store to close so defendant could commit an armed robbery of the store. Lighten v. State, 259 Ga. App. 280, 576 S.E.2d 658 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

From the defendant's words, demeanor, companionship, and conduct before and after an armed robbery, a jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the state established the requisite intent; the evidence authorized the jury to find that before an armed robbery, the defendant had planned to take money from a convenience store, the defendant's accomplice went into the store, took the money from the clerk at gunpoint, and then joined the defendant with the money, and that when the cohorts realized moments later that the police suspected the pair of the armed robbery, the defendant disobeyed police commands to stop, acted as the getaway driver in a high speed chase, and then tried to flee the police on foot. Espinosa v. State, 285 Ga. App. 69, 645 S.E.2d 529 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1281, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 760 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Rational trier of fact was authorized to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of being a party to the crime of robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-2-20 and16-8-40 because the defendant's admission that the defendant was present at the scene of the robbery, in conjunction with the defendant's possession of the recently stolen item, which the jury could find was unsatisfactorily explained by defendant, was sufficient to support the defendant's robbery conviction; the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's version of events because although the defendant contended that the defendant's videotaped police interview and defendant's trial testimony created a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, defendant's interview and trial testimony were not consistent with one another in all material respects, and defendant's statements also were inconsistent with the testimony of the pursuing patrol officers. Boggs v. State, 304 Ga. App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence of the circumstances was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator and the defendant's guilt of armed robbery, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, because the defendant matched the description of the perpetrator given by both a convenience store clerk and another store employee; when the defendant was apprehended, an officer recovered next to the defendant's person the contraband and instrumentalities used in the commission of the robbery. Daniels v. State, 310 Ga. App. 562, 714 S.E.2d 91 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery as a party to a crime given evidence that the defendant drove the vehicle with three other occupants to the site of the robbery, that there were four black masks for the four men, that the defendant hid a shotgun and showed police where to find the shotgun, and that the defendant was found one street over from the robbery site and was the only person in the area. Clemente v. State, 331 Ga. App. 84, 769 S.E.2d 790 (2015).

Defendant's armed robbery conviction was not based on insufficient circumstantial evidence based on the fact that the victim could not identify the defendant as one of the men who robbed the victim because the state presented evidence that two men, one taller and one shorter, used handguns to take property from the victim, and within minutes the police located the defendant's vehicle, which matched the victim's description and contained the victim's stolen belongings as well as two handguns; and, when stopped, the defendant spontaneously stated that the defendant committed the crime. Demps v. State, 337 Ga. App. 657, 788 S.E.2d 525 (2016)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for armed robbery conviction.

- Evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for armed robbery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-41(a) because the evidence supported two equally reasonable hypotheses, which did not meet the standard of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6; there was no direct evidence regarding where the victim was when the defendant entered the victim's kitchen, and there was no evidence, like signs of forced entry, from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that the victim heard and confronted the defendant before the defendant could take anything or that the victim usually kept the victim's wallet on the victim's person or in the victim's bedroom, which could support an inference that the defendant had to confront the victim before taking the wallet. Fox v. State, 289 Ga. 34, 709 S.E.2d 202 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's armed robbery conviction had to be overturned because the evidence failed to establish that the victim's debit card was taken with force before or contemporaneous with the taking, and the evidence failed to establish whether the defendant first took the debit card and then killed the victim or whether the defendant killed the victim and then took the debit card; the evidence incriminating the defendant of armed robbery was wholly circumstantial, and both scenarios were equally reasonable. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 771, 707 S.E.2d 92 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Several counts of the defendant's robbery and burglary convictions and one count of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery were reversed because the finding of the proceeds of some of the robberies at an apartment did not show that the defendant was in possession of the property taken and no witness testified connecting the defendant with some of the home invasions; thus, the evidence did not exclude the reasonable possibility that the defendant did not participate in some of the crimes. Cisneros v. State, 334 Ga. App. 659, 780 S.E.2d 360 (2015), aff'd, 792 S.E.2d 326 (Ga. 2016).

Evidence sufficient for assault and rape conviction.

- State presented direct evidence of the defendant's assault and rape of the victim in the form of the victim's testimony, and thus former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 did not apply, and the state was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt. Tarver v. State, 280 Ga. App. 89, 633 S.E.2d 415 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for aggravated sexual battery conviction.

- Circumstantial evidence that a defendant chastised the defendant's two-year-old child for soiling a diaper by poking the child's anus with a stick, resulting in perineal lacerations, was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated sexual battery in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.2(b). Viers v. State, 303 Ga. App. 387, 693 S.E.2d 526 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for conviction of sexual exploitation.

- Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of five counts of sexual exploitation of children beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence was more than sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis that someone other than the defendant possessed a USB drive containing explicit sexual images of children, which was found at a hotel; given the testimony of a forensic computer specialist, coupled with the fact that the defendant possessed several computers, a digital camera, and another USB drive in the defendant's home in Arkansas, a rational trier of fact could find that the defendant inadvertently left the USB drive on the fifth floor of the hotel, and the jury could also conclude that the defendant knowingly possessed material depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct in light of evidence that sexually explicit images of children were saved to the USB drive within seconds of the time two photographs of the defendant were saved to that drive. Hunt v. State, 303 Ga. App. 855, 695 S.E.2d 53 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of 15 counts of sexual exploitation of children based on the child pornography found on the defendant's girlfriend's computer because a Georgia Bureau of Investigation expert in computer forensics explained that there was no evidence that a virus had downloaded any of the illegal files, and that there was no evidence that anyone had hacked into the computer; the defendant's mother, the defendant's girlfriend, and the defendant's girlfriend's mother and brothers testified that they did not download the illegal files onto the computer; and the downloads began just one month after the defendant moved in with the defendant's girlfriend and only on days when the defendant was not incarcerated. Beaver v. State, 330 Ga. App. 496, 767 S.E.2d 503 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for armed robbery and aggravated assault conviction.

- When the testimonies of the victim, a doctor, and other witnesses were a sufficient indication under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 of the severity of the blow to show that a bludgeon device was used as an offensive weapon, there was sufficient competent evidence to find defendant guilty of armed robbery and aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-21(a) and16-8-41(a). Garrett v. State, 263 Ga. App. 310, 587 S.E.2d 794 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Ample evidence concerning the child victim's condition and expert testimony regarding the child's condition was presented to authorize the jury to find defendant guilty of committing felony murder by holding the child in scalding water, and guilty of committing cruelty to a child by failing to provide medical attention, and to reject the evidence and hypotheses defendant presented in an attempt to refute the charges. Robles v. State, 277 Ga. 415, 589 S.E.2d 566 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Despite the defendant's claim of innocence, convictions for armed robbery and two counts of aggravated assault were upheld on appeal, given sufficient evidence showing that the defendant waited at the scene of the robbery and then assisted the codefendants in an attempted escape; hence, the defendant was not entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal and the state was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt as required by O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Jordan v. State, 281 Ga. App. 419, 636 S.E.2d 151 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for kidnapping conviction.

- Because the eyewitness testimony showed that the defendant pushed, pulled, and then carried the victim out of a restaurant as the victim yelled for a coworker to call the police, and which was direct, not circumstantial, evidence that the victim did not go with the defendant willingly, sufficient evidence supported the defendant's kidnapping conviction. Holden v. State, 287 Ga. App. 472, 651 S.E.2d 552 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0189, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 153 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for shoplifting conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions on three counts of shoplifting following eyewitness testimony that the defendant had concealed cologne bottles under the defendant's shirt at a drugstore and had walked out of a grocery store carrying items that had not been paid for supported two of the counts; also, testimony that video games had been taken from a video store without being purchased, and that the defendant had the games on the defendant's person about 20 minutes after leaving the video store and at the time of the defendant's apprehension for shoplifting at the drug store was sufficient circumstantial evidence to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the defendant's innocence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Crosby v. State, 287 Ga. App. 109, 650 S.E.2d 775 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

To the extent that a defendant's criminal intent to commit a shoplifting could only be shown by circumstantial evidence, based on the uncontroverted direct evidence that the defendant and the defendant's accomplice took a cart with merchandise into a restricted area, lied about their purpose of being in the area, surveyed various emergency exits from the store defendants were in, abandoned the merchandise when an emergency exit jammed, and lacked any means for paying for the merchandise, no reasonable hypothesis for the defendant's innocence existed that was consistent with the evidence. Alford v. State, 292 Ga. App. 514, 664 S.E.2d 870 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for marijuana conviction.

- There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for possession of more than an ounce of marijuana as although the evidence of the defendant's constructive possession of the marijuana found in a shoebox in the backseat of the car the defendant was operating was circumstantial, it was within the jury's province to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt. The car owner testified that the owner did not possess the vehicle for over three months and the defendant's passenger testified that the marijuana did not belong to the passenger, thus, the jury was entitled to find that the proved facts excluded the possibility that the car owner left the marijuana on the backseat where the marijuana had gone unnoticed for several months or that the passenger had left the marijuana in the backseat. Prather v. State, 293 Ga. App. 312, 667 S.E.2d 113 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the defendant's conviction for possessing more than one ounce of marijuana because the defendant was presumed to have exclusive possession and control of the marijuana that a police officer found in the car the defendant was driving; as the factfinder, the jury was entitled to reject the testimony of the defendant's friend that the marijuana was the friend's and to determine that the presumption of the defendant's possession of the marijuana had not been rebutted. Nix v. State, 312 Ga. App. 43, 717 S.E.2d 550 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendants of felony possession of more than one ounce of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) because the trial court was authorized to conclude that the defendants had equal access to and joint constructive possession of the marijuana that was found in a minivan and that the defendants participated as parties to the drug possession offense; the defendants, who were passengers in the back of the minivan, knew that marijuana was inside the minivan, and the driver informed an officer that the passengers were hiding marijuana inside the minivan. Dennis v. State, 313 Ga. App. 595, 722 S.E.2d 190 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for possession with intent to distribute.

- Evidence of a defendant's unusual behavior in lifting up and kneeling next to the only doghouse in a dog pen that concealed contraband, the defendant's attempt to hide in the bushes when law enforcement officers arrived, and the defendant's previous history of selling drugs to passers-by from the same property, provided sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the contraband, access to it, and the power and intention to exercise control over it. Price v. State, 303 Ga. App. 859, 694 S.E.2d 712 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j)(1) because during the execution of a search warrant at the defendant's residence, police officers seized eighteen baggies of marijuana individually packaged in a manner that was indicative of possession with intent to distribute, and the residence belonged to the defendant, which permitted an inference that the defendant controlled the premises and was in constructive possession of the drug contraband; the circumstantial evidence implied the defendant's consciousness of guilt and further supported the defendant's conviction because when the officers approached the residence, the defendant fled inside to the closet area where the drugs were later located, and when the officers searched the closet, the officers discovered that the jacket the defendant had been wearing was placed over the box containing the drugs. Williams v. State, 303 Ga. App. 222, 692 S.E.2d 820 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana because the defendant was in possession of clear, plastic baggies, smaller baggies of suspected marijuana, a digital scale, and cash, and a police officer testified that in the officer's capacity as a marijuana tester for the county sheriff's office, the officer tested a total of 11 bags, containing approximately 190 grams of a substance that tested positive for marijuana; possession of a scale, baggies, and large amounts of currency along with drugs can constitute circumstantial evidence of intent to distribute. Hardaway v. State, 309 Ga. App. 432, 710 S.E.2d 634 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Appellate court refused to disturb the jury's verdict convicting defendant of possession of drugs with the intent to distribute because after hearing the evidence and having the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, the jury properly concluded that the only reasonable hypothesis was that defendant possessed the drugs found hidden in the kitchen, despite defendant's argument that others had equal access. King v. State, 325 Ga. App. 777, 755 S.E.2d 22 (2014).

Although circumstantial, evidence of the defendant's behavior in attempting to obtain the package including questioning the recipient about whether the recipient contacted police and opened the package, use of a false name to conceal identity, and prior convictions for conspiracy to sell marijuana and possession of cocaine was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant had knowledge of the presence of the marijuana in the package and the power and intent to control the package. Murray v. State, 335 Ga. App. 634, 782 S.E.2d 694 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C0916, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 435 (Ga. 2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient to show substance cocaine.

- Trial court did not err in revoking probation on the ground that the probationer committed the felony offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute because the trial court did not manifestly abuse the court's discretion when the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the substance found in the car in which the probationer was riding was cocaine; in addition to an officer's opinion on the identity of the substance, the record contained other circumstantial evidence indicating that the substance was cocaine, and the circumstantial evidence of the substance's identity was not offered to convict the probationer of possession of cocaine, but was offered to show that the probationer had violated a term of probation and, as such, was subject to a different standard of proof. Thurmond v. State, 304 Ga. App. 587, 696 S.E.2d 516 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient to convict defendant of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

- There was insufficient evidence of intent to convict the defendant of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 as there was no evidence that the cocaine had been divided and packaged for individual sale or as to a personal use quantity; thus, the circumstantial evidence did not permit a rational trier to exclude the reasonable hypothesis, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, that the defendant intended to use the cocaine. Florence v. State, 282 Ga. App. 31, 637 S.E.2d 779 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

While the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of cocaine found in a pill bottle in the defendant's vehicle, it was insufficient to prove that the defendant intended to distribute the cocaine under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b) because the state produced no evidence that the defendant had scales, cutting implements, weapons, a large amount of cash, a customer list, or drug packaging materials; there was no evidence of prior convictions of drug possession with intent to distribute, no testimony that the defendant was seen selling or trying to sell drugs, no expert testimony that the amount of drugs seized was inconsistent with personal use, and no evidence as to the amount of cocaine seized. Under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, storing drugs in a pill bottle, and possessing an unidentified number of sales-size pieces of the drug, without more, equally supported the hypothesis that the person found with the drugs was a user rather than a dealer. Hicks v. State, 293 Ga. App. 830, 668 S.E.2d 474 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Codefendant's convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a housing project, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-32.5(b), was unsupportable as a matter of law, and the trial court erred by denying the codefendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences derived therefrom were insufficient to connect the codefendant to the cocaine, which was found in an upstairs bedroom occupied by the codefendants; no evidence was introduced to show that the codefendant resided in the apartment where the cocaine was found, which could authorize an inference that the codefendant possessed the property therein. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for possession of dangerous drugs conviction.

- Jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant intended to possess a dangerous drug in violation of the Dangerous Drug Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-72, even if the defendant was subjectively unaware of the precise chemical compound in the bottle and its regulated nature because there was evidence supporting an inference that the defendant used a dangerous drug to sedate the defendant's sexual battery victim, and that conduct demonstrated the defendant's knowledge of the harmful effect of the compound; the term "dangerous drug" was defined to include alkyl nitrite, which was the compound the defendant possessed. Serna v. State, 308 Ga. App. 518, 707 S.E.2d 904 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for criminal trespass conviction.

- Because all the evidence was circumstantial as a defendant was not seen removing anything from the alleged victim's barn, the defendant's conviction for criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21 was inappropriate pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 because although the defendant was on the victim's property without permission, it was not proven that the defendant was there for a criminal purpose as the evidence indicated that the defendant was at the barn to drop off a saw that the defendant wanted to sell to the victim. Parker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 384, 677 S.E.2d 345 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for burglary conviction.

- Because all the evidence was circumstantial as a defendant was not seen removing anything from the alleged victim's barn, the defendant's conviction for burglary was inappropriate pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 as the evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the defendant was only at the victim's barn to drop off a saw the defendant wanted to sell to the victim based on a telephone message left by the defendant for the victim and eyewitness testimony. Parker v. State, 297 Ga. App. 384, 677 S.E.2d 345 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of the burglary of two residences where defendant's shoe prints and tire tracks were found; both tire tracks and shoe prints connected defendant to these burglaries, and defendant was caught by the police wearing the same shoes and driving the same car while in the process of participating in the burglary of a third residence, located near the first two residences. Wise v. State, 325 Ga. App. 377, 752 S.E.2d 628 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Conspiracy may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Dixon v. State, 116 Ga. 186, 42 S.E. 357 (1902) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); McLeroy v. State, 125 Ga. 240, 54 S.E. 125 (1906); Cook v. State, 22 Ga. App. 770, 97 S.E. 264 (1918) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Sentell v. State, 227 Ga. 153, 179 S.E.2d 234 (1971);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Corpus delicti may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Hutchings v. State, 4 Ga. App. 451, 61 S.E. 837 (1908) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Hurt v. State, 18 Ga. App. 110, 88 S.E. 901 (1916); Wright v. State, 199 Ga. 576, 34 S.E.2d 879 (1945) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Hilliard v. State, 92 Ga. App. 294, 88 S.E.2d 425 (1955); Reese v. State, 94 Ga. App. 387, 94 S.E.2d 741 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Brown v. State, 98 Ga. App. 350, 105 S.E.2d 785 (1958); Townsend v. State, 127 Ga. App. 797, 195 S.E.2d 474 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Fingerprint evidence.

- To warrant a conviction based solely on fingerprint evidence, the fingerprints corresponding to those of the defendant must have been found in the place where the crime was committed, and under such circumstances that the fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time when the crime was committed. Jackson v. State, 158 Ga. App. 530, 281 S.E.2d 252 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Fingerprints of the defendant found on bottles at the crime scene were sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for murder since the condition of the crime scene made it clear that the bottles were left just before the victim's death and the evidence suggested no occasion for the defendant to have left defendant's fingerprints there except during the crime. Leonard v. State, 269 Ga. 867, 506 S.E.2d 853 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Since the defendant's fingerprints on a lamp globe were not the only evidence linking the defendant to the crimes, and there was testimony that the defendant was a close friend of the victim, the victim was perceived to have money, and the crime scene suggested that the victim knew the attackers, who were looking for something of value and tortured the victim to find out where it was located, the evidence supported the defendant's convictions for malice murder, kidnapping, and false imprisonment. Roberts v. State, 296 Ga. 719, 770 S.E.2d 589 (2015).

Possession of pistol may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Reese v. State, 3 Ga. App. 532, 60 S.E. 122 (1908) ??? (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984)sb Williams v. State, 12 Ga. App. 84, 76 S.E. 785 (1912);(decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010).

Burglary conviction.

- Sufficient circumstantial evidence of defendant's intent supported defendant's burglary conviction as defendant admitted entering the victim's home, and the victim testified that medications and cash were missing from the victim's home after the incident and that no one else had been in the victim's home from the time that the victim last saw the items until the victim noticed the items missing; the trial court's comments as to defendant's intent referred to the trial court's reason for finding defendant not guilty of burglary with intent to commit rape, and did not go to defendant's burglary with intent to commit theft. Joyner v. State, 267 Ga. App. 309, 599 S.E.2d 286 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Regarding defendants' convictions for burglary and theft by receiving stolen property, sufficient evidence authorized the jury's decision to reject one defendant's version of events - that defendants believed that the property involved belonged to an accomplice - because, with regard to one of the burglarized residences, the fact that defendants were unsuccessful in taking anything from the home was irrelevant to the burglary convictions since the crime was completed upon entry into the dwelling. As to the second residence, the fact that property from that residence was found in the vehicle in which defendants were in was sufficient to establish that the property had been stolen. Clark v. State, 289 Ga. App. 612, 658 S.E.2d 190 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence supported a defendant's conviction of burglarizing a garden center. On the morning the garden center burglary was discovered, the defendant was caught burglarizing a car dealership two doors down; gloves that fell from the defendant's pocket at the dealership came from the garden center; a shoe print on another glove from the center matched the defendant's boots; an investigator who drove by the area the previous evening testified that neither building showed signs of forced entry at that time; and the defendant stated that the defendant could have committed the garden center burglary but did not remember doing so. Johnson v. State, 291 Ga. App. 253, 661 S.E.2d 642 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's burglary conviction in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 was supported by sufficient evidence because the defendant entered the victim's house without permission and there was circumstantial evidence that the defendant intended to commit a theft therein since there was money in the house before the defendant entered, but the money was gone after the defendant left. Hall v. State, 294 Ga. App. 274, 668 S.E.2d 880 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of burglary under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a). The victim's stolen computer was discovered in the attic area between the victim's side of a duplex and the defendant's side, and an officer noticed a path in the insulation from the defendant's side to the victim's attic access door. Norful v. State, 296 Ga. App. 387, 674 S.E.2d 633 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the defendant entered the victim's apartment without permission when although the victim, who owned the apartment, did not testify at trial, the evidence was that the victim had changed the locks after the defendant moved out and that the defendant could no longer use the defendant's keys; on the day of the burglary, the defendant attempted unsuccessfully to use the defendant's keys and then went around to the patio, climbed over the railing around the patio, and went, uninvited, into the apartment through the patio door. Ursulita v. State, 307 Ga. App. 735, 706 S.E.2d 123 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 for defendant's conviction of burglary because: (1) an investigating officer, who responded to a burglary alarm at a townhouse, found the defendant coming from the back of the townhouse; (2) the defendant said that the defendant had just put the defendant's dog away through the back door of the defendant's neighboring townhouse; (3) the defendant's shoe print was found outside the broken window of the townhouse with the alarm, and the defendant had a remote control in the defendant's pocket that operated a television set that had been unplugged and was put on the floor by the front door of the townhouse; and (4) the defendant's fingerprints were found on the television. Reggler v. State, 307 Ga. App. 721, 706 S.E.2d 111 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of burglarizing a tool supply store because the defendant's blood was found on the smashed-in door and the defendant had two prior convictions for strikingly similar hardware store burglaries. Although the evidence was circumstantial, there was no other evidence of how the defendant's blood could have been at the scene. The trial court's definition of "entry" as entry on to real estate was not error or if error was not harmful, because the charge as a whole required that the defendant enter the building. Roberts v. State, 309 Ga. App. 681, 710 S.E.2d 878 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to convict a defendant of burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) because the defendant was caught within four minutes of the burglary in a truck matching the victims' description of the truck outside their home, and the defendant was carrying a crowbar, had the victims' television, and fled from police. Veasley v. State, 312 Ga. App. 728, 719 S.E.2d 585 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence that a cigarette butt with the defendant's DNA on the butt was found in a burglary victim's home, that the defendant was seen standing in a neighbor's yard, that the defendant was wet and muddy, and that some of the stolen items were also wet and near a creek near the victim's home was sufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction. Stokes v. State, 327 Ga. App. 511, 759 S.E.2d 585 (2014).

Defendant's convictions for burglary and smash and grab burglary under O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-1(c) and16-7-2(b) were supported by circumstantial evidence, including cell phone evidence that the defendant was near the scenes of the two burglaries and DNA evidence from a cigarette butt found in a very similar burglary days after the charged crimes. Nations v. State, 345 Ga. App. 92, 812 S.E.2d 346 (2018).

Burglary and aggravated assault.

- Defendant's convictions of aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and burglary, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1, were affirmed as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to prove that the defendant was the person who committed the acts in question, based on witness testimony and the discovery of clothes and a gun used in the robbery in the defendant's room. Moore v. State, 277 Ga. App. 474, 627 S.E.2d 107 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Aggravated battery.

- Trial court properly denied a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1(a) since there was ample circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 for the jury to have found that the defendant was guilty of aggravated battery, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24(a); defendant's claim that the defendant tripped and fell while carrying the infant son was contradicted by expert testimony that the injury to the infant's brain was caused by Shaken Baby Syndrome. Lindo v. State, 278 Ga. App. 228, 628 S.E.2d 665 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Victim was struck from behind with a beer bottle; the victim's head was cut, requiring stitches. The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of aggravated assault because: (1) the victim saw the defendant standing close behind the victim after the blow was struck, and defendant began fighting with the victim; (2) similar transaction evidence showed the defendant's history of making unprovoked attacks on unsuspecting victims; and (3) a bartender's testimony that someone else committed the crime was internally inconsistent and uncorroborated. Maiorano v. State, 294 Ga. App. 726, 669 S.E.2d 678 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Malice murder.

- Defendant's conviction for malice murder was affirmed as it could be concluded that the evidence of malice murder, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis, save that of the guilt of the accused since: (1) the defendant was upset with the victim; (2) the defendant got a rifle and carried the rifle into the bedroom; (3) the victim asked the defendant to put the rifle down twice, but the defendant refused; (4) the defendant then shot the victim in the head; and (5) the defendant gave the police three versions of the events and the first two were refuted by a firearms expert and a supervisor in the criminal investigations division. Yeager v. State, 281 Ga. 1, 635 S.E.2d 704 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's conviction for felony murder and related charges was upheld on appeal because the evidence showed that the defendant had admitted to killing the defendant's girlfriend and others and the gun used to shoot the victim was the same that the defendant had shot at a party earlier in the evening; the defendant had asked the victim for a ride home from the party and the evidence indicated that defendant shot the victim twice and dumped the body in a wooded area. Lee v. State, 281 Ga. 511, 640 S.E.2d 287 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support defendant's malice murder conviction of her husband because they had a tumultuous marriage; she was faced that day with explaining her entanglement with the victim's finances; she was in financial difficulty, as she had filed for bankruptcy, and she was the beneficiary of the victim's insurance policies; defendant could not account for 30 minutes of her whereabouts during the relevant time; and defendant's gun, which had recently been used, matched the type used to kill the victim. Merritt v. State, 285 Ga. 778, 683 S.E.2d 855 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of malice murder because the jury was authorized to find that the defendant met with the victim's husband and other codefendants on at least two occasions to discuss the murder of the victim, that the defendant accepted money from the husband prior to the murder, that the defendant instructed one of the codefendants on how to kill the victim, that the defendant drove to the victim's home with the husband and another codefendant on the morning of the murder, and that the defendant demanded and accepted money from the husband as compensation for the murder. Owens v. State, 286 Ga. 821, 693 S.E.2d 490, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 156, 178 L. Ed. 2d 93 (2010); overruled on other grounds by Shelton v. Lee, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 452 (Ga. 2016) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in denying the codefendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal because the circumstantial evidence the state presented was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the codefendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of a girlfriend's child; both the girlfriend and the codefendant were with the child during the time period within which the fatal injuries were believed to have been inflicted upon the child. Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428, 721 S.E.2d 892 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's murder conviction and the defendant's argument that the state relied solely on circumstantial evidence was belied by the admission of the defendant's statement to police that the defendant hit the victim with the ax handle. Bunnell v. State, 292 Ga. 253, 735 S.E.2d 281 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of the malice murder because the defendant and the victim had a domestic dispute over the money that the defendant had borrowed from the victim; two days later, human body parts that were later identified as the victim's were found scattered around a secluded, wooded area near a house owned by the defendant; a coroner examined the remains and determined that the cause of death was homicide by unknown cause; the defendant never reported the victim missing; the defendant told conflicting stories about the victim's disappearance and the defendant's activities around that time; and the defendant towed the victim's car to a hotel parking lot and left the car. Benson v. State, 294 Ga. 618, 754 S.E.2d 23 (2014).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony because an eyewitness identified the defendant as the man leaving the victim's apartment wearing a camouflage jacket and with a gun in the defendant's hand; video from the convenience store at the time the defendant and the co-defendant encountered the victim showed the defendant wearing a camouflage jacket; the same or a similar jacket was later given to police by the defendant's aunt; and the defendant's own testimony placed the defendant at the scene, even though the defendant initially denied having been present and attempted to hide from police. Neely v. State, 302 Ga. 121, 805 S.E.2d 18 (2017).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the malice murder of a girlfriend's nine-month-old child because the medical examiner concluded that the cause of the child's death was blunt force injuries to the child's head and extremities, with the bleeding in the child's brain causing the child's organs to shut down and stop the child's breathing; the defendant was alone with the child just before the child's death; the medical examiner concluded that the child's injuries did not likely occur the way the defendant described; and the jury was authorized to reject the defendant's hypothesis that the child's mother caused the child's death. Bennett v. State, 301 Ga. 874, 804 S.E.2d 360 (2017).

Evidence sufficient for spouse's felony murder conviction arising out of killing officer.

- Defendant's conviction for felony murder arising out of the defendant's spouse's shooting and killing a police officer was supported by circumstantial evidence that the defendant was a party to the spouse's crime of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon and that the crime was the proximate cause of the officer's death. Lebis v. State, 302 Ga. 750, 808 S.E.2d 724 (2017).

Possession of stolen goods may authorize conviction.

- Fact that stolen goods were in defendant's possession shortly after commission of the burglary would, in and of itself, authorize the jury to infer that defendant was guilty, unless the defendant explained satisfactorily the defendant's possession of such stolen goods. McGee v. State, 159 Ga. App. 763, 285 S.E.2d 224 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show specific facts in the following cases.

- See Johnson v. State, 119 Ga. 446, 46 S.E. 634 (1904) (specific acts of sexual intercourse) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Jordan v. State, 119 Ga. 443, 46 S.E. 679 (1904) (bar to statute of limitations) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Little v. State, 3 Ga. App. 441, 60 S.E. 113 (1908) (weapon of assault) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Glover v. State, 15 Ga. App. 44, 82 S.E. 602 (1914) (intention) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Burke v. State, 183 Ga. 726, 189 S.E. 516 (1937) (identity of defendant) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Smith v. State, 154 Ga. App. 497, 268 S.E.2d 714 (1980) (prior similar offense) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Baxter v. State, 160 Ga. App. 181, 286 S.E.2d 460 (1981) (similar modus operandi) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Shaw v. State, 211 Ga. App. 647, 440 S.E.2d 245 (1994) (burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Alford v. State, 224 Ga. App. 451, 480 S.E.2d 893 (1997) (attempted burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Gooch v. State, 249 Ga. App. 643, 549 S.E.2d 724 (2001).

Robbery.

- When a defendant was arrested for one robbery, but connected to three prior robberies by witnesses who identified the mask taken from the defendant's car as being the mask worn in the three prior robberies, and other similarities were shown between the methods used in all of the robberies, there was more than sufficient evidence to convict the defendant. Gamble v. State, 194 Ga. App. 765, 391 S.E.2d 801 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the defendant jumped out of defendant's vehicle and began running away upon the approach of officers, narcotics were found in the immediate area of defendant's residence, the defendant was in possession of large amounts of money in small denominations, and no other persons were present in the area, there was more than sufficient evidence to convict the defendant. Jones v. State, 208 Ga. App. 559, 430 S.E.2d 877 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Even though the evidence that defendant forcibly entered the elderly victims' home, attacked and robbed the victims, inflicted fatal injuries, then later sold or attempted to sell items stolen from the victims, along with similar transaction evidence that defendant was involved in a pattern of conduct of forcing defendant's way into the homes of elderly victims, attacking the victims, and then stealing items from them to trade for crack cocaine, was largely circumstantial, the largely circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except defendant's guilt of the armed robbery and murder of the victims. Weston v. State, 276 Ga. 680, 580 S.E.2d 204 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for robbery by sudden snatching conviction.

- Although the victim never saw the defendant with the wallet, there was sufficient evidence to show that at the moment the defendant's companion darted in front of the victim's cart distracting the victim's attention, the defendant snatched the wallet from the victim's purse; despite the victim's detection of the defendant's efforts, nothing more was needed to prove the elements of the crime of robbery by sudden snatching. Andrews v. State, 270 Ga. App. 362, 606 S.E.2d 587 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for possession of tools for commission of crime conviction.

- Items stolen from victims' vehicles found in the defendant's car, stopped as the vehicle left the area of the thefts were sufficient to sustain convictions of entering an auto with the intent to commit theft, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-18; however, as there was no similar testimony as to items stolen from different victims, insufficient evidence supported other convictions, because the defendant's presence at the scene of the crime, without any other direct evidence, was insufficient to convict the defendant of the crimes that a passenger admitted to committing. Along with the stolen items found in the defendant's vehicle, and the defendant's presence at the crime scene where cars were broken into with the kind of tools found in the defendant's vehicle, the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of tools for the commission of a crime. Walker v. State, 281 Ga. App. 94, 635 S.E.2d 577 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for felony murder and armed robbery convictions.

- Given the testimony provided by both the codefendant and the codefendant's former wife, to whom the defendant admitted to firing the fatal shots killing the victim, which netted the victim's cellular phone and pager and evidence describing how the defendant participated in the events that happened before, during, and after the commission of the crimes, sufficient evidence was presented to uphold the defendant's convictions for felony murder and armed robbery as a party to the crimes. Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30, 644 S.E.2d 837 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's conviction for felony murder and armed robbery was not based upon insufficient circumstantial evidence because there was directed evidence of the defendant's guilt; the conviction was supported by an eyewitness identification, DNA consistent with the defendant's on the crack in the windshield of the getaway car, the defendant's fingerprint on the handle of the driver's door of the getaway car, and the defendant's birth certificate and mail in the getaway vehicle. Sanders v. State, 290 Ga. 637, 723 S.E.2d 436 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm.

- Given that the circumstantial evidence presented against the defendant sufficiently showed that: (1) the victim shot one of the intruders who committed the burglary; (2) shortly after the burglary, the defendant was treated for a gunshot wound and arrived at the hospital in a vehicle matching the description of the automobile seen leaving the crime scene; (3) the DNA evidence on ski masks found at the scene matched that of the owner of the car and the other passenger, who was also the defendant's brother; and (4) according to the defendant's brother, the driver of the car admitted to shooting the victim, the defendant's convictions for aggravated assault, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were affirmed on appeal. Sherman v. State, 284 Ga. App. 809, 644 S.E.2d 901 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for possession of drugs.

- If the totality of the evidence was sufficient to connect defendant to possession of drugs, even though there was evidence to authorize a contrary finding, the conviction would be sustained. Blair v. State, 216 Ga. App. 545, 455 S.E.2d 97 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for cocaine possession and possession with intent to distribute conviction.

- Defendant's convictions for possessing 28 grams or more of cocaine, possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony were upheld on appeal as sufficient evidence was presented via the direct testimony of the defendant's live-in girlfriend, which when combined with the evidence showing their joint constructive possession of the drugs and gun tended to connect and identify the defendant with the crimes charged. Allen v. State, 286 Ga. App. 469, 649 S.E.2d 583 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence that cocaine was found in the roof of defendant's vehicle and almost $1,000 in cash was found in defendant's pocket, although circumstantial, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Johnson v. State, 274 Ga. App. 282, 617 S.E.2d 252 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, 280 Ga. 511, 630 S.E.2d 377 (2006); vacated, in part, 283 Ga. App. 630, 642 S.E.2d 340 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Given an alternative school's security officer's actual observation of a hand-to-hand exchange from a juvenile to another student at the school and the discovery of marijuana in the recipient's hand immediately thereafter, the only reasonable hypothesis was that the juvenile had just possessed the marijuana satisfying former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. In the Interest of T. M., 303 Ga. App. 322, 693 S.E.2d 574 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a)(1), and possession of ecstasy, a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a), although the defendant was neither in actual possession of the contraband nor in control of the vehicle where the contraband was found because there was slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the contraband and, therefore, excluding every other reasonable hypothesis save that of defendant's guilt, as required under forme O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, the question of constructive, joint possession was within the jury's discretion. The ecstasy pills were found in a prescription pill bottle belonging to the defendant, and the pill bottle was found in a bag with the cocaine. Ferrell v. State, 312 Ga. App. 122, 717 S.E.2d 705 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for methamphetamine possession conviction.

- An officer found methamphetamine in a portion of a truck where the defendant kept personal belongings; the defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle. The defendant's testimony denying possession of the drugs and stating that others had equal access to the truck did not establish under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of possession of methamphetamine. Bryson v. State, 293 Ga. App. 392, 667 S.E.2d 170 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal after a jury found the defendant guilty of possession of methamphetamine because the totality of the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to reject as speculative and unreasonable the hypothesis that someone else discarded the drugs in a patrol car; the defendant possessed a homemade smoking pipe containing methamphetamine residue, there was similar transaction evidence, and the patrol officer testified that the officer had exclusive control of the officer's patrol car, the officer stayed with the officer's car whenever the car was serviced by third parties, the officer searched the backseat immediately after the defendant exited from the car, and the officer discovered the drugs directly up under the seat where the defendant had been sitting. Taylor v. State, 305 Ga. App. 748, 700 S.E.2d 841 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence supporting the defendant's conviction for methamphetamine possession was sufficient because the presumption of possession and control attached since the state presented evidence that the defendant was the sole resident of the house present during the execution of the search warrant when the methamphetamine was found in a common area of the house; the presumption of possession was not the sole evidence connecting the defendant to the crime of possession because the arresting officer testified that the defendant exhibited clear signs of methamphetamine intoxication. Martin v. State, 305 Ga. App. 764, 700 S.E.2d 871 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction of trafficking in methamphetamine.

- Trial court did not err in denying a codefendant's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of trafficking in methamphetamine because based upon the circumstantial evidence presented, the jury was authorized to find that the codefendant was in joint constructive possession of the methamphetamine with the defendant, which was located at the kitchen table where the defendant had been sitting; the defendant lived at the residence with the codefendant, the defendant was present at the time of a controlled buy, and the defendant had access to the drugs that were seized from the kitchen table. Fyfe v. State, 305 Ga. App. 322, 699 S.E.2d 546 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(f)(1) because given the evidence, the jury was authorized under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to find that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as either the actual perpetrator or as a party to the crime of the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine as charged in the indictment; officers executing a search warrant for a house discovered the defendant on a couch with a codefendant and baggies of methamphetamine. Hughes v. State, 309 Ga. App. 150, 709 S.E.2d 900 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine because the defendant was in joint constructive possession of methamphetamine found under the seat of the vehicle the defendant was driving, and the jury was entitled to reject the defendant's alternative hypothesis that the defendant believed the defendant was simply delivering a vehicle to a motel as the jury could have found that, given the high street value of the methamphetamine, the defendant would not have been permitted to drive the vehicle alone to the motel unless the defendant was a trusted accomplice. Garcia-Maldonado v. State, 324 Ga. App. 518, 751 S.E.2d 149 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for involuntary manslaughter conviction.

- There was sufficient evidence to support a defendant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter of the defendant's romantic friend given the evidence of the defendant's admission that the defendant placed the friend in a headlock during a fight, and the medical examiner's findings that the friend was strangled to death. As a result, the jury was authorized to exclude all other reasonable hypotheses and conclude that the defendant unintentionally caused the friend's death while committing simple battery. Lemon v. State, 293 Ga. App. 488, 667 S.E.2d 654 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for felony murder but insufficient for rape.

- In the defendants' joint trial for rape, murder, and other crimes against three separate victims, the evidence supported the felony murder verdict against one defendant because witnesses placed the defendants together prior to the murder, text messages on the defendant's phone discussed robbing the victim, and the defendant fled the state after the murder; but the evidence as to the rape merely placed the defendant at the scene, requiring reversal. Thomas v. State, 300 Ga. 433, 796 S.E.2d 242 (2017).

Evidence sufficient for armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm conviction.

- After two intruders burglarized and robbed a home at gunpoint, a pickup truck near the home fled from a patrol car and crashed, then two people matching the victims' description of the intruders fled from the truck. Since the defendant was trapped behind the steering wheel, and the items stolen from the home and a handgun were found in the truck, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a burglary. Olds v. State, 293 Ga. App. 884, 668 S.E.2d 485 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Flight may be shown by circumstantial evidence. Terry v. State, 15 Ga. App. 108, 82 S.E. 635 (1914) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 262, 50 S.E.2d 762 (1948);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Flight of the accused is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury in determining the accused's guilt. Brooks v. State, 63 Ga. App. 575, 11 S.E.2d 688 (1940) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Kirkland v. State, 67 Ga. App. 256, 19 S.E.2d 787 (1942); Tyler v. State, 91 Ga. App. 87, 84 S.E.2d 843 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Flight considered alone.

- Mere fact of flight alone is not an incriminatory circumstance of sufficient probative value of itself to authorize a conviction for a crime. Burchfield v. State, 40 Ga. App. 506, 150 S.E. 459 (1929) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Seay v. State, 63 Ga. App. 286, 11 S.E.2d 54 (1940);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Flight is generally not sufficient to support a conviction even if the flight was from the scene of the crime. Muckle v. State, 165 Ga. App. 873, 303 S.E.2d 54 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Flight of concealment considered with other circumstances is sufficient to convict. Diggs v. State, 90 Ga. App. 853, 84 S.E.2d 611 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Inference of participation.

- Confession of facts that are matter from which an inference of participation arises are circumstantial. Eberhart v. State, 41 Ga. 598 (1873) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-6); Riley v. State, 1 Ga. App. 651, 57 S.E. 1031 (1907);(decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984).

Others having access.

- Evidence that cocaine was found hidden on the outside of defendant's mobile home, which was parked in an area to which a large number of persons, not only visitors to the unit occupied by defendant but anyone having business in the mobile home park had potential access was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine. Prescott v. State, 164 Ga. App. 671, 297 S.E.2d 362 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for new trial after a jury found the defendant guilty of possession of more than one ounce of marijuana in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(j) because the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to show that the defendant was in sole constructive possession of the contraband when the defendant alone was charged with possessing the marijuana although the passenger in his car had equal access to it, and the only legal evidence linking the defendant to the marijuana in the back seat was his spatial proximity to it; an officer's testimony concerning scales that were found in the car, to the extent it suggested some deception on the passenger's part, that deception did not give rise to the sole, reasonable inference that defendant was in sole constructive possession of the marijuana, and because the inference did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of defendant, it was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in sole constructive possession of the marijuana. Rogers v. State, 302 Ga. App. 65, 690 S.E.2d 437 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Mere presence of contraband on premises occupied by an accused is insufficient to sustain a conviction when there is also evidence of access by others. Shockley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 182, 303 S.E.2d 519 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Presence, and approval of act, not sufficient.

- Presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to show that a defendant is a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20, and even approval of the act, not amounting to encouragement, will not suffice. This is so because of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 as to a conviction on circumstantial evidence. Ridgeway v. State, 187 Ga. App. 381, 370 S.E.2d 216 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Acquaintance, proximity, and dress insufficient.

- Fact that defendant knew a momentarily detained drug suspect, had been seen associating with the suspect in the past, and was dressed in a fashion not uncommon to drug vendors was insufficient circumstantial evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had joint constructive possession over controlled substances found in a nearby cache. Brooks v. State, 206 Ga. App. 485, 425 S.E.2d 911 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction for arson.

- Given evidence of defendant's serious altercation with a woman-resident of the subject arson house prior to the house's burning, defendant's identification at and around the premises minutes prior to, and after the fire, and other circumstantial indicia of motive, opportunity, and inconsistency, the evidence, though wholly circumstantial, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for arson. Jenkins v. State, 207 Ga. App. 500, 428 S.E.2d 410 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence presented at trial: that the defendant and the defendant's family were to leave a house they bought for failure to make payments, that the defendant was upset about the fact that the defendant was not going to receive the return of the earnest money, that defendant was alone in the house at the time of the fire, and that defendant appeared nervous was sufficient to convict defendant of arson. Burchette v. State, 260 Ga. App. 739, 580 S.E.2d 609 (2003), aff'd, 278 Ga. 1, 596 S.E.2d 162 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Jury was authorized to find defendant guilty of arson even though the evidence was circumstantial as the proven facts were consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and excluded every other reasonable hypothesis other than defendant's guilt as defendant's burning of three trucks using gasoline at a truck-driving school where defendant failed truck-driving courses, defendant's presence at a gas station around the time of the fire, and defendant's admission that defendant burned the trucks because an instructor "burned" defendant, meant defendant's conviction was supportable as a matter of law. Denson v. State, 259 Ga. App. 342, 577 S.E.2d 29 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for arson conviction.

- Conviction of first degree arson, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-60(a)(2), was not supported by sufficient evidence since there was no showing that a truck allegedly burned by the defendant was designed for use as a dwelling, and there was no showing of a lack of consent to the burning by the lienholder on the truck or by the joint owner, the defendant's wife; neither the wife's insurance claim form stating that she did not procure the loss, nor an insurance payment to the lienholder showed the required lack of consent, and there was no evidence in the entirely circumstantial case from which a jury could have excluded the very reasonable alternate hypothesis that the lien holder consented to the fire so as to recover the insurance proceeds for payment on a loan owed by a financially-troubled debtor, the defendant. Prater v. State, 279 Ga. App. 527, 631 S.E.2d 746 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient for aggravated battery conviction.

- Defendant's attempt to invoke the circumstantial evidence rule of former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was rejected and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of aggravated battery as the evidence was not entirely circumstantial since there was direct evidence that: (1) defendant said that defendant was going to set the victim on fire; (2) defendant was present and poured the gasoline on the victim; (3) defendant reached in defendant's pocket for something just before the fire started; and (4) the victim questioned why defendant had done it. Miller v. State, 265 Ga. App. 402, 593 S.E.2d 943 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Convictions of arson, O.C.G.A. § 16-7-60(a), and stalking, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-90, were proper because the circumstantial evidence presented at trial included a kerosene-soaked, partially burned, mailing label addressed to the defendant found at the scene of a fire at the victim's home; the state also presented evidence of the defendant's escalating obsession with the victim and the threatening phone calls the defendant made to the victim shortly before the fire. Although the circumstantial evidence must have excluded every other reasonable hypothesis save defendant's guilt, the evidence need not have excluded every inference or hypothesis. Ransom v. State, 297 Ga. App. 902, 678 S.E.2d 574 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Direct evidence required.

- Circumstances relied upon must be proved by direct evidence. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Harris, 1 Ga. App. 714, 57 S.E. 1076 (1907) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984).

Evidence not entirely circumstantial.

- Contrary to the defendant's claim, the evidence was not entirely circumstantial, but included testimony by a person the defendant dated that the defendant paid a cousin to kill the victim, and evidence that the defendant and the victim were in financial distress, the defendant stood to gain $600,000 from the victim's death, and the defendant told a friend the defendant needed to collect insurance money on the victim and, under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, that evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Clark v. State, 296 Ga. 543, 769 S.E.2d 376 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions because the state did not rely solely on circumstantial evidence as there was substantial direct evidence including the witnesses identifying the defendant as one of their assailants, and the defendant admitting to the defendant's participation in the home invasion to the deceased accomplice's older brother; furthermore, direct evidence from a witness who observed a crime was not converted into circumstantial evidence by the witness's credibility or lack thereof, and the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to reject any other reasonable theory except that the defendant was guilty as charged. Hill v. State, 297 Ga. 675, 777 S.E.2d 460 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient to support conviction of credit card fraud.

- Jury was authorized to find that the defendant acted with guilty knowledge and intent to commit credit card theft in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-9-31(a)(1) because the evidence established that the defendant obtained unauthorized possession of the victim's credit card, and there was circumstantial evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the defendant had knowledge that the defendant was accepting the credit card without authority and as part of an unlawful scheme; when the defendant was confronted by police officers, the defendant fled, and the defendant maintained unauthorized possession of a different credit card, along with additional items that could be used to engage in fraudulent credit transactions. Amaechi v. State, 306 Ga. App. 333, 702 S.E.2d 680 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient.

- Evidence sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of defendant's guilt. Brown v. State, 260 Ga. 153, 391 S.E.2d 108 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Grover v. State, 215 Ga. App. 907, 452 S.E.2d 586 (1994);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find the defendant and the codefendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder, directly or as a party to the crimes, because questions as to the reasonableness of alternative hypotheses were for the jury to decide, and the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to reject every alternative hypothesis of the crimes, save that of the guilt of the defendant and the codefendant. Krause v. State, 286 Ga. 745, 691 S.E.2d 211 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence held sufficient to support murder conviction.

- Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder, armed robbery, and related crimes in connection with the death of the victim because the defendant was identified by a witness as the person the witness saw coming upstairs from the victim's apartment just before the witness discovered the crimes; the defendant's fingerprints were found on the car used in the crimes; and the defendant's own statements, both via text message and in person, corroborated the defendant's participation in the murder and robbery. Babbage v. State, 296 Ga. 364, 768 S.E.2d 461 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction.

- See Griffin v. State, 2 Ga. App. 534, 58 S.E. 781 (1907) (gaming) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984); Perry v. State, 9 Ga. App. 871, 72 S.E. 446 (1911) (larceny) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Brown v. State, 13 Ga. App. 144, 78 S.E. 868 (1913) (larceny) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Smith v. State, 148 Ga. 332, 96 S.E. 632 (1918) (murder) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Shirley v. State, 168 Ga. 344, 148 S.E. 91 (1929) (murder) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Cheatham v. State, 57 Ga. App. 858, 197 S.E. 70 (1938) (larceny) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Johnson v. State, 79 Ga. App. 210, 53 S.E.2d 498 (1949) (illegal possession whiskey) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Fouts v. State, 96 Ga. App. 876, 101 S.E.2d 925 (1958) (possession of beer) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Blackwell v. State, 99 Ga. App. 579, 109 S.E.2d 62 (1959) (larceny) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Harvey v. State, 111 Ga. App. 279, 141 S.E.2d 604 (1965) (larceny and burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Anderson v. State, 120 Ga. App. 147, 169 S.E.2d 629 (1969) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Brown v. State, 125 Ga. App. 300, 187 S.E.2d 301 (1972) (larceny or burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Brown v. State, 133 Ga. App. 56, 209 S.E.2d 721 (1974) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Cosby v. State, 151 Ga. App. 676, 261 S.E.2d 424 (1979) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Prescott v. State, 164 Ga. App. 671, 297 S.E.2d 362 (1982) (no one other than self and wife had access to the bedroom closet) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201 (1983) (armed robbery) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Smith v. State, 250 Ga. 729, 300 S.E.2d 798 (1983) (murder) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Wilcox v. State, 250 Ga. 745, 301 S.E.2d 251 (1983) (murder and unlawful concealment of death) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Fields v. State, 167 Ga. App. 400, 306 S.E.2d 695 (1983) (entering motor vehicle with intent to commit theft) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Fredericks v. State, 176 Ga. App. 40, 335 S.E.2d 154 (1985) (driving while under the influence of alcohol) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Holland v. State, 176 Ga. App. 343, 335 S.E.2d 739 (1985) (possession of controlled substances; no evidence that anyone other than defendants had access to bedroom where controlled substances were found) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Childs v. State, 176 Ga. App. 549, 336 S.E.2d 309 (1985) (burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Turner v. State, 176 Ga. App. 785, 338 S.E.2d 37 (1985) (robbery) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925, 108 S. Ct. 287, 98 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1987) (murder and concealment of death) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Smith v. State, 257 Ga. 381, 359 S.E.2d 662 (1987) (murder) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Chews v. State, 187 Ga. App. 600, 371 S.E.2d 124 (1988) (drug violation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Beach v. State, 258 Ga. 700, 373 S.E.2d 210 (1988); Rich v. State, 191 Ga. App. 312, 381 S.E.2d 567 (1989) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Horton v. State, 194 Ga. App. 797, 392 S.E.2d 259 (1990) (burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Ware v. State, 198 Ga. App. 24, 400 S.E.2d 384 (1990) (drug violation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Anderson v. State, 225 Ga. App. 727, 484 S.E.2d 783 (1997) (attempt to commit burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Savage v. State, 229 Ga. App. 560, 494 S.E.2d 359 (1997) (intent to distribute cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Ross v. State, 240 Ga. App. 563, 524 S.E.2d 255 (1999); Lindsey v. State, 271 Ga. 657, 522 S.E.2d 459 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Foster v. State, 273 Ga. 34, 537 S.E.2d 659 (2000) (possession of cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Peek v. State, 247 Ga. App. 364, 542 S.E.2d 517 (2000) (malice murder) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Gresham v. State, 246 Ga. App. 705, 541 S.E.2d 679 (2000) (murder) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Withers v. State, 282 Ga. 656, 653 S.E.2d 40 (2007) (burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. App. 315, 645 S.E.2d 753 (2007) (burglary) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(entering automobile with intent to commit theft) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(felony murder and possession of a firearm) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6);(drug violation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Comparing the child's condition at the time the defendant took the child from the child's mother and shortly thereafter, with the child's condition at the time the child and the defendant appeared at the fire station, and considering the acts of abuse admitted by the defendant, the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the verdict, was sufficient to have authorized a rational trier of fact in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the child's death. Phipps v. State, 203 Ga. App. 128, 416 S.E.2d 319, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 907, 416 S.E.2d 319 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), and possession of marijuana, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b), because the circumstantial evidence established a meaningful connection between the defendant and the contraband, evidence which showed the defendant exercising power and dominion over the drugs found inside the wheel well on the front passenger's side of a car; the jury could infer that the drugs had been recently placed in the wheel well, and because the defendant had fled from the police, had been caught within arm's reach of the drugs, and had a large amount of cash in his pockets, the jury could infer that the defendant was a drug dealer and that the defendant had placed the drugs in the wheel well to avoid being prosecuted for possessing them. Wright v. State, 302 Ga. App. 332, 690 S.E.2d 654 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine because the evidence sufficed to sustain the conviction, and the jury was authorized to conclude that the circumstances excluded the hypothesis that another passenger had placed drugs in the bed of a truck; the passenger testified at trial that the passenger did not place the drugs in the truck bed, and a police officer testified that the passenger, whom the officer had in sight the entire time, never came within five-to-six feet of the truck and that the officer not only saw the defendant place the defendant's arm in the truck bed but heard an accompanying thump. Haggard v. State, 302 Ga. App. 502, 690 S.E.2d 651 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of trafficking in cocaine, possession of methylenedioxyamphetamine, and possession of less than one ounce of marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt because based on the evidence, the jury was authorized to conclude that the defendant threw a plastic bag containing drugs out the passenger side window of the defendant's car; the state presented evidence that a deputy saw the defendant actually possessing the bag of illegal narcotics as the defendant held the bag in the car before the defendant threw the bag out the passenger's window, and another deputy assigned to the drug suppression task force testified, without objection, that the amount of cocaine in the bag was more than a user would have in a user's possession and that would be the amount that a mid-level dealer would have in a dealer's possession. McCombs v. State, 306 Ga. App. 64, 701 S.E.2d 496 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's convictions for malice murder and theft by taking because: (1) after the victim, who was the defendant's roommate, disappeared, the defendant began driving the victim's car; (2) a witness who lived on a street on which the defendant used to live and that was miles away from the defendant's residence noticed a fire on the side of the road and a person squatting by the road watching the fire; (3) the victim's burned body was later found at the road side; (4) the victim's body had been burned, decapitated, drained of almost all blood, and cut into pieces; (5) the defendant told the police detectives who went to the defendant's apartment that the victim was on vacation and that the defendant did not know where the victim was; (6) the defendant's apartment had been recently cleaned and cleaning supplies were found in the apartment; (7) Luminol testing faintly revealed the presence of blood on the bathtub and surrounding walls of the apartment; (8) the trash which was collected from the apartment's dumpster included the victim's wallet, driver's license, and debit card; and (9) broken furniture, socks, and a sheet with the victim's blood were found in the trash. Adel v. State, 290 Ga. 690, 723 S.E.2d 666 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's conviction for possession of drugs by an inmate in violation of O.C.G.A. § 42-5-18(c) was reversed because the state failed to present any evidence to support even an inference that the defendant had any prior knowledge of drugs that were found in a bag or any idea what was in the bag; the state failed to demonstrate that the defendant had the bag in the defendant's possession for any reason other than the performance of the defendant's assigned duties of cleaning the visitation lobby in the prison and, thus, failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the defendant was merely performing the job when the defendant removed the bag from one trash can and placed the bag in the other. Strozier v. State, 313 Ga. App. 804, 723 S.E.2d 39 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence presented was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find that the state had excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of appellant's guilt with regard to the felony murder of a two-year-old child left in appellant's care based on the child being healthy when left in appellant's care, died as the result of blunt force trauma to the head which could not have resulted from the normal activities of a child or a fall down the stairs, and appellant was alone with the child. Alexander v. State, 294 Ga. 345, 751 S.E.2d 408 (2013).

Evidence that the defendant, the child's mother, and the child's father were the child's sole caregivers and were the only ones with access to the child in the timeframe of the fatal injury, that the defendant was the primary caregiver, that the fatal blow would have caused immediate and visible symptoms, that the child suffered many additional injuries, and that the defendant did not seek medical care for the child was sufficient to support convictions for felony murder and cruelty to children. Akhimie v. State, 297 Ga. 801, 777 S.E.2d 683 (2015).

Defendant's conviction for child molestation was affirmed because the testimony of the victim through the victim's description and use of dolls to demonstrate the acts the defendant took toward the victim was sufficient to show that the defendant had shown the victim a pornographic video and had touched the victim and had engaged in sexual activity. Chamblee v. State, 333 Ga. App. 749, 777 S.E.2d 41 (2015).

Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of burglary because the blood pools and drag marks found at the crime scene indicated that the victims were shot before being dragged inside their home, and the medical examiner testified to the absence of soot in one of the victim's lungs showing that that victim was not breathing during the fire; thus, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant entered the home without the victims' consent and that the defendant did so with the intention of committing the felony of arson once inside. Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 784 S.E.2d 365 (2016)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of theft of a motor vehicle because the victims' missing vehicle was found with one of the victim's blood on it and abandoned on railroad tracks near where the defendant's girlfriend picked the defendant up on the night of the murders. Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 784 S.E.2d 365 (2016)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Although circumstantial, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder, arson, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because the defendant and an associate visited the victims on the night that the victims were shot to death and the victims' trailer home was deliberately set on fire; the defendant's girlfriend picked the defendant up on a nearby highway about three hours after the neighbors heard gunshots at the victims' residence; the defendant admitted to the girlfriend that the defendant and an associate had fought with and shot at someone in the area where the victims lived and had set fire to a house; and DNA from both murder victims was found on the defendant's tennis shoes. Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 784 S.E.2d 365 (2016)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Appellant's conviction for vehicular homicide was affirmed because the verdict led to the strong inference that the appellant, while driving under the influence, killed the victim with a vehicle appellant was driving at a high rate of speed and there was no other evidence that another car or anything else struck the victim while alive with such force as to kill. Taylor v. State, 337 Ga. App. 486, 788 S.E.2d 97 (2016).

While the victim could not identify the gunman, the combined testimony of the other witnesses was sufficient to enable a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the charged crimes, including armed robbery and aggravated battery, and to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt. Epperson v. State, 340 Ga. App. 25, 796 S.E.2d 1 (2016).

Evidence sufficient for forgery conviction.

- Sufficient circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's conviction for forgery based on the reasonable inferences arising from the evidence showing that a check was drawn on an account of a roofing company for which the defendant never worked; thus, the inference arose that the defendant knew that the company did not owe any money to the defendant and that the defendant was not authorized to present the check for payment. Bettes v. State, 329 Ga. App. 13, 763 S.E.2d 366 (2014).

Evidence sufficient for murder conviction.

- Physical evidence of signs of struggle at victim's residence, defendant's attempts to remove these, and defendant's subsequent behavior regarding the disposal of victim's body sufficed to permit the jury to exclude every other hypothesis save the guilt of the accused in a prosecution for murder. White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 428 S.E.2d 789 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of armed robbery and malice murder because the victim went missing shortly after coming into a substantial amount of cash, the defendant had access to the victim's home, and the defendant was seen driving around in the victim's two vehicles, selling the victim's property, and with a large amount of cash; the victim died from blunt trauma to the head, a mallet with blood on the mallet was found inside the house, and a witness testified that the defendant confided to the witness that the defendant killed the victim, placed the victim's body in a freezer, and took the victim's money. Cutrer v. State, 287 Ga. 272, 695 S.E.2d 597 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to support the defendant's convictions for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, financial transaction card fraud, and recidivism because there was evidence placing the defendant at the victim's home during the time of the murder and evidence of the victim's blood on the defendant's shoes, which the defendant intentionally chose not to wear when being questioned by police; the evidence, together with the defendant's own statements regarding his use of the victim's debit card, was sufficient to authorize the jury to determine that the state excluded all reasonable hypotheses save that of the defendant's guilt and to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Johnson v. State, 288 Ga. 771, 707 S.E.2d 92 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to support the defendant's felony murder conviction because the evidence established that a witness saw the defendant in possession of a gun, that the defendant went to the victim's home, that the defendant used the defendant's gun to coerce the victim into the victim's car and to drive as the defendant instructed, that the victim stopped the victim's car and the victim and the defendant exited and went behind some bushes, that multiple gunshots were heard, that a witness saw the defendant step from behind the bushes and run back toward the car, and that the victim's body was found behind the bushes with 10 gunshots, including five shots to the head. Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 902, 708 S.E.2d 294 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence, including that there was no evidence that the victim died from a cause other than asphyxia due to strangulation, the fact that the victim tested negative for drugs at the time of death, negating any theory about a lethal combination of alcohol and drugs, and the lack of evidence of forced entry to a room that the defendant and the victim shared was sufficient to support the defendant's murder conviction. Simpson v. State, 293 Ga. 131, 744 S.E.2d 49 (2013).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of murder as the victim's daughter saw that the victim had about $600 in the victim's wallet the day before the murder; after the murder, the victim's purse had no cash in it; the defendant's girlfriend identified the knife handle and blade found near the victim's body as the steak knife with a loosened handle that the girlfriend had used in cooking at the defendant's apartment; and the defendant admitted to another prisoner that the defendant stabbed the victim. Bates v. State, 293 Ga. 855, 750 S.E.2d 323 (2013).

Jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that the defendant called the defendant's gang members to retrieve the defendant from an apartment where someone was threatening the defendant, as well as the defendant's celebrating with the gang that evening after the shooting, that the defendant was a party to the crime under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-20(b)(4) by advising, encouraging, counseling, or procuring others to commit the crime. Slaton v. State, 296 Ga. 122, 765 S.E.2d 332 (2014).

Evidence sufficient for burglary convictions.

- Circumstantial evidence of the burglary was sufficient to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save defendants' guilt as was required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 since defendants were seen at the burglarized property at the time that the burglary occurred, defendants fled the scene, and one of the defendants gave the police inconsistent stories as to what defendants were doing on the property. Bollinger v. State, 259 Ga. App. 102, 576 S.E.2d 80 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence supported defendant's burglary conviction because: (1) defendant drove a truck that exactly matched the truck in the surveillance tape; (2) defendant had a board in defendant's truck with glass particles embedded in the board that were of the same thickness and physical chemical properties as the glass of the window that was broken during the crime; (3) a sweater cap and white gloves found in the truck appeared to match those worn by the perpetrator in the surveillance tape; and (4) the stolen television and videocassette recorder were found approximately 500 yards from the defendant's mother's home. Brooks v. State, 273 Ga. App. 691, 615 S.E.2d 829 (2005), overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient for the factfinder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant juvenile committed burglary in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a) and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b)(2) because the defendant was in the vicinity of the victim's apartment shortly after the burglary, wearing a jacket that matched the victim's description of the jacket worn by the perpetrator, carrying a loaded pistol, and wearing shoes that matched the tread pattern and size of the muddy footprints found in the victim's apartment. In the Interest of J.D., 305 Ga. App. 519, 699 S.E.2d 827 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for trafficking in cocaine and possession of heroine with intent to distribute.

- Defendant's convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and16-13-31(a), were supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, since it was shown that a witness stated that defendant was residing in an apartment and selling drugs, a search of the apartment revealed drugs, cash, and photographs and papers with defendant's name on them, as well as a sweater which defendant was seen wearing, and defendant had changed the locks on the apartment; accordingly, the trial court's denial of defendant's motions for a directed verdict pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-9-1 and for a new trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-5-23 were properly denied. Williams v. State, 262 Ga. App. 67, 584 S.E.2d 625 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for malice murder conviction.

- There was sufficient evidence to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder after the victim, found in defendant's home, had been beaten and died from a severe blow to the head. Hannah v. State, 278 Ga. 195, 599 S.E.2d 177 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to support a malice murder conviction since witnesses saw the defendant arguing with the victim, go with the victim into an area behind a motel where the victim lived, heard shots from the area behind the motel, and later the victim's body was found in that area; also, the defendant was seen at a house with an item wrapped in cloth, and later, the defendant's gun, the murder weapon, was found in the yard of that house, wrapped in cloth. Smith v. State, 280 Ga. 161, 625 S.E.2d 766 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Bloody jogging suit belonging to the defendant found at the defendant's girlfriend's house with the victim's blood on it, witnesses' description of the defendant wearing that same jogging suit after the shooting, and a .380 pistol found hidden in a cinder block at the girlfriend's house that matched the type of gun used to kill the victim were sufficient evidence to support convictions for malice murder and other related crimes with regard to the killing of the girlfriend's neighbor. Hooks v. State, 280 Ga. 164, 626 S.E.2d 114 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence that the defendant threatened to kill the victim on numerous occasions, sometimes while brandishing a knife; that shortly before the victim was fatally stabbed, the defendant was seen in the victim's front yard; and that police matched the boots the defendant was wearing that night to a footprint at the crime scene was sufficient to convict the defendant of malice murder. Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 304, 667 S.E.2d 65 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of malice murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt because although the defendant denied to police that the defendant had any contact with the silver car that was connected to the robbery, the defendant's fingerprints were found on the outside of the car; an eyewitness's physical description of the second gunman from the robbery matched the defendant. Carter v. State, 289 Ga. 51, 709 S.E.2d 223 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant as a party to the crimes of malice murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault because the evidence showed that, during a drug deal and the subsequent shootings, the defendant was in the apartment and the defendant's blood was found there; witnesses saw two men matching the defendant's and the codefendant's descriptions leaving quickly; ammunition of the type used to kill the victim was found in a car that was owned by the codefendant with whom the defendant was living; and the defendant denied knowing any of the other defendants and fabricated a story that the defendant had been shot in a confrontation at a gas station. Dixon v. State, 298 Ga. 200, 779 S.E.2d 290 (2015)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of directly committing the crimes of malice murder and concealing the death of another or that the defendant was a party to the crimes because there was evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim, including evidence that the defendant had acted violently against the victim a few months before the victim's body was found; evidence that days before the victim's body was found, the defendant's son used the victim's cell phone to call their relatives; and evidence that the police found the victim's personal items, including items which could have been used to inflict the fatal injuries to the victim's body, inside the defendant's bags. Miller v. State, 303 Ga. 1, 810 S.E.2d 123 (2018).

Evidence sufficient for robbery convictions.

- There was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to participate in the robbery of a delivery man since the evidence showed that defendant was privy to the robbery plan, participated in the robbery, and convened with the codefendants after the robbery. In the Interest of C.L.B., 267 Ga. App. 456, 600 S.E.2d 407 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Denial of defendant's motion for a new trial was affirmed as defendant's fingerprint was on the robbery note, the victim eliminated all but the defendant's and one other's photos from a photo lineup, the victim's description matched the defendant's appearance, and the victim in a similar robbery positively identified the defendant as the robber; a defense witness's testimony that the witness saw defendant playing with cards in the hotel lobby a few days before the robbery did not exonerate the defendant as the witness did not see the defendant playing with cards similar to the one on which the robbery note was written. Dailey v. State, 271 Ga. App. 492, 610 S.E.2d 126 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery.

- Jury was authorized to conclude that the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except the defendant's guilt of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because the defendant surreptitiously watched others at a fast food restaurant, wore a mask, and drew a BB handgun that resembled a semi-automatic weapon when the defendant was confronted by a police officer. New v. State, 270 Ga. App. 341, 606 S.E.2d 865 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for possession of drugs conviction.

- Jury could rationally find from circumstantial evidence that defendant committed the offenses of possession of both amphetamine and GHB because substances found in defendant's gym locker were tested and found to be amphetamine and GHB, the amount of GHB found could be for personal use over a long period of time, and the containers in which the substances were found contained several prints that could not be identified but contained one that matched defendant's finger. Hobbs v. State, 272 Ga. App. 148, 611 S.E.2d 775 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

As the defendant was the driver, owner, and sole occupant of a vehicle, and 250 grams of methamphetamine were found hidden beneath the steering column, within arm's reach of the driver, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant's "knowing" possession of the drugs as required by O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e). The mere possibility that someone other than the defendant committed the crime was not such a reasonable hypothesis as had to be excluded in order for circumstantial evidence to authorize a verdict of guilty under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Garcia v. State, 293 Ga. App. 422, 667 S.E.2d 205 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for possession of cocaine conviction.

- Circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30, as the defendant was approached by two undercover officers and upon seeing that one of the officers had a badge, defendant turned around and made a throwing motion with a clenched fist in the direction of a trash barrel; defendant was in an area known for drug sales, and three pieces of crack cocaine were found in the vicinity of the trash barrel. Woods v. State, 275 Ga. App. 471, 620 S.E.2d 660 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Police officer testified about searching a patrol car before transporting the defendant in the car, and about the officer's suspicions that the defendant had stuffed something underneath the backseat because the officer saw debris on the back of the defendant's pants and on the backseat. This circumstantial evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to convict the defendant of possessing the cocaine found wedged underneath the backseat. Simmons v. State, 299 Ga. App. 21, 681 S.E.2d 712 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court was authorized to find a defendant guilty of possession of cocaine on the basis that the evidence excluded every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant's guilt, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6, as the state presented evidence other than the defendant's mere spatial proximity to the pipe containing cocaine to show that the defendant had constructive possession over it, in that the pipe, which was found on the grass where the defendant had been arrested, was dry, although it had been raining and the surrounding area was "soaked"; from this evidence the factfinder could infer that the pipe had been on the ground for a very short period of time. In addition, the state introduced similar transaction evidence that the defendant had been carrying a small crack pipe in the pocket of the defendant's jacket on the occasion of an earlier arrest. Brown v. State, 314 Ga. App. 212, 723 S.E.2d 504 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for rape conviction.

- Combination of circumstantial and direct evidence, including the victim's identification of the attacker, DNA evidence, and the testimony of several eyewitnesses who saw a man fitting the defendant's description in the area near the time of the attack, was sufficient to sustain a rape conviction. McKeehan v. State, 274 Ga. App. 14, 616 S.E.2d 489 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for malice murder and attempted arson convictions.

- Malice murder and attempted arson convictions were upheld as: (1) the evidence presented showed that an attempted arson was inextricably linked to the victim's murder, and the jury was authorized to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty; (2) the admission of two handwritten documents that defendant had penned was proper, as their prejudicial impact did not outweigh their probative value; and (3) the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in determining that any prejudicial impact of a religious prayer asking for strength, and an expression of uncertainty as to what "makes me tick," did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Fortson v. State, 280 Ga. 376, 628 S.E.2d 104 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for felony murder while in commission of cruelty to children conviction.

- Evidence that a defendant's 13-month-old child died while in the defendant's care from brain trauma caused by being struck by or against an object or violently shaken at a time when one other person and that person's child were in the defendant's apartment provided sufficient circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder while in the commission of cruelty to a child; questions as to the reasonableness of hypotheses were to be decided by the jury, and the jury's finding was not to be disturbed unless the guilty verdict was insupportable as a matter of law. Scott v. State, 281 Ga. 373, 637 S.E.2d 652 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and proximity to housing project convictions.

- Defendant's convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a housing project, in violation of O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-30(b) and 16-13-32.5(b), were based on sufficient evidence since the state proved by circumstantial evidence pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 that defendant had been walking back and forth to an overturned bucket when people approached from the street in what appeared to be drug transactions, and the drugs were found under the bucket; there was evidence that the amount of drugs recovered were more than one would use for personal use, indicating an intent to distribute, and there was also evidence indicating the proximity of the bucket to a nearby public housing complex. Reason v. State, 283 Ga. App. 608, 642 S.E.2d 236 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b), because the evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control over the cocaine, and the state established by overwhelming circumstantial evidence that the defendant was in either constructive or actual possession of the cocaine; the defendant was found kneeling over the contraband, the jury was authorized to infer that the defendant had been "fidgeting" with a piggy bank in which 37 small bags of cocaine were hidden, and pants with the defendant's driver's license and cash were found in the same corner of the bedroom as the cocaine. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for malice murder and armed robbery convictions.

- Evidence, which included uncontroverted testimony from an eyewitness who saw the defendant order a store employee into the street shortly before the employee was shot, the testimony of two other eyewitnesses, and the fact that calls had been made from the employee's stolen cellular phone to the defendant's mother, was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder, armed robbery, and a number of other associated crimes. Horne v. State, 281 Ga. 799, 642 S.E.2d 659 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for felony murder and arson convictions.

- Circumstantial evidence was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to support the defendant's arson and felony murder convictions and to exclude the theory that an intruder set the fire in the house since the defendant rented a room from the victim: (1) testimony of neighbors contradicted the defendant's claim that the defendant was asleep and unaware of the fire; (2) there was no evidence of a forced entry other than that of the neighbors who tried to save the victim; (3) the layout of the house authorized the jury to find that the defendant would have noticed an intruder; and (4) a motive could be inferred from the fact that the defendant owed rent to the victim and that the victim was planning to ask the defendant for the rent. Green v. State, 283 Ga. 126, 657 S.E.2d 221 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for trafficking marijuana conviction.

- There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction for trafficking marijuana as the jury was authorized to conclude that it was not reasonable, as the defendant suggested, that someone other than the defendant placed over 21 pounds of marijuana in open view in the back of a trailer of which the defendant had the only key, without the defendant's knowledge. Mora v. State, 292 Ga. App. 860, 666 S.E.2d 412 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for felony murder conviction.

- Circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's conviction of the felony murder of the defendant's two-month-old child. The victim's grandparent had not had contact with the victim on the day of the murder, and the evidence that the victim was well when the victim's other parent left the house, combined with a medical examiner's testimony and time line regarding the time of the child's death, excluded the other parent's guilt as well. Nixon v. State, 284 Ga. 800, 671 S.E.2d 503 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime because there was substantial corroborating evidence in addition to the accomplice's testimony; the defendant stated that the defendant had killed someone, other witnesses corroborated the accomplice's testimony regarding the arrival and departure of the two men on the night of the shooting, and blood was found on the shirt the defendant wore that night and tried to have destroyed. Gonnella v. State, 286 Ga. 211, 686 S.E.2d 644 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of felony murder predicated upon aggravated assault because the evidence at the crime scene showed there had been a struggle; the victim's injuries were consistent with strangulation; male DNA taken from the victim's body was later matched to the defendant's DNA; no other male DNA was found in the samples taken from the victim's body; and the state excluded all reasonable hypotheses except that of the defendant's guilt. Reeves v. State, 294 Ga. 673, 755 S.E.2d 695 (2014)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for felony murder and aggravated assault conviction.

- Contrary to a defendant's contention that the state presented only circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 that did not exclude all reasonable hypotheses except that of the defendant's guilt, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for felony murder and aggravated assault; the defendant's infant child died of a massive closed head trauma complicated by blunt force chest trauma, and the defendant had the sole care of the child just before the child suffered rib injuries allegedly due to the defendant pushing on the child's chest while the child was choking and just before the child suffered seizure-like symptoms. Berryhill v. State, 285 Ga. 198, 674 S.E.2d 920 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony because contrary to the defendant's arguments, the evidence showed that the person who was sitting in the back seat of the victim's car was not sitting directly behind the victim, but instead, that person was in the rear seat on the passenger's side of the car; the forensics testing showed that the murderer was located to the left of the victim, not the right, and there was blood spatter on the seat behind the victim from which the jury could have inferred that no one was sitting there at the time of the shooting. Julius v. State, 286 Ga. 413, 687 S.E.2d 828 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for aggravated assault conviction.

- Evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to two counts of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21 because even though the defendant did not actually use a weapon, there was evidence that an accomplice brandished a handgun and pointed the handgun at both the manager and the clerk of the video store, and the accomplice's use of a weapon could be attributed to the defendant; one who intentionally aids or abets the commission of a crime by another is a party to the crime and equally guilty with the principal, and reasonable apprehension of injury can be proved by circumstantial or indirect evidence as well as by direct or positive evidence since the presence of a gun would normally place a victim in reasonable apprehension of being injured violently. Rainly v. State, 307 Ga. App. 467, 705 S.E.2d 246 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for aggravated child molestation conviction.

- Evidence, including that defendant had access and opportunity to infect a victim at least two weeks prior to the victim exhibiting symptoms, and that the victim's immediate outcry was consistent with the victim's statement to a doctor identifying defendant, and excluding the hypothesis that the victim's father was present prior to the onset of the victim's symptoms, was sufficient to convict defendant of aggravated child molestation in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c). Zuniga v. State, 300 Ga. App. 45, 684 S.E.2d 77 (2009), cert. denied, No. S10C0169, 2010 Ga. LEXIS 125 (Ga. 2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient as there is direct evidence.

- Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for shoplifting, and the state was not required under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to present evidence excluding every other reasonable hypothesis except defendant's guilt because the state's case was not based on circumstantial evidence, but on the direct testimony of an eyewitness to the shoplifting. Fitzpatrick v. State, 271 Ga. App. 804, 611 S.E.2d 95 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for theft by shoplifting because the evidence was completely circumstantial and did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the defendant's guilt failed; contrary to the defendant's contention, the testimony from a store's loss prevention employee that the employee observed the defendant remove an item from a shelf, place the item in the defendant's back pocket, and then leave the store without presenting the item to a cashier was direct not circumstantial evidence. Walton v. State, 291 Ga. App. 736, 662 S.E.2d 820 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence held insufficient to support conviction.

- See Park v. State, 123 Ga. 164, 51 S.E. 317 (1905) (murder) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1984); Bush v. State, 7 Ga. App. 607, 67 S.E. 685 (1910) (larceny) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Calhoun v. State, 9 Ga. App. 501, 71 S.E. 765 (1911) (burglary) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Henderson v. State, 147 Ga. 134, 92 S.E. 871 (1917) (murder) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Haire v. State, 38 Ga. App. 116, 142 S.E. 697 (1928) (cattle stealing) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Wallin v. State, 38 Ga. App. 194, 143 S.E. 597 (1928) (burglary) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Smith v. State, 38 Ga. App. 741, 145 S.E. 500 (1928) (larceny) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1010); Hughie v. State, 52 Ga. App. 73, 182 S.E. 197 (1935) (larceny of automobile) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Graham v. State, 183 Ga. 881, 189 S.E. 910 (1937) (murder) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Orr v. State, 62 Ga. App. 774, 9 S.E.2d 917 (1940) (manufacturing whiskey) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Cheney v. State, 61 Ga. App. 726, 7 S.E.2d 335 (1940) (arson) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wells v. State, 75 Ga. App. 588, 44 S.E.2d 66 (1947) (larceny) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Woody v. State, 99 Ga. App. 857, 109 S.E.2d 896 (1959) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Purser v. State, 104 Ga. App. 728, 122 S.E.2d 749 (1961) (voluntary manslaughter) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Crane v. State, 123 Ga. App. 226, 180 S.E.2d 289 (1971) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Williams v. State, 126 Ga. App. 350, 190 S.E.2d 785 (1972) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Ennis v. State, 130 Ga. App. 716, 204 S.E.2d 519 (1974) (possession of marijuana) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Russell v. State, 132 Ga. App. 35, 207 S.E.2d 619 (1974) (possession of marijuana) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Wright v. State, 147 Ga. App. 111, 248 S.E.2d 183 (1978) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Kametches v. State, 242 Ga. 721, 251 S.E.2d 232 (1978) (possession for sale of obscene materials) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Hall v. State, 155 Ga. App. 211, 270 S.E.2d 377 (1980) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Smith v. State, 188 Ga. App. 415, 373 S.E.2d 97 (1988) (entering an automobile) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Krull v. State, 211 Ga. App. 37, 438 S.E.2d 152 (1993) (DUI, no proof of insurance, driving with suspended license, and failure to maintain lane) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Calhoun v. State, 213 Ga. App. 375, 444 S.E.2d 405 (1994) (shoplifting) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Jordan v. State, 225 Ga. App. 424, 484 S.E.2d 60 (1997) (trafficking in cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Mitchell v. State, 268 Ga. 592, 492 S.E.2d 204 (1997) (possession with intent to distribute marijuana) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); In re A.D.C., 228 Ga. App. 829, 493 S.E.2d 38 (1997) (possession with intent to distribute marijuana) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Greene v. State, 230 Ga. App. 155, 495 S.E.2d 634 (1998) (drug violation) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6); Johnson v. State, 245 Ga. App. 583, 538 S.E.2d 481 (2000) (possession of cocaine) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When the defendant drove a codefendant away from the crime scene in a subdivision after the codefendant shot the victim, to the extent that the evidence that the defendant's car had been parked at some point with the car's front end facing in the direction going out of the subdivision constituted circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt as a party, the evidence did not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, as required by former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. Ratana v. State, 297 Ga. App. 747, 678 S.E.2d 193 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Except as to one incident, the evidence was insufficient to show that a mother aided and abetted her husband's sexual abuse of their twin daughters when they were between four and eight years old, because the record showed that the mother had no knowledge of seven of the eight incidents until she took the children to therapy, and the prosecution's circumstantial evidence - including the fact of the family's nudist lifestyle, the existence of pornographic movies in the home, and the fact that during therapy, the mother advised the girls to not talk about their father - was insufficient to prove aiding and abetting beyond a reasonable doubt. Naylor v. State, 300 Ga. App. 401, 685 S.E.2d 383 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of misdemeanor fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer because a deputy identified the defendant as the driver; another officer followed the defendant out of the parking lot when the defendant refused to stop; and the officer activated the vehicle's lights and siren but lost sight of the speeding car moments before a car of the same color struck another vehicle just ahead; however, the evidence was insufficient to convict the defendant of felony fleeing or attempting to elude as no evidence was presented that the defendant was attempting to elude arrest for a non-traffic violation when the defendant struck the other vehicle. Johnson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 622, 788 S.E.2d 559 (2016).

Evidence insufficient for cocaine possession conviction.

- When: (1) defendant's only connection to cocaine that was found in a jacket was that defendant picked up the jacket after the jacket had been lying outside on an air conditioner in close proximity to a juvenile who was suspected in drug transactions and an unidentified woman; and (2) there was no evidence as to who placed the jacket on the air conditioner, the evidence against defendant was entirely circumstantial and did not exclude every other hypothesis except guilt; therefore, the evidence was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to support defendant's conviction of possessing cocaine in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-20 et seq. Stephens v. State, 258 Ga. App. 774, 575 S.E.2d 661 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

State failed to prove the state's case that defendant, a minor, was delinquent under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2 for trafficking in cocaine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31 as the state did not prove the necessary connection between defendant and the drugs, other than spatial proximity, which was insufficient; the fact that defendant was in a house in the middle of the night with non-family members, that a large amount of cocaine and cash were found in the house, although not visible, and that defendant was sitting on a couch where a bag containing crack cocaine was found did not establish the necessary connection, and did not exclude all other possibilities except the guilt of defendant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. In re E.A.D., 271 Ga. App. 531, 610 S.E.2d 153 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient to show constructive possession of controlled substance.

- Trial court erred in finding that the defendant violated the defendant's probation by committing the new felony of possessing a controlled substance, piperazine or TFMPP, in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 because the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to show the defendant's constructive possession of the TFMPP pills; the only evidence linking the defendant to the drugs was spatial proximity, but it was at least equally likely that the pills belonged to the driver of the truck where the pills were found. Scott v. State, 305 Ga. App. 596, 699 S.E.2d 894 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for financial identity fraud.

- Because the state's evidence failed to demonstrate that the defendant accessed the resources of another by using identifying information to procure a cell phone, and a service contract for the cell phone, and failed to establish that defendant either knew that a store clerk: (1) could not issue a phone without accessing the resources of a specific individual; (2) would need to use the identifying information of that individual to access such resources; or (3) in fact used such identifying information to access the resources of another for the purpose of providing defendant with a cell phone, the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of financial identity fraud. Jones v. State, 285 Ga. App. 822, 648 S.E.2d 133 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for theft by taking conviction.

- Evidence did not support the finding that a juvenile defendant committed theft by taking. Although there was circumstantial evidence that the defendant had a key to the home from which items were taken and had been in and out of the home at the time of the theft, the defendant testified that the defendant had left the door unlocked and returned to the home to find the home ransacked; the circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's version of the facts as well as the state's and thus did not warrant a finding of guilt under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6. In the Interest of M.H., 288 Ga. App. 663, 655 S.E.2d 249 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for theft by receiving stolen property.

- Juvenile court erred by adjudicating the defendant juvenile delinquent for violating O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) by committing theft by receiving a stolen motorcycle because the evidence did not support the finding that the defendant should have known that the motorcycle was stolen; the defendant's testimony permitted an inference that only after learning of the theft did the defendant realize that the motorcycle was stolen, the defendant rode the motorcycle on the street in front of the victim's house, and there was no evidence that the defendant tried to conceal the motorcycle; absent evidence of the real value of the motorcycle at the time of the theft, the evidence did not support a finding that the price the defendant offered to pay for the motorcycle was grossly disproportionate to the value. In re J. L., 306 Ga. App. 89, 701 S.E.2d 564 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for theft by taking conviction.

- Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that the defendant was guilty of theft by taking because an ATM was removed from a bank's property without authorization, defendant's vehicle was observed at the bank approximately two hours before the theft was reported and shortly after the alarm was activated; tire tracks at the scene matched the tire prints on the defendant's vehicle, the vehicle had a tow strap with a large metal hook tied to it, scrape marks consistent with a heavy object being drug on the pavement led from the ATM's location in the direction of a nearby grassy lot, where the ATM was later found, and the defendant possessed black electrical tape and gloves upon the defendant's arrest; the jury was authorized to consider the defendant's flight from the scene and police as circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt. Tauch v. State, 305 Ga. App. 643, 700 S.E.2d 645 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Rational trier of fact was authorized to find that the evidence was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of the defendant's guilt and to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of theft by taking, O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2, because there was evidence that the defendant was alone for 20 minutes or more on the floor of the house where the money was kept and where no cleaning was to be performed; while there was circumstantial evidence that also implicated another house cleaner, reasonable jurors could have found from the evidence that the hypothesis that the house cleaner took the money was excluded based on testimony that the defendant had been alone in the area of the house where the money was kept, and there was no such evidence regarding the house cleaner. Cookston v. State, 309 Ga. App. 708, 710 S.E.2d 900 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence that a defendant showed an interest in a car that was for sale and took a test drive and returned the car, that the car was stolen the next day, that the defendant was found driving the car hours after the car was stolen using a duplicate key, and that the defendant fled from an officer was sufficient to authorize the defendant's conviction for theft by taking (automobile) in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-8-2(a). Kelly v. State, 313 Ga. App. 582, 722 S.E.2d 175 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for methamphetamine possession.

- Evidence of a defendant's unconsciousness, possibly due to consumption of alcohol or other legal substances, and the defendant's spatial proximity to methamphetamine and pipes used to smoke it, to which two codefendants had equal access, was insufficient circumstantial evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that the defendant possessed methamphetamine. Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction. O'Neill v. State, 285 Ga. 125, 674 S.E.2d 302 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Circumstantial evidence was insufficient to show constructive possession of methamphetamine found in a car, in which defendant was a passenger, because there was no evidence, besides spatial proximity, connecting the defendant with the contraband since there was no evidence showing that the defendant knew that a baggy found in the car contained contraband or the defendant hid the baggy in the car. Millsaps v. State, 300 Ga. App. 383, 685 S.E.2d 371 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court erred in convicting the defendant of trafficking in methamphetamine in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(e)(3) because although the evidence raised grave suspicions of the defendant's guilt, the state failed to establish that the defendant had both the power and the intention at the time of the defendant's arrest to exercise dominion or control over the drugs and failed to show that other men did not have equal access to the house and the items within the house; all of the evidence was circumstantial with regard to the defendant's constructive possession of the contraband, there was nothing in the case linking the defendant to the drugs or manufacturing equipment in the house, and several other people with access to the house were unaccounted for and were not charged. Aquino v. State, 308 Ga. App. 163, 706 S.E.2d 746 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for aggravated battery, aggravated assault, and firearm possession conviction.

- Convictions of aggravated battery, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-24, aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, were not supported by sufficient evidence because, although the defendant's conduct before the crime was suspicious, the circumstantial evidence against the defendant was insufficient under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6; the state did not show that the defendant was anywhere near the scene at the time of the shooting, did not present evidence connecting a weapon used in the shooting to the defendant, and, although a witness testified that three days before the shooting, the witness saw the defendant's brother hand the defendant a gun, the witness could not identify the type of gun involved, and this testimony did not connect the defendant with the shooting. The state also failed to adduce evidence that the defendant intentionally aided, abetted, or encouraged the commission of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Gresham v. State, 298 Ga. App. 136, 679 S.E.2d 344 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for theft by receiving property conviction.

- Circumstantial evidence of a larcenous taking was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for theft by receiving beyond a reasonable doubt because the officer's testimony that radio dispatch identified the pistol as stolen was non-probative hearsay and the fact that the weapon was labeled for law enforcement use only and loaded with police-issue ammunition did not exclude the possibility that the weapon may have been given away or sold "on the black market" in violation of the warning. Lopez v. State, 259 Ga. App. 720, 578 S.E.2d 304 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for malice murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession convictions.

- Evidence did not show that defendant intentionally or knowingly provided handguns to two cousins who used the guns to commit murder and other crimes, and because defendant was not present when the crimes were committed and the evidence did not exclude all possibilities except guilt, the state supreme court reversed defendant's convictions for malice murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Clyde v. State, 276 Ga. 839, 584 S.E.2d 253 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence sufficient for aggravated assault.

- Trial court did not err in convicting the defendant and the defendant's codefendant of aggravated assault because based on the circumstantial evidence, the jury was entitled to infer that the defendant and the codefendant accompanied their accomplice to a convenience store knowing that the accomplice intended to assault the victim because of their past differences, that the defendant had specifically served as the getaway driver, and that the codefendant had accompanied the accomplice inside the store as a lookout, making both individuals parties to the aggravated assault. Romero v. State, 307 Ga. App. 348, 705 S.E.2d 195 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for weapons conviction.

- Circumstantial evidence was insufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to prove that defendant had constructive possession of a gun found in a car in which defendant was riding as a passenger or to support defendant's convictions for carrying a concealed weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-126(a) or possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(b) since: (1) the car was stopped for a traffic offense, and was searched, revealing the gun; (2) all of the occupants in the car denied possessing the gun; (3) the gun was found under a seat where defendant had been sitting; (4) the arresting officers did not see defendant bend over or appear to put anything under the seat; and (5) because defendant was only a passenger in a car that defendant did not own or control, there was no presumption that defendant possessed the gun. Wofford v. State, 262 Ga. App. 291, 585 S.E.2d 207 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Evidence insufficient for marijuana possession conviction.

- Evidence did not support defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute as the mere fact that a package of marijuana was addressed, but not delivered, to an apartment leased by defendant did not tie defendant to the drugs; the evidence was circumstantial and it was equally plausible that the codefendants were independently dealing in marijuana. Patten v. State, 275 Ga. App. 574, 621 S.E.2d 550 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Trial court erred in revoking the defendant's probation because the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that the defendant committed the new offense of possession of less than one ounce of marijuana since the state presented no evidence other than the defendant's mere spatial proximity to the marijuana to support a finding that the defendant had the intent to exercise dominion and control over the marijuana; there was no drug paraphernalia, the defendant was cooperative with the police and did not try to flee, there was no evidence that the defendant tried to hide or conceal anything in the vehicle or that the defendant had continuous access and control over the vehicle, and the defendant did not have any marijuana in the defendant's possession and was not under the influence of drugs. Smith v. State, 306 Ga. App. 54, 701 S.E.2d 490 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Intoxication causing accident.

- Circumstantial evidence that defendant's alleged intoxication caused the accident was sufficient under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 to exclude defendant's reasonable hypotheses of innocence due to mechanical failure. Griffin v. State, 242 Ga. App. 878, 531 S.E.2d 752 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Presumption in favor of verdict.

- After the verdict, the testimony is construed in the testimony's most favorable light to the prevailing party, which is in this case, the state, for every presumption and inference is in favor of the verdict. This rule has been applied when the evidence is circumstantial. Townsend v. State, 127 Ga. App. 797, 195 S.E.2d 474 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Should a trial court decline to direct the verdict and the jury then finds the defendant guilty, the appellate court is obliged to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict. Muckle v. State, 165 Ga. App. 873, 303 S.E.2d 54 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Verdict will not be disturbed when circumstances are aided by direct evidence. McGinnis v. State, 31 Ga. 236 (1860) (decided under former law); Hudson v. State, 92 Ga. 472, 17 S.E. 847 (1893); Coney v. State, 101 Ga. 582, 28 S.E. 918 (1897) (decided under former law);(decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 984).

Verdict not disturbed unless unsupportable as matter of law.

- If a jury is authorized to find that the evidence, circumstantial though it may be, is sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless the verdict is insupportable as a matter of law. Brewer v. State, 156 Ga. App. 468, 274 S.E.2d 817 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Lawhorn v. State, 200 Ga. App. 451, 408 S.E.2d 425 (1991);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Questions of reasonableness are generally decided by the jury, and the appellate court will not disturb the jury's finding that the evidence was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt unless the verdict is unsupportable as a matter of law. Shockley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 182, 303 S.E.2d 519 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

Questions as to reasonableness are generally to be decided by the jury which heard the evidence and when the jury is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, the appellate court will not disturb the finding, unless the verdict is unsupportable as a matter of law. Chambless v. State, 165 Ga. App. 194, 300 S.E.2d 201 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6).

When verdict overturned.

- Supreme Court is admittedly without authority to interfere with a verdict supported by direct evidence; it may declare, however, even though the jury has found otherwise, and the trial judge has approved their finding, that the proven circumstances do not sustain by their consistency the claim of the state as to the guilt of the defendant. Willoughby v. City of Atlanta, 50 Ga. App. 180, 177 S.E. 527 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Hypothesis consistent with innocence.

- When there appears a hypothesis from the evidence, or from the lack of evidence and the defendant's statement, pointing to the innocence of the accused and which, tested by all human experience, is a reasonable one, an appellate court, may declare it so as a matter of law. Wood v. State, 156 Ga. App. 810, 275 S.E.2d 694 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109); Walker v. State, 157 Ga. App. 728, 278 S.E.2d 487 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-109).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 29A Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 1390.

C.J.S.

- 32A C.J.S., Evidence, §§ 1604, 1605.

ALR.

- May conviction of perjury rest on circumstantial evidence, 15 A.L.R. 634; 27 A.L.R. 857; 42 A.L.R. 1063; 88 A.L.R.2d 852.

Character and sufficiency of evidence to show that letter was mailed, 25 A.L.R. 9; 86 A.L.R. 541.

Instruction on circumstantial evidence in criminal case, 89 A.L.R. 1379.

Evidence of acquisition or possession of money, source of which is not traced, as admissible against defendant in criminal case, 123 A.L.R. 119; 91 A.L.R.2d 1046.

Admissibility, in prosecution for burglary, of evidence that defendant, after alleged burglary, was in possession of burglarious tools and implements, 143 A.L.R. 1199.

Conviction of criminal offense without evidence as denial of due process of law, 80 A.L.R.2d 1362.

Homicide: identification of victim as person named in indictment or information, 86 A.L.R.2d 722.

Conviction of perjury where one or more of elements is established solely by circumstantial evidence, 88 A.L.R.2d 852.

Construction of statute or ordinance making it an offense to possess or have alcoholic beverages in opened package in motor vehicle, 35 A.L.R.3d 1418.

What amounts to "exclusive" possession of stolen goods to support inference of burglary or other felonious taking, 51 A.L.R.3d 727.

Conviction of possession of illicit drugs found in premises of which defendant was in nonexclusive possession, 56 A.L.R.3d 948.

Conviction of possession of illicit drugs found in automobile of which defendant was not sole occupant, 57 A.L.R.3d 1319.

Validity and construction of statute creating presumption or inference of intent to sell from possession of specified quantity of illegal drugs, 60 A.L.R.3d 1128.

Modern status of rule regarding necessity of instruction on circumstantial evidence in criminal trial - state cases, 36 A.L.R.4th 1046.