CopyCited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 31, 2016 | 793 S.E.2d 49
...nterests. As the parties acknowledged at oral argument, nothing in the statute limits the length ofan extension granted under OCGA §
15-11-521 (b), whereas as soon as the State files a new complaint, it willbe back on the 30-day clock. Compare OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) (limiting the extension of time that a superior court may grant to present a criminal charge against a detained juvenile to the grand jury to “one extension ....
...panel’s contrary decision, the D. V. H. panel persisted in ignoring our directly applicable and binding precedent. Instead, the D. V. H. panel cited only C.B. — a case that addresses not a time limitation within the Juvenile Code but rather OCGA §
17-7-50.1, a statute in the Criminal Procedure Code that deals with superior court jurisdiction over juveniles.
In any event, OCGA §
17-7-50.1 is textually different from OCGA §
15-11-521 in a pertinent way. OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) requires that a child who is charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court and is detained “shall within 180 days of the date of detention be entitled to have the charge against him or her presented to...
...S.’s conclusion is correct — a question we need not decide today — the statute at issue there provides an express consequence for the State’s failure to meet its 180-day deadline: the case is transferred to the juvenile court to proceed under the Juvenile *57Code. See OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b)....
CopyCited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Aug 19, 2019
...on
the same charges. After the State nolle prossed the April 2016
indictment, Coleman filed a motion to transfer his case to juvenile
court, arguing that, because the March 2018 indictment was
returned outside the 180-day time limit set by OCGA §
17-7-50.1,
the Superior Court no longer had jurisdiction.1
Relying on the Court of Appeals’ decisions in Edwards v....
...589, 591 (1) (774 SE2d 688)
(2015). When we construe such statutory authority on appeal, our
review is de novo. Hankla v. Postell,
293 Ga. 692, 693 (749 SE2d
726) (2013). With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutory
text in question.
OCGA §
17-7-50.12 provides:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is
within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided
in Code Section
15-11-560 or
15-11-561, who is detained
shall within 180 days of the da...
...ile court and
shall proceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title
15.
...
In granting Coleman’s motion to transfer, the trial court noted
that the phrase “who is detained” within OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) has
been interpreted by the Court of Appeals to mean that “the date of
detention is a specific point in time, rather than an ongoing
condition necessary for the running of the 180-day time limitation.”
Edwards, 323 Ga....
...at 866. Indeed, in Edwards, the Court of
Appeals determined that “nothing in the statute mandates that the
defendant continue to be detained for the entire 180-day period.” Id.
We respectfully disagree.
Turning to the language of OCGA §
17-7-50.1, the statute
entitles a child “who is detained” on criminal charges within the
jurisdiction of the superior court to have those criminal charges
presented to a grand jury within 180 days “of the date of detention.”
Id....
...Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of the statute,
and contrary to the Court of Appeals’ decision in Edwards, a child
must be detained in order for the 180-day time limitation to run.
Further supporting this conclusion is our prior interpretation
5
of OCGA §
17-7-50.1’s companion statute, OCGA §
17-7-50,3 which
addresses the same issue of ensuring timely indictment of confined
adults....
...State,
234 Ga. 512 (5) (216 SE2d 812)
(1975), overruled on other grounds by Hutchins v. State,
284 Ga. 395
(667 SE2d 589) (2008).
Reading the statute in its most natural and reasonable way,
we conclude that the 180-day time limitation in OCGA §
17-7-50.1
does not apply to a juvenile who is released and remains on bond
prior to the running of 180 days....
...Based on the foregoing, we overrule
Edwards, and further conclude that the trial court erred in
transferring Coleman’s case to the juvenile court.
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Peterson, J.,
not participating.
DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2019.
OCGA §
17-7-50.1; transfer order....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 2013 | 738 S.E.2d 86, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 180
...More than seven months later, on May 26, 2011, Johnson was indicted for murder in the Superior Court of Whitfield County.
In November 2011, Johnson filed a motion asking the superior court to transfer his case to the juvenile court pursuant to OCGA §
17-7-50.1, which says in relevant part:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided in Code Section
15-11-28 or 15-11-30.2, who is detained shall within 180 days of the date of dete...
...roceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title 15.
Johnson claimed that both his time in the youth detention center and on bond under the home confinement and electronic monitoring program constituted “detention” within the meaning of OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a). And because he was not indicted within 180 days of being so detained, Johnson argued, he was entitled to have his indictment dismissed and his case transferred to the juvenile court under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b)....
...On June 28, 2012, the trial court issued an order denying Johnson’s motion to dismiss the indictment but granting his motion to transfer the case to the juvenile court, ruling that the home confinement and electronic-monitoring program qualified as detention under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a).
The State then filed this direct appeal. At the Court’s request, the parties briefed the question of whether the State was authorized to appeal the trial court’s transfer order. We now hold that the State cannot appeal a transfer order entered under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b), and we therefore must dismiss this appeal.1
“The State does not have the right to appeal decisions in criminal cases unless there is a specific statutory provision granting the right.” State v. Caffee,
291 Ga. 31, 33 (728 SE2d 121) (2012). The types of trial *411court rulings that the State may appeal are listed in OCGA §
5-7-1 (a) . When the General Assembly enacted OCGA §
17-7-50.1 in 2006, see Ga. Laws 2006, p. 172, § 2, it did not amend or reference OCGA §
5-7-1 to specifically authorize the State to appeal transfer orders entered pursuant to OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b). The State contends, however, that an order transferring a case from superior court to juvenile court under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) amounts to “an order... setting aside or dismissing an[ ] indictment,” which the State may appeal under OCGA §
5-7-1 (a) (1). We disagree.
To begin with, OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) does not speak of “setting aside,” “dismissing,” or taking any other action regarding an indictment returned against a juvenile....
...ourt after indictment and “after investigation and for extraordinary cause.” Ga. Laws 1994atp. 1034;thenOCGA §
15-11-5 (b) (2) (B); now OCGA §
15-11-28 (b) (2) (B).2
In the same 1994 act, and in distinct contrast to the 2006 act creating OCGA §
17-7-50.1, the General Assembly amended OCGA §
5-7-1 to authorize the State to appeal this type of transfer order....
...fer order to be equivalent to an order dismissing or setting aside an indictment under OCGA §
5-7-1 (a) (1) but instead meant to extend the State’s appeal rights to such transfer orders.
Whether entered under OCGA §
15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) or OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b), a transfer order has the same effect: it transfers the juvenile’s entire case from the superior court to the juvenile court. There is no reason to believe that a transfer order entered under OCGA §
15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) is not an order dismissing an indictment but a transfer order entered under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) is....
... Walker v. State,
290 Ga. 696, 698 (723 SE2d 894) (2012).
OCGA §§
15-11-28 (b) (2) (B) and
5-7-1 (a) (6) demonstrate the General Assembly knows how to make transfer orders appealable by the State, yet despite referencing OCGA §
15-11-28 in OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), the legislature did not similarly authorize the State to appeal transfer orders entered under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b)....
...Evra, for appellee.
Having determined that the State was not authorized to bring this appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider its merits and therefore express no opinion as to the trial court’s transfer order.
Appeal dismissed.
All the Justices concur.
By contrast, a juvenile defendant may appeal an OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) order under some circumstances....
CopyCited 5 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 4, 2024 | 319 Ga. 665
...On November 21, 2023, at the
request of the State, the superior court issued an order of nolle
prosequi on the initial July 2023 indictment.
On December 1, 2023, Harris filed a motion to transfer his case
to the juvenile court pursuant to OCGA §
17-7-50.1, arguing that,
because he had been consistently detained since the date of his
arrest, the State was required to indict him within 180 days, and
because the November 2023 reindictment was returned outside that
180-day time period, the superior court no longer had jurisdiction
over his case....
...On appeal, the State argues that the superior court erred in
transferring this case to juvenile court because the grand jury
returned a true bill of indictment against Harris within 180 days of
his arrest and detention in accordance with OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a),
and a transfer is only required where that deadline passes without
a true bill being returned. See OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) (“If the grand
jury does not return a true bill against the detained child within the
time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the
detained child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court[.]”).
The State further argues that the subsequent reindictment of Harris
is immaterial to OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b), which does not purport to
alter the rules of reindictment. For these reasons, the State contends
that the superior court was not authorized by OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) to
3
transfer this case to the juvenile court, and its order doing so must
be reversed....
...When
we construe such statutory authority on appeal, our
review is de novo.
State v. Coleman,
306 Ga. 529, 530 (832 SE2d 389) (2019) (citations
and punctuation omitted). With these principles in mind, we turn to
the statutory text in question, OCGA §
17-7-50.1. See id.
In pertinent part, OCGA §
17-7-50.1 provides:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is
within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided
in Code Section
15-11-560 or
15-11-561, who is detained
shall within 180 days of the date of...
... against the detained child within the time limitations set
forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the detained
child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court and
shall proceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title
15.
OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), (b).
In granting Harris’s motion to transfer, the superior court
focused on the term “the charge” found in OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a)
(“Any child ....
...requires that ‘the charge’ be presented to the grand jury prior to the
180 day mark”; and (3) “while [Harris was] indicted twice for the
5
same incident, [he] was not indicted with the same charges prior to
the 180 day mark.” See OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a)....
...that an out-
of-time reindictment represents “the state’s failure to obtain the
timely return of a true bill,” which “requires that the case then be
transferred back to juvenile court.” Armendariz,
316 Ga. App. at 396
(1) (citing OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b)). But that holding is incorrect, is
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, and therefore is
overruled. See OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), (b).
As we explained in Coleman, the text of this statute is clear:
[OCGA §
17-7-50.1] entitles a child “who is detained”
on criminal charges within the jurisdiction of the superior
court to have those criminal charges presented to a grand
jury within 180 days “of the date of detention.” Id....
...at (a).
If the grand jury does not return a true bill “against the
detained child” within 180 days, then the superior court
must transfer “the detained child’s case” to juvenile
court.
Coleman,
306 Ga. at 531 (citing OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), (b)).
Reading this language “in its most natural and reasonable
way,” Coleman, 306 Ga....
...at 530, subsection (a) requires that, where
a child defendant is detained on a criminal charge or charges within
the superior court’s jurisdiction, the State must present that
7
“charge” or charges to the grand jury “within 180 days of the date of
detention.” OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a). And subsection (b) requires a
grand jury to return “a true bill” of indictment against a “detained
child” within 180 days. OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) (emphasis supplied).
See also OCGA §
15-12-74 (b) (addressing the procedure to be
followed when “a true bill is returned by the grand jury on any count
of an indictment”)....
...at 530, this
statute provides that, if a grand jury returns a true bill of indictment
against a “detained child” within 180 days of the date of the child’s
detention, that true bill is timely, and the case may proceed in the
superior court. OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), (b)....
...If, however, “the grand
jury does not return a true bill against the detained child within [180
8
days of the date of detention]” and the superior court did not
otherwise grant an extension as authorized by OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a),
the true bill is not timely, and “the detained child’s case shall be
transferred to the juvenile court[.]” OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b).
Moreover, the statute does not address reindictments at all, let
alone prohibit the return of a true bill on a subsequent indictment
outside the 180-day timeframe specified in OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a).
Under Georgia law, the State is generally authorized to reindict a
defendant at any time prior to trial, which could include modifying
the charges in the initial indictment or adding additional charges to
the indictment, unless...
...396, 396-397 (1) (614
SE2d 79) (2005) (explaining that a superseding charging instrument
can be returned by a grand jury against a defendant as long as
9
jeopardy did not attach to the first indictment). Thus, while OCGA
§
17-7-50.1 explicitly requires a grand jury to return a true bill of
indictment against a detained child within 180 days of his or her
detention, the statute does not by its clear terms prohibit a
reindictment of that same defendant outside the...
...ires
the case to be transferred to juvenile court. See id.
In this case, Harris was arrested and detained on April 30,
2023, and the grand jury returned a true bill against him on July
28, 2023 — within 180 days of his detention. See OCGA §
17-7-50.1
(a)....
...by the grand jury on November 16, 2023, included charges over
which the superior court retained its exclusive jurisdiction under
OCGA §
15-11-560 (b) (1). Accordingly, given that the true bill of the
July 2023 indictment against Harris was timely returned under
OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), we conclude that OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b) did not
authorize the superior court to transfer this case to juvenile court,
and that order must be reversed.
10
Judgment reversed....
CopyCited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 21, 2016 | 794 S.E.2d 49
Blackwell, Justice.
This case concerns the meaning of OCGA §
17-7-50.1, subsections (a) and (b)1 of which provide as follows:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court, as provided in Code Section
15-11-560 or
15-11-561, who is detained shall within 180...
..., and Baxter and the State filed the waiver with the superior court.2 In October 2014, however, Baxter filed a motion to transfer his case to juvenile court, asserting that his case had not been timely presented to the grand jury as required by OCGA §
17-7-50.1 and that his waiver was ineffective....
...diction upon a court that otherwise is without it. See
333 Ga. App. at 851-853. We issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and we now reverse.
In our view, the Court of Appeals went astray when it understood OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) to absolutely require presentation to the grand jury within 180 days of detention (unless the time is extended by the superior court for good cause). As we have explained before, when we consider the meaning of a statute, “we presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Jackson v. Sanders,
299 Ga. 332, 334 (788 SE2d 387) (2016). Here, OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) does not say that a charge “shall be presented” within 180 days....
...See Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 649 (10th ed. 2014) (“entitle” means “[t]o grant a legal right to”). But personal legal rights (even those guaranteed by the Constitution) generally can be relinquished. Even assuming that the right to prompt presentation under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) is a right that can only be lost by way of an affirmative and intentional waiver (as opposed to a forfeiture), see, e.g., Hill v. State,
290 Ga. 493, 494-495 (2) (722 SE2d 708) (2012), there was an express waiver here.
That OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a) permits the superior court to extend the time for presentation only once and for not more than 90 days does not alter our view of the statute....
..., see OCGA §
15-11-560 (b) (7), and it is divested of that jurisdiction (and must transfer the case to juvenile court) only “[i]f the grand jury does not return a true bill against the detained child within the time limitations set forth in [OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a)].” OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (b)....
...unning, the child may agree to stop it.
Decided November 21, 2016.
Tom Durden, District Attorney, Sandra Dutton, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Cheryl C. Quick, Catherine G. DeRoth, for appellee.
The Court of Appeals misunderstood OCGA §
17-7-50.1 when it concluded that the statute does not permit a detained child to waive presentation within 180 days of the date of detention....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 8, 2025 | 321 Ga. 349
...with murder.
Shortly before trial, Appellant filed a plea in bar.2 Appellant
argued that the superior court lacked jurisdiction over the
superseding indictment because that indictment had not been
returned within the 180-day period prescribed by OCGA §
17-7-50.1,
2 As noted below, we need not decide whether the plea in bar was timely.
2
which provides in relevant part:
(a) Any child who is charged with a crime that is
within the jurisdiction of the superior court ....
...against the detained child within the time limitations set
forth in subsection (a) of this Code section, the detained
child’s case shall be transferred to the juvenile court and
shall proceed thereafter as provided in Chapter 11 of Title
15.
OCGA §
17-7-50.1 (a), (b)....
...ineffective for failing to timely file the plea in bar. The superior court
rejected both claims. As to Appellant’s challenge to the court’s denial
of his plea in bar, the court concluded that, under the plain language
3
of OCGA §
17-7-50.1, the court had jurisdiction over Appellant’s case
because the original indictment charging Appellant with murder
was filed within the time limitation imposed by OCGA §
17-7-50.1,
and it was irrelevant that the case was reindicted after the 180-day
period....
...Appellant’s plea in bar on the merits rather than rejecting it as
untimely.
2. On appeal, Appellant argues again that the superior court
erred in denying his plea in bar because he was reindicted more than
180 days after his arrest, in violation of OCGA §
17-7-50.1, and the
court therefore lacked jurisdiction over his superseding indictment.
This argument, however, is foreclosed by our decision in State v.
Harris,
319 Ga. 665 (906 SE2d 402) (2024), which issued the day
after Appellant filed his principal brief in this Court. In Harris, we
held, based on the plain language of OCGA §
17-7-50.1, that the
“statute only requires that a true bill be returned on at least one
4
charge that is within the jurisdiction of the superior court [within
180 days of the date of the child’s detention] for the court to retain
jurisdiction.” Harris, 319 Ga....
...We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial of
Appellant’s plea in bar.
3. Appellant also argues on appeal that trial counsel was
5
ineffective for failing to file the plea in bar challenging the court’s
jurisdiction under OCGA §
17-7-50.1 within ten days of his
arraignment or to seek an extension to file the plea in bar, in
accordance with OCGA §
17-7-110 (“All pretrial motions, including
demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the
date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the
court.”)....
