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O.C.G.A.Title 17Chapter 7

O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110 (2020)

Time for filing pretrial motions

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2020 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2020 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2020 session at the latest cited 1983–2026 244citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 244 opinions since 1983, 14 of them in the last five years.

All pretrial motions, including demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court.

History

Code 1981, § 17-7-110, enacted by Ga. L. 2003, p. 154, § 2.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. - This Code section formerly pertained to copy of indictment or accusation to be furnished. The former Code section was based on Laws 1833,

Cobb’s 1851 Digest, p. 834; Code 1863, §§ 4522, 4523; Code 1868, §§ 4541, 4542; Code 1873, §§ 4634, 4635; Code 1882, §§ 4634, 4635; Penal Code 1895, § 945; Penal Code 1910, § 970; Code 1933, § 27-1403; Ga. L. 1966, p. 430, § 3; Ga. L.

1983, p. 503, § 2 and was repealed by Ga. L. 1994, p. 1895, § 1, effective January 1, 1995.

Law reviews. - For note and comment, ‘‘Hope for the Best and Prepare for

the Worst: The Capital Defender’s Guide to Reciprocal Discovery in the Sentencing Phase of Georgia Death Penalty Trials,’’ see 23 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 995 (2007).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Construction of ten day period. - While there may be a constitutional or other right to make a certain motion after the time period set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110, that does not mean ruling that a motion filed within the time period set forth in § 17-7-110 is untimely; under the plain language of the statute, any pretrial motion will be considered timely if made before ten days after the date of the arraignment, and some motions may be cognizable after that time, but determining the timeliness of such must rest upon other authority. State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 727 S.E.2d 670 (2012). O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110 provides that all pretrial motions, including demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court. The failure to file a timely special demurrer seeking additional information constitutes a waiver of the right to be tried on a perfect indictment. Strickland v. State, 349 Ga. App. 673, 824 S.E.2d 555 (2019). Motion untimely and no extension sought. - Trial court did not err in refusing to consider the defendant’s motion to suppress because the motion was untimely, the defendant failed to hire private counsel as was indicated and, even after court-appointed counsel was provided, the defendant failed to seek leave to file a motion for an extension after the ten day filing period. Taylor v. State, 326 Ga. App. 27, 755 S.E.2d 839 (2014). Trial court did not err in refusing to hear the defendant’s motion to suppress on the ground that the motion was untimely because the defendant failed to move for and obtain an extension of time; the defendant’s proffered amendment of the motion to suppress, which was tendered more than one month after the defendant waived arraignment, was untimely; and, although the defendant had the benefit of testimony from the state’s

witnesses regarding the issues in the case at the probation revocation hearing in July 2010, the defendant failed to take timely advantage of the opportunity to challenge the traffic stop. Gonzalez v. State, 334 Ga. App. 706, 780 S.E.2d 383 (2015). Failure to file motion to suppress to challenge evidence. - Because the defendant did not file a timely motion to suppress any physical evidence in the case, the defendant waived any right to claim that the underlying search which produced the physical evidence was unconstitutional; thus, the defendant was not entitled to exclusion of testimony describing the physical evidence on the basis that the testimony was the fruit of an unconstitutional search. Riley v. State, No. A20A1376, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 431 ( July 21, 2020). Motion to quash indictment properly denied. - Defendant’s motion to quash an indictment and a subsequent motion to quash a failure to register as a sex offender count under former O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 were properly denied as whether the rule on the timing of a motion to quash had been changed by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110 was not reached because the trial court also properly denied the motion on the merits; the defendant waived the right to challenge the form of the failure to register count of the indictment because the defendant’s motion was not made before entry of a not guilty plea and even if § 17-7-110 applied to the filing of the defendant’s motion, it was untimely under that statute. Bryson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (2006). Motion to quash indictment should have been granted. - Trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to quash an indictment because the motion was filed before the statutory deadline contained in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110; no arraignment occurred when the defendant

filed the motion. State v. Dempsey, 290 Ga. 763, 727 S.E.2d 670 (2012). Oral motion to dismiss indictment properly denied. - Trial court properly denied the defendant’s oral motion in arrest of judgment or motion to dismiss or general demurrer, made after the jury was sworn but before the trial began, as while the nolle pros of the coindictee could have been drawn more explicitly, considering it in context and in light of a subsequent indictment, which only contained one count against the coindictee, there was no intent shown that the charges against defendant required reindictment. Atkins v. State, 291 Ga. App. 863, 663 S.E.2d 286 (2008). State waived claim that motion was untimely. - State waived the state’s claim that the defendant’s motion to suppress, filed two months after arraignment, was untimely as the state failed to raise the issue or object to the motion on that basis before the trial court; moreover, the state’s failure to object was particularly significant in light of the express provision in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110 allowing the trial court to extend the time for filing. Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. App. 105, 650 S.E.2d 767 (2007). Untimely pretrial motions properly denied. - Trial court did not abuse the court’s discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to file untimely pre-trial motions because it was within the court’s discretion to refuse to consider the motion since the defendant failed to use reasonable diligence to obtain counsel prior to the arraignment. Preston v. State, 327 Ga. App. 556, 760 S.E.2d 176 (2014). Special demurrers to indictment. - Defendant’s special demurrers to an indictment charging the defendant with 24 counts of sexual exploitation of children were improperly dismissed as untimely under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110 because the plain language of a 2003 amendment allowed special demurrers to be filed within ten days of arraignment as the defendant had done; the court of appeals improperly interpreted case law decided after the statute’s effective date as the defendants in those cases had been convicted and arraigned prior to the effective date of the statute. Palmer v. State, 282 Ga. 466, 651 S.E.2d 86 (2007).

Accusation was not fatally defective because the accusation informed the defendants of the charges against the defendants and protected the defendants against another prosecution for the same offense, and the defendants could not admit that the defendants passed in an area defined by markings as a no-passing zone without being guilty of the crime charged. Moreover, to the extent that the defendants’ attack on the accusation could be read as a special demurrer, seeking greater specificity, the attack was waived by the defendants’ failure to raise the issue within ten days after the defendants pled to the accusation. Haynes-Turner v. State, 289 Ga. App. 652, 658 S.E.2d 203 (2008). Because the defendant argued that the accusation charging the defendant with two traffic violations failed to charge any offense, the trial court did not err in considering the defendant’s demurrer on the merits even though the defendant’s motion was filed more than ten days after the defendant waived arraignment. State v. Shabazz, 291 Ga. App. 751, 662 S.E.2d 828 (2008). Defendants’ contention that a felony murder indictment was deficient because the indictment did not contain all the essential elements of the underlying crime of aggravated assault was, in essence, a special demurrer seeking greater specificity with regard to the predicate felony. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110, the defendant’s failure to file a timely special demurrer seeking additional information constituted a waiver of the right to be tried on a perfect indictment. Dasher v. State, 285 Ga. 308, 676 S.E.2d 181 (2009). With regard to a defendant’s conviction for rape of a minor relative, the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground that the indictments were fatally flawed because the indictments did not specifically allege the required element of force in charging rape because by alleging ‘‘unlawful’’ carnal knowledge during 1992 to 1995, the indictment asserted a charge of forcible rape under the law in effect prior to the 1996 amendment, therefore, the indictment did establish cognizable charges. Additionally, the defendant filed

no special demurrers as to the form of the indictment and, thus, waived any argument in that regard. Flournoy v. State, 299 Ga. App. 377, 682 S.E.2d 632 (2009). Because the defendant did not file a timely special demurrer to the indictment or a timely motion in arrest of judgment, the defendant waived any claim that could have been raised via special or general demurrer. Kirt v. State, 309 Ga. App. 227, 709 S.E.2d 840 (2011). Because the defendant did not file a special demurrer, the defendant waived the right to a special indictment. Bryant v. State, 320 Ga. App. 838, 740 S.E.2d 772 (2013). No ground exists for dismissing an appeal based on a special demurrer, or for that matter any motion, if the motion was not timely filed in the trial court. Kimbrough v. State, 336 Ga. App. 381, 785 S.E.2d 54 (2016). Indictment sufficiently alleged possession of a weapon during the commission of certain crimes, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106, by alleging that the defendant had a handgun during the commission of the crime of aggravated assault; if the defendant sought to know to which of the two aggravated assault counts was referred to, the defendant’s motion was a special demurrer and was untimely under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110. Allen v. State, 300 Ga. 500, 796 S.E.2d 708 (2017). To the extent that the defendant argued that an indictment should have been more specific as to the timing in which the offenses were committed, such argument amounted to a special demurrer and because the defendant failed to file a special demurrer, the defendant waived the right to perfect the indictment. Miller v. State, 305 Ga. 276, 824 S.E.2d 342 (2019). Failure to file timely special demurrer. - Defendant’s motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment challenging the wording of the indictment charging the defendant with aggravated assault, O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), (3), were properly denied because the defendant could not have admitted the allegations of the indictment without admitting that the defendant was guilty of a crime and, under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110, having failed to file a timely special demurrer, the defendant

waived the right to a perfect indictment. McDaniel v. State, 298 Ga. App. 558, 680 S.E.2d 593 (2009). Failure to file special demurrer to indictment waived later challenge. - In a prosecution for felony murder and multiple armed robberies, as the defendant did not file a special demurrer seeking greater specificity with regard to the predicate felony, i.e., the name of the armed robbery victim, to the extent the defendant’s merger argument alleged insufficiency of the indictment due to the state’s failure to specify which armed robbery count was the underlying offense for the felony murder charge, it was waived. Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240, 675 S.E.2d 28 (2009). Defendant waived the defendant’s right to be tried under a perfect indictment because the defendant did not file a special demurrer within ten days after the arraignment as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110. Additionally, to the extent the defendant’s motion was one in arrest of judgment, the motion was untimely because the motion was not filed in the same term of court as the judgment as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-9-61. Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 889, 692 S.E.2d 379 (2010), overruled on other grounds, State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011). Because the defendant failed to raise a challenge to the indictment in a timely written special demurrer, the challenge was waived. State v. Wilson, 318 Ga. App. 88, 732 S.E.2d 330 (2012). Trial court did not err by finding that the defendant waived the defendant’s right to challenge the indictment charging the defendant with reckless driving because the defendant failed to timely file a written special demurrer. Lauderback v. State, 320 Ga. App. 649, 740 S.E.2d 377 (2013). Seven year delay in challenging indictment based on grand jury composition. - Appellants waived the appellants’ challenge to the indictment based on the composition of the grand jury because an elected official served on the grand jury that returned the indictment since the appellants failed to challenge the indictment on the ground that the grand jury was illegally constituted until

the appellants filed amended motions for new trial more than seven years after the statutory deadline for such a claim. Bighams v. State, 296 Ga. 267, 765 S.E.2d 917 (2014). Demand remained effective when matter transferred to another court. - Statutory demand for a speedy trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110 was effective when the demand was first filed in a court that was later abolished as that court was a constitutional court with jury jurisdiction and two terms of court; the defendant’s demand remained effective following the transfer of the criminal matter to another court. State v. Reid, 298 Ga. App. 235, 679 S.E.2d 802 (2009). Counsel’s failure to file timely demurrer not ineffective assistance because demurrer was meritless. - Criminal attempt to possess cocaine was properly used as the underlying felony for a felony murder conviction because the defendant’s plan to rob a cocaine dealer was the proximate cause of the victim’s death, and the plan to rob an individual dealing in illegal drugs carried with it a

foreseeable risk of danger and death; therefore, counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a demurrer to the indictment within the time provided in O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110. Funck v. State, 296 Ga. 371, 768 S.E.2d 468 (2015). Section did not apply. - Motion for discharge and acquittal based on the constitutional speedy trial right, and a renewal of that motion, were timely filed by the defendant when both motions were filed prior to the time of trial; the time limitations under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110 were not applicable. State v. Reid, 298 Ga. App. 235, 679 S.E.2d 802 (2009). Cited in Dingler v. State, 281 Ga. App. 721, 637 S.E.2d 120 (2006); Langlands v. State, 282 Ga. 103, 646 S.E.2d 253 (2007); Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 651 S.E.2d 689 (2007); Boatright v. State, 308 Ga. App. 266, 707 S.E.2d 158 (2011); State v. Mojica, 316 Ga. App. 619, 730 S.E.2d 94 (2012); Brown v. State, 322 Ga. App. 446, 745 S.E.2d 699 (2013); Smith v. State, 338 Ga. App. 635, 791 S.E.2d 418 (2016); Bullard v. State, 307 Ga. 482, 837 S.E.2d 348 (2019).

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENAllison v. State, 353 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 1987).
cites § 17-7-110 28×cited by 123 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“OCGA § 17-7-110 provides that on demand a criminal defendant must be furnished with "a list of the witnesses on whose testimony *854 the charge against him is founded," and prohibits the prosecution from calling witnesses whose names do not appear on the list furnished to the…”
The case’s holding
An expert may not testify to the existence of a fact unless the necessary inference is beyond the ken of the jurors due to a lack of specialized knowledge.
Later courts cite it for
“an expert may not testify as to her opinion as to the existence vel non of a fact (in this case, whether the child had been abused sexually) unless the inference to be drawn from facts in evidence is beyond the ken of the jurors - that is, unless the jurors, for want of specialized knowledge, skill, or experience, are incapable of drawing - from facts in evidence - such an inference for themselves.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENPalmer v. State, 651 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. 2007).
cites § 17-7-110 18×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“In 2003, the General Assembly enacted the statute presently codified at OCGA § 17-7-110, 1 thereby changing the judicially established deadline for the filing of special demurrers from arraignment to ten days after arraignment.”
The case’s holding
All pretrial motions, including demurrers and special pleas, must be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment unless the court extends the time for filing.
Later courts cite it for
“all pretrial motions, including demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Dempsey, 727 S.E.2d 670 (Ga. 2012).
cites § 17-7-110 22×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“OCGA § 17-7-110 reads in toto: “All pretrial motions, including demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court.” It is uncontroverted that no arraignment had occurred when Dempsey…”
The case’s holding
Statutory deadlines for pretrial motions apply to challenges regarding grand jury composition, requiring such motions to be filed within ten days after arraignment.
Later courts cite it for
“in enacting ocga 17-7-110, the general assembly . . . created a new rule that seeks a more uniform deadline for the filing of pretrial motions in criminal cases.” · 1 citing court
4
GREENAllen v. State, 796 S.E.2d 708 (Ga. 2017).
cites § 17-7-110 6×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“*503 To the extent that Appellant was demanding to know to which of the two aggravated assault counts alleging use of a firearm Count 14 and Count 15 were referring, or the name of the victim of the predicate aggravated assault, then his motion was a special demurrer, and…”
Later courts cite it for
“the true test of the sufficiency of an indictment that will withstand a general demurrer is as follows: if all the facts which the indictment charges can be admitted, and still the accused be innocent, the indictment is bad; but if, taking the facts alleged as premises, the guilt of the accused follows as a legal conclusion, the indictment is good.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENBighams v. State, 765 S.E.2d 917 (Ga. 2014).
cites § 17-7-110 8×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“See OCGA § 17-7-110 (“All pretrial motions, including demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court.”
The case’s holding
Challenges to the composition of a grand jury must be brought within ten days of arraignment or the claim is waived.
Later courts cite it for
“to be cognizable, most attacks on an indictment, including a challenge to the composition of the grand jury that returned it, must be brought within ten days of arraignment, unless the trial court extends that deadline.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENBullard v. State, 837 S.E.2d 348 (Ga. 2019).
cites § 17-7-110 4×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“”5 Contending that “those technical defects are fatal to those 4 The special demurrer was filed on December 10, 2013, which was 20 days after Bullard waived formal arraignment and pled not guilty on November 20, 2013.”
The case’s holding
An indictment is sufficient to withstand a special demurrer if it provides enough detail to allow a defendant to prepare a defense intelligently.
Later courts cite it for
“allow a defendant to prepare his defense intelligently.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENWhite v. State, 317 S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 1984).
cites § 17-7-110 6×cited by 103 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“In his third enumeration of error the appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing, over his objection, three witnesses to testify whose names were not on the witness lists provided to him pursuant to his demand under OCGA § 17-7-110. The state acknowledges that…”
The case’s holding
Circumstantial evidence must exclude only reasonable inferences and hypotheses and need not be devoid of every hypothesis except that of guilt.
Later courts cite it for
“although the appellant is entitled to a thorough and sifting cross-examination of a witness, the scope of such cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. cits.” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENHayes v. State, 405 S.E.2d 660 (Ga. 1991).
cites § 17-7-110 8×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“OCGA § 17-7-110. According to Turner, Mr.”
The case’s holding
A trial court is not required to instruct a jury on involuntary manslaughter if the evidence does not support the charge, even if it is the defendant's sole defense.
Later courts cite it for
“a charge on involuntary manslaughter is not warranted even if it is the sole defense if the evidence does not support the charge.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENBerry v. State, 490 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. 1997).
cites § 17-7-110 8×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“The trial court denied the motion and allowed the defense two hours and fifteen minutes to interview the witness. Cal testified that he was in the area and that he ran to the scene after shots were fired, but that he did not witness the shooting.”
The case’s holding
Peremptory strikes are constitutional if the prosecution provides reasons that are gender-neutral, reasonably specific, and related to the case.
Later courts cite it for
“on a basis which was 'gender-neutral, reasonably specific, and related to the case.” · 1 citing court
10
REDAllison v. State, 346 S.E.2d 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
cites § 17-7-110 12×cited by 18 cases
Reversed by Allison v. State (1987): the Supreme Court of Georgia's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“He contends that the testimony was improper rebuttal testimony, and that the State failed to supply him with the names of the witnesses pursuant to his timely demand under OCGA § 17-7-110. While we agree with appellant that out of a sense of fairness, the State could have…”
11
GREENFelker v. State, 314 S.E.2d 621 (Ga. 1984).
cites § 17-7-110 4×cited by 196 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“See OCGA § 17-7-110. (Code Ann. § 27-1403). On the list was the victim’s former name as well as her married name.”
The case’s holding
Evidence of prior criminal acts is admissible to prove identity through a distinctive modus operandi if the crimes are sufficiently similar and relevant to the issues at trial.
Later courts cite it for
“not the only factor, nor is it necessarily the controlling factor. 'the ultimate issue in determining the admissibility of evidence of other crimes is not mere similarity but relevance to the issues in the trial of the case.' cits. depending upon the purpose for which the extrinsic offense is offered, 'the state may be required to prove a high degree of similarity between relevant characteristics of the extrinsic offenses and the charged crimes, or it may only have the burden of showing a logical connection between crimes which are essentially dissimilar. cits.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENBoone v. State, 549 S.E.2d 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 17-7-110 6×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“In support of this argument, Boone relies on OCGA § 17-7-110, which dealt with permitting witnesses not listed to testify.”
The case’s holding
A reversal is limited to convictions affected by an erroneous jury instruction, so other convictions unaffected by the faulty charge remain valid and are not disturbed on appeal.
13
GREENState v. Mojica, 730 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 17-7-110 12×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“(a) The state does not contest that Mojica’s original motion to suppress was timely filed, arguing instead that the trial court erred in considering Mojica’s second and third motions for reconsideration because they were filed outside the time period proscribed by OCGA §…”
Later courts cite it for
“all pretrial motions, including demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENBrown v. State, 759 S.E.2d 489 (Ga. 2014).
cites § 17-7-110 15×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“Challenging Grand Juror Bias Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-110, “[a]ll pretrial motions, including demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court.”
15
GREENBryson v. State, 638 S.E.2d 181 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 17-7-110 6×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“Bryson, however, contends that OCGA § 17-7-110, which became effective May 14, 2003, changed this rule.”
16
GREENPark v. State, 495 S.E.2d 886 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 17-7-110 10×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“In October 1996, Park demanded a list of the State’s witnesses pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-110. But OCGA § 17-7-110 had been repealed as of January 1, 1995 and replaced with the new criminal discovery statute, OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq.”
17
GREENTaylor v. State, 755 S.E.2d 839 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
cites § 17-7-110 4×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-110 and Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 31.”
Later courts cite it for
“when a defendant files an untimely pre-trial motion, the trial court may dismiss the motion or entertain a request by the defendant to accept the late filing.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENThompson v. State, 816 S.E.2d 646 (Ga. 2018).
cites § 17-7-110 2×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“The evidence presented at the motion for new trial hearing, however, belies Appellant's claim (even assuming that he did not forfeit it by failing to raise it in a timely plea in abatement, see OCGA § 17-7-110 ). At the hearing, a supervisor in the Fulton County Superior Court…”
The case’s holding
To establish plain error, an appellant must identify a clear, undisputed error that likely affected the outcome or the integrity of the judicial proceedings.
Later courts cite it for
“appellant claims that his convictions are void because the record does not show that his indictment was returned in open court.” · 7 citing courts
19
GREENBentley v. State, 438 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 17-7-110 8×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“] This constitutional provision overrides all legislative enactments upon the subject; and [OCGA § 17-7-110] must be construed with such constitutional provisions.”
20
GREENThompson v. State, 304 Ga. 146 (2018).
cites § 17-7-110 2×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 17-7-110
“The evidence presented at the motion for new trial hearing, however, belies Appellant’s claim (even assuming that he did not forfeit it by failing to raise it in a timely plea in abatement, see OCGA § 17-7-110). 6 At the hearing, a supervisor in the Fulton County Superior Court…”

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Citing cases by year
198320042026

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Ga. Ct. App.185Ga.56N.D. Ga.211th Cir.1
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