O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 19-11-170 (2019)

Requirements for modification; effect on jurisdiction

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) If Code Section 19-11-172 does not apply, upon petition a tribunal of Georgia may modify a child support order issued in another state which is registered in Georgia if, after notice and hearing, the tribunal finds that:

(1) The following requirements are met:

(A) Neither the child, nor the obligee who is an individual, nor the obligor resides in the issuing state;

(B) A petitioner who is a nonresident of Georgia seeks modification; and

(C) The respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of Georgia; or

(2) This state is the residence of the child or a party who is an individual, is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of Georgia, and all of the parties who are individuals have filed consents in a record in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

(b) Modification of a registered child support order is subject to the same requirements, procedures, and defenses that apply to the modification of an order issued by a tribunal of this state, and the order may be enforced and satisfied in the same manner.

(c) A tribunal in Georgia may not modify any aspect of a child support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state, including the duration of the obligation of support. If two or more tribunals have issued child support orders for the same obligor and same child, the order that controls and must be so recognized under the provisions of Code Section 19-11-116 establishes the aspects of the support order which are nonmodifiable.

(d) In a proceeding to modify a child support order, the law of the state that is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of the obligation of support. The obligor’s fulfillment of the duty of support established by that order precludes imposition of a further obligation of support by a tribunal of Georgia.

(e) On issuance of an order by a tribunal of Georgia modifying a child support order issued in another state, the tribunal of Georgia becomes the tribunal having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

(f) Notwithstanding subsections (a) through (e) of this Code section and subsection (b) of Code Section 19-11-110, a tribunal of Georgia retains jurisdiction to modify an order issued by a tribunal of Georgia if:

(1) One party resides in another state; and

(2) The other party resides outside the United States.

History

Code 1981, § 19-11-170, enacted by Ga.

L. 1997, p. 1613, § 33; Ga. L. 2013, p. 705, § 1/SB 193.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2016–2026 · leading case: Ross v. Ross, 805 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. 2017).
Ross v. Ross, 805 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. 2017). · cites it 4× “See OCGA § 19-11-170 (a) (1). See also 28 USC § 1738B (e) (2) (A).”
Tashika M. Robinson v. Darrell T. London, Jr. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 8× “Although Robinson contends that London has minimum contacts with Georgia to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court in this state, as stated above, a Georgia tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction under the UIFSA is limited to the conditions specified in OCGA §§…”
Sarah Serluco v. John Taggart (Ga. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 4× “al court’s order cites only to the UEFJL and OCGA § 19-6-15 (e) (“Child support guidelines”), and there is no indication that the trial court properly considered husband’s petition under the framework of the UIFSA or that it applied New Jersey law when it modified the 3 OCGA §…”
Ross v. Ross (Ga. 2017). · cites it 4× “8 See OCGA § 19-11-170 (a) (1). See also 28 USC § 1738B (e) (2) (A).”
Moye, L. v. Njie, B. (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016). “… Ga. Code Ann. § 19-11-170 . Clearly, at the time Georgia terminated Father’s support order, both Mother and the Child continued to reside in Pennsylvania.”
— 19-11-170(a) — 1 case
Tashika M. Robinson v. Darrell T. London, Jr. (Ga. Ct. App. 2026). “Although Robinson contends that London has minimum contacts with Georgia to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court in this state, as stated above, a Georgia tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction under the UIFSA is limited to the conditions specified in OCGA §§…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.