CopyCited 42 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 5, 2009 | 686 S.E.2d 635, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3148
...wledged before the court, has been given; provided, however, that acknowledgment before the court is not necessary where the parent or parents voluntarily surrender the child for adoption as provided by subsection (e) of Code Section
19-8-4,
19-8-5,
19-8-6, or
19-8-7;
(2) A decree has been entered by a court of competent jurisdiction of this or any other state ordering the parent, guardian, or other custodian to support the child, and the parent, guardian, or other custodian has wantonly and wi...
CopyCited 34 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 5, 1989 | 259 Ga. 650
...Johnnie Thorne is currently incarcerated in the Augusta Correctional Medical Institute, serving a fifteen-year sentence for his conviction of armed robbery. He and his former wife are the parents of a minor child. The former wife's new husband, appellee David Padgett, filed a petition to adopt the child pursuant to OCGA §
19-8-6 (b). Thorne received notice of the adoption petition, and filed objections to it. Relying on OCGA §
19-8-6 (b), the trial court granted Padgett's petition to adopt the child, finding that Thorne had failed significantly for a period of one year prior to the filing of the adoption petition to provide support for the child. The trial court further concluded that the adoption was in the best interests of the child. It is not disputed that Thorne is without any financial resources. OCGA §
19-8-6 (b) provides in pertinent part, Surrender or termination of parental rights, as provided in Code Section
19-8-3, shall not be required as a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for adoption....
...(2) to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial decree, where the court is of the opinion that the adoption is for the best interests of the child. In affirming the trial court, Thorne v. Padgett,
191 Ga. App. 814 (383 SE2d 160) (1989), the Court of Appeals held that under OCGA §
19-8-6 (b), "a simple finding of `significant failure' to support is sufficient." Id....
...The evidence showed that many of these letters were returned to Thorne or destroyed by his former wife before the child could see them. There was no evidence before the trial court that Thorne intended to abandon the child. The predecessor to OCGA §
19-8-6 (b), former Code Ann....
...We have held that even an unwed father who demonstrates a commitment to parenthood by participating in the life of his child "acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause" of his parental rights. In re Baby Girl Eason,
257 Ga. 292, 295 (358 SE2d 459) (1987). Yet, OCGA §
19-8-6 (b) permits a court to effectively sever the rights of a natural parent in his child where the trial court concludes that the natural parent has failed to provide financial support in the year preceding the filing of the adoption petition,...
...lain why he has failed to provide support. The statute permits the trial court to sever the parent's right in his child even in the face of overwhelming evidence that the parent had justifiable cause for not supporting the child. In this regard OCGA §
19-8-6 (b) circumvents the constitutional requirement that a natural parent's rights in his child may not be terminated absent a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, of his unfitness. OCGA §
19-8-6 (b) may be used to terminate the rights of any parent who fails to provide support, regardless of the reason....
...The statute does not distinguish between those cases where the failure to provide care and support is wilful, and those cases where the parent wishes to provide care and support for his child, but lacks the financial resources or ability to do so. Because OCGA §
19-8-6 (b) forecloses an inquiry into the reasons for a parent's failure to provide care *652 and support, thus depriving that parent of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, it denies due process of law....
...184 (6) (275 SE2d 23) (1981), relied on by the trial court, is distinguishable in that the constitutional attack presented by this case was not squarely before the court in Chandler. In fact, the opinion in Chandler indicates that there was a question as to whether the appellant in that case was attacking OCGA §
19-8-6 (a) or §
19-8-6 (b). Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., and Weltner, J., who dissent. WELTNER, Justice, dissenting. 1. The majority holds: Because OCGA §
19-8-6 (b) forecloses an inquiry into the reasons for a parent's failure to provide care and support, thus depriving that parent of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, it denies due process of law....
...opt children with a living parent who has failed to provide support may no longer do so. 6. This is because OCGA §
19-8-3 (a) provides the exclusive means of adopting a child with a living parent or guardian except as otherwise specified in OCGA §
19-8-6. "Except as otherwise specified in Code Section
19-8-6, no adoption of a child who has a living parent(s) or guardian(s) of his person shall be permitted except where ...." (a) OCGA §
19-8-6 (a) permits adoptions without surrender or termination of parental rights: where (1) a child has been abandoned by a parent, or (2) the parent of a child cannot be found after a diligent search has been made, or (3) the parent is insane or...
...(d) OCGA §
19-8-3 (a) (6) permits adoptions when "The child has been placed for adoption by a juvenile court or other court of competent jurisdiction, which court has terminated the parental rights of the parents." 7. Because the majority has stricken OCGA §
19-8-6 (b), there now is no means by which stepparents and relatives who seek to adopt a child with a living parent who has failed to support that child may do so....
CopyCited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 11, 2002 | 560 S.E.2d 1, 2002 Fulton County D. Rep. 417
...8).3 The second is if the “biological father” is not a “parent” for the purpose of OCGA §
19-8-1 (8) under the foregoing circumstances, may a stepfather to the child of the “biological father” adopt his spouse’s child pursuant to OCGA §
19-8-6 (a) (2)4 even if the child’s *766“biological father” is living....
...was born on February 26, 1992. Her biological mother and biological father were never married. C. N. W.’s biological mother married on February 1, 1997. On June 26, 2000, C. N. W.’s stepfather filed a Petition for Adoption by a Stepparent pursuant to OCGA §
19-8-6 in the Superior Court of Walton County....
...hat case was “known” or “unknown” for the purpose of then OCGA §
19-8-12, dealing with notice to the “biological father” and termination of his rights. In its discussion, the Cowdell court found “the absence of a paragraph (3) in OCGA §
19-8-6 (a) which would cover stepparent adoption by the spouse of a mother of a child whose father is biological only and not legal.” Cowdell v. Doe at 100. It further stated that “the legislature left a gap in the stepparent adoption section (OCGA §
19-8-6) by omitting to *767provide for adoption by the husband of the legal mother of a child whose biological but not legal father is living....
...fied in OCGA §
19-8-12 (b).” Cowdell v. Doe at 100. Pivotal to such determinations was the Court of Appeals’s apparent consideration of the “biological father” as a “parent” for the purpose of the surrender of parental rights under OCGA §
19-8-6 (a). But this was error for the Court failed to consider the statutory definition of “parent” found in OCGA §
19-8-1 (8), and thereby the proper construction of OCGA §
19-8-6 (a).
The statutory definitions found in OCGA §
19-8-1 govern Chapter 8 of Title 19, dealing with adoption....
...who has accomplished one of five acts. See footnote 2, supra. It does not make any reference to the “biological father.” This legislative distinction between the “biological father” and the “legal father” is echoed in other parts of OCGA §
19-8-6, see subsections (e) (2) & (i), as well as other portions of the adoption Code....
...ion (8) as the “legal father or the legal mother of the child.” There is no mention of the “biological father” of the child in the definition of “parent.”
The application of the provisions for the surrender of parental rights under OCGA §
19-8-6 must be determined by the legislative definition of “parent” even if the definition of that term is more narrowly drawn than the definition employed in certain case law or used in everyday parlance....
...And the legislative definition is plain in its requirement that a male have more than a biological connection with a child before he is considered to be a “parent” for purposes of the adoption statutes. In fact, OCGA §§
19-8-4 (i);
19-8-5 (i);
19-8-6 (i); and
19-8-7 (i),5 all dealing with the surrender of rights to a child, carry forth the clear differentiation between a “parent” and a “biological father who is not the legal father.”
Accordingly, a “biological father who is not...
...Baker, Attorney General, for appellee.
2. Inasmuch as the “biological father who is not the legal father” is not a “parent” within the meaning of OCGA §
19-8-1 (8), the stepfather to the child of the “biological father” may adopt his spouse’s child pursuant to OCGA §
19-8-6 (a) (2) even if the child’s “biological father” is living. This is so because the child then has only one “parent” still living, that is, the “legal mother” of the child, see OCGA §
19-8-1 (8), precisely the circumstances outlined in OCGA §
19-8-6 (a) (2)....
...(E) Has legitimated the child by a final order pursuant to Code Section
19-7-22, and who has not surrendered or had terminated his rights to the child.
OCGA §
19-8-1 (8) states: “ ‘Parent’ ” means either the legal father or the legal mother of the child.”
OCGA §
19-8-6 (a) provides:
Except as otherwise authorized in this chapter:
*766(1) A child whose legal father and legal mother are both living but are not still married to each other may be adopted by the spouse of either parent only when the other par...
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 11, 2002 | 274 Ga. 765
...A §
19-8-1(8). [3] The second is if the "biological father" is not a "parent" for the purpose of OCGA §
19-8-1(8) under the foregoing circumstances, may a stepfather to the child of the "biological father" adopt his spouse's child pursuant to OCGA §
19-8-6(a)(2) [4] *2 even if the child's "biological father" is living....
...was born on February 26, 1992. Her biological mother and biological father were never married. C.N.W.'s biological mother married on February 1, 1997. On June 26, 2000, C.N.W.'s stepfather filed a Petition for Adoption by a Stepparent pursuant to OCGA §
19-8-6 in the Superior Court of Walton County....
...tepfather in that case was "known" or "unknown" for the purpose of then OCGA §
19-8-12, dealing with notice to the "biological father" and termination of his rights. In its discussion, the Cowdell court found "the absence of a paragraph (3) in OCGA §
19-8-6(a) which would cover stepparent adoption by the spouse of a mother of a child whose father is biological only and not legal." Cowdell v. Doe at 100,
483 S.E.2d 347. It further stated that "the legislature left a gap in the stepparent adoption section (OCGA §
19-8-6) by omitting to provide for adoption by the husband of the legal mother of a child whose biological but not legal father is living....
...d in OCGA §
19-8-12(b)." Cowdell v. Doe at 100,
483 S.E.2d 347. Pivotal to such determinations was the Court of Appeals's apparent consideration of the "biological father" as a "parent" for the purpose of the surrender of parental rights under OCGA §
19-8-6(a). But this was error for the Court failed to consider the statutory definition of "parent" found in OCGA §
19-8-1(8), and thereby the proper construction of OCGA §
19-8-6(a)....
...as a "male" who has accomplished one of five acts. See footnote 2, supra. It does not make any reference to the "biological father." This legislative distinction between the "biological father" and the "legal father" is echoed in other parts of OCGA §
19-8-6, see subsections (e)(2) & (i), as well as other portions of the adoption Code....
...nd in subsection (8) as the "legal father or the legal mother of the child." There is no mention of the "biological father" of the child in the definition of "parent." The application of the provisions for the surrender of parental rights under OCGA §
19-8-6 must be determined by the legislative *3 definition of "parent" even if the definition of that term is more narrowly drawn than the definition employed in certain case law or used in everyday parlance....
...679, 682,
523 S.E.2d 571 (1999). And the legislative definition is plain in its requirement that a male have more than a biological connection with a child before he is considered to be a "parent" for purposes of the adoption statutes. In fact, OCGA §§
19-8-4(i);
19-8-5(i);
19-8-6(i); and
19-8-7(i), [5] all dealing with the surrender of rights to a child, carry forth the clear differentiation between a "parent" and a "biological father who is not the legal father." Accordingly, a "biological father who is not the legal...
...of OCGA §
19-8-1(8). 2. Inasmuch as the "biological father who is not the legal father" is not a "parent" within the meaning of OCGA §
19-8-1(8), the stepfather to the child of the "biological father" may adopt his spouse's child pursuant to OCGA §
19-8-6(a)(2) even if the child's "biological father" is living. This is so because the child then has only one "parent" still living, that is, the "legal mother" of the child, see OCGA §
19-8-1(8), precisely the circumstances outlined in OCGA §
19-8-6(a)(2)....
...ed the child by a final order pursuant to Code Section
19-7-22, and who has not surrendered or had terminated his rights to the child. [3] OCGA §
19-8-1(8) states: "`Parent'" means either the legal father or the legal mother of the child." [4] OCGA §
19-8-6(a) provides: Except as otherwise authorized in this chapter: (1) A child whose legal father and legal mother are both living but are not still married to each other may be adopted by the spouse of either parent only when the other parent vo...
