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O.C.G.A.Title 19Chapter 8

O.C.G.A. § 19-8-6 (2022)

Stepparent adoption

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2022 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest cited 1983–2026 73citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 73 opinions since 1983, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(1) (2 cases).

(a)(1) A child whose legal father and legal mother are both living but are not still married to each other may be adopted by the spouse of either parent only when the other parent voluntarily and in writing surrenders all of his or her rights to the child to that spouse for the purpose of enabling that spouse to adopt the child and the other parent consents to the adoption and, when there is any guardian of that child, each such guardian has voluntarily and in writing surrendered to such spouse all of his or her rights to the child for the purpose of such adoption.

(2) A child who has only one parent still living may be adopted by the spouse of that parent only if that parent consents to the adoption and, when there is any guardian of that child, each such guardian has voluntarily and in writing surrendered to such spouse all of his or her rights to the child for the purpose of such adoption.

(b) In the case of a child 14 years of age or older, the written consent of the child to his or her adoption shall be given and acknowledged in the presence of the court.

(c) The surrender of rights specified in this Code section shall be executed following the birth of the child under oath and in the presence of a notary public and an adult witness. A copy of the surrender shall be provided to the individual signing the surrender at the time of the execution thereof.

(d) An individual signing a surrender of rights pursuant to this Code section shall have the right to revoke such surrender within four days as provided in subsection (a) of Code Section 19-8-9.

(e)(1) The surrender of rights by a parent or guardian specified in subsection (a) of this Code section shall meet the requirements of subsection (e) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such surrender shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public and an adult witness.

(2) A biological father who is not a legal father of a child may surrender all his rights to the child for purposes of an adoption pursuant to this Code section. Such surrender shall meet the requirements of subsection (d) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such surrender shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public and an adult witness.

(f) A surrender of rights shall be acknowledged by the individual who surrenders those rights by also signing an acknowledgment meeting the requirements of subsection (g) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such acknowledgment shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public and an adult witness.

(g)(1) A legal mother who surrenders her parental rights or consents to the adoption of her child by her spouse pursuant to this Code section shall execute an affidavit meeting the requirements of subsection (h) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such affidavit shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public.

(2) A legal mother who is the adoptive mother of the child and who surrenders her parental rights pursuant to this Code section shall execute an affidavit meeting the requirements of subsection (i) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such affidavit shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public.

(h) Whenever rights are surrendered pursuant to this Code section, the representative of each petitioner or the representative of the individual signing such surrender shall execute an affidavit meeting the requirements of subsection (k) of Code Section 19-8-26. Such affidavit shall be signed under oath and in the presence of a notary public.

(i) A surrender of rights or consent pursuant to this Code section may be given by any parent or biological father who is not a legal father of the child regardless of whether such individual is a citizen of the United States, a resident of this state, or has reached the age of 18 years. Such surrender or consent given by such individual shall be binding upon him or her as if the individual were in all respects sui juris and shall include a consent to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any action filed under this article. Such surrender shall state that such individual agrees to be bound by a decree of adoption.

(j) The parental consent by the spouse of a stepparent seeking to adopt a child of that spouse and required by subsection (a) of this Code section shall meet the requirements of subsection (l) of Code Section

Annotations

The 2018 amendment, effective September 1, 2018, rewrote this Code section.

Law reviews. - For annual survey on law of domestic relations, see 42 Mercer L. Rev. 201 (1990).

For comment on adoptions by homosexuals, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 1415 (2004).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes. - In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former § 19-8-6, as last amended by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1182, § 5, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Constitutionality. - Grant of adoption pursuant to former § 19-8-6(b), prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Thorne v. Padgette, 259 Ga. 650, 386 S.E.2d 155 (1990), must be reversed because former subsection (b) foreclosed an inquiry into a parent's reasons for failure to support the child to be adopted, thus denying due process. Moore v. Butler, 195 Ga. App. 1, 392 S.E.2d 285 (1990) (decided under former § 19-8-6, as last amended by Ga. L. 1979, p. 1182, § 5).

Findings of fact and conclusions of law are mandatory. - Adoption decree terminating a father's parental rights failed to set forth mandatory findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-8-18(b), based on the criteria of O.C.G.A. § 19-8-10(b)(1) as to whether the father's failure to communicate with the child for two years occurred immediately prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, whether the father made a bona fide attempt to communicate with the child, whether the father's failure to communicate was without justifiable cause, and the basis for the opinion regarding the best interests of the child. Maynard v. Brown, 276 Ga. App. 229, 622 S.E.2d 901 (2005).

Trial court erred by terminating a biological father's parental rights and ordering step-father adoption because the court failed to set forth specific findings of fact to support the conclusion that the requisites of O.C.G.A. § 19-8-10(b) as to abandonment of the child had been met. Ray v. Hann, 323 Ga. App. 45, 746 S.E.2d 600 (2013).

Stepparent adoption. - Trial court erred by holding a biological father, who was not the legal father of the child, could not surrender all his rights to the child for purposes of adoption by the child's stepfather. In re C.N.W., 274 Ga. 765, 560 S.E.2d 1 (2002).

Because a father failed to communicate with the children or to pay the court-ordered support for more than one year, the father's consent to the adoption of the children by their stepparent, the mother's new husband, was not required. McCurry v. Harding, 270 Ga. App. 416, 606 S.E.2d 639 (2004).

Trial court did not abuse the court's broad discretion in finding the adoption of a child by a stepparent to be in the child's best interest and thereby terminating a biological parent's parental rights as the evidence established that the biological parent failed to see the child for over five years, never provided financial support for the child, and failed to communicate with the child with no justifiable cause for such failure shown. Johnson v. Taylor, 292 Ga. App. 354, 665 S.E.2d 49 (2008).

Denial of the stepmother's adoption petition and termination of the parental rights of the child's biological mother was upheld because the trial court acted within the court's discretion in finding that the termination of the biological mother's parental rights was not in the child's best interests as the biological mother had been sober for years, had recently attained a job, was a good mother to children in her care, and made efforts to communicate and develop a relationship with the child. Price v. Grehofsky, 349 Ga. App. 214, 825 S.E.2d 594 (2019).

Stepparent adoption reversed when natural parent without notice. - Trial court erred by granting a stepparent's petition to adopt an eight-year-old child and by terminating the parental rights of one of the child's natural parents as the trial court failed to make any finding in the court's adoption decree as to whether the natural parent's lack of communication with the child was without justifiable cause as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-8-18(b). Further, the trial court erred by basing the court's adoption decision, in part, on O.C.G.A. § 19-8-10(a)(4) as the stepparent's petition did not assert any claim pursuant to § 19-8-10(a) and, instead, relied exclusively on § 19-8-10(b); thus, the natural parent was not served with a petition making allegations under subsection (a) and, therefore, received no notification that the natural parent had to prepare to show cause why the natural parent's parental rights should not be terminated pursuant to subsection (a). Smallwood v. Davis, 292 Ga. App. 173, 664 S.E.2d 254 (2008).

Mother's affidavit containing knowingly false statements purporting to address the material issues of the natural father's lack of parental involvement does not substantially comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-6(g) and 19-8-26(h) so as to sustain a judgment terminating the father's parental rights based thereon. Coleman v. Grimes, 250 Ga. App. 880, 553 S.E.2d 185 (2001).

Although a mother failed to provide an affidavit as required by O.C.G.A. § 19-8-26(h) in an adoption petition by the new husband over the mother's three minor children, such was deemed immaterial and therefore harmless because the statutory requisites had been met because the mother alleged that the father did not live with the children, that he failed to pay the court-ordered support for them for more than a year, and the mother asserted that the father provided no financial assistance. McCurry v. Harding, 270 Ga. App. 416, 606 S.E.2d 639 (2004).

Cited in Moore v. Pope, 196 Ga. App. 475, 396 S.E.2d 243 (1990); Woodall v. Johnson, 348 Ga. App. 820, 823 S.E.2d 379 (2019).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR. - Rights of unwed father to obstruct adoption of his child by withholding consent, 61 A.L.R.5th 151.

Natural parent's indigence as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption - general principles, 82 A.L.R.5th 443.

Natural parent's indigence resulting from unemployment or underemployment as precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption, 83 A.L.R.5th 375.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 19-8-6 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENThorne v. Padgett, 386 S.E.2d 155 (Ga. 1989).
cites § 19-8-6 62×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“The former wife's new husband, appellee David Padgett, filed a petition to adopt the child pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-6 (b). Thorne received notice of the adoption petition, and filed objections to it.”
The case’s holding
A statute violates due process if it allows the termination of parental rights based on a failure to provide support without requiring an inquiry into the reasons for that failure.
2
GREENMcCurry v. Harding, 606 S.E.2d 639 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 19-8-6 16×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“He contends that the petition originated under the provisions of OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) (l), 1 because “the biological parents of the children were married, and then divorced, but are still living,” and thus, the mother was required to include an affidavit with the adoption petition…”
3
GREENGriffith v. Brooks, 389 S.E.2d 246 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 19-8-6 22×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“11 of this order shows a large portion was struck through by the trial court and appears in full with the judge’s initials set out beside each strike-through, as follows: “The natural father has failed to provide support within the terms of OCGA § 19-8-6 (b) (2) and the…”
4
GREENMaynard v. Brown, 622 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 19-8-6 10×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“, his ten-year-old stepson, pursuant to OCGA§ 19-8-6 (a) (1), which governs adoptions by a stepparent, 1 and OCGA § 19-8-10 (b) (1), which provides that Surrender of rights of a parent pursuant to subsection (a) of Code Section 19-8-6 .”
Later courts cite it for
“in all cases wherein code section 19-8-10 is relied upon by any petitioner as a basis for the termination of parental rights, the court shall include in the decree of adoption appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the applicability of code section 19-8-10.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENJones v. Sauls, 443 S.E.2d 693 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
cites § 19-8-6 10×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“” It is not enough that a substantial failure be shown to have existed for the requisite statutory period; unless it can also be shown that such failure was without justifiable cause, surrender of parental rights under OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) or § 19- *57 8-7 (a) would still be…”
6
GREENIn re C. N. W., 560 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2002).
cites § 19-8-6 22×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“3 The second is if the “biological father” is not a “parent” for the purpose of OCGA § 19-8-1 (8) under the foregoing circumstances, may a stepfather to the child of the “biological father” adopt his spouse’s child pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) (2) 4 even if the child’s *766…”
7
GREENSmith v. Soligon, 561 S.E.2d 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 19-8-6 4×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“Attached to Soligon’s petition was the mother’s affidavit regarding the biological father, pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-26, and the parental consent to stepparent adoption, under OCGA § 19-8-6. Five days after being served with the adoption petition, on November 6, 2000, Smith filed…”
The case’s holding
A biological father abandons his constitutionally protected opportunity interest to develop a relationship with a child by failing to make meaningful efforts to maintain that relationship.
Later courts cite it for
“must initially determine whether the father has abandoned his opportunity interest to develop a relationship with the child.” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENArrington v. Hand, 388 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
cites § 19-8-6 12×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“See OCGA § 19-8-6 (b). 1. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in failing to accept, as a matter of law, that they were the child’s paternal grandparents.”
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of a transcript, we must assume that the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence and that the trial court's actions taken during the hearing were appropriate.” · 1 citing court
9
GREENHooper v. Hedgepath, 796 S.E.2d 779 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 19-8-6 7×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“] Construing this statute according to its plain meaning, 8 a petitioner pursuing an adoption and consequent termination of parental rights under OCGA § 19-8-6 or § 19-8-7 may do so by proving the requirements outlined in either OCGA § 19-8-10 (a) or (b), as both of those…”
10
GREENRay v. Denton, 628 S.E.2d 180 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 19-8-6 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“, his five-year-old stepdaughter, based upon OCGA§ 19-8-6 (a) (1), governing adoptions by a stepparent, and OCGA § 19-8-10 (b), which provides: Surrender of rights of a parent pursuant to subsection (a) of Code Section 19-8-6 .”
Later courts cite it for
“each case must be decided on its own circumstances.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENCowdell v. Doe, 483 S.E.2d 347 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 19-8-6 14×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“He filed a petition for stepparent adoption pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) (1), but neither paragraph (1) nor paragraph (2) of subsection (a) fit the circumstances because the child does not have a “legal father and legal mother” and there is no contention or evidence that the…”
12
GREENSmallwood v. Davis, 664 S.E.2d 254 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 19-8-6 4×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) (1) provides that a child whose legal father and mother are living, but not married to each other, may be adopted by the spouse of either parent only when the other parent voluntarily surrenders his or her rights to the child.”
Later courts cite it for
“may appear in the pending adoption action and show cause why such parent's rights to the child sought to be adopted in that action should not be terminated by that adoption.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENWilliams v. Perry, 370 S.E.2d 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 19-8-6 6×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“Our Code, OCGA § 19-8-3, provides generally that, except as specified in OCGA § 19-8-6, no adoption of a child will be permitted who has a living parent or parents except where the parent or parents have voluntarily, and in writing, surrendered all of their rights to the child…”
14
GREENJohnson v. Taylor, 665 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 19-8-6 6×subsections: (a)(1) 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“'s biological father, pursuant to OCGA §§ 19-8-6 and 19-8-10. Johnson objected and sought to maintain his parental rights in his son.”
15
GREENColeman v. Grimes, 553 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
cites § 19-8-6 8×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“to be adopted by her stepfather, appellee William “Tommy” Grimes, pursuant to OCGA § 19-8-6 (1). While often steeped in emotional conflict, an appeal from an order of adoption is just as often fairly straightforward, because “in matters of adoption the superior court has a very…”
16
GREENIn re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1987).
cites § 19-8-6 2×cited by 83 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“Compare OCGA § 19-8-6 (a). If it is determined that the opportunity interest has not been abandoned then the court must determine whether Scharlach is a fit person for custody.”
The case’s holding
An unwed biological father possesses a constitutionally protected opportunity interest to develop a relationship with his child that begins at conception and endures unless he abandons that interest.
Later courts cite it for
“absent an abandonment of his interest, a state may not deny a biological father a reasonable opportunity to establish a relationship with the child.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENIn the Interest of C. D. B., 355 S.E.2d 759 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 19-8-6 8×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“As noted in Division 1, appellant's various constitutional attacks on OCGA § 19-8-6 (b) were not raised in the trial court.”
18
GREENWheeler v. Wheeler, 642 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 2007).
cites § 19-8-6 4×subsections: (a)(2) 2×cited by 8 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
19
GREENCain v. Lane, 309 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
cites § 19-8-6 10×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“See in this regard OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) (b) (formerly Code Ann.”
20
GREENSapp v. Solomon, 314 S.E.2d 878 (Ga. 1984).
cites § 19-8-6 4×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 19-8-6
“" OCGA § 19-8-6 (a) (Code Ann. § 74-405). The parental rights of a putative father may be terminated without notice where the putative father cannot be found and he "has not lived with the child, nor contributed to its support, nor made any attempt to legitimate the child, and .”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 10 cases in 1989. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga. Ct. App.65Ga.8
By subsection
(a)1 case
In re CNW, 560 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2002).
(a)(1)2 cases
Johnson v. Taylor, 665 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).“'s biological father, pursuant to OCGA §§ 19-8-6 and 19-8-10. Johnson objected and sought to maintain his parental rights in his son.”
Damien Brooks v. Tatum Eichfeld, 930 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. Ct. App. 2026).
(a)(2)2 cases
Wheeler v. Wheeler, 642 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 2007).
In re CNW, 560 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 2002).

Show all 73 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2022 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2022 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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