CopyCited 33 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 24, 2019 | 306 Ga. 252
...We vacate the trial court's denial of the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion at issue in this case, and we remand the case with direction to reconsider the motion under the proper standards.
LTC Consulting, L.P. and two affiliated entities sued law firm Wilkes & McHugh, *121P.A. and one of its attorneys for violations of OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j), deceptive trade practices, and false advertising after the defendants ran full-page advertisements in local newspapers targeting patients of nursing homes owned by the plaintiffs. The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or to Strike Pursuant to OCGA §§
9-11-11.1 and
9-11-12 (b) (6), arguing among other things that OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j), which was enacted in 2015, violates the First Amendment....
...is responsible for the content of this advertisement ."4
(b) The Trial Court Proceedings
On October 19, 2017, the owner of Powder Springs filed a Verified Complaint for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief against the defendants, alleging that the ads violated OCGA §
31-7-3.2 's recently enacted subsection (j), which imposes limitations on advertisements that use or reference the results of federal or state surveys or inspections of nursing homes....
...d Rockdale Healthcare in addition to the ad concerning Powder Springs. The plaintiffs alleged that 91% of nursing homes surveyed are found to have "deficiencies" and that the defendants did not include in the ads all the information required by OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j)....
...misleading advertisements concerning the Plaintiffs"; "the advertisements included as Exhibits A, B, and C to Plaintiffs' [First] Amended Complaint"; and "any advertisements concerning the Plaintiffs that do not fully comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. §
31-7-3.2 (j)." The expanded TRO was to remain in effect for 30 days or until November 10, 2017, when the court would hold a consolidated hearing on the plaintiffs' requests for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
On the day befo...
...Dismiss or to Strike Pursuant to OCGA §§
9-11-11.1 and
9-11-12 (b) (6), attaching as exhibits printouts from the Medicare.gov website concerning the surveys that the defendants cited in their ads. The defendants argued among other things that OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j) violates the First Amendment and, in any event, that the ads substantially complied with the statute....
...The defendants then filed a timely notice of appeal directed to the Court of Appeals.
(c) The Appeal
After briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals on August 27, 2018, properly transferred the case to this Court based on the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j), which **257the trial court implicitly rejected in denying the defendants' motion.6 On October 2, 2018, the plaintiffs *124filed a motion to return the case to the Court of Appeals, which this Court denied on October 22, 2018. The parties then filed supplemental briefs addressing certain First Amendment issues, but only as to OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j)....
...See Navellier , 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 709.
OCGA §
9-11-11.1 (c) (4) refers to "[a]ny other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public concern." The plaintiffs' claims that the defendants violated OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j), the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the false advertising statutes are all based on the defendants' running of ads in local newspapers informing the public of the defendants' availability to provide legal services related...
...The second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires a determination of whether the party or parties opposing the anti-SLAPP motion - here, the plaintiffs - have established that there is a probability that they will prevail on their claims that the defendants violated OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j), the UDTPA, and the false advertising statutes....
...itation and punctuation omitted)). Moreover, neither the trial court nor the parties have addressed certain important preliminary questions.
The first such question is whether the statutes cited in the complaint apply here at all. For example, OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j) appears in Article 1 of Chapter 7 of Title 31 of the Georgia Code, which establishes Georgia's regulatory framework for hospitals and related institutions, including nursing homes, which seems an unlikely place to find a statute regulating attorney advertising....
CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 4, 1990 | 260 Ga. 477
...This case involves the Georgia Open Records Act, OCGA §
50-18-70 et seq., as it relates to accreditation reports for the licensing of hospitals. To obtain an operating permit, hospitals may either submit to an inspection by the Department of Human Resources (DHR) or (under OCGA §
31-7-3 (b)) provide DHR with a report by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), a nonprofit Illinois corporation....
...of appellants that JCAHO is a peer review committee. Appellees respond that the reports in question are generated as part of the state's licensing activities rather than as peer review, arguing *478 that the reports are generated to comply with OCGA §
31-7-3 (b), which deals with licensing, rather than to comply with §
31-7-15, which deals with peer review. We agree. OCGA §
31-7-3 (b), enacted earlier than OCGA §
31-7-15, provides that the DHR may accept accreditation from JCAHO....
CopyPublished | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 24, 2019
...motion at issue in this case, and we remand the case with direction
to reconsider the motion under the proper standards.
LTC Consulting, L.P. and two affiliated entities sued law firm
Wilkes & McHugh, P.A. and one of its attorneys for violations of
OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j), deceptive trade practices, and false advertising
after the defendants ran full-page advertisements in local
newspapers targeting patients of nursing homes owned by the
plaintiffs. The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or to Strike
Pursuant to OCGA §§
9-11-11.1 and
9-11-12 (b) (6), arguing among
other things that OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j), which was enacted in 2015,
violates the First Amendment....
...Any advertisement
shall include the name, physical location and telephone number of each lawyer
or law firm who paid for the advertisement and who takes full personal
responsibility for the advertisement. . . .”).
defendants, alleging that the ads violated OCGA §
31-7-3.2’s
recently enacted subsection (j), which imposes limitations on
advertisements that use or reference the results of federal or state
surveys or inspections of nursing homes....
...le
Healthcare in addition to the ad concerning Powder Springs. The
plaintiffs alleged that 91% of nursing homes surveyed are found to
have “deficiencies” and that the defendants did not include in the
ads all the information required by OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j)....
...ertisements
concerning the Plaintiffs”; “the advertisements included as Exhibits
A, B, and C to Plaintiffs’ [First] Amended Complaint”; and “any
advertisements concerning the Plaintiffs that do not fully comply
with the requirements of O.C.G.A. §
31-7-3.2 (j).” The expanded TRO
was to remain in effect for 30 days or until November 10, 2017, when
the court would hold a consolidated hearing on the plaintiffs’
requests for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief.
On...
...a Motion to Dismiss or to Strike Pursuant to OCGA §§
9-11-11.1 and
9-11-12 (b) (6), attaching as exhibits printouts from the
Medicare.gov website concerning the surveys that the defendants
cited in their ads. The defendants argued among other things that
OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j) violates the First Amendment and, in any event,
that the ads substantially complied with the statute....
...The
defendants then filed a timely notice of appeal directed to the Court
of Appeals.
(c) The Appeal
After briefing and oral argument, the Court of Appeals on
August 27, 2018, properly transferred the case to this Court based
on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge to OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j),
which the trial court implicitly rejected in denying the defendants’
motion.6 On October 2, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to return
the case to the Court of Appeals, which this Court denied on October
22, 2018. The parties then filed supplemental briefs addressing
certain First Amendment issues, but only as to OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j).
The case was orally argued in this Court on January 22, 2019.
6 See Ga....
...See Navellier,
52 P3d at 709.
OCGA §
9-11-11.1 (c) (4) refers to “[a]ny other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
concern.” The plaintiffs’ claims that the defendants violated OCGA
§
31-7-3.2 (j), the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“UDTPA”),
and the false advertising statutes are all based on the defendants’
running of ads in local newspapers informing the public of the
defendants’ availability to provide le...
...The second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires a
determination of whether the party or parties opposing the anti-
SLAPP motion — here, the plaintiffs — have established that there
is a probability that they will prevail on their claims that the
defendants violated OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j), the UDTPA, and the false
advertising statutes....
...(citation and punctuation omitted)). Moreover, neither the trial
court nor the parties have addressed certain important preliminary
questions.
The first such question is whether the statutes cited in the
complaint apply here at all. For example, OCGA §
31-7-3.2 (j)
appears in Article 1 of Chapter 7 of Title 31 of the Georgia Code,
which establishes Georgia’s regulatory framework for hospitals and
related institutions, including nursing homes, which seems an
unlikely place to find a statute regulating attorney advertising....
