Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1882, § 684; former Civil Code 1895, § 603; former Civil Code 1910, §§ 748, 761, 768; and former Code 1933, § 95-1001, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Delegation to contractor permitted.

- Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(24)(J) or O.C.G.A. § 32-2-2(a)(3) prevents the Georgia Department of Transportation from delegating the responsibility for designing and implementing a traffic control plan to a private contractor. Comanche Constr., Inc. v. DOT, 272 Ga. App. 766, 613 S.E.2d 158 (2005).

Sidewalk is included in term "public roads." Broadnax v. City of Atlanta, 149 Ga. App. 611, 255 S.E.2d 86 (1979).

Unopened, undeveloped, proposed roads in a subdivision do not become "public roads" solely by virtue of the process of implied dedication and acceptance. Chatham County v. Allen, 261 Ga. 177, 402 S.E.2d 718 (1991).

County, which had accepted dedication of a subdivision road in 1962 but had not completed the road or maintained it for 50 years, due to the county's mistaken belief that the road was private, was ordered to complete and maintain the road; the county's failure to complete the road was arbitrary and capricious, given the county's acceptance of subdivision plats requiring the road. As to unopened roads in the subdivision, the roads were not public under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-21(b), and the county had no obligation to maintain those unopened roads. Burke County v. Askin, 294 Ga. 634, 755 S.E.2d 747 (2014).

Word "bridge," in this section giving a right of action against a county for defective construction, means a bridge used as an instrumentality for travel along a highway and for crossing streams or ravines. Hubbard v. County of Fulton, 144 Ga. 363, 87 S.E. 281 (1915); Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 717, 102 S.E. 181 (1920); Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748 and former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

Public bridge.

- Bridge which constitutes a portion of the public road is necessarily a public bridge. Early County v. Fain, 2 Ga. App. 288, 58 S.E. 528 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 603).

Public bridge includes toll bridge owned by individual.

- If a person owning land on both sides of a stream built a bridge across the stream for the use of the public, and charged tolls, such a bridge is a public bridge. Dougherty County v. Tift, 75 Ga. 815 (1885) (decided under former Code 1882, § 684).

Public bridge includes all abutments and approaches.

- Term "bridges" includes all the appurtenances necessary to the bridge's proper use and embraces the bridge's abutments and approaches, and that which is necessary as an approach, to connect the bridge with the highway, is an essential part of the bridge itself. Howington v. Madison County, 126 Ga. 699, 55 S.E. 941 (1906); Havird v. Richmond County, 176 Ga. 722, 168 S.E. 897, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933); Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240, 172 S.E. 673 (1934); Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 603; former Civil Code 1910, § 748; and former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

Public bridge includes fill or embankment in a road which constitutes the approach to a bridge and which is necessary to make access to the bridge a part of the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933) (decided under former Code 1910, § 748).

Public bridge includes contiguous embankments necessary for access, which county must repair.

- Contiguous embankment necessary to make access to a bridge, so as to pass over the bridge, is a part of the bridge, and title to the bridge covers such an embankment, but if the embankment is not a necessary part of the bridge, but a part of the streets of the municipality, the town, and not the county, would be bound to keep the bridge in repair. Havird v. Richmond County, 176 Ga. 722, 168 S.E. 897, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

Public bridge does not include culverts.

- Culvert and a bridge are not the same even though the culvert and bridge may serve the same purpose. Hubbard v. County of Fulton, 144 Ga. 363, 87 S.E. 281 (1915); Ellis v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 717, 102 S.E. 181 (1920); Floyd County v. Stewart, 97 Ga. App. 67, 101 S.E.2d 879 (1958) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748 and former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

Alley and adjoining culvert were "public roads."

- Alley and an adjoining drainage culvert and ditch in which a child drowned fell within the definition of "public road" under O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(24)(N), (O). Walden v. City of Hawkinsville, F.3d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2005).

Public bridges do not include piping and water boxes.

- Piping and water boxes and culverts for drainage purposes across the public roads are not "bridges" within the meaning of the law. Montgomery County v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 41 Ga. App. 130, 152 S.E. 261 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

Public bridges do not include road leading to bridge.

- Word "bridge" does not include the public road leading thereto, or a drain or opening thereunder. Warren County v. Battle, 48 Ga. App. 240, 172 S.E. 673 (1934) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

Definition of defects in bridge.

- Defect in a bridge, which serves as the basis for liability by a county for injuries received by reason thereof, includes any condition of the bridge which renders the bridge unsafe for travelers passing over the bridge. Havird v. Richmond County, 47 Ga. App. 580, 171 S.E. 220 (1933) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 748).

O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3 does not create liability for counties for defects in bridges. Coweta County v. Adams, 221 Ga. App. 868, 473 S.E.2d 558 (1996).

Road striping falls under definition of construction.

- Summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted in the county's action to recover money had and received by the contractor after the contractor asserted that the contract, which was for road striping and which was not opened for public bidding, was for a specialized service under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-63(5), an exception to the public bidding requirements under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-64; however, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(6) expressly defined road striping as a form of road construction and not as a special service. Howard v. Brantley County, 260 Ga. App. 330, 579 S.E.2d 758 (2003).

Construction involving moderate road improvement.

- Plans or designs for striping or widening a road need only be in conformity with then existing standards for striping and widening. Plans or designs do not need to address design issues outside the scope of the moderate improvements. Murray v. DOT, 240 Ga. App. 285, 523 S.E.2d 367 (1999).

County, not Department of Transportation, liable for bridges.

- County is liable for damages resulting from a defect in a bridge, although it may appear that jurisdiction over the highway on which the bridge was located had been assumed by the Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) under the terms of the law, and that the department and not the county was guilty of negligence in the maintenance and construction of the bridge or its approaches, which caused the injury. Berrien County v. Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 95-1001).

County's duty to maintain dedicated roads in subdivision.

- Trial court erred by granting mandamus relief under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 with regard to a property owner seeking to compel a county to maintain roads in a subdivision because while the county had accepted dedication of the streets, the county still was vested with the discretion to decide whether to open all of the roads or close any of the roads, and the trial court was required to determine whether the county's decisions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable or a gross abuse of discretion as nowhere in the judgment was that standard articulated. Burke County v. Askin, 291 Ga. 697, 732 S.E.2d 416 (2012).

Jury question as to effect of limited-access road on existing business.

- Court erred in limiting a property owner's right to present evidence to show that the owner's access had been substantially restricted when the road on which the business fronted was changed by construction to a limited-access road. Whether a property owner has "reasonable access" to the property under the circumstances and whether the existing access was "substantially interfered with" are questions of fact to be decided by the jury. Circle K Gen., Inc. v. Department of Transp., 196 Ga. App. 616, 396 S.E.2d 522 (1990).

Incumbrance known at time of purchase.

- Public road running through a tract of land, which was known to the purchaser at the time of purchase, is not such an incumbrance on the land as would constitute a breach of a covenant of warranty against incumbrances. Hood v. Spruill, 242 Ga. App. 44, 528 S.E.2d 565 (2000).

Railroad grade crossings.

- Georgia Code of Public Transportation precluded a common-law cause of action against a railroad for the failure to install adequate protective devices at a grade crossing on a public road since the railroad had not been requested to do so by the appropriate governmental entity. Southern Ry. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 188 Ga. App. 623, 373 S.E.2d 774 (1988).

Railroad was entitled to summary judgment in a survivor's action claiming damages from the survivor's decedent's fatal collision with a train because the survivor failed to show that the allegedly vision-obstructing vegetation was planted or maintained in violation of any statute, code, or local ordinance and although railroads could be liable under common law negligence principles, the failure to maintain a railroad right of way was addressed by the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, specifically by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51, and the scope of those provisions encompassed railroads. Town of Register v. Fortner, 262 Ga. App. 507, 586 S.E.2d 54 (2003).

Cited in Wiles v. State, 161 Ga. App. 473, 288 S.E.2d 271 (1982); Duncan v. City of Macon, 221 Ga. App. 710, 472 S.E.2d 455 (1996); Gilbert v. City of Jackson, 287 Ga. App. 326, 651 S.E.2d 461 (2007); Toole v. Georgia-Pacific, LLC, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Jan. 19, 2011).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former Code 1933, § 102-103, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Street or road presumed to include bridges.

- Bridges may be a part of city streets, county roads, or the State Aid Highways System; in each case the street or road is defined as including bridges, unless a different meaning is apparent from the context. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-64 (decided under former Code 1933, § 102-103).

Merely deeding privately owned road or driveway to county will not necessarily turn it into a public road. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-37.

Department of Transportation's use of motor fuel tax funds.

- Department of Transportation may not utilize motor fuel tax funds to construct walkways on bridges for fishing. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-96 (decided under former Code 1933, § 102-103).

No expenditure of money on historic preservation if not for transportation.

- Department of Transportation may expend federal and state funds on transportation enhancement activities as defined in 23 U.S.C. § 101(a) in those instances where the Code of Public Transportation gives the department the authority to expend such funds, but the Department of Transportation has no authority to expend federal or state money on historic preservation, rehabilitation, and operation of historic transportation buildings, structures, or facilities (including historic railroad facilities and canals) when such buildings, structures, or facilities are not being acquired for transportation purposes. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-3.

ALR.

- Establishment by user of highway running longitudinally on railroad right of way, 46 A.L.R. 893.

Extent of rights in right of way acquired for power or light line, 46 A.L.R. 1463.

Power of public utility commission to require railroad company to grant or renew leases or other privileges on its right of way, 47 A.L.R. 109.

Construction or maintenance of sewers, water pipes, or the like by public authorities in roadway, street, or alley as indicating dedication or acceptance thereof, 52 A.L.R.2d 263.

Conveyance of right of way, in connection with conveyance of another tract, as passing fee or easement, 89 A.L.R.3d 767.