Choice of condemnation procedures.

- Even though the title to property to be condemned for transportation purposes was not in question, a city could choose to use procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 32-3-4 and, although the city could have done so, was not required to use the procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 22-2-1 et seq. Back v. City of Warner Robins, 217 Ga. App. 326, 457 S.E.2d 582 (1995).

Definition of "owners."

- Word "owners" as used in this statutory scheme means all parties having an interest in the subject land, whether their claims be based on a warranty deed, security deed, filed lis pendens notice, or other statutory lien. DOT v. Olshan, 237 Ga. 213, 227 S.E.2d 349 (1976).

Land condemnable in one proceeding.

- If the ownership rights of any one with an interest in the land attaches to one tract of land in its entirety, regardless of the extent of the claims of the other "owners," the tract of land can be condemned in a single in rem action. DOT v. Olshan, 237 Ga. 213, 227 S.E.2d 349 (1976); DOT v. Kenney, 238 Ga. 173, 231 S.E.2d 767 (1977).

No compensation for traffic pattern change.

- Compensation for a change in the traffic pattern on the road adjacent to the condemnees' property is not recoverable. DOT v. Katz, 169 Ga. App. 310, 312 S.E.2d 635 (1983).

Consideration of other factors impacting deprivation.

- In a condemnation case, the jury instructions as a whole were correct in informing the jury that when the owner's access to a public road was taken, the deprivation should be compensated, but the jury could consider whether the owner had any alternative access when determining the amount of damages due to the deprivation of access. Curry v. DOT, 341 Ga. App. 482, 801 S.E.2d 95 (2017).

Department of Transportation's exercise of eminent domain powers.

- Department of Transportation may not exercise eminent domain powers over municipally owned property as the legislature has not clearly granted such authority or created a procedure therefore, and as such grant may not be implied from statutory provisions generally establishing a procedure for state agencies to condemn "private property." DOT v. City of Atlanta, 255 Ga. 124, 337 S.E.2d 327 (1985) (decided prior to the 1986 amendment, which added subsection (b)).

Admission of deeds of sale on other properties as direct evidence of valuation.

- In a condemnation action wherein a county challenged the valuation placed on the landowner's property, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by allowing the admission of four deeds of sale on other properties as direct evidence of the condemned property's value since a proper foundation was laid for the deeds and dissimilarities in the land went to the weight of the evidence of the deeds, not the admissibility of the deeds. Henry County v. RJR Mgmt. One, LLC, 290 Ga. App. 241, 659 S.E.2d 676 (2008).

Trial court erred in dismissing the Georgia Department of Transportation's (DOT's) condemnation petition for the department's failure to submit a properly attested affidavit with the department's petition as the condemnees were estopped from challenging the taking of the condemnees' property because the condemnees withdrew the money deposited by DOT in the court registry. Ga. DOT v. Bowles, 292 Ga. App. 829, 666 S.E.2d 92 (2008).

Cited in Chamlee v. DOT, 189 Ga. App. 334, 375 S.E.2d 626 (1988).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain, §§ 54, 69, 70.

C.J.S.

- 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §§ 32, 33, 100, 101, 107 et seq.