O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-206 (2019)

Reimbursement for costs of medical treatment

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Any party to a claim under this chapter, a group insurance company, or other health care provider who covers the costs of medical treatment for a person who subsequently files a claim under this chapter may give notice in writing to the board at any time during the pendency of the claim that such provider is or should be a party at interest as a result of payments made in the employee’s behalf for medical treatment. (b) In cases where a group insurance company or other health care provider covers the costs of medical treatment for a person who subsequently files a claim and is entitled to benefits under this chapter, the board shall be authorized to order the employer or workers’ compensation insurance carrier to repay the group insurance company or other health care provider the funds it has expended for the claimant’s medical treatment, provided that such employer or its workers’ compensation insurance carrier is liable under this chapter for such medical treatment and provided, further, that such other provider has become or should be a party at interest pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section. The employer or its workers’ compensation insurance carrier deemed liable for such medical treatment shall not be obligated to pay such sums directly to the employee unless, and only to the extent that, it is proven that the employee has paid for such medical treatment himself.

History

(Code 1981, § 34-9-206, enacted by Ga. L. 1985, p. 727, § 6; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1409, § 9.)

Annotations

Code Commission notes. - Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1986, in subsec-

tion (b) commas were inserted preceding and following ‘‘further’’.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS Requirement of section. - Only requirement of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-206 is that the provider must have covered the costs of medical treatment. Tolleson Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 200 Ga. App. 689, 409 S.E.2d 260 (1991). No liability when statute of limitations runs. - When a claimant was injured in 1985, but did not file a claim for Workers’ Compensation benefits until July 1987, the claim was barred by the statute of limitations contained in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82(a), and neither the employer nor its compensation carrier was liable. Thus, neither the employer nor its compensation carrier was liable to the group health provider for medical expenses incurred by the claimant from 1985 to July 1987 for treatment of the 1985 work-related injury. State Wholesalers, Inc. v. Parks, 194 Ga. App. 900, 392 S.E.2d 64 (1990). Personal injury protection carrier as party at interest. - Under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-206, a motor vehicle personal injury protection carrier which covered certain medical expenses of the claimant can be a party at interest to a workers’ com-

pensation claim. Tolleson Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 200 Ga. App. 689, 409 S.E.2d 260 (1991). Intervention not required. - Workers’ compensation insurers/payors did not have a ‘‘property right’’ under the Workers’ Compensation Act that required medical care providers to intervene in an injured employee’s workers’ compensation claim, rather than proceed in the superior court, in order to protect the payors’ potential windfall. Aetna Workers’ Comp Access, LLC v. Coliseum Med. Ctr., 322 Ga. App. 641, 746 S.E.2d 148 (2013). Claimant’s right to direct payment affected by time of injury. - The 1990 amendment allowing a workers’ compensation insurer to gain the windfall that results when a third-party provider does not seek payment constituted a substantive change not applicable to a 1988 injury, and, thus, a claimant covered under the prior law was entitled to be paid directly for the amount of the claimant’s medical expenses which were paid by a third party provider which had not sought reimbursement. Carroll v. Diamond Rug & Carpet Mills, Inc., 224 Ga. App. 361, 480 S.E.2d 374 (1997).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases, 1987–2013 · leading case: Tolleson Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 409 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
Tolleson Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 409 S.E.2d 260 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 12× “We granted these discretionary appeals to address the issue of whether under OCGA § 34-9-206, a motor vehicle personal injury protection (“PIP”) carrier which covered certain medical expenses of the claimant, can be a party at interest to a workers’ compensation claim.”
Aetna Workers' Comp Access, LLC v. Coliseum Med. Ctr., 746 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 4× “With respect to “Parties at Interest,” OCGA § 34-9-206 (a) provides: Any party to a claim under this chapter, a group insurance company, or other health care provider who covers the costs of medical treatment for a person who subsequently files a claim under this chapter may…”
Carroll v. Diamond Rug & Carpet Mills, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). · cites it 10× “Held: We are concerned here with the evolution and construction of OCGA § 34-9-206. Under the law prior to the enactment of this statute in 1985, the two-part rule was that (1) payments for an award of medical benefits, including those where the health care provider had *362…”
Murray Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Wilbanks, 379 S.E.2d 559 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). · cites it 4× “1 We note that OCGA § 34-9-206 (Ga. L. 1985, p. 727, §§ 6, 12) sets forth a procedure by which group insurance carriers may obtain reimbursement for payments made on behalf of an insured who subsequently becomes entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, but this statute, which…”
Boyette v. Elmer, 361 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 2× “Compare OCGA § 34-9-206. Moreover, this case ultimately involves appellee’s entitlement to receive neither no-fault benefits nor workers’ compensation benefits.”
State Wholesalers, Inc. v. Parks, 392 S.E.2d 64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 8× “After claimant’s filing of a claim for his “new injury” in 1987, Blue Cross/Blue Shield in 1988 interposed a claim by letter, as a “Party at Interest” pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-206, asking for reimbursement of $32,622.”
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Coliseum Med. Ctr., LLC D/B/A Coliseum Med. Centers (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 2× “The Board is a “creature of statute” with only the jurisdiction, power, and authority 9 With respect to “Parties at Interest,” OCGA § 34-9-206 (a) provides: Any party to a claim under this chapter, a group insurance company, or other health care provider who covers the costs of…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.