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2018 Georgia Code 35-3-37 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 35 LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND AGENCIES

Section 3. Georgia Bureau of Investigation, 35-3-1 through 35-3-204.

ARTICLE 2 GEORGIA CRIME INFORMATION CENTER

35-3-37. Review of individual's criminal history record information; definitions; privacy considerations; written application requesting review; inspection.

  1. As used in this Code section, the term:
    1. "Drug court treatment program" means a treatment program operated by a drug court division in accordance with the provisions of Code Section 15-1-15.
    2. "Entity" means the arresting law enforcement agency, including county and municipal jails and detention centers.
    3. "Mental health treatment program" means a treatment program operated by a mental health court division in accordance with the provisions of Code Section 15-1-16.
    4. "Nonserious traffic offense" means any offense in violation of Title 40 which is not prohibited by Article 15 of Chapter 6 of Title 40 and any similar such offense under the laws of a state which would not be considered a serious traffic offense under the laws of this state if committed in this state.
    5. "Prosecuting attorney" means the Attorney General, a district attorney, or the solicitor-general who had jurisdiction where the criminal history record information is sought to be modified, corrected, supplemented, amended, or restricted. If the offense was a violation of a criminal law of this state which, by general law, may be tried by a municipal, magistrate, probate, or other court that is not a court of record, the term "prosecuting attorney" shall include the prosecuting officer of such court or, in the absence of such prosecuting attorney, the district attorney of the judicial circuit in which such court is located.
    6. "Restrict," "restricted," or "restriction" means that the criminal history record information of an individual relating to a particular charge shall be available only to judicial officials and criminal justice agencies for law enforcement or criminal investigative purposes or to criminal justice agencies for purposes of employment in accordance with procedures established by the center and shall not be disclosed or otherwise made available to any private persons or businesses pursuant to Code Section 35-3-34 or to governmental agencies or licensing and regulating agencies pursuant to Code Section 35-3-35.
    7. "Serious violent felony" shall have the same meaning as set forth in Code Section 17-10-6.1.
    8. "State" includes any state, the United States or any district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession of the United States, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
    9. "Veterans treatment program" means a treatment program operated by a veterans court division in accordance with the provisions of Code Section 15-1-17.
    10. "Youthful offender" means any offender who was less than 21 years of age at the time of his or her conviction.
  2. Nothing in this article shall be construed so as to authorize any person, agency, corporation, or other legal entity of this state to invade the privacy of any citizen as defined by the General Assembly or as defined by the courts other than to the extent provided in this article.
  3. The center shall make an individual's criminal history record information available for review by such individual or his or her designee upon written application to the center.
  4. If an individual believes his or her criminal history record information to be inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading, he or she may request a criminal history record information inspection at the center. The center at which criminal history record information is sought to be inspected may prescribe reasonable hours and places of inspection and may impose such additional procedures or restrictions, including fingerprinting, as are reasonably necessary to assure the security of the criminal history record information, to verify the identities of those who seek to inspect such information, and to maintain an orderly and efficient mechanism for inspection of criminal history record information. The fee for inspection of criminal history record information shall not exceed $15.00, which shall not include the cost of the fingerprinting.
  5. If the criminal history record information is believed to be inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading, the individual may request that the entity having custody or control of the challenged information modify, correct, supplement, or amend the information and notify the center of such changes within 60 days of such request. In the case of county and municipal jails and detention centers, such notice to the center shall not be required. If the entity declines to act within 60 days of such request or if the individual believes the entity's decision to be unsatisfactory, within 30 days of the end of the 60 day period or of the issuance of the unsatisfactory decision, whichever occurs last, the individual shall have the right to appeal to the court with original jurisdiction of the criminal charges in the county where the entity is located.
  6. An appeal pursuant to subsection (e) of this Code section shall be to acquire an order from the court with original jurisdiction of the criminal charges that the subject information be modified, corrected, supplemented, or amended by the entity with custody of such information. Notice of the appeal shall be provided to the entity and the prosecuting attorney. A notice sent by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery shall be sufficient service on the entity having custody or control of the disputed criminal history record information. The court shall conduct a de novo review and, if requested by a party, the proceedings shall be recorded.
    1. Should the court find by a preponderance of the evidence that the criminal history record information in question is inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading, the court shall order such information to be appropriately modified, corrected, supplemented, or amended as the court deems appropriate. Any entity with custody, possession, or control of any such criminal history record information shall cause each and every copy thereof in its custody, possession, or control to be altered in accordance with the court's order within 60 days of the entry of the order.
    2. To the extent that it is known by the requesting individual that an entity has previously disseminated inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading criminal history record information, he or she shall, by written request, provide to the entity the name of the individual, agency, or company to which such information was disseminated. Within 60 days of the written request, the entity shall disseminate the modification, correction, supplement, or amendment to the individual's criminal history record information to such individual, agency, or company to which the information in question has been previously communicated, as well as to the individual whose information has been ordered so altered.
  7. Access to an individual's criminal history record information, including any fingerprints or photographs of the individual taken in conjunction with the arrest, shall be restricted by the center for the following types of dispositions:
    1. Prior to indictment, accusation, or other charging instrument:
      1. The case was never referred for further prosecution to the proper prosecuting attorney by the arresting law enforcement agency and:
  8. The offense against such individual is closed by the arresting law enforcement agency. It shall be the duty of the head of the arresting law enforcement agency to notify the center whenever a record is to be restricted pursuant to this division within 30 days of such decision. A copy of the notice shall be sent to the accused and the accused's attorney, if any, by mailing the same by first-class mail within seven days of notifying the center; or

    If the center receives notice of the filing of an indictment subsequent to the restriction of a record pursuant to this division, the center shall make such record available in accordance with Code Section 35-3-34 or 35-3-35. If the center does not receive notice of a charging instrument within 30 days of the applicable time periods set forth in this division, such record shall be restricted by the center for noncriminal justice purposes and shall be considered sealed.

    1. The charges were nolle prossed or otherwise dismissed because:
      1. Of a plea agreement resulting in a conviction of the individual for an offense arising out of the same underlying transaction or occurrence as the conviction;
      2. The prosecuting attorney was barred from introducing material evidence against the individual on legal grounds, including, without limitation, the granting of a motion to suppress or motion in limine;
      3. The conduct which resulted in the arrest of the individual was part of a pattern of criminal activity which was prosecuted in another court of the state or a foreign nation; or
      4. The individual had diplomatic, consular, or similar immunity or inviolability from arrest or prosecution;
    2. The charges were tried and some but not all of the charges resulted in an acquittal; or
    3. The individual was acquitted of all charges but it is later determined that the acquittal was the result of jury tampering or judicial misconduct.
    1. When an individual had a felony charge dismissed or nolle prossed or was found not guilty of such charge but was convicted of a misdemeanor offense that was not a lesser included offense of the felony charge, such individual may petition the court in which he or she was accused or convicted, as applicable, or, if such charge was dismissed, the superior court in the county where the arrest occurred to restrict access to criminal history record information for the felony charge within four years of the arrest. Such court shall maintain jurisdiction over the case for this limited purpose and duration. Such petition shall be served on the arresting law enforcement agency and the prosecuting attorney. If a hearing is requested, such hearing shall be held within 90 days of the filing of the petition. The court shall hear evidence and shall grant an order restricting such criminal history record information if the court determines that the misdemeanor conviction was not a lesser included offense of the felony charge and that the harm otherwise resulting to the individual clearly outweighs the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available.
    2. When an individual was convicted of an offense and was sentenced to punishment other than the death penalty, but such conviction was vacated by the trial court or reversed by an appellate court or other post-conviction court, the decision of which has become final by the completion of the appellate process, and the prosecuting attorney has not retried the case within two years of the date the order vacating or reversing the conviction became final, such individual may petition the court in which he or she was convicted to restrict access to criminal history record information for such offense. Such court shall maintain jurisdiction over the case for this limited purpose and duration. Such petition shall be served on the prosecuting attorney. If a hearing is requested, such hearing shall be held within 90 days of the filing of the petition. The court shall hear evidence and shall determine whether granting an order restricting such criminal history record information is appropriate, giving due consideration to the reason the judgment was reversed or vacated, the reason the prosecuting attorney has not retried the case, and the public's interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available.
    3. When an individual's case has remained on the dead docket for more than 12 months, such individual may petition the court in which the case is pending to restrict access to criminal history record information for such offense. Such petition shall be served on the prosecuting attorney. If a hearing is requested, such hearing shall be held within 90 days of the filing of the petition. The court shall hear evidence and shall determine whether granting an order restricting such criminal history record information is appropriate, giving due consideration to the reason the case was placed on the dead docket; provided, however, that the court shall not grant such motion if an active warrant is pending for such individual.
      1. When an individual was convicted in this state of a misdemeanor or a series of misdemeanors arising from a single incident, and at the time of such conviction such individual was a youthful offender, provided that such individual successfully completed the terms of his or her sentence and, since completing the terms of his or her sentence, has not been arrested for at least five years, excluding any arrest for a nonserious traffic offense, and provided, further, that he or she was not convicted in this state of a misdemeanor violation or under any other state's law with similar provisions of one or more of the offenses listed in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, he or she may petition the court in which the conviction occurred to restrict access to criminal history record information. Such court shall maintain jurisdiction over the case for this limited purpose and duration. Such petition shall be served on the prosecuting attorney. If a hearing is requested, such hearing shall be held within 90 days of the filing of the petition. The court shall hear evidence and shall determine whether granting an order restricting such criminal history record information is appropriate, giving due consideration to the individual's conduct and the public's interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available.
      2. Record restriction shall not be appropriate if the individual was convicted of:
        1. Child molestation in violation of Code Section 16-6-4;
        2. Enticing a child for indecent purposes in violation of Code Section 16-6-5;
        3. Sexual assault by persons with supervisory or disciplinary authority in violation of Code Section 16-6-5.1;
        4. Keeping a place of prostitution in violation of Code Section 16-6-10;
        5. Pimping in violation of Code Section 16-6-11;
        6. Pandering by compulsion in violation of Code Section 16-6-14;
        7. Masturbation for hire in violation of Code Section 16-6-16;
        8. Giving massages in a place used for lewdness, prostitution, assignation, or masturbation for hire in violation of Code Section 16-6-17;
        9. Sexual battery in violation of Code Section 16-6-22.1;
        10. Any offense related to minors generally in violation of Part 2 of Article 3 of Chapter 12 of Title 16;
        11. Theft in violation of Chapter 8 of Title 16; provided, however, that such prohibition shall not apply to a misdemeanor conviction of shoplifting or refund fraud in violation of Code Section 16-8-14 or 16-8-14.1, as applicable; or
        12. Any serious traffic offense in violation of Article 15 of Chapter 6 of Title 40.
    4. When an individual was arrested on a fugitive from justice warrant as provided in Code Section 17-13-4, such individual may petition the superior court in the county where the arrest occurred to restrict access to criminal history record information for such warrant. Such court shall maintain jurisdiction over the case for this limited purpose and duration. Such petition shall be served on the arresting law enforcement agency and the prosecuting attorney. If a hearing is requested, such hearing shall be held within 90 days of the filing of the petition. The court shall hear evidence and shall grant an order restricting such criminal history record information if the court determines that circumstances warrant restriction and that the harm otherwise resulting to the individual clearly outweighs the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available.
    1. The center shall notify the arresting law enforcement agency of any criminal history record information, access to which has been restricted pursuant to this Code section, within 30 days of the date access to such information is restricted. Upon receipt of notice from the center that access to criminal history record information has been restricted, the arresting law enforcement agency or other law enforcement agency shall, within 30 days, restrict access to all such information maintained by such arresting law enforcement agency or other law enforcement agency for such individual's charge.
    2. An individual who has had criminal history record information restricted pursuant to this Code section may submit a written request to the appropriate county or municipal jail or detention center to have all records for such individual's charge maintained by the appropriate county or municipal jail or detention center restricted. Within 30 days of such request, the appropriate county or municipal jail or detention center shall restrict access to all such criminal history record information maintained by such appropriate county or municipal jail or detention center for such individual's charge.
    3. The center shall be authorized to unrestrict criminal history record information based on the receipt of a disposition report showing that the individual was convicted of an offense arising out of an arrest of which the information was restricted pursuant to this Code section.
  9. If criminal history record information is restricted pursuant to this Code section and if the entity declines to restrict access to such information, the individual may file a civil action in the superior court where the entity is located. A copy of the civil action shall be served on the entity and prosecuting attorney for the jurisdiction where the civil action is filed, and they may become parties to the action. A decision of the entity shall be upheld only if it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the individual did not meet the criteria set forth in subsection (h) or (j) of this Code section.
    1. For criminal history record information maintained by the clerk of court, an individual who has a record restricted pursuant to this Code section may petition the court with original jurisdiction over the charges in the county where the clerk of court is located for an order to seal all criminal history record information maintained by the clerk of court for such individual's charge. Notice of such petition shall be sent to the clerk of court and the prosecuting attorney. A notice sent by registered or certified mail or statutory overnight delivery shall be sufficient notice.
    2. The court shall order all criminal history record information in the custody of the clerk of court, including within any index, to be restricted and unavailable to the public if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:
      1. The criminal history record information has been restricted pursuant to this Code section; and
      2. The harm otherwise resulting to the privacy of the individual clearly outweighs the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available.
    3. Within 60 days of the court's order, the clerk of court shall cause every document, physical or electronic, in its custody, possession, or control to be restricted.
    4. The person who is the subject of such sealed criminal history record information may petition the court for inspection of the criminal history record information included in the court order. Such information shall always be available for inspection, copying, and use by criminal justice agencies and the Judicial Qualifications Commission.
    1. Except as provided in subsection (j) of this Code section, as to arrests occurring before July 1, 2013, an individual may, in writing, request the arresting law enforcement agency to restrict the criminal history record information of an arrest, including any fingerprints or photographs taken in conjunction with such arrest. Reasonable fees shall be charged by the arresting law enforcement agency and the center for the actual costs of restricting such records, provided that such fee shall not exceed $50.00.
    2. Within 30 days of receipt of such written request, the arresting law enforcement agency shall provide a copy of the request to the prosecuting attorney. Within 90 days of receiving the request, the prosecuting attorney shall review the request to determine if the request meets the criteria set forth in subsection (h) of this Code section for record restriction, and the prosecuting attorney shall notify the arresting law enforcement agency of his or her decision within such 90 day period. If the prosecuting attorney denies such request, he or she shall cite with specificity the reason for such denial in writing and attach to such denial any relevant documentation in his or her possession used to make such denial. There shall be a presumption that the prosecuting attorney does not object to the request to restrict the criminal history record information if he or she fails to respond to the request for a determination within the 90 day period set forth in this paragraph. The arresting law enforcement agency shall inform the individual of the prosecuting attorney's decision, and, if record restriction is approved by the prosecuting attorney, the arresting law enforcement agency shall restrict the criminal history record information within 30 days of receipt of the prosecuting attorney's decision.
    3. If a prosecuting attorney declines an individual's request to restrict access to criminal history record information, such individual may file a civil action in the superior court where the entity is located. A copy of the civil action shall be served on the entity and prosecuting attorney for the jurisdiction where the civil action is filed, and they may become parties to the action. A decision of the prosecuting attorney to decline a request to restrict access to criminal history record information shall be upheld unless the individual demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the arrest is eligible for record restriction pursuant to subsection (h) of this Code section and the harm otherwise resulting to the privacy of the individual clearly outweighs the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available.
    4. To restrict criminal history record information at the center, an individual shall submit a prosecuting attorney's approved record restriction request or a court order issued pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection to the center. The center shall restrict access to such criminal history record information within 30 days of receiving such information.
  10. Nothing in this Code section shall give rise to any right which may be asserted as a defense to a criminal prosecution or serve as the basis for any motion that may be filed in any criminal proceeding. The modification, correction, supplementation, amendment, or restriction of criminal history record information shall not abate or serve as the basis for the reversal of any criminal conviction.
  11. Any application to the center for access to or restriction of criminal history record information made pursuant to this Code section shall be made in writing on a form approved by the center. The center shall be authorized to develop and publish such procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Code section. In adopting such procedures and forms, the provisions of Chapter 13 of Title 50, the "Georgia Administrative Procedure Act," shall not apply.
  12. It shall be the duty of the entity to take such action as may be reasonable to prevent disclosure of information to the public which would identify any individual whose criminal history record information is restricted pursuant to this Code section.
  13. If the center has notified a firearms dealer that an individual is prohibited from purchasing or possessing a handgun pursuant to Part 5 of Article 4 of Chapter 11 of Title 16 and if the prohibition is the result of such individual being involuntarily hospitalized within the immediately preceding five years, upon such individual or his or her attorney making an application to inspect his or her records, the center shall provide the record of involuntary hospitalization and also inform the individual or attorney of his or her right to a hearing before the judge of the probate court or superior court relative to such individual's eligibility to possess or transport a handgun.

The center does not receive notice from the arresting law enforcement agency that the offense has been referred to the prosecuting attorney or transferred to another law enforcement or prosecutorial agency of this state, any other state or a foreign nation, or any political subdivision thereof for prosecution and the following period of time has elapsed from the date of the arrest of such individual:

If the offense is a misdemeanor or a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature, two years;

If the offense is a felony, other than a serious violent felony or a felony sexual offense specified in Code Section 17-3-2.1 involving a victim under 16 years of age, four years; or

If the offense is a serious violent felony or a felony sexual offense specified in Code Section 17-3-2.1 involving a victim under 16 years of age, seven years.

The case was referred to the prosecuting attorney but was later dismissed;

The grand jury returned two no bills; or

The grand jury returned one no bill and the applicable time period set forth in division (ii) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph has expired; and

After indictment or accusation:

Except as provided in subsection (i) of this Code section, all charges were dismissed or nolle prossed;

The individual was sentenced in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) or (c) of Code Section 16-13-2, and the individual successfully completed the terms and conditions of his or her probation;

The individual pleaded guilty to or was found guilty of a violation of paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (a) of Code Section 3-3-23 and was sentenced in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of Code Section 3-3-23.1, and the individual successfully completed the terms and conditions of his or her probation;

The individual successfully completed a drug court treatment program, mental health treatment program, or veterans treatment program, the individual's case has been dismissed or nolle prossed, and he or she has not been arrested during such program, excluding any arrest for a nonserious traffic offense; or

The individual was acquitted of all of the charges by a judge or jury unless, within ten days of the verdict, the prosecuting attorney demonstrates to the trial court through clear and convincing evidence that the harm otherwise resulting to the individual is clearly outweighed by the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available because either:

The prosecuting attorney was barred from introducing material evidence against the individual on legal grounds, including, without limitation, the granting of a motion to suppress or motion in limine; or

The individual has been formally charged with the same or similar offense within the previous five years.

After the filing of an indictment or accusation, an individual's criminal history record information shall not be restricted if:

(Code 1981, §35-3-37, enacted by Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 6-2/HB 1176; Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 14/HB 349; Ga. L. 2014, p. 79, § 3/SB 320; Ga. L. 2014, p. 404, § 2-2/SB 382; Ga. L. 2016, p. 443, § 6B-7/SB 367; Ga. L. 2018, p. 550, § 2-8/SB 407.)

The 2013 amendment, effective July 1, 2013, in paragraph (j)(1), substituted the present provisions of the first sentence for the former provisions, which read: "When an individual had felony charges dismissed or nolle prossed or was found not guilty of felony charges but was convicted of a misdemeanor offense or offenses arising out of the same underlying transaction or occurrence, such individual may petition the superior court in the county where the arrest occurred to restrict access to criminal history record information for such felony charges within four years of the arrest.", and, near the end of the last sentence, substituted "that the misdemeanor conviction was not a lesser included offense of the felony charge and that the harm otherwise resulting to the individual clearly outweighs the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available" for "the charges in question did not arise out of the same underlying transaction or occurrence"; in paragraph (n)(1), substituted "Except as provided in subsection (j) of this Code section, as" for "As" at the beginning of the first sentence; in paragraph (n)(2), in the second sentence, substituted "the request meets the criteria set forth in subsection (h) of this Code section for" for "he or she agrees to", and added the third and fourth sentences; in paragraph (n)(3), substituted the present provisions of the third sentence for the former provisions, which read: "A decision of the prosecuting attorney shall not be upheld if it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the harm otherwise resulting to the privacy of the individual clearly outweighs the public interest in the criminal history record information being publicly available"; and, in paragraph (n)(4), substituted "of receiving" for "from receiving" in the last sentence. See Editor's notes for applicability.

The 2014 amendments. The first 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, added present paragraph (a)(9); redesignated former paragraph (a)(9) as present paragraph (a)(10); and, near the middle of subparagraph (h)(2)(C), substituted a comma for "or" following "drug court treatment program" and inserted "or veterans treatment program,". The second 2014 amendment, effective July 1, 2014, substituted "shoplifting or refund fraud in violation of Code Section 16-8-14 or 16-8-14.1, as applicable" for "shoplifting in violation of Code Section 16-8-14" in division (j)(4)(B)(xi).

The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, at the end of paragraph (a)(6), added "or to governmental agencies or licensing and regulating agencies pursuant to Code Section 35-3-35"; rewrote subsection (h); and substituted the present provisions of paragraph (j)(5) for the former provisions, which read: "Any party may file an appeal of an order entered pursuant to this subsection as provided in Code Section 5-6-34.".

The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, inserted "court in which he or she was accused or convicted, as applicable, or, if such charge was dismissed, the" in the middle of the first sentence of paragraph (j)(1); substituted "petition the court in which he or she was convicted" for "petition the superior court in the county where the conviction occurred" near the end of the first sentence of paragraph (j)(2); and substituted "petition the court in which" for "petition the superior court in the county where" in the middle of the first sentence of paragraph (j)(3) and near the end of the first sentence of subparagraph (j)(4)(A).

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2012, a period was added at the end of paragraph (j)(3).

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1995, p. 139, § 7, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that no local ordinance which was in effect on March 22, 1995, shall be affected by Code Section 16-11-184 until January 1, 1996, at which time, unless enacted subsequent to March 22, 1995, as provided by that Code section, any such ordinance shall be of no further force or effect, and further provides that no ordinance or regulation attempting to regulate firearms in any manner shall be enacted by any county, city, or municipality after July 1, 1995.

Ga. L. 1995, p. 139, § 8, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that subsection (f) of this Code section shall be repealed automatically upon a final judicial determination that such Act is invalid for any reason.

Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 16, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment to this Code section is applicable with respect to notices delivered on or after July 1, 2000.

Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 6-2/HB 1176, effective July 1, 2013, repealed the former Code section and enacted the current Code section. The former Code section was based on Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6; Ga. L. 1995, p. 139, § 4; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1345, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1589, § 3; Ga. L. 2012, p. 775, § 35/HB 942.

Ga. L. 2012, p. 899, § 9-1/HB 1176, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that Part VI of this Act, which amended this Code section, shall become fully effective on July 1, 2013; provided, however, that for the purpose of preparing for implementation of Part VI of this Act, said part shall become effective on July 1, 2012.

Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 21/HB 349, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2013, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2013, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense."

Ga. L. 2014, p. 79, § 1/SB 320, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The General Assembly recognizes that veterans have provided and continue to provide an invaluable service to our country and this state. In connection with a veteran's service, some servicemen and servicewomen have incurred physical, emotional, or mental impairments which cause or contribute to behaviors that may draw a veteran into the criminal justice system. The General Assembly has determined that having dedicated veterans court divisions is important to address the specialized treatment needs of veterans and that there are resources, services, and treatment options that are unique to veterans that may best facilitate a veteran's reentry into society."

Ga. L. 2014, p. 404, § 3-1/SB 382, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2014, and shall apply to all conduct occurring on or after such date."

Law reviews.

- For article on the 2012 enactment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 290 (2012). For article, "Appeal and Error: Appeal or Certiorari by State in Criminal Cases," see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 17 (2013). For annual survey on criminal law, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 37 (2014). For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 139 (2016). For note, "Give It to Me, I'm Worth It: The Need to Amend Georgia's Record Restriction Statute to Provide Ex-Offenders with a Second Chance in the Employment Sector," see 52 Ga. L. Rev. 267 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code Section 35-3-37, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Application of amendments.

- Recent amendments to Georgia's criminal history record information statute, O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37, are to be applied to information regarding arrests occurring prior to the amendments' effective date as the statute itself made clear that the statute does apply to information regarding arrests pre-dating the amendments, and such application presents no constitutional problem. Mosley v. Lowe, 298 Ga. 363, 782 S.E.2d 43 (2016).

County erred and should have granted the defendant's request to have the defendant's arrest record restricted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(h) because it was undisputed that the 1996 assault charge against the defendant was nolle prossed and, as such, that disposition did not fall within any of the exceptions enumerated in subsection (i)(1) of the statute and the defendant was eligible for record restriction under the current statute. Mosley v. Lowe, 298 Ga. 363, 782 S.E.2d 43 (2016).

Investigatory case file open unless privacy invaded.

- When "criminal history record information" has been incorporated by a law-enforcement agency into an investigatory case file, it should be open for public inspection unless its disclosure would constitute an invasion of privacy. Napper v. Georgia Television Co., 257 Ga. 156, 356 S.E.2d 640 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

Hearing was mandatory under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(c). Strohecker v. Gwinnett County Police Dep't, 182 Ga. App. 853, 357 S.E.2d 305 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

No modification following nolle prosequi.

- Petitioner was not entitled to modification or expungement of criminal record to reflect entry of nolle prosequi on certain charges. Drake v. State, 170 Ga. App. 846, 318 S.E.2d 721 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

Sealing clerk's records.

- Because the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(m)(2) applied to arrests that pre-dated July 1, 2013, the trial court should have considered the merits of the defendant's motion to seal the clerk's records, and the order denying the defendant's motion to seal the clerk of court's records was vacated. Woodhouse v. State, 336 Ga. App. 880, 785 S.E.2d 429 (2016).

Sheriff's office's refusal to expunge subject to appeal to superior court.

- Trial court erred in dismissing an indictee's appeal from the sheriff's office's refusal to expunge the indictee's record without determining whether the charges had been nolle prossed for a reason set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(d)(7)(A) through (G). If the charges had not been nolle prossed for one of these reasons, the refusal to expunge could not be affirmed. Grimes v. Catoosa County Sheriff's Office, 307 Ga. App. 481, 705 S.E.2d 670 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

Expungement not supported.

- Former defendant's petition under O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(j)(2) to expunge the defendant's record was denied; because the defendant had been tried twice already, and the child molestation victim and similar crimes witnesses did not wish to go through a third trial, the prosecutor decided not to press the charges after a reversal for ineffective assistance of counsel. Gibbs v. Bright, 330 Ga. App. 851, 769 S.E.2d 590 (2015).

Because imposition of a sentence upon a plea of nolo contendere was not a dismissal or a nolle prosse, O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(h)(2)(A), providing for restriction of access to certain criminal history records, did not apply to an applicant's plea of nolo contendre to theft by taking; and the applicant's civil rights claim was barred by the statute of limitations, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Nasir v. Gwinnett County State Court, 341 Ga. App. 63, 798 S.E.2d 695 (2017).

Discretionary appeal procedures.

- Appeal of a superior court decision reviewing a decision of an agency denying a request to expunge criminal records requires the discretionary appeal procedures of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35. Strohecker v. Gwinnett County Police Dep't, 182 Ga. App. 853, 357 S.E.2d 305 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

Appeal to superior court.

- By the former statute's express provisions, an appeal from the denial of a request to expunge a criminal record under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(d)(6) was as provided in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19. In such case, the review should be conducted by the court without a jury and should be confined to the record. Grimes v. Catoosa County Sheriff's Office, 307 Ga. App. 481, 705 S.E.2d 670 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

Appellate jurisdiction was in Court of Appeals absent viable constitutional challenge.

- Because an appeal of the denial of a motion to seal a criminal record under O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(m) failed to present a viable challenge to the statute's constitutionality, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Para. II(1), because the challenge (a separation of powers argument, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. III, based on the Supreme Court's record-keeping authority under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Para. I, and Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 21.4) was not raised below, jurisdiction was properly before the Court of Appeals, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(12). Doe v. State, 303 Ga. 237, 811 S.E.2d 413 (2018).

Applicability to inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading records.

- If a criminal record is inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading, a superior court has three available remedies - expungement, modification, or supplementation - so long as the court finds the remedy to be "required by law" and "appropriate." Meinken v. Burgess, 262 Ga. 863, 426 S.E.2d 876 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

Expungement remedy exceptional.

- Expungement should be reserved for exceptional cases based upon competing state and citizen interests, and the fact that the defendant's arrest record did not reflect that the defendant was acquitted by operation of law did not constitute an exceptional circumstance warranting the remedy of expungement instead of modification or supplement. Meinken v. Burgess, 262 Ga. 863, 426 S.E.2d 876 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

Cited in Sosniak v. State, 292 Ga. 35, 734 S.E.2d 362 (2012).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6 and former Code Section 35-3-37, which were subsequently repealed but were succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Confidentiality of information obtained from Georgia Crime Information Center.

- Since information supplied by the Georgia Crime Information Center to local law enforcement agencies may often contain nonconviction data, such as arrests resulting in acquittals, dismissals, or arrests resulting in no prosecutions, such material is of a sensitive nature and disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion of privacy of a citizen. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U81-47 (decided under former Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6).

Information obtained pursuant to criminal history background check, required by O.C.G.A. § 16-11-129, from taking of fingerprints and checking of these fingerprints with those presently on file with the Georgia Crime Information Center is of a confidential nature and prohibited from public disclosure. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. Op. No. U81-47 (decided under former Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6).

Center may allow private researchers access to information under imposed conditions.

- Georgia Crime Information Center is permitted to allow private researchers access to criminal history record information and to impose such conditions on that access as the center deems appropriate. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-78 (decided under former Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6).

Only superior court judges may order records expunged or modified.

- Only superior court judges may order criminal history records to be expunged or otherwise modified, and then only after strict compliance with the procedure set forth in former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(c). 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 89-60 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

Expungement by city solicitor's office.

- City of Atlanta Solicitor's office does not have the authority to approve the expungement by an original agency of a criminal arrest record involving a felony or misdemeanor state offense which is dismissed in municipal court and for which no indictment or accusation has been drawn. 1998 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U98-11 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

Only basis upon which Georgia Crime Information Center shall expunge a record is upon clear finding by court that said record is inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading, and setting forth the factual basis for such finding. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 82-8 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37).

Purging of records.

- Center should purge the center's records only when the records are inaccurate. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-110 (decided under former Ga. L. 1973, p. 1301, § 6).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Records and Recording Laws, § 2.

C.J.S.

- 76 C.J.S., Records, §§ 76, 82 et seq., 116, 126, 130, 131, 152.

ALR.

- Judicial expunction of criminal record of convicted adult, 11 A.L.R.4th 956.

Judicial expunction of criminal record of convicted adult in absence of authorizing statute, 68 A.L.R.6th 1.

Judicial expunction of criminal record of convicted adult under statute - General principles, and expunction of criminal records under statutes providing for such relief where criminal proceeding is terminated in favor of defendant, upon completion of probation, upon suspended sentence, and where expungement relief predicated upon type, and number, of offenses, 69 A.L.R.6th 1.

Judicial expunction of criminal record of convicted adult under statute - Expunction under statutes addressing "first offenders" and "innocent persons," where conviction was for minor drug or other offense, where indictment has not been presented against accused or accused has been released from custody, and where court considered impact of nolle prosequi, partial dismissal, pardon, rehabilitation, and lesser-included offenses, 70 A.L.R.6th 1.

Expunction of federal arrest records in absence of conviction, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 652.

Effect of expungement of conviction on § 241(a)(4), (11) of Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 USC § 1251(a)(4), (11)), making aliens deportable for crimes involving moral turpitude or drugs, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 750.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37

Total Results: 10  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 109 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 25, 2016 | 784 S.E.2d 775

...child custody cases awarding, refusing to change, or modifying child custody or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of such child custody judgment or orders; and (12) All judgments or orders entered pursuant to Code Section 35-3-37. 5 defense such as sovereign or quasi-judicial immunity, the case is final and may be appealed under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1)....
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Sosniak v. State, 292 Ga. 35 (Ga. 2012).

Cited 77 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 19, 2012 | 734 S.E.2d 362, 2012 Fulton County D. Rep. 3646

...(11) All judgments or orders in child custody cases including, but not limited to, awarding or refusing to change child custody or holding or declining to hold persons in contempt of such child custody judgment or orders; and (12) All judgments or orders entered pursuant to Code Section 35-3-37. On August 26,2010, by administrative order, the trial court had transferred $50,000 from a trust account established for co-defendant Ortegon with money received from Georgia Public Defender Standards Council to an account for Sosn...
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Seals v. State, 860 S.E.2d 419 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 61 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 18, 2021 | 311 Ga. 739

...The second statute relates to occasions when a surety’s principal will be considered surrendered or released. See OCGA § 17-6-31 (c), (d) (1). And the final statute concerns a defendant’s ability to restrict access to his criminal history record. See OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (3)....
...ant pending for the individual. See id. Nothing about these statutes reveals that a dead-docketed count is to be treated as a final disposition. Indeed, the treatment of 19 dead-docketed counts under OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (3) ⸺ waiting 12 months after dead-docketing and examining the reasons for the dead-docketing ⸺ acknowledges that merely dead-docketing a count does not necessarily constitute a final disposition. (b)Extensive Georgia case...
...which shall contain: (1) a summary record of all criminal 10 As discussed in the majority opinion, the dead docket is also referenced in OCGA § 17-6-31 (c), (d) (1) in relation to when a surety’s principal will be considered surrendered or released, as well as in OCGA § 35-3-37 (j) (3), which addresses a criminal defendant’s ability to restrict access to his or her criminal history record. 33 indictments in which true bills are rendered; (2) all criminal accusations tha...
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Napper v. Georgia Television Co., 356 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. 1987).

Cited 46 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | May 6, 1987 | 257 Ga. 156, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1075

...ocal and state criminal justice agencies, all federal criminal justice agencies, and criminal justice agencies in other states any information in the files of the center which will aid these agencies in the performance of their official duties. OCGA § 35-3-37 (a) provides, "Nothing in this article shall be construed so as to authorize any person, agency, corporation, or other legal entity to invade the privacy of any citizen as defined by the General Assembly or the courts other than to the ext...
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Buckner-webb v. State, 878 S.E.2d 481 (Ga. 2022).

Cited 15 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 20, 2022 | 314 Ga. 823

...ain displacing a basic role of the federal collateral-order doctrine.23 ————————————————————— § 8-1 (adding paragraph (a) (12): “All judgments or orders entered pursuant to Code Section 35-3-37”); Ga....
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Mosley v. Lowe, 298 Ga. 363 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 19, 2016 | 782 S.E.2d 43

...Decided: January 19, 2016 S15A1722. MOSLEY v. LOWE. HUNSTEIN, Justice. This case requires us to determine whether recent amendments to this State’s criminal history record information statute, OCGA § 35-3-37, are to be applied to information regarding arrests occurring prior to the amendments’ effective date....
...the court granted the motion in May 1996. In August 2014, after the effective date of recent amendments to the criminal history record information statute, Lowe applied to the Clayton County Sheriff’s Office to have her arrest record restricted pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (h).1 The Clayton County Solicitor General denied the request, and Lowe then petitioned the superior court for judicial review, naming as respondents Clayton County Solicitor General Tasha Mosley and Clayton County Sheriff Victor Hill (hereinafter, collectively, “Mosley”). Following a hearing, the superior court determined that Mosley had erred in denying Lowe’s application. Noting that its determination rested on whether the recent amendments to OCGA § 35-3-37 were to be applied retroactively to prior arrests, the court held that the General Assembly had intended for the amended statute to apply to prior arrests; that such application does not violate the constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws, see Ga....
...X; and that, under the amended statute, Lowe was eligible for record restriction as to the 1996 assault charge. Having reviewed the record and the applicable law, we agree with the superior court’s conclusions. 1. The current version of OCGA § 35-3-37 was enacted as part of a As discussed below, record “restriction” refers to the process of protecting 1 from public access information regarding an individual’s criminal history. See OCGA § 35-3-37 (a) (6) (defining “restriction”). 2 comprehensive criminal justice reform effort spearheaded in 2011 by Governor Nathan Deal....
...See Meg Buice & Tamara Garcia, Crimes & Offenses, HB 1176, 29 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 290, 294-295 (2012). Signed into law in May 2012, House Bill 1176 constituted an omnibus package of reforms to the State’s criminal justice laws and procedures, which, inter alia, replaced the previous version of OCGA § 35-3-37 with the current version, effective July 1, 2013. Ga....
...899, 930, 949, §§ 6-2, 9-1 (c). Under the current law, the concept of “restriction,” whereby arrest records are generally shielded from public view, replaces the concept of “expungement,” under which such records were destroyed outright. Compare OCGA § 35-3-37 (a) (6), with OCGA § 35- 3-37 (d) (4) (2012).2 Under the current version of OCGA § 35-3-37, individuals are afforded the right to automatic restriction of their “criminal history record information”3 2 Specifically, records that are “restricted” are “available only to judicial officials and criminal justice agencies for law enforcement or criminal investigative purposes or to criminal justice agencies for purposes of employment” and are prohibited from being “disclosed or otherwise made available to any private persons or businesses.” OCGA § 35-3-37 (a) (6)....
... pertaining to most arrests ultimately ending in non-conviction. OCGA § 35-3- 37 (h).4 As compared to expungement under prior law, restriction is thus available as to a broader range of criminal dispositions, with fewer exceptions. Compare OCGA § 35-3-37 (h) - (j), with former OCGA § 35-3-37 (d) (2012). In addition, record restriction generally takes effect automatically as to eligible arrests, see OCGA § 35-3-37 (h) (“[a]ccess . . . shall be restricted by the [GCIC]”), whereas expungement was accomplished only by request, see former OCGA § 35-3-37 (d) (1) (2012) (individual “may request” expungement). As a means of addressing criminal history record information predating the effective date of these amendments, the statute expressly provides that “as to arrests occurring before July 1, 2013, an individual may, in writing, request the arresting law enforcement agency to restrict the criminal history record information of an arrest.” OCGA § 35-3-37 (n) (1).5 Such requests are to be identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, accusations, information, or other formal charges, and any disposition arising therefrom, sentencing, correctional supervision...
...Coleman, legislative schemes under which citizens are afforded access to public information generally create public rather than private rights. Id. at 183-184. Accordingly, such schemes may be modified retroactively with no constitutional impediment. Id. at 184. The effect of the amendments to OCGA § 35-3-37 is to expand the right 5 of individuals to restrict access to their criminal history record information and, concomitantly, to limit the right of the general public to gain access to such information....
...The only right that has been impaired in any way is the public’s right to access information. Because such a right is a public right, incapable of vesting in any particular person, the modification of this right poses no constitutional problem. See Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. at 184. The amended version of OCGA § 35-3-37 thus both is intended to apply and properly can be applied to Lowe’s record restriction request. 3. The amended statute, in pertinent part, provides for restriction where, after indictment or accusation, “all charges were dismissed or nolle prossed.” OCGA § 35-3-37 (h) (2) (A)....
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Meinken v. Burgess, 426 S.E.2d 876 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 1993 | 262 Ga. 863, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 1165

...Thomas Morgan III, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellees. SEARS-COLLINS, Justice. We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that a person with an incomplete arrest record can never have his arrest record expunged under OCGA § 35-3-37 (c) but instead can only have his arrest record supplemented....
...Meinken *864 was thus acquitted by operation of law. OCGA § 17-7-170 (b). Meinken then requested the DeKalb County Police Department and the Chief of Police of DeKalb County to expunge his arrest record. After they declined to do so, Meinken appealed to superior court. OCGA § 35-3-37 (c). The trial court found that Meinken's arrest record was "inaccurate and misleading in that it does not reflect the disposition with this case," and therefore ordered that Meinken's arrest record be expunged. OCGA § 35-3-37 (c)....
...The Court reversed on the ground that the remedy of expungement is only available when an arrest record is inaccurate. Burgess, supra, 204 Ga. App. at 601-602. We then granted certiorari to determine whether that holding is correct. We conclude that it is not. 1. OCGA § 35-3-37 (c) provides that [i]f an individual believes his criminal records to be inaccurate or incomplete, he may request the original agency having custody or control of the detail records to purge, modify, or supplement them and to notify the [Georgia Crime Information Center] of such changes....
...Gary Meinken's criminal record accurately reflects that he was arrested and charged with two counts of molesting his three-year-old daughter. Meinken's record fails to reflect that he was subsequently acquitted, an incompleteness which is subject to remedy under OCGA § 35-3-37 (c) by the supplementation of his record....
...is arrest is accurate, the reason for his arrest was the result of alleged impropriety by a police officer in leading Kelly Meinken into naming her father as her molester. Hence, Meinken claims his criminal record should be expunged pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (c) because he would not even have a criminal arrest record but for the alleged impropriety. The majority, citing foreign authorities to support extending OCGA § 35-3-37 (c) far beyond its plain language, holds that remand to the trial court is necessary in order for the court to determine whether "there was any foundation whatsoever for Meinken's arrest." I disagree....
...as unable to talk about the alleged molestation within the months following Meinken's demand for a speedy trial. This is not the case to determine whether a factually "accurate" record can be deemed "inaccurate" requiring expunction pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (c) because of constitutional violations or misconduct by police or prosecution....
...Meinken, 204 Ga. App. 600 (420 SE2d 329) (1992). The undisputed pertinent facts are that the appellant was arrested, indicted and was acquitted. The records sought by appellant to be expunged did not reflect the acquittal. In a de novo hearing under OCGA § 35-3-37 (c), the trial judge *869 found "the arrest record is inaccurate and misleading in that it does not reflect the disposition of this case." The trial court ordered the record to be expunged....
...ls to "reflect the disposition" of the case. This is not an "inaccurate" record but rather an "incomplete" record for which the appropriate remedy would be supplementation. [3] To hold otherwise would render meaningless the word "incomplete" in OCGA § 35-3-37....
...he court "may order such relief as it finds to be required by law, " and by requiring "inaccurate, incomplete or misleading ..." records to be " appropriately expunged, modified, or supplemented by an explanatory notation." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 35-3-37 (c)....
...exact." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary; and The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2nd ed. While arguably "inaccurate" could include "incomplete," it should not be so construed where the word "incomplete" also appears in the same clause of the same statute. [4] OCGA § 35-3-37 (c): The court shall conduct a de novo hearing and may order such relief as it finds to be required by law....
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Clark v. State, 912 S.E.2d 593 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 2 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 18, 2025 | 321 Ga. 35

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Doe v. State, 811 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 5, 2018

HINES, Chief Justice. This is a "John Doe" appeal from the denial of a motion to seal the records of a criminal case pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (m)1 , which appeal was originally filed in the Court of Appeals....
...o OCGA § 16-13-2 (a),2 a conditional discharge provision. Doe *415was discharged under such provision and his sentence terminated in January 2008. In December 2013, Doe filed a motion to seal the record of his criminal case, in accordance with OCGA § 35-3-37 (m)....
...d as untimely, but following a motion for reconsideration by Doe, the Court of Appeals reinstated the appeal. In response in the Court of Appeals to the merits of the appeal, the State raised for the first time that OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12) and OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) as applied in this case violate the separation of powers clause of the Georgia Constitution as found in Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III.4 It maintained that, [i]n OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12), the legislature confers appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals for all decisions under OCGA § 35-3-37. However, OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12), as applied to rulings under OCGA § 35-3-37(m), and OCGA § 35-3-37(m), itself , violate the separation of powers clause of the Georgia Constitution....
...(Emphasis supplied.) It argued then and does now that there is conflict with Uniform Superior Court Rule 21 ("USCR 21"),5 which provides a procedure for limiting access to court records that are otherwise public records,6 and that inasmuch as OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) establishes a different procedure from that found in USCR 21, OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) represents "an impermissible intrusion" on the part of the General Assembly into the administrative record-keeping authority of this Court as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution of 1983.7 The State concludes that because "the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute is wholly void and of no force and effect from the date it was enacted, ... OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) is void and OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12) does not apply." *416Jurisdiction of the Appeal Certainly, this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases in which the constitutionality of a law has been drawn into question....
...This is so "because the statute of appellate procedure comes into play only when an adverse ruling below is obtained and the dissatisfied party determines to pursue an appeal." Id. at 832-833 (1), 686 S.E.2d 635. As noted, the gravamen of the State's challenge is that OCGA § 35-3-37 (m), which is the basis for Doe's action in the trial court, runs afoul of, inter alia, USCR 21 and thereby provides for unauthorized and unconstitutional procedures and standards for a trial court to seal or unseal an individual's criminal record....
...But, the State has not made a separate and discrete constitutional challenge, either facial or as applied, to OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12) ; its constitutional attack on the jurisdictional statute is inextricably bound with and entirely dependent upon a threshold determination by this Court that OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) is unconstitutional. And, the State has forfeited its present constitutional challenge to OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) by failing to raise it and secure a ruling below; it cannot circumvent such requirements by its invocation of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12). Simply, this appeal of the denial of a motion to seal criminal history record information fails to present a viable challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. Consequently, it is properly before the Court of Appeals. Appeal returned to the Court of Appeals. All the Justices concur. OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) provides: (1) For criminal history record information maintained by the clerk of court, an individual who has a record restricted pursuant to this Code section may petition the court with original jurisdiction over the charges in the...
...owing judgments and rulings of the superior courts, the constitutional city courts, and such other courts or tribunals from which appeals are authorized by the Constitution and laws of this state: ... All judgments or orders entered pursuant to Code Section 35-3-37. Ga....

Doe v. State (Ga. 2018).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 5, 2018

...Decided: March 5, 2018 S17A1694. DOE v. THE STATE. HINES, Chief Justice. This is a “John Doe” appeal from the denial of a motion to seal the records of a criminal case pursuant to OCGA § 35-3-37 (m)1, which appeal was 1 OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) provides: (1) For criminal history record information maintained by the clerk of court, an individual who has a record restricted pursuant to this Code section may petition the court with original jurisdiction over the...
...ent of guilt 2 was discharged under such provision and his sentence terminated in January 2008. In December 2013, Doe filed a motion to seal the record of his criminal case, in accordance with OCGA § 35-3-37 (m)....
...mely, but following a motion for reconsideration by Doe, the Court of Appeals reinstated the appeal. In response in the Court of Appeals to the merits of the appeal, the State raised for the first time that OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12) and OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) as applied in this case violate the separation of powers clause of the Georgia Constitution as found in Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III.4 It maintained that, [i]n OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12), the legislature confers appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals for all decisions under OCGA § 35-3-37. However, OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12), as applied to rulings under OCGA § 35-3-37(m), and OCGA § 35-3-37(m), itself, violate the separation of powers clause of the Georgia Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.) 3 OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12) provides: Appeals may be taken to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appea...
...judgments and rulings of the superior courts, the constitutional city courts, and such other courts or tribunals from which appeals are authorized by the Constitution and laws of this state: . . . All judgments or orders entered pursuant to Code Section 35-3-37. 4 Ga....
...4 It argued then and does now that there is conflict with Uniform Superior Court Rule 21 (“USCR 21"),5 which provides a procedure for limiting access to court records that are otherwise public records,6 and that inasmuch as OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) establishes a different procedure from that found in USCR 21, OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) represents “an impermissible intrusion” on the part of the General Assembly into the administrative record-keeping authority of this Court as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution of 1983.7 The State concludes that because “the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute is wholly void and of no force and effect from the date it was enacted, . . . OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) is void and OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12) does not apply.” 5 USCR 21 provides: All court records are public and are to be available for public inspection unless public access is limited by law or by the pr...
...This is so “because the statute of appellate procedure comes into play only when an adverse ruling below is obtained and the dissatisfied party determines to pursue an appeal.” Id. at 832- 833 (1). As noted, the gravamen of the State’s challenge is that OCGA § 35-3-37 (m), which is the basis for Doe’s action in the trial court, runs afoul of, inter alia, USCR 21 and thereby provides for unauthorized and unconstitutional procedures and standards for a trial court to seal or unseal an individual’s criminal record....
...But, the State has not made a separate and discrete constitutional challenge, either facial or as applied, to OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12); its constitutional attack on the jurisdictional statute is inextricably bound with and entirely dependent upon a threshold determination by this Court that OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) is unconstitutional. And, the State has forfeited its present constitutional challenge to OCGA § 35-3-37 (m) by failing to raise it and secure a ruling below; it cannot circumvent such requirements by its invocation of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (12). Simply, this appeal of the denial of a motion to seal criminal history record information fails to present a viable challenge to the constitutionality of a statute....